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Prologue:
Weimar Society
in Retrospect
GUNTER W. REMMLING

The social system of Heimar Germany has always been controversial.
From the start 1leimar society was c;laracterized by a peculiar
fluidity: between 1913 and 1933, the German Reich, commonly
referred to as the \Veimar Republic, v1as a virtual laboratory of
sociocultural experimentation. In the streets of German ·towns
and cities, political armies competed for followers--a orocess
punctuated by assassinations and advertised by street battles
embroiling monarchists, imperial militarists, nihilistic war
veterans, Communists, Socialists, anarchists, and National
Socialists. Parliamentary activity involved about twenty-five
political parties whose shifting alliances produced twenty
governmental cabinets with an average lifespan of less than
nine months. The political circus performed in an economic crazy
house: the hungry post\var years skidded into an inflationary
period during which the German mark--valued before the war at
4.2 per dollar--plummeted to the value of 4.2 billioa to the
dollar. At this point, in November 1923, individuals paid a
billion marks to send a letter abroad and the German Republic
verged on complete financial bankruptcy and political
disintegration.
An era of political and econouic reconstruction began in 1924;
by 1929 Germany had become the leading industrial power on the
European continent. The Great DeDression, announced by the
crash of the New York Stock Sxchange in October 1929, brought
the ~eimar Republic to the brink of disaster: by the end of
1932, nearly half of the German labor force was unemployed.
Hany jobless men provoked arrest, seeking shelter and food in
prison, others swelled the ranks of the Red Front and, ominously,
those of l!itler's Storm Troops. In his propaganda the budding
dictator exploited the additional economic problern of
reparations payments to the ~estern Allies which the Young
Garnmittee had finally set in such a way that the actual payments,
including interest, were to total approximately 29 billion

4

Towards the Holocaust

dollars from 1923 to 1938.
The Weimar Republic was also a whirling carousel of personal
experimentation with differing life-styles. Guitar-playing,
poetry-reading, free-loving youngsters roamed the country giving
expression to the antibourgeois sentiments of the youth movement;
nudist colanies flourished; in Berlin nightclubs phallic symbols
became part of interior decoration, naked girls swang from the
ceiling, and the staged performance of the sexual act was
incorporated in the routine of show business; prostitutes and
transvestites took their place in the street scene along with
proselytizers for exotic cults.
The controversial character of \Jeimar Germany found its most
intense expression in political conflict. Rightists and ~azis
attacked the Weimar Republic as the product of sinister
machinations; as a no-man's-land conjured up by the traitorous
hands of a cowardly and servile gang: "the November criminals."
Leftists and Communists worked against the new German Reich, which
they denounced as an unholy alliance against the workers--the
founders of the Republic, they claimed, had betrayed the
proletarian revolution.
Many sober and respected citizens experienced ~leimar Germany as
a necessary evil and turned ~nft~ep_~~likaner--rational
republicans.
The Social Democrats and many liberals worked hard to launch and
navigate the new ship of state. Some progressive intellectuals
and artists hailed the \veimar Republic as a new golden age, and
their enthusiasm was not unfounded. In Weimar Germany,
intellectual and artistic innovations transformed science,
philosophy, literature, music, painting, the theater, movies,
and architecture into irnages expressing the dawn of a new
consciousness. After the collapse of the Republic, political
refugees carried the productive spirit of lleimar culture into
the four corners of the world, merging it with the creative
mainstream that aroused the awareness of people in the twentieth
century. The creative process of Weimar culture is rich in
conspicuous examples such as expressionist painting, atonal
music, Brechtian theater, Einsteinian physics, and revolutionized
visual experiences commonly associated with the Bauhaus. But
while cosmopolitan audiences cheereJ successive opening nights,
exhibitions, and first editions, conservatives and, increasingly,
Nazis, reassured the provincial masses with warmed-over portians
of traditional beer-and-sauerkraut culture (see Tilton).
Special political interests as well as past and present controversy
have shrouded \veimar Germany in the swirling mis ts of his tory
and often the contemporary interpreter feels reminded of the
blurred outlines of that "ghostly freighter" Lotte Lenya used
to sing about in The Thre~~~~~Opera.
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But one stark fact rises clearly above the shifting fogs which
glide across the historical landscape: Weimar Germany became
the demoniacal creator of the monster Nazism.
Nazi mass murder and other manifestations of genocide in the
twentieth century have given a special urgency to analyses
which pursue anti-Semitism and those frightening changes in
political climate that led to the ash-darkened sky over Holocaust
Germany (see Kren and Rappoport). Weimar society bubbled to
the surface in the crucible of war and revolution. The German
revolution followed in the wake of the military catastrophes
triggered by the Allied offensives of July and August 1918. By
October, Kaiser William II and the German High Command were
sufficiently unnerved to allow the formation of a parliamentary
government and to prompt its chancellor, the liberal Prince Max
of Baden, to request President Woodrow Wilson to take steps for
the restoration of peace. The half-hearted maneuverings of the
German leaders and the Allied desire for Germany's total defeat
prolonged the privations of the war, and in late October and early
November sailors of the imperial fleet at Kiel mutinied to prevent
a suicidal engagement with the English. By November 4, all
German battleships flew the red flag and disgorged armed sailors
who spread the revolution from ports to other cities. The
soldiers who were sent against the mutineers refused to take
action, and many of them joined the revolt (see Tobin). On
the morning of November 9, Berlin was in revolutionary turmoil:
crowds of workers and soldiers had transformed the Reichstag
into an armed camp; Karl Liebknecht, the Spartaeist leader,
prepared to proclaim a soviet republic from the balcony of the
imperial castle; Philipp Scheidemann, a leader of the Majority
Socialists, countered this move by proclaiming the German
Republic from a window of the Reichstag; Prince Max handed over the
office of chancellor to the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert. On
the following day, William II fled across the German border to
Holland, and at 5:00 A.M. on the morning of November 11, 1918,
four reluctant German delegates signed the armistice.
On the day of the kaiser's departure, the Berlin convention of
the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets voted to support Ebert's
11
social republic. 11 On November 10, as well, Ebert was informed
by General Wilhelm Grtlner that he could count on the collaboration
of the Supreme Military Command. A disgusted Liebknecht denied
his support, but the Independent Socialists joined with the
Majority Socialists to create a cabinet. The provisional German
government, which commenced its activities as the 11 Council of
People 1 s Representatives, 11 lost the cooperation ·Of the
Independent Socialists after Ebert had ordered troops to Berlin
on December 24 for an unsuccessful attempt to clear the palace of
revolutionary 11 people 1 s sailors. 11
Ebert's Majority Socialists began to long for a return to law
and order by means of a national assembly, elected not only by
Socialists, but by the entire population; elections for a
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constituent assembly were fixed for January 19, 1919 . When Ebert
tried to dismiss the president of Berlin's police, the Independent
Socialist Emil Eichhorn, the Communists joined the Independent
Socialists in the manifesto of January 5, 1919, calling upon the
German proletariat to stage a great mass demonstration agairrst
the government of Ebert and Scheidemann. These developments
unleashed the Spartacus Rebellion, which transformed the German
capital and other cities into battle zones where radical
Independent Socialists and Communists fought agairrst the supporters
of the Ebert government . Ebert appointed the former basket
weaver and trade union leader Gustav Noske as Supreme Commander
of a volunteer corps . Led by bloodthirsty career officers of the
old imperial army, Noske's troops entered the center of Berlin
on January 11. The Spartaeist strongholds succumbed to heavy
fire, and by January 15, the volunteers of "bloodhound" Noske
had cleared the last snipers from Berlin. The same day the
Spratacist leaders Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and Wilhelm
Pieck were arrested and beaten by staff members of the GardeKavallerie-Schlltzendivision. Liebknecht was murdered b-y---KapitHnleutnant von Pflugk-Hartung; Luxemburg was gunned down by
Leutnant Vogel; Pieck survived to participate in the affairs of
the Weimar Republic as a Communist delegate. He returned to
Germany from his Hoscow exile in 1945 and became president of
the German Democratic Republic in 1949.
The murder of Rosa
anti-Semites hated
but above all as a
occupied a special

Luxemburg is of special importance: German
her not only as a professional revolutionary,
representative of the East European J ews who
place in anti-Semitic demonology (see Aschheim).

The elections for a national constituent assembly were held, as
scheduled, on January 19, and on February 6 the national assembly
met at Weimar, the city of Goethe. On February 11, Ebert was
elected president of the Reich that was commonly called the
Weimar Republic. The next day Scheidemann formed a coalition
government made up of Social Democrats, the Catholic Center, and
the Democrats. After approving Scheidemann's cabinet, the assembly
began drafting a new constitution, which was adopted on July 31
and signed on August 11, 1919 .
Ebert's alliance with the High Command of the old army had cleared
the way for a democratic republic; but in fighting the extreme
Left, the new government bent so far to the Right that it became
an accomplice to the defeat of the social revolution . The Weimar
coalition neither achieved public control over Germany's
reactionary, monopolistic industrialists, nor did it succeed in
breaking up the huge landed estates that were the power bases
of feudal-minded agrarian overlords. From the beginning, therefore,
the democratic leaders of Weimar Germany had sealed their own
doom: their actions preserved the economic arrangements and
military values of imperial Germany, leaving excessive power in
the hands of cartel bosses and Junkers, who hated the Republic
and worked for the return ·of an authoritarian regime . Many
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workers, disappointed by the failure of social reform,
strengtherred the left-wing opposition of Independent Socialists
and Communists who attacked the Social Democratic party and the
Republic from the other corner of the ring. In growing numbers,
discouraged bourgeois liberals withdrew into a world of fantasy,
where they dreamed of vague and irrational verities. Their
ill-defined concerns with the German horneland and German youth
tied many Weimar liberals to exponents of neoconservatism, antiSemitism, and the radical right (see Pois) , Bourgeois feminism
as well failed to challenge the class structure of German society
and became an ally of groups working for the preservation of
inequality and social injustice (see Bridenthal).
The year 1920 marks both the beginning of full-scale Rightist
Counter-revolution and the last successful demonstration of
working-class solidarity , In March 1920, a rightist conspiracy,
headed by the self-proclaimed "Reich Chancellor" Wolfgang Kapp
and supported by the rebellious troops of the Ehrhardt Brigade,
a Freikorps unit, assumed power in Berlin for a few days , The
Kapp Putsch was defeated by the refusal of the higher civil
servants to collaborate with the rebel government and by the
crippling blow of a general strike called by the Social Democratic
party and carried out by all labor unions.
German labor failed to reap the benefits of its success in the
Kapp Putsch; the Socialist parties refused to cooperate with
the victorious trade-union leaders, who called for the
establishment of a labor government as the unified expression of
the will of the entire working class. The rebuffed trade unians
accepted the return of the ineffectual Weimar coalition, and
thus began their disastraus policy of compromising with the
ruling groups , While the workers' leaders permitted organized
labor to skid to a secondary power position, General Hans von
Seeckt, chief of the army command, used all his cunning to build
the army into a state within the state. From then on it was not
the life-giving strength of productive labor (see Grossmann),
but the death-oriented power of the army that was to exercise
the decisive force in the Republic.
At the end of June 1920, the Social Democrats lost their dominant
position in Germany; the Weimar coalition was replaced by the new
combination of the Center, the Democrats, and the German People's
party , The parlimentary delegation of the German People's party
was led by Gustav Stresemann, who contributed signally to the
further development of Weimar Germany as a bourgeois-capitalist
democracy. From August 1923 to November 1923, Stresemann held
the offices of chancellor and foreign minister; afterwards-until his death in 1929--he acted as foreign minister.
Stresemann began his political career in the Republic under
difficult circumstances , The population was ernbittered by the
severe demands of the Treaty of Versailles, which had become
effective in January 1920. Public dissatisfaction was deepened
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by Allied insistence on reparations payments, more than six
billion gold marks annually for forty-two years, and by the French
and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, in
retaliation against technical German defaults on reparation
obligations in the delivery of timber. People were unnerved by
the steady deterioration of the value of German currency and
the subsequent inflation which culminated on November 20, 1923.
Stresemann's patient negotiations and careful policies of
stabilization averted the warst consequences of these developments;
he called off the passive resistance against French occupation
forces and ordered the resumption of work and reparation payments o
On November 20, 1923, a new currency, covered by a mortgage on
Germany's entire agricultural and industrial resources, ended
the inflation; in 1924, the Dawes Plan reduced annual reparation
payments and provided the German government with an international
loan of 200 million dollars. Strengthened by the Dawes Plan,
the German economy began its remarkable recovery.
During these years of crisis and slow recovery, the rightist
opponents of the Republic missed no opportunity to strengthen
their position; free from the responsibilities of government,
they peddled cheap and unrealistic slogans designed to incite
chauvinistic emotions among the voters. Undaunted by the
miserable Kapp Putsch, right-wing conspiracies, such as
Organization Consul, elevated murder to an expression of patriotism;
many republican leaders fell victim to Fememord. On August 26,
1921, Matthias Erzherger (see Hunt), Catholic Center politician
and chief signer of the armistice, was gunned down in the Black
Forest; on June 24, 1922, Walter Rathenau, Jewish industrialist
and foreign minister, was attacked with guns and hand grenades in
suburban Berlin-Gr~newald o Rathenau's death motivated Chancellor
Josef Wirth to give a Reichstag speech in which he announced that
the "enemy stands on the right." Despite mass demonstrations and
measures such as the Law for the Protection of the Republic,
assassination remained a favored mode of Rightist policies o
Ominously, the courts of law developed a tendency to show
incredible leniency toward rightist terrorists, while severely
punishing even minor infractions on the part of leftist
individuals o Indicative of this tendency was Hitler's brief and
comfortable stay at Landsberg prison--a virtual sabbatical for
subversives--which was the only consequence of his Beer-Hall
Putsch of 1923.
The professional army of Weimar Germany did not fail to turn
republican problems and achievements to the advantage of antirepublican militarists. The economically significant treaty of
friendship that was signed between the Soviet Union and Germany
on April 16, 1922, at Rapallo provided the chance for military
activities in Russia, which the Treaty of Versailles had
withheld from the volunteer army that the Allies had limited to
100,000 men. In 1920 the army delighted in putting down the
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workers' revolt in the Ruhr; in 1923, the army again made itself
"useful" by suppressing attempted Cornrnunist coups in the workingclass strongholds of Saxony and Thuringia.
For the Germans the year 1925 brought prosperity and further
international reconciliation; on the front of internal politics
the year spelled disaster. The Dawes Plan of 1924 bad initiated a
flow of foreign investments and short-term loans to Germany o
This stimulated a wave of modernization affecting large portians
of the country's industrial apparatus. Rising production and
wages were accompanied by decreasing unemployment and by the
end of 1928 Gerrnany bad become the leading industrial power in
Contineutal Europe.
The internal political disaster began on February 28, 1925, when
Friedrich Ebert, president of the Republic, died at the age of
fifty-four. On Harch 29, 1925, the Germans went to the polls to
elect a new president, but, as could be expected, not one of the
seven candidates achieved the required majority on the first
ballot. For the second round of voting, the republican groups
supported Wilhelm Marx of the Center party as the single
candidate of the Volksblock; the German Nationalists rallied
the forces of the Right around the retired Field Marshal Paul
von Hindenburg, and their major. s~okesman, Admiral Alfred von
Tirpitz, persuaded the seventy-seven-year-old Junker to run; the
Cornrnunists renominated their own candidate, party chairman Ernst
ThHlmann. By the slim margin of 904,151 votes, the elections
of April 26, 1925, gave Hindenburg the simple plurality which the
law required for a second-ballot victory. The self~professed
monarebist Hindenburg received 14.6 million votes, while 13.7
million votes went to Marx, supporter of the Republic. ThHlmann
received the crucial 1.9 million votes which withdrew strength
from the republican forces and ironically helped the Rightist
cause by making possible the election of a man who personified
Prussian militarism, German nationalism, and agrarian Junker
conservatism. Kurt Tucholsky, one of the company of left-wing
intellectuals associated with the radical, but independent
Berlin journal WeltbUhne, rernarked after the election of
Hindenburg that the Germans now bad a "republic until further
notice."

This "notice" was not given until 1930, and for five years
parliamentary principles continued to govern the political life
of the German Reich. The period from 1925 to 1928 was not only a
time of prosperi ty, it was also the core of the "Stresernann
era," which some like to identify as those "golden twenties."
While Stresernann acted as foreign minister he signed three major
treaties on behalf of Germany, contributing to the development
of an era of international good will. The L9carno Pact, signed on
October 16, 1925, guaranteed the status quo of Gerrnany's western
frontiers, reaffirming in particular the German renunciation of
Alsace-Lorraine. In response, the Allies began to wi.thclraw their

10

Towards the Holocaust

military units from the Cologne zone of the occupied Rhineland;
on September 3, 1926, Germany was admitted to the League of
Nations with a permanent seat on the council. On April 24, 1926,
Stresemann signed the Berlin Pact, extending the original Rapallo
agreement with the Soviet Union; the new Russo-German agreement
calmed Soviet fears with regard to German complicity in an
anti-Soviet bloc, but renewed suspicion of Germany in most other
European nations. On August 27, 192ß, Stresemann signed the
Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war and was warmly received by the
Parisians.
The sincerity of Stresemann's intentions has been questioned by
historians, and the problern of his political morality may never
be satisfactorily resolved. His policies of international
reconciliation, however, combined with economic prosperity to
create a period of relative stabilization. In the 1928 elections
to the Reichstag, voting practices indicated strong popular
support for the original design of the Republic: approximately
65 percent of the ballot went to political parties that were
loyal to the Weimar constitution; the Communists received 11
percent of the votes; right-wing parties picked up less than
25 percent, and among them the Nazi party received no more than
3 percent of the valid votes.
The Social Democrats, who had received 30 percent of the ballot,
supported Stresemann's foreign policy, but opposed the strong
influence that industrialists and businessmen exerted on the
government. Especially ominous was the consolidation of
monopoly capitalism, which gave far-reaching power to such
gigantic trusts as I. G. Farben, Siemens, and Vereinigte Stahlwerke.
The right-wing Nationalists, who had received 14 percent of the
vote in 1923, fought violently and vociferously against
international reconcil~ation. The Communists remained suspicious
of Stresemann's policies and attacked what they considered his
plotting agains t the Sovie t Union; tvhen Germany entered the
League of Nations, they denounced this move as an anti-Soviet
alliance between German capitalists and an international
"consortium of imperialist bandits."
In 1929 Germany's prosperous economic development came to a
grinding halt. The Great Depression brought the German Reich
close to economic collapse: by the end of 1932, almost half of
Germany's labor forcewas jobless • .In the Reichstag elections
of May 1928, the Nazis had received a mere 3 percent of valid
votes, but in July 1932, 37 percent of the ballot went to the Nazi
party. Hitler's propaganda campaign--financed by big industrialists
and bankers (see Kllhnl)--exploited the additional economic
problern of reparations payments to the Western Allies, totaling
about 29 billion dollars payable until 193ß.
The depression brought the beginning of the end for parliamentary
government: on March 27, 1930, Weimar Germany's last Great
Coalition broke up with the resignation of the !1llller cabinet.
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The government of Social Democrarie Chancellor Hermann HUller
collapsed because of its inability to settle a dispute between
the Social Democrars and the People's party concerning the
elimination of a serious deficit in the unemployment fund. The
business-oriented People's party called for a cut in unemployment
benefits, while the Social Democrars demanded new taxes on
business. The crisis provided Hindenburg and General Kurt von
Schleicher, head of the ministerial office in the ministry of
defense, with the long-awaited opportunity for authoritarian
government.
On March 23, 1930, President Hindenburg asked Heinrich BrUning,
parliamentary leader of the Catholic Center party, to form a
cabinet without firm party ties; two days later he appointed
BrUning chancellor. The new government was weighted to the right
and included no Social Democrars (see Breitman). BrUning's
deflationary policy and program of economic retrenchment found
insufficient parliamentary support, and his unpopular measures
were carried out by means of the president's ernergency powers
under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution . From the beginning
Social Democrat Rudolf Breitscheid implored the government not
to use Article 43: its employment, he warned, could only lead
into the darkness of dictatorship.
These developments encouraged Hindenburg to drop all democratic
pretenses and to show hirnself for what he was--a treacherous,
reactionary Junker . The eighty-four-year-old president withdrew
his support from Brlining, forcing his resignation on May 30;
then Hindenburg sided openly with the large landowners and
industrial magnates against the Social Democrarie working
masses that had supported him against the presidential candidates,
Hitler and Th~lmann, thereby making possible the old field
marshal's reelection on April 10, 1932. llindenburg's betrayal of
the democratic forces sealed the fate of the doomed Republic,
which became subject to the dangeraus crosscurrents of partisan
interests represented by generals, cartel bosses, and EastElbian landlords, who shared an appreciation of the Nazis as an
ill-mannered, but highly useful force counterbalancing the
Socialist and Communist hordes. General von Schleicher confided
in a letter: "Indeed, if the Nazis did not exist , we should
have had to invent them." Under Schleicher's influence Hindenburg
appointed Franz von Papen as chancellor on May 31, 1932; this
ambitious Catholic aristocrat confronted the people with his
"cabinet of barons," a government consisting of military leaders,
industrialists, and Junkers .· Papen's nonparty government had no
popular Support, but survived until November 1932, propped up by
the president and the army (see H~rster-Philipps).
In 1932 German jails were crowded with close to nine thousand
Leftist political prisoners. In the basements of their
headquarters, the Nazis tortured their enemies to death; in the
streets, Communists and Nazis fought pitched battles. Following
the advice of his minister of defense, General von Schleicher,
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Papen lif.ted the ban that BrUning's government had imposed on the
Nazi SA (Sturmabteilung) and SS (Schutzstaffeln). Hitler was
given a free hand, and the Reichstag elections of July 31, 1932,
resulted in a triumph for "Adolf Legalite," whose party became
the largest in the country, polling over 13,700,000 votes with
230 seats in the Reichstag (see Stachura).
The Weimar Republic came to an end in the Byzantine power games
which Papen, Schleicher, and Hitler played against a deadlocked
parliament (see Petzina). The November elections of 1932 reduced
the Nazi seats in the Reichstag to 196; only the Communists
registered significant gains, polling close to six million votes
with one hundred seats. The Social Democrats retained 121 seats,
but deep-rooted programmatic differences between the two Marxist
parties, as well as mutual blindness to the lethal nature of
Nazi power, prevented the formation of a leftist coalition
government (see Geary). These differences would not interest the
SS concentration camp guards, who would later murder Communists
and Socialists side by side.
Alarmed by the increase in the Communist vote and Hitler's drive
for power, Schleicher forced Papen's resignation and took over
the office of chancellor. On December 3, 1932, Schleicher's
government began to operate in the hope of dividing the opposition
on both the right and the left. Schleicher planned to reduce the
Nazi threat by bringing Gregor Strasser's "left wing" into his
regime; he also intended to pacify the Social Democrats by
inviting the participation of trade-union leaders. aitler
immediately reacted by removing Strasser from the office of party
secretary; later, in the Nazi blood purge of June 1934, he had
Gregor Strasser murdered, along with Schleicher (see Nagle).
The leaders of ti1e Social Democratic party opposed any form of
cooperation with Schleicher, and by January 6, 1933, they had
succeeded in cutting all connections between organized labor and
the chancellor.
On January 23, 1933, Schleicher admitted to Hindenburg that his
strategy of forming a parliamentary majority had failed; he
asked the president for an order dissolving the Reichstag linked
with an indefinite and, therefore, unconstitutional postpanerneut
of the prescribed new elections. Hindenburg refused Schleicher's
request, trusting in the success of secret negotiations involving
Papen, rightist leaders, and the detested, but unavoidable Hitler.
On January 23, Schleicher and his entire cabinet resigned and
Hindenburg asked Papen to "clarify" the political situation.
The nineteen Weimar governments were not noted for longevity:
the average life span of a cabinet was less than nine months.
With a duration of twenty-one months the Great Coalition of 1928
had survived the langest; with a duration of fifty-four days
Schleicher's government was short-lived even by the standards
of the Republic.
Papen wasted no time; with the Support of Oskar von Hindenburg
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and Otto Meissner he persuaded President Hindenburg to do what
the old field marshal had so far considered inconceivable, namely,
to appoint the "Austrian corporal," Adolf Hitler, chancellor of
Germany. Hitler and the members of his proposed cabinet, which
included von Papen as vice-chancellor, received their commissions
from Hindenburg on the morning of January 30, 1933. On the
evening of this demonie Monday, a confused eighty-five-year-old
German president and an ecstatic Hitler gazed down on the stream
of Nazi battalions, marehing with flaming torches through the
Wilhelmstrasse.
\leimar society was dead. Germany sank into a darkness from the
depth of which there soon emerged a ceaseless stream of political
refugees.
The proscription of creative activity formed part of the
immediate program of Nazi oppression. Shortly after their
assumption of power, the Nazis erdered the Berlin newspaper Die
Nachtausgabe to publish a "first !ist" of forbidden authors. The
black !ist, which appeared on April 23, 1933, outlawed all major
writers including such \Veimar luminaries .as Bertolt Brecht, l1ax
Brod, Alfred DHblin, Lion Feuchtwanger, Egon Erwin Kisch,
Heinrich Mann, Themas Mann, Theodor Plievier, Erich Maria Remarque,
Arthur Schnitzler, Ernst Toller, Xurt Tucholsky, Arnold Zweig,
and Stefan Zweig . This first !ist was followed by others, and
soon literate Germans realized that nearly eight hundred writers
had disappeared from their cultural environment.
The Nazi attack against German culture proceeded on all fronts
of intellectual-artistic creativity and banned all significant
thinkers, composers, sculptors, and painters. Soon intellectuals,
artists, and writers disappeared in Nazi concentration camps where
they were beaten to death along with activist workers and
political enemies of the German dictatorship.
But like the later exhibitions of Entartete Kunst, which were
meant to demonstrate the evils of "degenerate art," the blacklisting of authors alerted the world to the astounding creative
vitality of Weimar culture. People began to realize to what
extent the artistic-intellectual community of Weimar Germany had
contributed to the transformation of science, philosophy,
literature, music, painting, the theater, motion pictures,
and architecture into configurations of images expressing the
dawn of a new consciousness. The Nazi policy of proscription
could not fail to backfire, since it included creative movements
of international renown, such as expressionism, Piscator's
documentary theater, Einsteinian physics, Dadaist photomontage,
the new portraiture, the Dessau Bauhaus, the typographic
revolution, functional design, cqnstructivism, photo~journalism,
Brecht's epic theatre, agitprop, Proletkult, and New Music
(see Meyer).
Weimar Germany's creative avant-garde went abroad.
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kept on working in Paris, London, New York, Chicago, and
throughout the world.
In Germany the new rulers slapped their own art scene tagether
(see Burns). Nazi public art, mass-produced by and for the
media, consisted of sculpture, and architecture that glorified
oppression, armament production, combat, and death. The dictator,
who had once painted postcards during his residence in a Viennese
asylum for vagrants, left the imprint of his taste on paintings.
Nazi exhibits showed archaic provincial genre works. The
creators of Auschwitz had an insatiable appetite for nondescript
nudes, insipid country scenes, and group portraits of simple
people. These hyper-German productions of tenth-rate painters
came complete with absurd and pompaus titles to endow them with
"blood and soil" profundities. Nazi art had a dual function.
The practitioners of this art were ordered to justify degrading
and oppressive social relatio.nships. Nazi artists also had to
spread a tattered veil over the real processes taking place
in Holocaust Germany: police terror, torture, murder,
moronicization of the masses, war planning, genocide, and the
repression and destruction of the Jews.

2
Introduction
MICHAEL N. DOBKOWSKI AND
ISIDOR WALLIMANN

There had been considerable work done on the lleimar period and
the rise of fascism from a variety of perspectives, including
political, cultural, and psychohistorical. Although valuable
and iraportant, many of these perspectives have underemphasized
what we consider to be key elements in an understanding of the
rise of fascism and the collapse of liberal bourgeois democracy
in the lleimar Republic as a prelude to the Holocaust, namely,
factors directly resulting from the socioeconomic (structural)
problems and contradictions of Weimar society. This book attempts
to highlight these factors. In particular, the focus of the essays
collected in this volume has shifted from the political and
constitutional structures of the Republic to the social and
economic determinants of this underlying weakness. Rather than
examining the lleimar Republic j us t as a failed democracy, the
emphasis herein has moved towards examining lleimar Germany as a
developed capitalist society with structural problems which
served to undermine the political system that took shape after
the defeat in the First World War. The picture that emerges
from these essays is that of a republic fatally flawed at the
outset by a failure to effect structural changes which would have
secured a democratic order--of a republic that consequently
was undermined because the bourgeois elements which should have
defended it would not do so, and the working-class and minority
group elements which tried to defend it, could not do so.
Several of the essays dealing with these structural factors are
written from a Marxist perspective, a perspective that has been
relatively little noticed among American scholars writing on the
lleimar period. For that reason, we have included essays from
two ivest German scholars who operate within this tradition.
We have also included essays on ideology and culture because
they demonstrate that ideology generally reflects the structural
dimensions and contradictions of Weimar society. "All myths,"
as Aschheim points out, "if they are to function, must have
some basis, however, tenuous, in social reality."
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Petzina's socioeconomic historical analysis provides the reader
at the outset with a factual background against which certain
political and ideological developments during the Weimar
Republic can be seen. Given the fact that the National Socialist
German \lorkers Party' s (NSDAP) mass support came primarily from
the old and new "middle class," it is important to note that
there had been continuous economic pressure to migrate out of
agriculture, that monopolization and concentration of industry
had been increasing, and that the percentage of self-employed
individuals had been decreasing. It is also important to note
that post-\lorld \lar I inflation was most damaging to members
of the old "middle class" and that, relatively speaking, the
income of the self-employed rose more slowly than that of the
non-self-employed and that the civil servants failed to regain
their pri vileged pre-\lorld War I income level. \lhen the NSDAP
rase to power during the Great Depression, its supporters did
not come, for the most part, from the ranks of the poor or
unemployed workers suffering most from the depression, but came
instead from the ranks of those whose status and economic standing
had become threatened. In many ways, however, their support of
the Hazi movement was in vain since, despite the NSDAP's promise
to economically save the middle class, relatively more individuals
lost their self-employed status during Nazi rule than did during
the lleimar Republic.
Internationally speaking, Germany, despite having an industrial
potential second only to that of the United States, lagged behind
other nations in its ability to increase industrial output
relative to pre-World War I levels • . The years of the Weimar
Republic were characterized by economic stagnation, while rnany
other countries were increasing their industrial output during
the same period. However, Petzina maintains that this anomalaus
Situation was not caused by war reparation payments, which in
his view had, if anything, a stimulating effect since they were
tied to a loan program. All things considered, more capital
was flowing into Gerrnany during this time than was flowing out
of Gerrnany.
Petzina focuses on socioeconomic develo;nnents dur:i_np, the lleimar
Republic and how they affected various segments of the population.
With this approach, he points to the structural processes and
bottlenecks that tended to induce certain groups to Support the
NSDAP. Tilton also uses this type of analysis in his essay,
which deals specifically with reasons for the NSDAP's strong
rural appeal. Both Petzina's and Tilton's macrostructural
analysis is supplemented by Nagle's study investigating the
socioeconomic background of NSDAP deputies to the Reichstag, thus
providing a more detailed insight into the nature of the NSDAP's
mass support.
Kllhnl recognizes the domestic political conditions particular to
Weimar Gerrnany that were conducive to the rise of fascism.
However, he particularly focuses on Germany's competitive standing
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relative to other industrialized countries at a time of imperialist
expansion. According to him, fascism in Germany was just as much
a response to a particular international situation as it was a
response to domestic conditions. Klihnl maintains that even
though Germany had achieved an industrial potential surpassing
that of France and Britain, it had no basis for further exoansion.
Thus, the First \lorld War, as well as \vorld War II, represented
Ge rmany's attempts to breakout of this situation, in part by
allying itself with other similarly "disadvantaged" nat:i.ons like
Italy and Japan. Germany strove for and demanded a new distribution
of the world's territories, markets, and resources.
Klihnl's position is based on the observation that any capitalist
economy depends on possibilities for expansion. Germany was
no exception. It too relied upon a capital accumulation rate
that would allow it to maintain or improve its position relative
to other capitalist countries. Since it could not do so
satisfactorily, major segments of big business, (including
banks and landowners) as well as segments of the military and
the top civil servants, had never accepted the defeat during
World \Jar II. They were bent on pursuing a strongly expansionary
course. Within this scheme, the parliamentary democracy of the
\veimar Republic, a result of the worker movement' s November
Revolution of 1913, would have to be abolished in favor of an
authoritarian regime. Under this rubric, an expansionary course
could be pursued more effectively. Authoritarianism, furthermore,
served as a means to maintain or speed up capital accumulation
by robbing the working class of parliamentary mechanisms to
articulate demands and effectuate social and economic changes, and
by increasing possibilities to stifle workers' extraparliamentary
attempts to achieve social change. Fascism then, a particular
form of an authoritarian regime, is, in Klihnl's view, only
possible with the full backing of the ruling class, which
directly depends on capital accumulation if it is to maintain its
economic and political position as a ruling class.
While Klihnl gives us a theoretical framework within which the
persistent push for expansion, increased capital accumulation,
and an authoritarian regime can be understood, I!Urster-Philipps
documents in detail the ways in which the \Jeimar Republic was
undermined and replaced by authoritarian regimes. She shows how
already at an early stage of the \"eimar Republic, big business,
the military, and certain parties were again aiming for an
expansionary course and an authoritarian government.
Although it may be true that fascism generally has not been
observed to exist without the consent and backing of the ruling
class, Germany during the 1930s being no exception, it
nevertheless must be investigated how it was possible for the
NSDAP to gain mass support in addition to ruling class backing.
We know that Nazi supporters were primarily not recruited from
the ranks of the working class or the poor and unemployed but
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from the Mittelstand, whose status and economic position had
become threatened. Numerous other similar structural circumstances,
however, did not result in a faseist mass movement, raising the
question as to whether or not the Nazi party had a specific
strategy enabling it to exploit the structurally caused anxiety
to its fullest.
Did the NSDAP resort to a special technique
which allowed it to mobilize the masses behind its program?
Kllhnl suggests that this was the case. He maintains that the
NSDAP's mass supportwas not due to the party's ideology, which
in many ways was not unlike that of other right~wing, nationalistic, and militantly anti-Communist parties. According to
him, the NSDAP's success in mobilizing the masses lay in the
employment of strategies, like mass rallies and meetings, which
were known to be successful in the worker movement.
Although the NSDAP was highly successful in mobilizing the
Mittelstand and gaining its support, it largely failed to convince
the working class. Except for the cases which Stachura shows to
be exceptions, the NSDAP (upon assuming power) was confronted
with a working-class Opposition that had to be broken with terror
and violence on the one hand and with techniques of seduction
and intensive Supervision on the other. According to Stachura,
it is not the case that the NSDAP was uninterested in receiving
a strong working-class support. Subjectively speaking, its
position was not an antiworking class position, although
objectively speaking its policies were not in the interest of
the working class. Stachura points out that, to a great extent,
the NSDAP's failure must be seen in its inability to circumscribe
what it meant by socialism and to arrive at a concrete socialist
program that, although different from previously existing
programs, would at least be plausible and wirr the support of
workers organized in trade unions, the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) and the German Communist Party (KPD).
Instead, the Nazi
party's radical rhetoric about socialism remairred nothing
but rhetoric.
Stachura maintains that, as a rule, the party
showed little interest in going beyond this level of discourse.
If, however, the Nazis failed to get a strong working-class
endorsement, why ,.;as the working class unable to prevent the
NSDAP from coming to power? Tobirr explores the nature of the
circumstances surrounding the November Revolution of 1913 on
the basis of which certain political trends can be detected
that tended to weaken the German working-class movement in the
lang run.
She suggests that the failure of the SPD leadership
to respond to the rank-and-file demands for democratization of
the military, bureaucracy, and industry led to widespread
disaffection and political defection to the Independent Social
Democratic Party (USPD) and the KPD. Thus, at the beginning
of the Weimar Republic, the working class was split in ways not
necessarily conducive to most effectively resisting
authoritarianism and the faseist movement.
Indeed, as Geary
shows in his essay, resistance agairrst fascism was weakened
as the split between the KPD and SP~ continued and was repeatedly
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reaffimed. However, this was not the only reason why workingclass resistance to the faseist onslaught was quite weak. Geary
mentions tl1at the SPD tended to underestimate the Nazi movement.
Breitman explores this issue further. He shows how the SPD
largely failed to deal with the faseist movement both in theory
and in practice and that the party's perception of the nature of
German fascism was, despite the availability of some competent
left-wing analyses, seriously flawed.
Parallels can be found between the workinß-class movement and
Catholic political organizations insofar as both were very
resiliant to faseist appeals, and both were equally ineffective
in preventing the fascists from assuming power. Once the fascists
were in control, these organizations tended to become rather
passive onlookers. Hunt investigates the role Catholicism played
during the Heimar Republic. Ile demonstrates that the Catholic
population before and during the :Jeimar Republic was structurally
in a marginal position, even while slowly becoming more integrated.
Thus, the Catholics had a serious dilemma. Hanting to become
fully integrated, they could not afford to strongly oppose the
persistent trend towards right-wing authoritarianism and fascism.
The Jev1ish community of Weimar Gemany found itself in a similar
bind. Split between the newly immißrated East European Jews
and Gennarr Jews, it failed to decisively combat, as Aschheim shows,
the anti-Semitic tendencies directed agairrst the Ostjuden.
Rather, while often internalizing these negative attitudes towards
Ostjuden themselves, Jews tended to remain ambivalent and
ineffective in fißhting what, as Aschheim suggests, was the
radical right's prelude to an all-out attack on the entire
Jewish population.
Similarly, a further subject of concern is the role some women
played in supporting the Nazi movement, even when it appeared
to be so overtly misogynist. Bridenthal's study sheds some light
on the dynamics that may have been involved in women's attitudes
towards the NSDAP by analyzinß the long-lasting tug of war
between the middle-class Housewives Union and the Central Union
of Domestic Employees concerning the contractual regulation of
domestic work. She points to the circumstances under which the
Ilousewives Union abandoned its officially nonpolitical stand and
expressed its gratitude to Hitler in 1933 for his interest in a
domestic service year. This was not, however, without cost. It
simultaneously also symbolized the submission of many women to
Nazi notions and policies concerninß the role and rights of
women in society. That these notions and policies were in stark
cantrast to developments during the Ueimar Republic is shown by
Grossmann's study of the sex reform movement and the faseist
response to it in August 1933. She also speaks to the problern
of the internal fractionalization of the left, eventually
effecting the sex reform movement itself.
To this point we have been speaking of the structural aspects of
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Weimar society and how they contributed to the demise of the
republic and the rise of National Socialism on the one hand, and
the failure of the various subgroups--be they political, labor,
religious, or gender--to meet the challenge, on the other. In
the process, we have alluded to the ideological notions held at
the time. At least in some respects, as Burns, Meyer, and Pois
illustrate, the ideology generally reflected the structural
dimensions of Heimar society, although the correspondence may
not have been a perfect one.
Burns, Meyer, and Pois discuss National Socialism as a cultural
phenomenon, not in the liberal or bourgeois sense of culture as
having to do solely with literature, art, film, or music in
isolation from the social, economic, and political developments
in Genaany, but rather culture as an att itude, as a reflec tion
and result of the fissures, crises, and fears in society that are
structurally detenlined. They argue that National Socialism and
the culture that supported it and that it produced was a culture
fueled by a sense of crisis and by an elaborate mythology--a
mythology by which people define ther.1selves and their place in
the world. ßut this mythology connects to reality because it
functions within a social and economic context. Thus there is
a dialectic between people's vision of their place in the
universe as expressed by literature, music, and film and reflections
on t;1e health and func tion of the arts generally and the reali ty
with which they live. These authors remind us of the role of
culture as a barometer of attitudes and social reality and thus
contribute to a i1arxist approach t:1at is based on a dialectic.
National Socialism, having a great talent for mass organization,
they argue, combined politics and aesthetics. Politics and
aesthetics are always combined as long as people think in
stereotypes, as long as ideas of beauty and ugliness, be they
visual, auditory or literary, are so all-embracing in people's
lives that they become political categories. People in Nazi
Germany had very definite ideas of what was beautiful and what
was ugly and, of course, racism made an alliance wit~ beauty
and defined ugliness in its own terms. So in faseist politics,
aesthetics played a very important function because politics was
defined in a totalistic context as subsuming attitudes toward
life.
Nazism put forward a myth--t:1e myth of "bourgeois return," of a
restoration of a happy and healthy world, of a simpler, purer,
more authentic culture, of a new man, the myth of race in
Germany--and t:1en it tried to actualize this myth. It used this
kind of appeal to the vlllkish populist past, but at the same
time it promised a future outside the problems of industrialization,
outside the problems of inflation--in other words, outside the
problems of the day, including unemployment--all the problems
which actually existed. It said that by recapturing a vlllkish
past, Germans will determine a future which is a German future
when every German will get back his individual dignity and sense
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of worth. The notion of a genuine social revolution as we have
seen, was anathema to many Germans, yet they were profoundly
dissatisfied with their world. This tension was exploited by
the Nazis. They played upon this bourgeois fantasy to create a
bourgeois revolution, a revolution of attitude which actually
threatened none of the vested interests of the middle class.
Instead, v!:llkish thought concentrated upon another enemy within.
That is why the Jews and the Jewish question are central. The
Jew stood for modernity in all its destructiveness. It can be
argued (as George Hasse and Pois do) that the attitude toward
the Jew provided much of the cement for this thought and gave it
a dyna~ic it might otherwise have lacked. The Jew, or rather
the stereotype that v!:llkish thoug:1t made of him, is therefore
central to any analysis and understanding of this ideology.
This was appreciated by Theodore W. Adorno, as well, in several
works including his sociological analysis of music, described
by Meyer. Adorno's extended examination of Richard Wagner,
lieyer notes, for example, is crucial for the study of pre-Nazi
fascisra and anti-Semitisra in view o::' the iinportance of \/agner
as perhaps the outs tanding cul tural hero of the Nazis who
captured, in their view, the spirit of v!:llkish Germany in his
music.
However, v!:llkish anti-Semitic ideology is insufficient by itself
to explain Germany's anti-Jewish passion. In most contemporary
analyses of German anti-Semitism in the Weimar and early Nazi
periods, there has been a disturbing separation of the phenomenon
from an analysis of capitalist development, thereby locating the
German-Jewish problern in a structural vacuum, independent from
other economic or social tendencies. There has been much valuable
work done on the role of image, ideology, and myth in the
development of German anti-Semitism. There has not, however,
been sufficient reflection on socioeconomic factors independent
of ethnic, religious, or national characteristics. We know,
for example, from sociological literature, that there is a wellestablished tendency as economic competition increases, whether
it be real or imagined, for ethnic antagonisms to increase if
competition takes place between discernible groups. This is
true for wage-labor, certain economic dependency relationships,
or business competition. Hax I/eber pointed to the antagonisms
which can result if a particular group is identified with a
particular eocnomic activity or position such as debtor or
creditor. Similarly, ethnic antagonism has been observed
between retailers and consumers when the two tended to belang to
different ethnic groups.l Were suc:1 mechanisms, for instance,
also present in the German-Jewish situation? Was the Jewish
community in any way discernible as a competitor of other nonJewish segments of the German society, and could as such be
targeted for political exploitation by a rising Nazi movement?
By 1910, for example, 54.4 percent of Prussian Jewry resided
in cities of 100,000 or ~ore and by 1925 half of German Jewry
lived in t;1e seven major cities of that country in cantrast to
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13 percent of the general population. In 1933, on the eve of the
Holocaust, 70.7 percent of German Jewry, including foreign
Jews, lived in cities of 100,000 or more. The comparable figure
for the general population was 30 percent. The urban setting in
which an urbane, cosmopolitan culture could thrive was thus
highly visible. Peter Gay, who examined that spirit in the Berlin
of the Weimar Republic, characterized it as alienated from soul
and tradition, "rootless, restless," disrespectful of authority,
and distant from the vßlkish ideals.2 It was against this
culture that the Nazi ideologue Hans Rosenberg and others would
rail. IJhat the Nazis despised was what they saw as a contrived,
artificial, non-German culture developed by a minority group
whom they considered merely guests in Germany.
There is a danger in overestimating the impact of a small number
of Jewish thinkers, writers, and artists who became trend
setters. llndoubtedly, most Jews who moved to cities continued
to live parochial, circumscribed and fairly anonymaus lives.
Yet one can note in their hunger for secular education, for
example, a portent of potential intergroup conflict. For the
period of 1859-1860, when Jews were about 1 percent of the
population of Prussia, they composed 6.3 percent of all secondary
students. By 1906 a remarkable 53.9 percent of the potential
Jewish secondary-school population were receiving such an
education, compared to 7.9 percent of the general population.
By 1921 the comparable figures had risen to 60.5 percent and
9.7 percent, respectively. The figures for university education
are even more remarkable. Despite restrictions in Jewish
enrollment, they again emerge as enthusiastic consumers of
secular education, especially in the fields of law, medicine,
philosophy, and the arts. In these faculties Jewish enrollment
was five times as high as that of the general population.
Moreover, despite strong opposition to having Jews hold teaching
posts in tl1e university, 9.4 percent of university positions,
primarily in the lower ranks, were held by Jews in 1374. By
the year 1390, the figure had risen to 12 percent, and by 1920,
to 14 percent. Jews made up approximately 1 percent of the
Germanpopulation during this entire period. By 1331, Berlin's
Jews were already 7.9 percent of the city's lawyers, 11.7 percent
of its doctors, and 3.6 percent of its journalists. The figures
would rise to even more astounding proportians in decades to come.
Table 2.1 summarizes the general outline of the Jewish socioeconomic position in Germany.
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Table 2.1
SOCIAL AHD OCCUPATIONAL POSITION IN 1933
Social Position of
Full-time Employed

All full-time
employed in Germany
(in percentages)

Full-time
employed Jews
(in percentages)

Self-employed

16.4

46 . 0

Employed members of
the family

16.4

9.6

4.G

1.0

12.5

33.5

46.3

3.7

3.ß

1.2

100.0

100.0

Civil servants and
soldiers
White collar employees
~Jorkers

(incl. cottage
laborers)

Domestic help
Totals
Source:

Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 453/2, p. 14,
quoted from Esra Bennathan, "Die demographische und
wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden," in Entscheidungsjahr
1932, ed. ~verner Mosse (Tlibingen: J. C. B. l1ohr, 1966).

There clearly is, then, sufficient evidence to suggest that
split-labor market antagonisms and/or middleman minority
antagonisms may be a factor in explaining the ferocity of Nazi
anti-Semitism. This is a fruitful avenue for further investigation.
In a related but somewhat distinct area, it might be useful, as
Jay, Anson Rabinbach, Paul Piccone, and Russell Berman,
in their various ways argue, to reexamine the implications of
the Frankfurt School interpretations of anti-Semitism, particularly
the relevant sections in Max Ilorkheimer and Theodor ~. Adorno's
Dialectic of Enlightenment,3 The averarehing theory they
presented was grounded in an analysis that stressed the ambiguous
implications of the age-old domination of nature in Western
culture and the resulting idealization of instrumental reason.
The administered society, epitomized by the Nazi technobureaucratic state in its gradual erosion of all lingering
individuality and autonomaus structures of civil society,
generated severe internal crises that were met with even greater
repression.

l ~rtin
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Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis is clearly indebted to the
insights of Karl !1arx. "Bourgeois anti-Semitism," t:1ey wrote,
"has a specific economic reason: the concealment of domination
in production," or what Cary !1cWilliams has called in another
context, "a mask for privilege."4 Like Franz :-<eumann, who was
particularly critical of state capitalism in Behemoth, they
recognized the function of the Jews as scapegoats for anticapitalist sentiments. "They were the representatives--in
harmony with their particular religion--of municipal, bourgeois
and finally, industrial conditions. "5 If this analysis is
correct, then the sociological insights mentioned above concerning
split-labor market antagonisms and middleman-minority group
antagonisms would be even more germane.
Beyond this more traditional l~rxist approach with its echoes
of Marx's essay, "On the Jewish Question," and of Ferdinand
August Bebel's celebrated remark that anti-Semitism is "the
socialism of fools," Horkheimer and Adorno provided an analysis
of the postbourgeois anti-Semitism that spoke directly to the
problern of fascism. They argued that fascism represented a
more brutal form of repression than classical liberal capitalism
with its reliance on the mediation of the marketplace. lvhen
there is no longer any need for economic domination, as was
the case in the world of Auschwitz, "the Jews are marked out
as the absolute object of domination pure and simple."6 Fascism
is an order of unlimited force led by people who "long for total
possession and unlimited power, at any price."7 In fact, it is
only in total power, in the ability to control life and death,
that fascists can reach the orgasmic peak of domination. These
yearnings are displaced by claiming that it is the Jews who
actually strive for total control.
The long-range tendency towards this type of domination, which
went through a classical capitalist stage before reaching its
conclusions in fascism, had to be understood in more fundamental,
more structural terms than the scapegoat theory, or the religious
prejudice theory, or the ideological theory, or even the racist
theory would allow. For "anti-Semitism is a deeply imprinted
schema, a ritual of civilization."8 It is thus to the fundamental
dialectic of civilization (or Enlightenment, as they called it)
that Horkheimer and Adorno turned for their structural analysis,
and it is here that their insights may prove most suggestive
for our purposes.
The essence of that explanation was equating "civilization" with
the domination of nature, a domination whose implications were
only then becoming fully manifest. (Their essay was written
at least a year before the magnitude of the Nazi genocide was
fully known.) The implicit link between totality and domination
is the central theme of the work. "Those who spasmodically
dominate nature," they wrote, "see in a tormented nature a
provocative image of pm•erless happiness. The thought of
happiness without power is unbearable because it would then be
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true happiness." 9 The Jews are singled out for special attack
and treatment because they are confused with nature itself, and
thus seen as having "happiness without power, wages without work,
a harne witi1out frontiers, religion without myth. "10 Society
like nature, abhors a vacuum, Hannah Arendt has reminded us.i1
Horkheimer and Adorno thus believe that the projection of power
and otherness onto the Jew is not mere appearance, but historically
connected to the perceptual system of civilization. In this sense,
the "object" is not simply interchangeable (a point which
contradicts the usual Marxistclaim to the contrary), but is
crucial for the development of the logic of anti-Semitic
domination.
Throughout this work, Horkheimer and Adorno play with the
tension between nationalist anti-Semitism in which the Jew
represents a projection outward of the desire for total domination
reflected in the image of the Jew as an international manipulator
of culture and civilization, the kind of image Henry Ford would
exploit in the United 3tates, and bourgeois anti-Semitism,
which identified the Jew as an abstraction to be absorbed into
society until all traces of his negative essence disappears,
the T. S. Eliot or Henry Adamsversions of anti-Semitism. Again
we have the ancient canard--the Jew as simultaneaus symbol of
the triumph of Enlightenment (as modernity, urbanity,
intellectualism, civilization) and its absolute opposite (as
the powerful conspiratorial other).12 In the bourgeois sense,
anti-Semitism is the rage directed against the nonidentical,
the "eternal stranger" of Leo Pinsker, that characterizes the
totalistic dominating impulse of \Jestern civilization. Same
Jews, in their refusal to be assimilated, thus represent an
obstacle to the total integration of the "administered world"
or "one-dimensional society" as Herbert Marcuse was to call it.
Nationalism, on the other hand, constitutes the image of the Jew
as the nonorganic Other, the focus of repressed desires for
violence and control. The Jew in this context is both the
outsider and the insider whose essential character is ambiguous,
hence dangeraus and to be feared. Thus, for both the Enlightenment
and its opponents, the Jew is a paradox. Consequently, two
very distinct ideological images of the Jew appeared in Western
anti-Semitism, each focusing on two very real social groups:
the ghetto Eastern European Jews, who are fundamentally
unassimilable (an image also held by German Jews, as Steven
Aschheim ably demonstrates); and the assimilated Jew (Disraeli,
Rothschild, Rathenau), who represent power, infiltration, and
control. Once again, we should investigate the role that real
market-labor conditions had on intensifying these images.
The anti-Semitic ideology projects the Jew as the collective
other, representing power (capitalism, Marxism, liberalism,
Zionism) or putrifaction (miscegenation, filth, pronography,
sexuality). This tendency may suggest that anti-Semitism has
deeper roots than the other forms of racial prejudice that were
prevalent in European society, as Pois intimates. Given the
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historical roots of anti-Semitism in Christianity and the specific
historical role of the Jews as a pariah class in Western culture
as articulated by Harrnah Arendt, plus their role as a competing
economic class, anti-Semitism may have a history distinct from
national chauvinism or racial hatred.
This anti-Semitic tendency reached deeply into the fiber of
National Socialism. National Socialism represents an equally
fantastic joining of two irreconcilables. Nationalism pretended
to unite all classes; socialism is based on the class struggle.
Nationalism tended towards imperialist expansionism, while
socialism cla"imed to be universalistic. Nationalism deepl y
respected existing power relations; socialism sought to overthrow
them. National Socialism pretended to be a mass movement
characterized by reformist aspirations and struggles agairrst a
class society on behalf of the workers. Its inherent illogic
is such, however, that it was held tagether as an outlook and
movement by fastering aggressive national expansion as the basis
for creating the material for a vtllkish socialism that claims to
provide economic benefits for the workers and the poor while in
reality it deeply respects existing economic structures; and
by a virulent anti-Semitism as the main defining element of the
Germanie fantasy-community that leaves class boundaries
untouched.
The Nazi drive for community was the assertion, even if made
aggressively and brutally, of an abiding need for human
connectedness greater than that provided by the depersonalized
world of corporate capitalism. In Dialectic of Enlightenment
Horkheimer and Adorno emphasized that self-denial and
renunciations were inherent in the ~estern program of the
domination of nature. Fascism and, indeed, anti-Semitism are
seen as one pole of the dialectic of Western civilization
itself: as domination progressed, so did the mad revolt of
brutalized nature, culminating in the anti-Semitism of twentiethcentury totalitarianism. If Auschwitz expressed the barbarism
chosen by those unwilling or unable to join the modern world,
Auschwitz also represented the explosion of the repressed side
of our long journey away from barbarism and toward civilization.
These brief remarks should be sufficient to dernarrstrate that
the general historical materialist tradition may be helpful
in understanding the complicated and problematical phenomena
of anti-Semitism in the \veimar and early Nazi periods. But i t
should also be evident that the specific logic of anti-Semitism
also contributes to our understanding of the unique character
of the Holocaust, which cannot be explained satisfactorily by
discussions of the ideological function of anti-Semitism; by
the logic of faseist domination per se; by the role of religious
prejudice; by the desire to eliminate surplus populations; by
the desire to eliminate an economically competing group. As
bureaucratically organized, technological, mass death for the
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sole purpose of destroying a "defined" racially inferior group
that paradoxically was also seen as intent on domination, the
Holocaust may be consistent only with the view that the Jew is a
powerful, corrupting Other. Although a historical materialist
approach, which emphasizes structural considerations in the
socioeconomic realms of society, is intriguing and should be
explored as well as an explanation for the Holocaust, there
still are serious questions that need to be posed: Why
extermination and not servitude? Why the secrecy surrounding
the apparatus of destruction? Why the bizarre identification
and preoccupation with the victim? Did the Nazis need the Jews
to be fully themselves? Were the Nazis afraid of being free
in Jean Paul Sartre's sense? Did the Jews have to be destroyed
because they became the metaphoric equivalent of that stubborn
remnarrt of society preserving negation and the nonidentical;
that portion of society that refused to be one-dimensionalized?
Here again, llorkheimer and Adorno introduce a complicated
discussion of the role of mimetic behavior in civilization and
its distortion in Nazism's mimicry of its Jewish victims.
"Anti-Semitism is based on false projection," they wrote.
"Mimesis imitates the environment but 'false projection' makes
the environment like itself."l3 This type of false projection
politicized paranoia. To many who fell victim to its appeal,
fascism may have provided a mass delusional system that was
mistaken for reality. l!ow this reality turned into a nightmare
is a question of even greater perplexity.
It is becoming increasingly obvious, as Kren and Rappoport have
ably argued, that the Holocaust is a watershed event, one of
those which changes or should change our notions of reality,
language, meaning, our basic epistemological categories. No
assessment of twentieth-century civilization can ignore the
fact that science and technology, celebrated as the guarantors
of progress, then climaxed in the factories of death and that
the unlimited, value-free use of knowledge and science had paved
the way for the mass murder of a faceless, mindless bureaucracy.
The Holocaust was an advance warning of the demonie potential
in modern culture. For Germany was one of the most advanced
Western countries--at the center of the academic, cultural,
scientific, and technological enterprise. Auschwitz may be
what happens when you divorce morality from politics; when
you exploit knowledge for nonethical, nonhumanitarian goals,
when you allow technology and bureaucracy to run amuck.
It is no accident that the term Final Solution was finally
chosen to indicate a program of mass muder. It is an operational
rather than an ideological term. The Jews were the problern
and Auschwitz was the solution.
It is not enough to say that those who committed these horrible
crimes or who condoned them through active indifference were,
in some fashion, outside their own culture and civilization. The
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facts won't allow such an evasion. \Je must, therefore , formulate
as precisely as we can, and pres s home a much more disturbing
question: \Jere there powerful elements inside humanism, wi thin
civilization, wi thin the political, economic, and social
structure, that not only failed to impede barbarism but helped
produce it? Is the notion of "civilization" itself flawed
or tragically implicated, as Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, in the
coming of the Holocaust ? Did the separation of thought and
praxis, in some way incapacitate people's more immediate
political reflexes ? Has the Holocaust the result of the inevitable
crisis in capitalism predicted by Marx? Is it conceivable that
civilization repres s es Eros, thus strengtherring Thanatos, the
destructive energy? According to Freud, the more intense the
repression of primary erotic drives in a society, the g reater
a mobilization of surplus aggressiveness agairrst the repression .
Again, according to Freud, repression is bound to increase with
the progress of civilization, and at the same time, aggressive
energy is going to be released.
George Steiner, who has written unusually we ll about the proximity
of political barbarism to Western traditions of learning, draws
attention to the fact that mass murder had little trouble
flourishing side by side with activities previously regarded
as guarantees of human conduct; namely, fine literature, music,
and the arts. He wonders what the connections are between the
mental-psychological habits of high literacy and the tempta tions
of the inhuman. \Jhile we are not in a position to answer
Steiner's question, its challenge remains constant--Nazi poster
and magazine art provide popular illustrations of the ways in
which the disciplines of learning, religion, and artistic effort
could be put to the service of brutal power. Meye r has shown
how music was used for similar purposes. Philosopher and
existentialist Martin Heidegger's inaugural address as rector
of Freiburg University, aligning the labors of the scholar with
those of the soldier, is a muted and more refined example of
this complicity. Professor Heidegger's denial of schalarship
funds to Jewish students at the university and, contrastingly,
the preference he gave to those who fought in the SA or SS are
more active and unsettling examples of the same thing. Yet
Heidegger was hardly alone. Thousands of such actions can be
cited, directly implicating intellectuals, students, artists,
scientists, jurists, and churchmen in the day-to-day programs
of the Nazi movement. Corruption ran deeply through German
culture. Thus we misunderstand modern political power if we
focus too heavily on the high-ranking individual. Hitler,
Himmler, Heydrich, Eichmann--their roles were necessary, but
nonewas sufficient to produce Auschwitz. We must look for the
answer in more structural considerations, not in individuals.
The passage of time, as Kren and Rappoport note, has made it
increasingly evident that a heretofore unbreachable moral and
political barrier in the history of iJestern civilization was
successfully overcome by the Nazis in i~orld ilar II, and that
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henceforth the systematic, bureaucratically administered
extermination of millians of citizens or subject peoples will
forever be one of the capacities and temptations of government.
A barrier has been overcome in what for millennia had been
regarded as the permissible limits of political action. The
Nazi Holocaust may just be the logical conclusion of the political
institution we call "state," a conclusion that even the most
critical anarchist could not have foreseen. It may be the
logical conclusion of a rampant capitalism that turns everything
and everyone into commodities, some to be processed, exploited,
sold, and even disposed of once every drop of profit has been
squeezed out of their beings, disposed of on the dump heap of
history to be burned, literally like refuse, their by-products
used for fertilizer and soap.
The Holocaust was an expression of some of the most significant
political, moral, religious, and demographic tendencies of
Western civilization in the twentieth century. There were,
however, unique elements in the Holocaust. It was the first
attempt by a modern, legally constituted government to pursue a
policy of bureaucratically organized genocide both within and
beyond its own frontiers. As such, it must be distinguished
from the use of violence by a state against another state or even
against its own people for the purpose of .securing compliance
with its policies. It is fundamentally different from American
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example. The
American assaults, although unbelievably deadly, ceased as
soon as the Japanese surrendered, and never had total annihilation
as an objective. German mass violence against Jews, gypsies,
and other racially defined "inferior" groups, was intensified
after the victims had surrendered. Never before have people
been so expendable.
The Nazi elite, as Richard Ruhenstein has argued in The Cunning
of History, acted upon the assumption that the Jews and gypsies
were a surplus people, a surplus commodity, not needed for slave
labor since there were potentially tens of millians of Eastern
Europeans available for labor exploitation, a surplus people
whom nobody wanted and whom they could dispose of as they
pleased. Given the moral universe of the twentieth century,
the most rational and least costly solution of the problern of
disposing of a surplus population, may, tragically, be
extermination. It is understood that people can act rationally
and be absolutely immoral. Again, given a certain utilitarian
and instrumentalist mind set committed to efficiency,
practicality, order, control, and predictability, extermination
may be the problem-solving strategy least likely to have
unanticipated repercussions for its planners, assuming, of course,
you win the war. This was certainly true during World War II,
when the world, by and large, did little to convince the Nazis
that it was seriously opposed to the Nazi policies. Joseph
Goebbels, minister of propaganda, who read world public opinion
carefully, noted in his diary that free-world inaction is proof
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that the Germans were in fact doing the world's dirty work for
it. Heinrich Ilimmler frequently reminded his commanders that
the world would someday be thankful for what Germany had the
iron will to achieve. So from a purely bureaucratic
perspective, the extermination of Jews, gypsies, and other
racially defined inferior groups made eminent sense.
Extermination was the logical conclusion of racism.
Yet, will was insufficient; beyond the desire there had to be
the capacity. Usually when we focus upon the possibility of mass
death in the twentieth century, we focus upon technological
advances in weaponry. Far too little attention has been given to
the advances in social organization that allowed for the effective
use of the new weapons. In order to understand how the moral
barrier was crossed that made massacre in the millians possible,
it is necessary to consider the importance of bureaucracy in
modern political and social organizations. The German
sociologist Max Weber was especially cognizant of its significance.
In fact, \leber' s analysis of bureaucracy is one of the central
points in his general sociology. His key concept of rationalization
as a distinctive feature of modern society, especia1ly as linked
to his notion of a demystification of the world, finds one of its
concrete manifestations in bureaucracy and bureaucratization.
Rationalization and demystification are in turn linked to
\leber' s emphasis on power in all social relationships. Wri ting
in 1916 lang before the Nazi party came to power, Weber observed:
~lhen

fully developed, bureaucracy stands under the
principle of without scorn and bias. Its specific
nature which is welcomed by capitalism developes the
more perfectly the more bureaucracy is dehumanized, the
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from
official business love, hatred, and all purely
personal, irrational and emotional elements which
escape calculation. This is the specific nature of
bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special
virtue.l4

Weber, of course, could not predict that the police and civil
service bureaucracies could be used as a death machine to eliminate
millians who had beendefinedas superfluous. Even Weber seems
to have stopped short of foreseeing state-sponsored massacres
as one of the dehumanizing capacities of bureaucracy. In the
Nazi state, or more specifically, in the SS offices in Berlin,
an inconspicuous series of offices in an even more inconspicuous
building, this occurred. Bureauerats like Adolph Eichmann
manipulated numbers on paper, shuffled these papers to other
bureaucrats, and a few hundred miles away tens of thousands
of people were condemned to brutal death. They never had to and
often never did see the results of their paper-shuffling genocide.
Bureaucratic mass murder reached its fullest development when
gas chambers with a capacity for killing t wo thousand people
at a time were installed at Auschwitz. As Hannah Arendt has

lntroduction

31

observed, the very size of the chambers emphasized the complete
depersonalization of the killing ~rocess.
So there seems to be a connection between bureaucracy and mass
death. In the case of Jews and gypsies, they were defined as
inferior and "legally" deprived of their citizenship. People
without political rights are superfluous people. They have
lost all rights to life and human dignity. The Nazis, as
Arendt has indicated, understood that people have no rights
unless they are guaranteed by a state with the power to defend
such rights. They were perfectly consistent in demanding that
the deportees be made stateless before exterminating them, Once
the Germans had collected the stateless, rightless, politically
superfluous people, they exercised a domination over them more
total than was ever before exercised by one people over another.
In the past, political or social domination was limited by the
ruler's or the slaveholder's need to permit at least a minimal
level of subsistence because of the economic value of the subject
peoples. Now, the SS felt they had a potential supply of
millians of superfluous people. Those they did not immediately
exterminate, they worked under the most brutal conditions,
usually for about four months, and then they were annihilated.
So the Nazis could create a society of total domination because
they had a bureaucratic administration capable of governing
with utter indifference to the human needs of the inmates and a
supply of inmates capable of continuous replenishment, an
invaluable natural resource,
The Final Solution utilized the industrial processes and the
managerial techniques that enabled European civilization
to prosper. Those mountains of shoes, human hair, eyeglasses,
and suitcases that have been imprinted on our mind's eye, were
by-products of a modern manufacturing process. They were
destined to be reintegrated into the consumer economy. In
keeping with the most advanced management techniques, an accurate
record of production was maintained, so many units (lives)
processed per day and week; and constant improvement of
efficiency was encouraged. Rudolf I!oess, the camp commandant of
Auschwitz, recalled his achievement in this area: "The Camp
Commandant at Treblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000
in the course of one-half year, he used monoxide gas and I did
not think his methods were very efficient. So when I set up
the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyclon B
/sie? . • • . Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that
;e built our gas chambers to accommodate 2,000 people at one
time, whereas at Treblinka their ten gas chambers only
accommodated 200 people each."15 For I!oess the concentration
camp was a mundane extension of normal operational procedures.
No sector of German society was immune, certainly not the
corporate community. I.G. Farben, Germany's massive chemical
combine, was the most important German corporate user of slave
labor at Auschwitz. The corporation's activities at Auschwitz
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are an important part of the story of the camp as a society of
total domination. It invested 700 million Reichsmarks in its
Buna synthetic rubber plant at Auschwitz. About 35,000 slaves
were used, and at least 25,000 such workers died there. The
diet fed to I. G. Farben inmates, which included the infamous
"Buna soup," resulted in an average weight loss for each
individual of about six to eight and one half pounds a week.
At the end of one month, the change in the prisoner's appearance
was marked; at the end of four months, they were either dead or
so unfit for work that they were released to the gas chambers
at Birkenau. The more unfortunate (if this can be imagined)
inmates served as human guinea pigs for medical experiments
conducted by the Bayer division of I.G. Farben. Similar examples
could be drawn from among the greatest German industrial concerns
who also used concentration camp inmates--Krupp, AEG, Telefunken,
Siemens, BMW, and Rheinrnetall, to name only the most important.
These companies made tremendous profits, paying dividends to
thousands of investors. I.G. Farben made particularly handsome
profits from its subsidiary, Degesh, which manufactured
Zyklon-B, the gas used in the gas chambers. It was a highly
profitable business, which paid 100 to 200 percent dividends in
1942, 1943, and 1944.16
Karl l1arx and Friedrich Engels have observed that the triumph of
the capitalist class who owned the means of production had "left
remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked selfinterest, than callous cash payment."l7 Marx and Engels were
pointin8 to the same kind of "dehumanized" rationalization as
had Weber.lß According to Marx, the bourgeoise had reduced
industrial labor to a commodity, like every other article of
commerce. As soon as profit and productivity became the sole
criteria by which a business enterprise was to be measured, it
was in the factory owner's interest to work his employees as
long as he could and pay them as little as he could get away
with.l9 Harx saw how these abuses operated in mid-nineteenth
century England. l!owever, for exploitation to be truly systematic,
there needs to be a large pool of unorganized people who have
no choice but to work or die--or more accurately put, to work
and die. The industrial and corporate use of slave labor in
the concentration camps and ghettos took this structural
propensity of capitalism to its final conclusion. Human life was
cheap, exploitable, and expendable.
This may be what happens when corporate profits and bureaucratic
efficiency are the only values left. Hass murder was both a
highly complex and successful business venture. The men who
carried out the business part of the enterprise were not uniformed
thugs or criminals. They were highly competent, respectable,
corporate executives who were only doing what they had been
trained to do--run large corporations profitably. As long as
their institutions functioned efficiently, they apparently had
few qualms concerning the uses to which they were put.
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It is also interesting to note what became of the directors of
these companies. Most of them served very nominal jail terms,
usually from one to four years. John McCloy, the U.S. high
commissioner, wanted to begin a new relationship with Germany,
and so in 1951, through a general act of clemency, he released
all the German industrialists then incarcerated. They resumed
their corporate elitist positions. These men showed no remorse,
defending their decisions as necessary in time of war. One
industrialist, Friedrich Flick, who annually contributed 100,000
Reichsmarks to the SS, who personally listened to reports from
the Einsatzgruppen, whose firms used Jewish slave labor, had
glibly declared at Nuremberg: "Nobody of the large circle of
persans who know my fellow defendants and myself will be willing
to believe that we committed crimes agairrst humanit y , and nothing
will convince us that we arewar criminals." Flick never paid
a penny in compensation to his victims, and when he died in 1972
at the age of 39, he left almost one billion dollars to his son.20
Why were people who were responsible for the death of thousands
and implicated in the death of millians essentially let free
while SS guards received stiff sentences ? A society whose
prosperity depends upon economic virtuosi capable of applying
calculating rationality to large-scale corporate enterprise can
ill-afford the lass of highly trained managers. It seems that
it just may be possible to argue that the horrors committed
by the Nazis in their society of total domination, such as
medical experiments and corporate utilization of death-camp
slave labor, merely carried to an extreme operational attitudes
and procedures that dominate the workings of bureaucracy and
modern capitalist corporate enterprise.
The administered society, in constantly eroding all lingering
individuality and autonomaus structures of civil society,
generated internal crises whose successful management required
the radical reversal of its main strategy. JUrgen Habermas
describes these as the economic, rationality, motivational, and
legitimation crises. It seems that successful administration
requires at least a minimal lingering negativity to regulate its
rationalizing a gencies. However, when the controller totally
determines the controlled, as was the case in the Nazi period,
the necessary dialectical tension between the two which operates
before total control as a mediating factor and which imparts
to both parties a will which could be asserted tends to
disappear, and conflict that would otherwise be resolved within
a structure is transformed into the annihilation of one party,
At that point, the point of the Holocaust, logical systems
change, predictable Standards of behavior are breached, meaning
and values and knowledge itself are challenged, and the
system collapses into absolute negativity, into l'univers
concentrationnaire, whose only morality is that everything is
possible. The Holocaust was an attempt to own life by controlling
the process of death. It was hell literally brought on earth
as the human world of all the peoples of Europe was literally
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turned upside down in the Nazi social organization and became
the "kingdom of death." Death now ruled as the syrnbol of
ultimate power. The artist Naphtali Bezem very appropriately
portrayed this inverted Nazi world in the Yad Vashem Hemorial
in Israel with the figure of a woman holdin g two flaming
candlesticks upside down with the flames burning her breasts,
Precisely because of this absurdity, the meaning of the Holocaust
is impenetrable. Language is inadequate to express the
inexpressible. "The Holocaust is so agonizing," writes Steven
Schwarzchild, "precisely because it is the ultimate paradox. It
imposes silence even while it demands speech." But the moral
imperative dernands an encounter. For to be human, to exe rcise
one's humanity, is to pose questions 'a nd suggest meaning,
even in the face of the absurd, of nothingness.
It is to this
quest, the quest to understand, that this volume is dedicated.
In surnrnary, we believe that these essays suggest the connection
between the structural problems and contradictions of Weimar
society and their relationship to the rise of fascism; the
ineffectual opposition of anti-faseist seßments of the population
in the face of this crisis, an ineff ec tuality which in itself
has structural dimensions; and the way in wh ich cultural
symbols, notions, and ideas also refl ec t structural tensions.
We believe, then, that the essays contained in this collection
and our reflections upon them, indicate that there is a connection
between socioeconomic tensions, processes of objectification,
and the level of anti-Semitism that may have contributed to the
Holocaust or made it possible. These essays are, of course,
not meant to provide a comprehensive history of lleimar German y .
However, given the limitation of space, it is hoped this book
will offer a fresh perspective on key problems in the social
and economic history of the Weimar Republic. As a developed
capitalist society that proved structurally unstable--socially,
economically, and politically--and as a political culture which
offered fertile ground for the growth of National Socialism,
Heimar Germany continues to demand our attention.
And the
conclusions to be drawn from its history should offer some
insights into and warnings about the society in which we live.
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Problems in the
Social and Economic
Development of the
Weimar Republic
DIETMAR PETZINA
Translated by Irene Stumberger, Michael N. Dobkowski,
and Isidor Wallimann
Many historical accounts narrowly interpret the Weimar Republic
as a mere prelude to German Fascism. The questions concerning
the independent developments and the new social start following
1918 are fe1.rer than those regarding the realm of social problems
that seem to have unavoidably led to the political breakdown of
the first German Republic. Indeed, such an evaluation of the
first German Republic is understandable since not only its
beginning but also its end were marked by serious political and
economic crises as well as social conflicts. On the other hand,
this interpretation fails to sufficiently acknowledge the
unmistakably positive beginnings of the 1920s. There was an
astounding revival of art and culture, and German Sozialpolitik
(the German government's laws and policies affecting the welfare
of the people in social, economic, and cultural terms) was the
leading role model internationally, at least until 1929, and
despite the continuation of authoritarian traditions in German
society, there also existed a widespread democratic trend,
whose violent end was by no means predetermined.
The following explications do not claim to be a new interpretation
of social behavior and economic processes in the 1920s. Nor
do they limit themselves solely to socioeconomic reasons for the
collapse of the political system. Rather, they focus upon this
epoch's prospects for development which distinguishes the Weimar
Republic so notably from the Kaiserreich (German empire).
Many of these possibilities were permanently crushed by
National Socialism, and others forged the way for the new
beginning of the Second Republic following 1945. The self-image
of the Federal Republic of Germany, her people, and the
institutions they rebuilt were greatly influenced by the manifold
Weimar experiences. Therefore, the Weimar Republic does not
only form the prelude to National Socialism and the Holocaust;
it also forms the prelude for the new democratic beginning
after the Second \lorld War.
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To attempt to give an all-encompassing account of economic and
social developments in the Weimar Republic is not the purpose
of this chapter. The intent is simply to extract a few questions
from the profusion of problems in order that a framework for the
analysis of political and ideological aspects can be formed.
These questions are as follows:
1. Which economic liabilities resulting from the First World
War especially burderred the Weimar Republic?
2. IJhat changes was German society subjected to? Did these
developments correspond to general Hestern capitalistic
patterns or was there something particular to Germany's
development that created a special potential for conflict?
3. I!ow did the \leimar governments react to social and economic
challenges, that is, to what extent were the administrations
prepared and capable of stabilizing the economic foundation
of the Republic?
4. Finally, why did German society react politically in
such a different and disastraus manner during the
worldwide economic crisis as opposed to similar
industrial societies in Europe and America?
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
Contrary to the appearance of drastic change and revolution,
social conditions were not fundamentally altered by World War I.
Certainly, widespread popular consensus attributed the blame for
the war and defeat to the ruling elites of the empire.
Nevertheless, no overthrow of influence, power, and prestige
patterns resulted. Surely, the nobility that once dominated
society lost its social and political privileges. Yet even
before 1914, there had been disputes about the aristocracy,
and now, just as before, the nobility held many of the republic's
important positions in diplomacy and in the military. There
was also little change in the traditional dominance of the
conservative elites in government, the judicial system, and in
the universities. The contradiction between the democratic
will to change, on the one hand, and the authoritarianconservative stubbornness in key centers of power, on the other,
became a constitutive element of the Weimar Republic.
Of course, this continuity did not imply a solidification of the
ruling strata. Rather, it went hand in hand with a noteworthy
shifting of influence within the bourgeoisie and between the
industrial bourgeoisie and the quasi-feudal elites. As a
result of the world war, class differences revealed themselves
more distinctly than in preindustrial times and thereby
strengtherred the role of the industrial bourgeoisie.l More so
than before 1914, control of the means of production determined
one's material standing, working conditions, the level of
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workers' lifestyles, and the privileges and welfare of those
with possessions. Despite the demarcation of class lines, which
had been brought about by the war, social conflicts were not
primarily discharged agairrst entrepreneurs. The military state 's
bureaucratic interventionism turned the workers ' protest and
the displeasure of many entrepreneurs upon the government
authorities. The goal of state intervention between 1915 and
1913 was to guarantee mobilization of the war economy, and
government agencies had to force great sacrifices from the workers .
On the other hand, the government was neither prepared nor in a
position to compensate for these financial burdens with
concessions in the political arena, such as trade-union
participation in war -related economic decisions and the setting
of priorities. Hence, among the masses, Opposition to and
disappointment with the state and agairrst the political system
as a whole grew without the masses simultaneously coming to a
questioning of the entrepreneurs' position. These experiences
were very much in, the foreground when the "Produzentenkartell"
(producer cartel) was founded in 1913, consisting of organized
labor and entrepreneurs. Thus , the coalition of capital and
labor set the political direction for the new state.
In comparison to the economic development before World War I and
after the Second \lorld War, the German economy in the period
between world wars presents a picture of stagnation .2 In the
1920s the industrial production and the gross national product
per capita barely exceeded the level before 1914. A statistical
average con tribut es little to a description of the economic
development and its consequences for the social and political
history of the period. Ilistorically more significant was the
hectic sequence of critical disturbances and short periods of
economic growth that can be identified between the world wars,
inflation, the 1924 stabilization crisis, the crisis of 1926, and
the Great Depression. Just as the trend in economic growth
changed, so did the prewar pattern of economic cycles . Before
World \Jar I, highs and lows in the economy corresponded to
rhythmical changes, which according to the experience over
several decades usually led to a higher level of production.
The economic development between world wars differs from the
pattern of classical economic cycles.
It gave reason for a
widespread pessimistic outlook upon future social development.
The interpretation of these crises as a sign of a secular
breakdown of growth seemed to be confirmed by the Great
Depression that had been regarded as a transition to a new epoch
by many contemporaries. This notion is certainly understandable
if one considers that in the period from 1919 to 1933, nine years
can be described as times of crises. Economic and subsequentl y
social structural changes (the shifting career structure, for
example) must have unfurled an explosive force far greater in
this period of stagnating economic growth than it would .have
in times of accelerated development.
It is advisable to examine
economic problems individually before turning to the social
structural changes and the role of the state .
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The Weimar Republic can be divided into three time periods:
The period of postwar crisis and inflation (1919-1923), the
following phase of stabilization from 1924-28/29, and finally
the phase of the Great Depression. Of course, this sort of
periodization overemphasizes the persistent twenty-year-long
crisis-character of the \Jeimar Republic, making the years of
economic upswing an exception and lumps the "anomalous" years
until 1924 tagether with the other years.3 It must be said
that the commonly held crisis theory can certainly be verified
if one only considers the inflation and its economic and social
consequences. But if the criteria of employment and unemployment,
industrial production, and gross national product are also
considered, there arises a distinct cantrast to the traditional
points of view. For example, the rate of unemployment from
1920 to 1922 was under 3 percent, thereby nearly reaching the
prewar full employment level. Only in 1923, at the height of
galloping inflation, did unemployment rise above 20 percent,
while the comparable figure rarely fell below 10 percent during
the entire period of stabilization after 1924. From 1920 to 1922,
the real Gross National Product may likely have reached 80 percent
of the prewar level, and the growth of industrial production
totaled 100 percent between 1919 and 1922. Despite the uncertainty
of all data for the period of inflation, the fact of a distinct
industrial postwar boom cannot be overlooked. At the same time,
in 1921, other important industrial countries suffered serious
production losses, emphasizing to an even greater extent the
recovery of the German economy from 1920 to 1922.
However, the rapid recovery should not be overrated in view of
the very heavy decline in production at the end of the war.
During the war, Germany's industrial production fell to 57
percent of its prewar level and entailed disproportions in the
production structure that could only be corrected at the cost
of a continued decline in production.
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Table 3.1
Index of Irrdustrial Production, 1913-1938 (1923=100)
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1913
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
Source:

93
81
66
63
61
56
37
54
65
70
46
69
81

1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

78
93
100
100
37
70
58
66
83
96
107
117
125

\lagenfUhr, Industriewirtschaft, pp. 23 and 64; Industrie
im Kriege, pp. 166 and 191; Bevl:llkerung und \Hrtschaft,
s. 176; Stat. Jb. f. d. Dt. Reich 1941-42, p. 192.

Until 1922, the upswing (disregarding the greatly lowered
production level in comparison to 1913) alleviated problems that
immediately followed the war. Above all, it allowed for an
easier integration of the returning soldiers into the economic
process--although at the cost of a lower productive standard
whose extent and consequences were initially covered up by the
inflation.
A second divergence from the worldwide economic development
appeared when inflation unavoidably l ed to an economic breakdown
while in England, France, and the United States, there was an
upswing after the cyclical depression in 1921. At the end of
the first five - year period following the war, and at the same
time as the beginning of the "normal upswing," the power of
the German economy had clearly diminished internationally.
According to calculations by the League of Nations, the world
industrial production index stood at 121 (1913=100) in 1925,
while Germany's production volume had not yet reached its prewar
level.
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Table 3 .2
An International Comparison of Germany's Industrial Production
in 1925 (1913=100)
Japan
Italy
USA
Australia
Czechoslovakia
India
Canada
Source:

222
157
143
141
136
132
117

France
Sweden
Austria
Germany
Great Britain
Russia
Po land

114
113
95
95
36
70
63

League of Nations, Industrialisation and Foreign Trade,
Geneva (1946), p. 134.

Although economic development from 1925 until 1929--the Weimar
Republic's period of stability--compared well with prewar levels,
Germany still lagged behind the relative development of the
majority of other industrial countries at the end of the 1920s.
The industrial production of France surpassed its prewar level
by 38 percent, that of the United States by 70 percent, and
the world average rose approximately 47 percent. In contrast,
German production rose by a modest 13 percent, based on its 1920
level. Germany was thus among the losers of the industrial race
after the war, even though she placed second to the United States
in total potential. Measured by total economic performance,
the upswing from the middle of 1926 had already passed its peak
by 1928. Just before then, however, from the summer of 1926 to
the autumn of 1927, there was a short , hectic rise in economic
activity that caused a 50 percent gain in industrial production
and even a 70 percent rise in the production of capital goods
within a year . Already by the third quarter of 1927, the peak
of economic activity had been passed--a sign of the instability of
the cyclical upswin g . Early indications of the world economic
crisis surfaced by 1929. In that year, capital investments
and industrial production were below the previous year, and by
1932 the national income declincd by as much as 43 percent in
relation to 1929. The data of various individual economic
sectors confirm, if with varying degrees of intensity, the
development of the national economic output . In 1932-1933, the
production index of German industry fell to half of its 1923
standing and to one-third in capital goods production, which are
particularly sensitive to crises . During the world economic
crisis , there was not only a decline of the industrial investment
volume, but also an absolute decrease in the existing capital
stock. Over a span of years, signs of a crisis emerged every>vhere,
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a cr~s~s which was without precedent in the history of industrial
capitalism. The extremely quick rise in unemployment was the
most severe social indicator of t~e crisis. At the peak of
unemployment in 1932, statistics indicated that six million
people were unenployed in Germany. The actual number was
probably considerably oigher, since many who had been unem~loyed
for years no langer received state aid and therefore weren't
included in the statistics. It is most likely that every third
worker was unemployed in 1932. The quota of unemployed in
industrial trade unions clearly rose above 40 percent. A review
of unemployment in selected countries points to the special
problems which confronted Gennan society in its crisis.

Table 3. 3
Unemployment in Selected Countries, 1919-1939 (Percent of labor
force une1nployed)
Year

Germanya

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

3.7
3.3

Swedend

Great Britainb

France

e

1.5
10.2

5.2
3.2
17.0
14.3
11.7

3.4
5.8
16.9
10.9
4.6

5.5
5.4
26.6
22.9
12.5

5.0
2.0
2.0

1924
1925
1926
1927
1923
1929

13.1
6.3
13.0
3.3
8.6
13.3

10.3
11.3
12.5
9.7
10.3
10.4

8.0
5.9
2.3
5.9
6.4
4.7

10.1
11.0
12.2
12.0
10.6
10.2

3.0
3.0
3.0
11.0
4.0
1.0

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

22.7
34.3
43.8
36.2
20.5

16.1
21.3
22.1
19.9
16.7

13.0
23.3
34.0
35.3
30.6

11.9
16.8
22.4
23.3
13.0

2.9
6.5
15.4
14.1
13.8

1935
1936
1937
1933

16.2
12.0
6.9
3.2

15.5
13.1
10.3
12.9

23.4
23.9
20.0
26.4

15.0
12.7
10.8
10.9

14.5
10.4
7.4
7.3

Source:

Stanley Lebergott, Annual Estimates of Employment in the
United States 1900-1950, 'lalter Galenson, Arnold Zellner,
"International Comr>arison of Unemployment Rates," in
The !1easurement and ßehavior of Unemployment, ed. by NßER
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

2.G
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a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
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Only trade union members until 1932.
Unemployed determined on the basis of unemployment insurance.
Unemployed as percent of the non-agrarian work force.
Trade union statistics.
Unemployed covering non-self-employed wage and salary earners
in mining, construction, and industry.

The statistical indicators, particularly the data on unemployment,
suggest that next to the United States, Germany was hit the
hardest by the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1934, the
average rate of unemployment fluctuated araund 30 percent in
both countries. Nevertheless, this crisis pattern was also
typical for other industrial nations although characterized by
less intensity or by a certain time lag. In Germany and in the
United States, the economic world crisis reached an exceptional
magnitude due to mutually enforcing causes after an economic
boom lasting several years covered up the unstable character
of the countries' economic systems following the war. On the
whole, the United States experienced a more stable development
than Germany. This can be recognized by the low rate of
unemployment from 1924 to 1929 amounting to merely 5.6 percent
in the United States as opposed to 11 percent in Germany.
ECONOMIC SECTOR SIIIFTS DURING THE \lEH1AR REPUBLIC
Disregarding the inhibitors of growth and the cyclical
irregularities, shifts typical for the industrialization process
continued during the Heimar Republic. They were to the
advantage of industry and the tertiary sector and to the
disadvantage of agriculture.
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Table 3.4
Warking Population according to Economic Sectors, 19J7-1939
(percent of labor force)
Year

Agriculture
and Forestry

Industry
and Trade

Tertiary Sector
Total

Trade
Public
and
and
Commerce Private
Services

Domestic
Help

1907

35.2

40.1

24.3

12.4

6.2

6.2

1925

30.5

42.1

27.4

16.4

6.6

4.4

1933

23.9

40.4

30.7

13.5

3.3

3.9

1939

25.9

42.2

31.9

17.5

10.5

3.9

Source:

Stat. d. Dt. Reiches Val. 203, p. 2 f. (1907); Val. 757,
H. 24, p. 2 f. (Saargebiet 1939); Stat. Jb. f. d. Dt.
Reich 1941/42, p. 33 (1925-39).

By approximately 1890, the industrial sector--measured by the
number of people enployed and their productivity--had already
noved agriculture to the second position in the national economic
structure. Thereafter, agriculture continuously lost economic
importance althou3h no corresponding decrease of influence in
socie ty and eovernr.1ent occurred. Even so, this process still
emphasized the rapid decline in the social impact of the agrarian
socioeconomic sphere and life-style on the total social development
of Germany between the world wars. From 1907 to 1925, at least
1.5 million people left their jobs in agriculture. The sample
years , chosen on the basis of occu~ational census data, do not
reveal the entire process of sectoral change. The displacement
of agriculture and its social manifestation--the migration
from the country to the towns--exnerienced periods of acceleration
as well as deceleration.
The First \Jorld \.lar, the agricultural business cycles, and the
absence of an industrial pull during the Great Depression held
up the migration out of agriculture, while the relative industrial
prosperity of the latter half of the 1920s strengtherred it. It
is noteworthy that the agrarian migration reached a climax during
the reign of National Socialism even thoup,h its ideology allotted
the farmers a privileged position. In view of the long-term
pattern of change in the sectoral structure, this is by no means
surprising. While the number of people engaged in agriculture
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continued to decrease during the economic world crisis, the
corresponding increase in the industrial sector was i1alted for
the first time. A development that had persisted throug:wut the
First llorld \lar and the great inflation was thus thrust back to
prewar conditions at the end of t~e Great Depression. This
slowdown of industrialization, even if just tem~orary, i1luminated
the social irregularities caused by the economic crisis. At
the same time, the overproportional increase of people emp1oyed in
trade and commerce is also an expression of a crisis phenomenon.
The rush into trade professions was frequently the desperate
attempt of the unemployed to find jobs at any cost.
The characteristic process of development for an industrial
society--increasing wage and salary employment and decreasing
self-employment--continued throug:1 the 1920s. Every fifth person
employed in 1907 was self-employed; only every eighth by 1925.
Of course, this over1ooks different processes that took place
within economic sectors. Independent craftsmen, whose decline
had been predicted by contemporaries before the First \lor1d \lar,
were actually able to expand operations between the wars. The
number of people employed in craft trades rose from 2.5 mi1lion
to 4.9 million between 1395 and 1939.4 The social consequences
of this development were significant. Craftsmen found their
place within industrial capitalism after fighting the threatening
dominance of industry for decades. Accordingly, the trades gave
up their anticapitalistic position and started to align with
industry on social-politica1 questions. In turn, industry
realized that consideration of petty bourgeois segments wou1d
be in the interest of their own stabi1ity.
On the other side, the number of self-employed farmers had already
been decreasing before the First ilorld \lar. This development
acce1erated even farther in the 193t)s. 'lhile the number of
independent farmers decreased to about 300,000 from 1907 to 1925,
this category stabilized from 1925 to 1933, only to again fall
by 200,000 during the period of National Socialism. The Great
Depression's motto, "Selbstl:lndigkeit aus Hot" (Independence out
of Necessity), was responsible for this slowdown in the
shrinking process during the Weimar Republic. Remarkab1y, despite
the fascists' claim upon "Rettung des Mittelstandes" (Saving
the i1idd1e Class), a relatively !arger portion of the middle
class had to give up üteir self-employment after 1933 than during
the \1eimar Republic.
\lith the decline in se1f-emp1oyment brought about by the
accelerated concentration of factories and the means of production,
there was a corresponding predictable rise in number of bluecollar workers, white-collar workers, and civi1 servants.
Here, however, the crucial social-structural changes took place
in relation to the proportional growth of these groups. Only
the industrial working class remained re1atively stable. Their
share of the total labor force fell from 55 percent to 50 percent
between 1907 and 1925 and remained at that level during the 1930s.
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In contrast, the size of the white-collar employee class changed
dramatically. In 1833, white-collar workers numbered 300,000; in
1925, there were approximately 3.5 million. They fell into the
fields of commerce, transportation, banking, and insurance.
The increase of white-collar employees in industry was not quite
as steep; only every eighth employee belonged to the "new middle
class," whereas in the tertiary sector more than half of the wage
laborers could be considered white-collar employees. A betterthan-average representation was held by those white-collar employees
in new industries--which had already expanded heavily before the
First llorld l'iar and were also the leading sectors of industrial
growth in the lleimar Republic. T:1e emergence of scientific
methods in production, swelling bureaucratization, and the
growing share of tertiary production represented in the gross
national product triggered and fastered this movement. The
difference between white-collar and blue-collar employees cannot
be clearly established economically and is of little practical
significance. Yet these differences were fundamental for
undeTstanding social roles and political behavior. The efforts
to cut oneself off from classes beloH in the interest of securing
one's own personal status, created an antiproletariet self-image
that seemed to be especially susceptible to faseist slogans
during the Great Depression.5 In this way, large numbers of
white-collar employees, along with the old Hittelstand, made
up the mass basis of the National Socialist regime.
Theodor Geiger's6 data clarifies how great the potential for
radical movement was by showing--with data based on a population
and business census--how German society was stratified in 1925.
He estimated that at least half of the population belonged to
grou~s that felt their status was threatened from "oben"
(above) and "unten" (below), by big business and the proletariat,
in the event of a crisis.

Table 3.5
Stratifications of German Society, 1925
Groups

Mentality

0.92

Large entrepreneurs, large
landholders, wealthy retirees

Shocked by the "crisis in
caoitalist thousht"

Old Hittelstand

17.77

Self- employed individuals in
medium and small businesses in
trade, craftsmanship, and
agriculture

Tendency to revert to the
"culture of early capitalist
society"; defensive posture in
order to maintain one's own
social status

llew Mittelstand

17.95

Civil servants, white-collar
employees, academics

"their social positions are
historically new"; ideologically
unsteady

Proletarianized

12.65

Old l1ittelstand which has lost
previous socioeconomic position;
small farmers, cottage laborers,
craftsmen working without
employees in tertiary sector

Tendency to resign, but during
times of crisis tendency to
"harsh rebelliousness"

Proletariat

so. 71

\lorkers in indus try and
agriculture

!1oderately Marxist

Strata

Percentage

Capitalists

Source:

Th . Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes, Stuttgart 1932, pp. 73, 77, 82-1 05,
quoted from \Verner Abelshauser, Sozialer \Jandel zwischen den Weltkriegen, unpublished
manuscript (Bochum, Ruhr-UniversitMt, 1930).
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ECONOl1IC CONTINUITIES AND GROWTH DU:\ING TI!E \JEI!1AR REPUBLIC
It has become clear tllat the economic structures and problems
characteristic of the two decades after the First \lorld War
are basically so different from those of the period before 1914
that every comparison of these two periods of German history
becomes problematic. For the contemporaries of the 1920s and
early 1930s, prewar conditions may have seemed like a golden age,
particularly in the realm of economics, where continuing expansion
until \lorld \lar I mitigated the struggle between classes over
the distribution of the national product. In contrast, the
decades between the wars were characterized by Stagnation, serious
economic crises, inflation, and self-aggravating social conflicts.
It is not surprising, then, that a majority of the German people
often viewed t:1e \leimar Republic as a dismal reflection of the
prosperaus times before the war.
Of course, identifying the source of the difficulties exclusively
as the military defeat and its effects was only half the truth.
It is true that the world war placed too heavy a demand on
national resources and simultaneously destroyed the international
currency, finance, and trade system with serious consequences
for Germany; it is also likely that, during the war, traditions
of state and administrative bureaucracy arose which blocked a
swift, private, capitalistic reconstruction as well as a clear
Socialist alternative. It is also indisputable that the war
frequently strengthened tendencies that had already been formed
before the war and thus influenced the future economic development
of the \Jeimar Republic.
The continuation of earlier trends is applicable to the
monopolization of the economy and the changes that were thereby
brought about in the economic system. The military bureaucracy
hastened this process with the help of the war industry, the
establishment of state production controls, and the regulation
of resources and goods, but it did not initiate it. In Germany,
a collapse of the liberal-capitalistic competition mechanisms
and a changeover to a system organized by syndicates, big business
associations, and state bureaucracy had been already noticed by
the 1390s. Therefore, it would be a reversal of cause and effect
if one merely wished to view the monopolization of the 1920s as
a result of the war.
Furti1er continuities exist. Although the ruin of the liberal
world-trade systeia after 1918 was a direct consequence of the war,
there were signs as early as the 1330s of a neomercantilist
protection of trade. Such tendencies appeared in all of the
European countries after the turn of the century. The government's
influence uron the economy, i1owever, intensified durinp, t:1e
course of the war. Out of the humble beginnings of the War
Hutrition and Resources Administration, a bureaucratized war
economy developed as of 1916 and subjected every phase of
production and distribution to public regulation. But even here,
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at least in the very important raw material industries, prices and
sales usually ceased to be determined by market mechanisms and
were increasingly submitted to cartel agreements in the various
spheres of production.
Finally, in Germany, governmental influence was traditionally
more significant than in other large industrial countries.
Decades before ti1e First World war, the government obtained
significant shares of heavy industry and developed into one of
the largest bankers. The Gemeindesozialismus (socialism of the
communities) promoted an expansive public assistance program even
before the turn of the century. In addition, Germany's individual
social security system for old ase, illness, and invalids had
already been carried over from the Bismarck era' s quasi-governmental
institutions. The example of governmental intervention therefore
demonstrates that many social and economic political problems
after 1913 only can be understood if the interventionist
mechanisms created since the lß90s and the corporatist penetration
of the economy are taken into consideration. This, however,
does not mean that the significance of the war should be underestimated because without it, these tendencies would probably
have just appeared in weakened form and after a time, dissipated.
The immediate economic problems of the new Republic were without
question direct results of tne war. They partially resulted from
the stipulations of the peace treaty and partially from the
economic waste of the war years. Accordinß to the peace treaty,
Germany had to surrender one-tenth of its territory and
po!'ulation. Although East Prussia and parts of \lest Prussia
were less economically important agricultural regions, the lass
of Alsace-Lorraine, East-Upper Silesia and the Saarland were a
heavy burden on the economic balance. It vJas in these areas
that a large part of German industry's valuable natural resources
were located--for example, one-fourth of the coal production.
The turning over of tl1e merchant marine without compensation and
the lass of German assets abroad caused similar difficulties
since their revenues before the war were important elements of
Germany's positive balance of trade and payments. The lasses
of these assets directly affected only the large banks and the
relevant industries, but even the social democratic government
could not remain indifferent to the wide-reaching consequences.
After 1913, the revenues from services and foreign capital were
no langer available for leveling a trade balance that had already
been negative before the war. Yet, more than ever, the German
economy needed a positive balance of payments because of political
burdens. This was above all true because, with their reparation
demands, the victorious allies, at least immediately after the
war, had counted upon bindering Germany for several generations.
The allies actually carried through nore realistic policies
within a few years, due above all to pressure from the United
States, which was persistently interested in an economic exchange
with Germany. l<otwithstanding the importance of the question of
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reparation for the \veimar Republic' s foreign and domes tic policy,
the economic politics and the economic development of Germany
we re on the whole les s affected by it than was feared in the first
few years following the war. The original astronomically high
reparation claim of 132 billion marl~s (which was double the
nation's prewar income) did not harm the German economy, since
there was no point in time when it 1.;as required to carry the full
burden. Between 1924 and 1932 , 28 billion marks were transferred
abroad, but simultaneously, the same amount of foreign capital
flowed back into Germany, particularly froTI the United States.
As paradoxical as it may seem, the reparation problern worked
like an economic stimulant, thanks mostly to the lending policies
to which it was tied. Glose analysis unmasks as mythical the
connection betwee n economic instability and payments abroad,
claimed by all German parties at the time. Still, this economic
relativity does not diminish the oolitical weight of the
reparations. Reparation payments served as a ?ermanent leverage
for right-radical agitation up until the 1930s and had considerable
political and psychological significance.
The second major economic problern of the 1920s developed out of
the inflation. The German public also siraplified the causes of
inflation by seeing its origins solely in the reparations
requirements. Actually, the inflationwas a liability resulting
from the war, specifically from the method of financing the
war. In 191G, Germany's debts amounted to 150 billion marks-approximately twice the sum of the national income in 1913. To
pay this debt and the interest upon it would have required greater
means than the entire national expenditures before the war. To
have avoided the development from war-time inflation to galloping
depreciation of the currency, the imbalance between the
circulation of money and the real production possibilities should
have been corrected. That, however, would have meant cutting
the nation's debt drastically by splitting the value of the currency
and by not allowing the national budget to be a continuing
source of inflation.
Each of these alternatives was unpopular, and actually, all of
the European countries that had participated in the war were
harassed by inflation after the war. Of course, the clearest
sign of this was the devaluation of the German currency, since
the government di<i nothing until 1922 to limit the potential
of inflation. On the contrary, the government contributed to
the process of inflation through the increasing budget deficit and
through the large-scale printing of money. The government's
revenues amounted to 13.2 billion l1arks from 1920 to 1922,
whereas expenditures came to 33.3 billion, based upon the value
of ti1e gold mark before the First 'Jorld War. This immense
deficit economy not only promoted t:1e devaluation of the
currency, but caused t ·,1e postwar booTI a t the same time. In
this fashion, the state remairred capable of engaging in
Sozialpolitik, wiüch was significant in view of the revolutionary
pressures at harne. The accompanying full employment policy
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helped to create jobs, thus easing the worker's integration into
the new system, particularly since the government spent twice
as much as in 1913 despite a gr ea tly diminished r,ross national
product. 7
Those hurt by this inflationary policy (which did not end until
the complete collapse of the currency in 1923) were, above all,
the old middle class. Employees and industrialists profited
from the inflation in their own way, whether through full
employ~ent or through large profits.
Thus, a silent coalition
of interest s arose (consisting of government, bie business, and
trade unions) against which small businesses and mvners of money
wealth were powerless. Until 1923, their v1ealth and claims on
government and business were worthless paper. It is difficult
to determine who was really harmed, since even within the
Mittelstand, there were groups who, as debtors, profited from
the inflation. Farmers and owners of tenement buildings
belonged to such groups. Then there is, finally, the insoluble
question of to w:1om the "inflation gains" on the part of the
state can be attributed, since plausible estimates are not
available of how public expenditures during the inflation
affected the various classes. In any case, the temporary
advantage for the governme nts was politically insured; it could
credit itself with the liquidation of state debt and the avoidance
of unemployment. The owners of tangibles, generally including
entrepreneurs, also benefited. Yet in the long run, damages
to the German democracy far surpassed the advantages to
individual groups. The economic ruin of a part of the l1ittelstand
increased their susceptibility to right-wing political radicalism.
The radicalization of the Mittelstand was also encouraged by
the economic concentration promoted by inflation and the
connected loss of status suffered by small manufacturers,
traders, and craftsmen.
All groups benefited from the prosperity phase following the
stabilization crisis of 1923-24. However, they did so to
markedly different degrees. The civil servants could not regain
their privileged prewa r position. For workers and white-collar
employees, however, the real wages and salaries increased
relatively si§nificantly, that is, 26 percent and 16 percent
respectively.
Considering the impoverishment of the population
during the war and inflation periods, this did not mean that
mass prosperity had set in, as was the case in the United States.
Nevertheless, the population enjoyed a relatively low level of
unemployment and experienced political and social stability on
the domestic front. During the five years from 1924 to 1929,
important CJrogress in the Sozialpolitik, improvements in living
conditions, and an expansion of the public infrastructure could
be achieved. The distribution of income within German society
shifted in favor of workers and employees at the expense of
those who derived their income from Money wealth or CJroperty. 9
The share of wage and salary incomes increased from 70.9 percent
of the GHP in 1910-13 to 37.3 percent of the G~<P in 1925-29.
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Only after the fascists rase to power did this percentage-during a period of growth in the military industrial complex
(1935-33)--fall again to 73 percent of the GNP.
The develo,ment in private income confirms this trend favoring
wage and salary earners. Between 1913 and 1923, private
incomes increased from 66.1 billion to 72.7 billion marks.
Simultaneously, the income of the self-employed segments
decreased from 2.::i billion to 18 billion marks, and the income
derived from wealth and rent decreased fron 10 billion to 3.6
billion marks. In contrast, wages, salaries, pensions, and
various supportin3 transfer payments jumped from 33.6 to 51
billion marks.
After Uorld llar I, the most severe lasses were experienced by
those who derived income from money wealth. Inflation erased
the rentier category just as it erased a large portion of the
self-employed and dependent Mittelstand's wealth. In this
manner, income derived from wages rase in the 1920s faster than
the income of the self-employed. In 1925, the average income of
the non-self-employed amounted to 43 percent of that of the
self-employed, as compared to 40 percent in 1913.10 All in all,
the non-self-employed could count themselves among the modest
beneficiaries of an economic development in which their real
income reached tne prewar level sametime between 1925 and 1929.
In part, this was also due to increased state transfer payments,
whic:1 to a larger extent went to the non-self-employed than to
groups with a higher income. Avera3e figures, however, hide
the redistribution of income within the wage-and-salary-earner
category, which consisted primarily in a decrease of the spread
in inequali ty .11 Before the First ~lorld llar, the income gap
between the skilled and unskilled workers was markedly larger
than in 1913. The same pattern also held for civil servants
and white-collar employees.
The farmers' income trend deviated from that of the wage and
salary earners. The years of relative prosperity were accompanied
by a worldwide depression in agriculture so that, by 1923, the
income gap between the farmers and the rest of the population
amounted to 44 percent.12 During t:1e last prewar year, however,
this gap was only half as large. Decreasing yields per acre
during the war, an international price collapse for agricultural
products, and, finally, the stagnation in the consumption of
agricultural products led to a noticeable worsening of the farmers'
social position. Although most of the famers could pay back
their debts during the inflation period, only a few years later
they became just as indebted as before. ßy the end of the 1920s,
therefore, the farmers proved to be a source of political
radicalism, particularly in Germany's Protestant north and east.
Also, this turning away from the republic, as reflected in voting
behavior, could not be prevented by the voluminous support and
subsidy programs, of which agriculture was the main beneficiary.
On t:1e contrary, Brllning, the last not openly antidemocratic
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Chancellor of the republic, failed despite his active agricultural
policy in the fall of 1932 because of a coalition of dissatisfied
entrepreneurs and large landholders. The fruits of this crisis,
here as elsewhere, were reaped by the National Socialists.
CONCLUSION
Through its policies , the state influenced the course of
development in the economy and society for some years. llowever,
i t did not provide the German population with a fundamentally
new, anticapitalist perspective. Similarly , the Social Democrats
showed little inclination in 1919-20 to put into effect the
prewar demands (which were part of their pa rt y program) for state
planning and the socialization of the means of ~roduction.
The question must even be asked whether or not they would have
been ab le to do so since, in parliament they depended on the
cooperatiorr of the left-liberal bourgeoisie. In place of
fundamental reforms, capitalist market mechanisms began to assert
themselves again throughout the economy after a short transition
period. Facing the extra-parliamentary worker and soldiers '
council movement, the parliamentary left--given the relative
strength of the council movement--sllied away from a conflict with
traditional powers . It believed itself to be dependent on the
cooperation of the conservatively minded state bureaucracy, The
parliamentary left was also afraid that fundamental socialistic
changes in the economic system would prevent rather than
facili tate, so lut ions for the Republic ' s already grave economic
problems. It therefore was logical that, of the socialization
promises of 1919, only the rudiments remained, concerning
primarily state influenced car tels in coal and potassium
production. llowever, these arrangements had little in common
with socialism, since large enterprises ap,ain enjoyed the most
influence.
It would nevertheless be unjustified to blame the Social Democratic
c hancellors of the fi rst postwar years for me rely restoring
traditional capitalism. A shift of power in favor of the state
and away from private capital did occur, since the various
gov ernments gained influence in many , mostly indirect, ways.
The increased volume of government spending alone strengtherred
the role of the state as a redistributing agent of the GNP. Thus,
Ueimar coalition governments were at least in a position t o
correct some of the undesired social effects of the private
market system. This ne'~ interventionism also caused a
strengtherring of the federal government's institutions at the
expense of the competencies of various states and communities.
It therefore promoted a trend that countered the historically
fastered German fe derali s m.
The most remarkable area of the state's new activities--and at
the same time ex~ressive of the most positive political changes
as compared to the Kaiserreich--was that of Sozialpolitik,
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Because of its Qultidimensionality, it became in many ways a
model for the new post-World I/ar I German welfare state
interventionism. 7 hree areas of this Sozialpolitik were
particularly exemplary: The continued development in (1) labor
law, (2) housing and public health, and finally, (3) the extension
of co~unal services . The introduction of the eight-hour day
(which was one of the first 'l!easu::es tal~en after the revolution)
became symbolic of a number of labor-law changes through which
relations bet1veen classes were to become newly r-egulated. Of
particular importance for the social reality of the 1920s was
the introduction of the collective labor law, mainly because
it included an official recognition of collective bargaining.
In part, however, these laws, sup~lemented by the law regulating
the intro duction of worker representation on the factory level
(Betriebsdlte) of privately owned firms, bad only tended to
confirm what bad become social reality.
The relationship between
labor unians and entrepreneurs had already begun to change by
the First World War. This found its expression in the founding
of a central cooperative body ( Zeotrale Arbeitsgemeinschaft),
which included unians a'nd business associations. llithin this
frame~Vork, new industry - wide labor contrac t s and new limited
forms of cooperation were agreed uoon. Although this body
rapidly lost its practical significance after 1921, its politicalpsychological significance was nevertheless imoortant at the
beginnin g of the Republic. On the one hand, it pointed the way
for the collective labor law that later became a part of the
1\leimar Sozialpolitik; on the other hand, it demonstrated labor's
and business 1 s 1vill to independen tly deal wi th labor market
issues, particularly since the state had not yet become fully
stabilized.
The cooperation between the se organized social forces
had been ques tioned frorn the very be g inning, ini tially within
labor unians and later, after consolidation of their own power
posi tion had taken place, among entrepreneurs. l1any union members
saw in this cooperation oerely the continuance of the truce
maintained during the wa r and believed that the entrepreneurs '
co nc ess ions reflected their fear of a revolutionary change in
society . Indeed, this cooperation 1vas initially more advantageaus
for the entrepreneurs than for the workers since it implied that
capitalist power relationships were in principle accepted by
the unions.
In the face of the g rowing self-consciousness
evident among union raak and file members--which in part was
due to the drastic increase in union membershiTJ--the union
leadership, after 1920, had t o distinctl y emphasize the gap
between itself and the entrepreneurs. This was not easily
possible wi thin the Zentrale Arbeitsgemeinschaft . ~<o small
Qatter, union membership increased from 3 million in 1913-after a low of 1. :Z million during the Har--t o 9. 2 million in
1920 . The unions' coo~eration with the class enemy, coupled
with this expansion in membership, allowed them to strongly
influence le g islation concerning work and collective bargaining.
At least at the beginning of the Republic, they could also affect
the state ' s Sozialpolitik . This was short-lived , however,
since unio:1 power peaked b y 1921-22. During the period of
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inflation, membership decreased by .30 percent and, after 1924,
the unians Here only one interest group amonß others. They enjoyeo
more influence than they had had before 1914, but it \vas a
meager acconplishment if measured by the hopes and expectations
held by a majority of the workers in 1913.
The Weimar state "'as relatively late in beginning to influence
the producer cartel of entrepreneurs and unions. The constitution
had provided a many-faceted role for the state in the area of
Sozialpali tik.
The governments, however, limited themselves initially to
securing, on the labor market, the social compromises made by
the parties. Even the already mentioned lvorker factory
representation law (Betriebsr~tegesetz) of 1920 was only the
continuation of a policy ini tiated during liorld Uar I. Only when,
during the period of inflation, the unions' and entrepreneurs'
ability to compromise declined, was the state practically
forced to increasingly influence the nature of collective
bargaining agreements and wage policies by resorting to forced
arbitration. Virtually all important collective bargaining
agreements between 1924 and 1932 were the result of such forced
arbitration. This indicates that the 1913 agreed-upon free play
of forces on the labor market did not function. For their
part, unians evaluated the state's intervention positively until
the Great Depression. IHth wage disputes, state arbitration
tended to be more in favor of workers than of entrepreneurs,
which induced the entrepreneurs to fundamentally question this
system in 1923.13 Only during the Great Depression and at a
time of rigorously pursued deflationary and economic cleansing
policies was state arbitration used against the workers. These
different experiences during the various phases of the Weimar
Republic explain why in 1945 neither entrepreneurs nor unians
were willing to institutionalize state arbitration.
A quantitative expression of the state's Sozialpolitik was the
quadrupling of public Axpenditures for social purposes since 1913.
This occurred despite a stagnating GNP.l4 During the sametime
span, 1913-30, total public expenditures doubled and the
expenditures for education increased by 60 percent. In contrast,
defense expenditures decreased to less than one-third of its
prewar level. An example of this new form of Sozialpolitik was
the state's public housing program. Before the war, only about
every tenth apartment had been cofinanced by the state. Between
1919 and 1930 this increased to 30 percent. These measures
markedly improved the problern of shortages in apartments, but
did not fully overcome it.
The decade from 1919 to 1929, it can be concluded, brought about
a qualitatively new welfare-state interventionism, which could
have corrected the market's distribution processes but only
indirectly influenced the capitalist economic structure.
Attempts an the part of the German left to fundamentally change
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the system; for example, through socialization of means of
production or through workers and soldier councils, remained
without practical consequences and fell apart almost from the
outset. Despite all the Opposition against Sozialpolitik and
hidden socialization (Kalte Sozialisierung) the entrepreneurs
would certainly have been able to live with this sociopolitical
class struggle compromise, and farsighted industrialists promoted
it. State redistribution efforts seldom hindered free-market
activity; often it supplemented or even promoted it. l!owever,
even this welfare-state reformism broke apart during the Great
Depression because of the consensus destroying tactics employed
by big business and big agriculture interests who believed,
in 1930, that the time for a turn around had come. Their cry
against deficit spending, politically realized by the vigorously
pursued deflationary policy at the expense of employees under
Chancellors Brllning, Papen, and Schleicher, liquidated all
important welfare-state measures even before 1933. As regards to
Sozialpolitik, therefore, l!itler did not represent a new
beginning. On the contrary, he systematically pursued those
conservative ideologies that had become guide posts of German
political thinking by 1931-32.
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude from the increase
in conservative and authoritarian tendencies, the inevitability
of fascism. Until the September elections of 1930, the NSDAP-although making lots of noise--was an insignificant splinter
group on the right of the German party spectrurn. Only the very
critical combination of economic crisis, unemployment,
conservative-authoritarian undermining of the constitutional
welfare state, and the radical-nationalist agitation gave the
NSDAP a chance to quantitatively become an important movement.
Despite its power monopoly, however, it even failed in 1933 to
gain an absolute majority. Its mass basis did not consist of
those who suffered most from the Great Depression--the workers-but of the broad spectrum of Hittelstand groups in the city and
the country who became economically threatened and felt socially
insecure. They were supplemented by socially uprooted, unemployed,
young students without much of a professional future and former
soldiers lacking bonds to the civilized order of everyday
democratic life. During times of economic crisis, the diffuse
anticapitalism of the German population did not stabilize the
Republic. Instead it destroyed it because it lacked a
progressive change-oriented perspective. It is the ironic
tragedy of the Ueimar Republic that the National Socialists'
anticapitalist slogans became democracy's death song. In its
place came a system which not only stood for fanatical racism
and the Holocaust, but which also robbed the rnajority of Germans
of the modest fruits gained by the century-long struggle for a
constitutional and democratic welfare state.
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4
The Social Origins
of Nazism:
The Rural Dimensions
TIMOTHY A. TILTON

The Nazis attracted disproportionately large support in rural
areas. Their greatest electoral successes came in such rural
districts as Schleswig-Holstein (the only electoral district to
give the Nazis an absolute majority before the party came to
power), Lower Saxony, Pomerania, and Hecklenbur:_~. Within these
provinces, the Nazis drew their strongest support in rural areas;
in Schleswig-Holstein, for example, rural communities cast 63.3
percent of their votes for the NSDAP in July 1932, while urban
centers cast 44.3 percent for the ~SDAP.l The percentage of
peasants and farmers joining the party sometimes lagged behind
the voting results, but the intensity of rural support for Hitler
was strong. The Strategie Bombing Surve~ reported that rural
areas nanifested the highest war morale.
Above all, it was the
party's breakthrough in the countryside from 1928 to 1932 that
gave it political importance.
How can one explain the susceptibility of the countryside to
l<azi appeals? First, one must discern which rural voters backed
the NSDAP. Then, by a~alyzing the party's development, its
appeals, its organization, and its opposition, one can hope to
understand why tnese voters enlisted under the i-lazi banner.
Both of these steps are essential: Only by comprehending which
individual voters lent their support is it possible to appreciate
the causes of the Nazis' success. To bring intellectual order
to the plethora of sociological and psychological explanations
of nazism, it is essential to penetrate to the motivation of
these individual voters. Who the rural ~azi supporters were and
why they gave their support constitute the focus of this chapter.
Hitler's early plans for the seizure of power envisioned a coup
similar to that of Uussolini's in Italy. By building support
in the cities a~d by developing an armed force, the Nazis could
seize control of the dominant means of production, transportation,
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communication, administration, and violence. The turn from this
strategy to a more rural and electoral orientation took place
between 1924 and 1923. Two factors conditioned this change of
emphasis: First, Hitler's dismal failure in the Beer-Ilall Putsch
of 1923, his subsequent imprisonment, and the restrictions upon
his political activity convinced him that the NSDAP must pursue
a strategy that would at least appear legal and parliamentary.
Second, the party's unimpressive showing in urban areas in the
1923 Reichstag elections and its surprising success in such
rural regions as Schleswig-Holstein, parts of nanover, and
Franconia prompted a redirection of effort.
A week after the 1923 elections, tne party newspaper carried an
article demonstrating how the party's rural successes produced
a shift in strategy:
The election results in the country show that with
less expenditure of effort, money and time greater
successes can be achieved there than in the large
towns. National Socialist mass meetings in small
towns and market communities are important events and
form the topic of daily conversation for weeks afterwards,
while in the large towns meetings even with 3,000 and
4,000 people sink into insignificance and pass away.3
From this point the NSDAP, in Orlow' s 1vorris, "deliberately set
out to become the political party that gave the most blatant
expression to the fears and prejudices of the middle- and
particularly the lower-middle-classes in the rural and small-town
regions of Germany. 1•
These efforts bare fruit in the 1929 local elections and then
dramatically in the 1930 Reichstag election when the NSDAP
became the second largest party in the state, attracting 6.4
million voters and electing 107 Reichstag deputies. The party's
greatest support came from agricultural and middle-class
(especially lower-middle-class) regions in Protestant northern
Germany. In Catnolic districts and urban working-class districts,
the party fared much poorer. In 1931 and 1932 the NSDAP seized
control of major agricultural interest organizations, gaining
power from the grass roots up. In the July 1932 Reichstag
elections, the party registered impressive gains virtually
everywhere, but again its greatest strength lay in the rural
north; it lagged in southern Germany and industrial areas. The
November elections and subsequent local elections produced NSDAP
setbacks everywhere, but the l1arch 1933 elections (held after
the Nazis controlled the state machinery) produced enormaus
Nazi majorities in rural areas, although the Nazis still failed
to achieve a majority of the votes in the nation as a whole.
These global data demonstrate the ~azis' appeal for the Protestant
rural middle class, but for a more discriminating view one needs
to consult regional studies.
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Rudolf Heberle's pioneering research continues to be the most
valuable of a growing collection of excellent regional and local
investigations. l!eberle's sensitive analysis of electoral
patterns in Schleswig-Holstein begins with a sketch of the three
major geographic areas of the province: The lush west coast
marshes with a risk-filled econamy based on cattle-grazing and
cabbage-growing and a society marked by sharp class differences
between the wealthy farmers and the comparatively small stratum
of farm workers; the eastern hill area with a social and
economic structure characterized largely by estate agriculture;
and the rolling, sandy Geest, a backward region of small peasant
farmers and Dorfgemeinschaft (village community). The Nazis
succeeded best in the Geest:

Table 4.1
NSDAP Vote (percent of total vote)

1923
1930
1932 (July)
Source:

Uarsh

Geest

Hill Area

7.9
41.2
61.6

15.9
45.9
78.7

2 .0
24.3
57.1

Rudolph l!eberle, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1945), p. 99.

In the marshes and the hill area the rural working class voted
steadily and dominantly for the Socialists or Communists, whereas
the smaller rural proletariat of the Geest shed its allegiance to
the Social Democrarie Party (SPD) to vote first for the German
National People's Party (DNVP) and then for the Nazis.
Heberle's analysis of the variation in voting patterns within
Schleswig-Holstein strongly suggests that an abundance of family
farmers and the relative absence of a distinct upper and
especially of a lower class, as on the Geest, promoted Nazi
gains. His correlations between voting and occupational status
confirm this finding. The correlation between Nazi voting in
July 1932 and the presence of small farmers is an eye-catching
+.35. Nazi success also correlates highly with the percentage
of independent proprietors, but negatively with the presence of
wage earners. A typical Nazi supporter voted for the liberal
parties immediately after the war, then for the German Nationalists
in the mid-1920s, and finally for the Nazis. In short, the Nazis
drew their adherents from family farmers who had previously
supported liberal parties.
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Gerhard Stoltenberg, the prominent CDU politician, has
supplemented Heberle's analysis in two useful ways. First, he
shows how the DNVP pursued a radical and antirepublican
nationalism that attracted a broad rural following in the midtwenties: It proved particularly compelling for the estate
owners of the eastern hill area, who remairred faithful to the
DNVP into 1933. The DNVP's success in mid-decade indicates that
the rural population had abandoned its allegiance to the Republic
before the Hazi upsurge.
Stoltenberg also shows how the liberal and rightist parties
failed to establish local organizational roots. In local
elections the bourgeois parties yielded to local alliances
claiming to be above parties. These minor "apolitical" local
groupings evinced the rural property holders' and artisans'
distrust of the urban middle-class parties and of the parliamentary
system as a whole.s All this evidence indicates that the rural
population, particularly the farmers, craftsmen, and merchants,
did not switch abruptly from a staunch liberalism to nazism,
but rather that they had never shown great enthusiasm for the
Weimar Republic.6
The political situation in Lower Saxony (the Prussian provinces
of Hanover, Oldenburg /excluding Birkenfeld and LUbeck/,
Brunswick, and SchaumbÜrg-Lippe /excluding Bremen/) and its
evolution closely resembled developments in Schleswig-Holstein.
In both areas the NSDAP's first supporters were radical rightists
with ties to older Freikorps, vHlkisch, or rightist organizations.
Prior to 1930, party members came largely from the 11ittelstand-peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, small businessmen, and whitecollar workers; they tended to be young and many had served in
World \lar I. In Lower Saxony ,. Jeremy Noakes reports, two-thirds
of the membership "was under forty, with slightly more falling in
the twenty-one to thirty age group than the thirty-one to forty
group; 37 percent of the members were ex-servicemen.7 Their
devotion to the party was fanatical.
In 1930 the NSDAP vote in Lower Saxony increased to 23 percent
from 4.5 percent in 1923. The new HSDAP voters came from among
previous nonvoters and defectors from the bourgeois parties.
The party's strongholds lay in North Oldenburg and East Friesland
and Kreise like Diepholz and Hoya--remote agricultural areas with
poor Geest or moor conditions. The Nazis fell below average
in two areas, first in Catholic areas in South Oldenburg and
OsnabrUck, where "religious loyalties were strong enough to
withstand even the severest economic crisis," and second in
LUneburg, where deeply conser;~tive peasants remairred suspicious
of the Nazis and retained their traditional loyalty to the Guelph
party.ß
The July 1932 Reichstag elections demonstrated a further
radicalization of the Lower Saxon electorate. The Nazis garnered
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45.2 percent of the ballots. The Nazis' strongest bastions lay in
remote, backward areas, where modern communications and social
and economic organization penetrated only slowly, and traditional
rural communities persisted.9
The Bavariru1 countryside, with its predominantly Catholic
population, affered sterner resistance to llazi inroads. The
Nazis were slow in recruiting the Catholic peasantry. Available
evidence indicates that the small-town bourgeoisie formed the
backhone of the party in Bavaria, but the peasantry was
distinctly underrepresented. As late as 1928, Bavaria remained the
center of !~azi support in the coun try as a whole; the party
received 6.3 percent of the vote in Bavaria, but only 2.6
percent nationwide. Nonetheless, Geoffrey Pridham observes,
"the tlSDAP had failed • • • to ma;,e nuch impact on the country
areas, which in the predominantly rural state of Bavaria was
crucial."lO Only in some Protestant areas of Franconia did the
Nazis attract a sizeable rural following: Disenchanted Catholic
peasants supported the local ßaverischer Bauern--und
Hittelstandsbund (ßBHB).
As elsewhere, in Bavaria the 1930 Reichstag elections marked a
substantial llazi advance, even though the provincial vote fell
slightly below the national average, and the party's center of
electoral gravity shifted north and east.ll
The Nazis drew support from previous DNVP and BBHB voters who had
become disillusioned by their parties' participation in government
coalitions; rather than continue with parties tainted by their
collusion with tne Weimar system, these voters opted for the
undiluted radicalism of the HSDAP. The ::lazis also seem to have
benefited from the rise in voter participation: In Bavaria as
elsewhere "the overwhelming majority of new voters seem to have
supported the NSDAP."12
The Nazi rural propaganda campaign produced results after 1930.
As Pridham states, "the stampede of peasant voters to the NSDAP
finally came in the Reichstag Election of July 1932, although
this did not happen in the former Bßlill stranghold of Lower
Bavaria until the election of Harch 1933."13 ßy capturing
disillusioned BBHB voters in even greater numbers, enlisting
almost all the Deutsche Landvolk supporters, and attracting many
new voters, the ~arty registered enormaus advances in rural
areas. In the September 193J elections, the towns of Franconia
had voted 24.4 percent for the NSDAP, the rural areas 22 .7
percent. In July 19 32, the towns produced 39.J percent, the
countryside a striking 59.8 percent Nazi votes. With some local
exceptions like tlte city of Passau, Catholic areas proved far
more resistant to Nazi appeals than Protestant districts; not
until the March 1933 elections, when the llazis' control of the
state allowed them distinctly new opportunities for propaganda
and coercion, did the NSDAP finally win strong backing from
Bavaria's rural Catholics.
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This regional evidence allows one to conclude that the rural
population uf the 1/eim<>.-c Republic, never staunchly supportive
of its institutions, began abandonine the Republic in the aftermath
of the inflation crisis of 1923-1924. It turned first to rightwing parties like the DHVP and to local coalitions and then to
the Nazis. The rural middle class, the small farmers, artisans,
shopkeepers, and businessmen, formed the core of the Nazi
electorate; in many regions they enlisted or intimidated farm
workers and domestic servants into supporting the Nazi cause.
Everywhere the Nazis succeeded in bringing new voters to the
polls, people who had previously abstained from elections.
Catholics resisted the Hazi appeal more steadfastly than did
Protestants, but even in Bavaria most of them eventually voted
for the NSDAP.
The facts regarding the Nazis' ascendancy in the German
countryside and the major sources of their support are relatively
undisputed; explanations for their ascent are, however,
distinctly rnore controversial. To many contemporary Germans and
to a segment of the academic community, the economic depression
offers a satisfactory explanation of the Hazi upsurge.l4 To
others, the economic suffering of the rural poryulation was more
imagined than real; for them the rise of rural nazism represents
either an irrational reaction to economic and social fears or
a conscious commitment to extreme right-wing nationalism. Given
the enormaus number of individuals who voted for the ~-SDAP and
the potential complexity of motivation in each individual case,
it is unlikely that any single explanation will suffice; a
variety of explanations must be advanced to account for the
various grounds for NSDAP support. This commitment to a more
synthetic and integrated explanation does not imply, however,
that all explanations are equally valid; to understand the causes
of the Nazis' rural victories requires more detailed scrutiny
of the factors contributing to their advance.
Economic hardship certainly promoted the rise of the NSDAP. The
ravages of the great inflation left many farmers with substantial
debts. This was complicated by the general structural crisis
of German agriculture (engendered by the pampering of German
farmers behind hi gh tariff barriers) combined with cyclical
agricultural crises and declining urban consumption in the late
1920s, German farmers suf fered genuine distress. Farm prices
descended precipitously, incomes dropped, indebtedness and rural
underemployment grew, and the rate of foreclosures rose sharply.lS
Farmers' sons, who had hoped for urban jobs or stable rural
living, saw their hopes dashed; the growing number of restive
young men in the countryside was a conspicuous sign and result
of the general economic slump, but the depres sion alone did not
make them Nazis.
The economic determinist explanation of rural nazism, as Petzina
has already indicated, s uffers from numerous flaws. First, many
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strong Nazi supporters sustained little economic lass. Bodo Uhse
recalled that many of the rebellious Schleswig-Ilolstein farmers
were "not exactly the poorest;" they "sat like lords on proud
and splendid estates." And Rudolf aeberle suggests that
"increasing economic insecurity rat:1er than an actual suffering
from the agricultural depression" accounts for the turn to
nazism in Schleswig-Ilolstein's marshes.l6
The fit between agricultural distress and Nazi success is far
from perfect. As noted earlier, the Hazis advanced far more
slowly in Catholic than in Protestant areas even when economic
conditions were similar. Organized rural farm workers, who
endured privations at least as severe as those of other rural
groups, largely retained their traditional allegiance to the
Social Democrats, or if they defected, they veered to the
Communist left rather than the Nazi right. Regional aberrations
also occurred; Angeln in Schleswig-l!olstein did not feel the
impact of the economic crisis until late 1932, yet in July
the Nazis had already gained 70.3 ~ercent of the rural vote.l7
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that economic misery alone
cannot constitute a sufficient explanation of nazism's rural
appeal comes from international comparisons. Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden--to cite just three nearby European cases--all
underwent agricultural depressions in the same period, but rather
than yielding to nazism, rural Scandinavians proved largely
immune to faseist appeals, retained their allegiance to democratic
parties, and in many cases supported Social Democratic
initiatives.lß The Scandinavian experience does not demonstrate
that the depression was unimportant, but only that economic
events do not produce political results in a rigid and mechanical
fashion; people interpret the significance of economic events
in the light of their experience and intellectual tradition.
In Germany and in Scandinavia what proved decisive was not the
severity of the depression, but rural people's reaction to it,
their interpretation of its causes, and their choice of remedies.
As Barrington Moore, Jr., has written,
The partial failure of a set of institutions to live
up to what is expected of them provides an atmosphere
receptive to demands for a more or less extensive overhaul
of the status quo. At this juncture the future course
of events depends heavily upon the models of a better
world that become available to various strategic groups
in the population.l9
Thus, a more adequate explanation of the drift towards nazism
requires a consideration of traditional rural ideology, the
nature of the political system in rural areas, and the
character of Nazi organization and propaganda.
The German rural population never warmed to Weimar democracy.
Schleswig-i!olstein, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and other areas
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incorporated by Prussia into the new Germany, the rural people
longed for the simplicity of local government in a preindustrial
setting. They disliked r.~odern bureaucratic government with its
distant structure of authority, regulations, and higher taxes.
In particular, they disliked the Weimar Republic; at the time
of the Kapp Putsch, farm organizations expressed support for
Kapp's regime. As the 1920s unfolded, the rural people came to
see the \Veimar system as the tool of the Social Democrats who
used it to harass religious education, channel benefits to urban
workers rather than farmers, and permit what they regarded as
decadent cultural phenomena.
A host of extremist right-wing and nationalist organizations,
playing upon these attitudes and the belligerent nationalism of
the countryside, stoked the fires of discontent. Ludendorff's
Tannenburg League, the Stahlhelm, the Freikorps brigades, Werwolf,
and Landvolk movement, the Schleswig-llolstein Bond, and the
various vHlkisch organizations propagandized widely among the
rural population; even more respectable organizations like the
Landbund and the DNVP kept up .a steady barrage of antirepublican
propaganda. The constant virulent attacks upon the Versailles
treaty, the great inflation, and the Republic's social, cultural,
and military policy helped create a climate in which rational
political debate ceased to be effective and in which tendencies
to political irrationality could flourish.
The reigning climate of opinion predisposed rural folk to
interpret the depression in the categories of radical reaction,
but their deep-seated distrust of urban outsiders made them
suspicious of Hazi overtures. The !-lazis overcame this reluctance
by recruiting prominent local figures as their spokesmen;
especially in the early phases.20 Using the right man gave the
Nazis immediate respectability; where such figures did not exist,
the Nazis' legitimacy as a political alternative grew with their
electoral successes and their association with more established
conservative movements as in the Young Plan referendum.
Even if the antidemocratic, antisocialist, nationalist, and
militarist content of traditional ideology biased rural people,
drew them toward Nazi-like understandings of their Situations,
and lured them away from support of the Republic, the llazis
still had to assemble them under the swastika. This process
occurred late and rapidly. In l923 rural protest rallies
raised largely economic demands. In Lower Saxony, for example,
disgruntled rural groups called for protection against imports,
lower and simpler taxes, cuts in public expenditure and bureaucracy,
and the provision of long-term credit at low rates of interest .
Not merely farmers, but all those dependent upon agricultural
prosperity participated in a united demonstration of rural
dissatisfaction. They firrnly believed in the justice of their
cause and remained confident that the state would assist them.
Once their expectations of assistance were shattered and the
traditional rural interest groups and parties were discredited
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by their failure to obtain aid, the rural population's patience
with traditional arrangements was at an end. They were ready
to heed appeals for more radical measures.
The failure of the traditional rural parties and lobbying
organizations merits further consideration, for the turn to
nazism occurred in two stages . First there was a withdrawal from
the liberal parties and farm interest organizations and then
adherence to nazism. The very structure of the \leimar political
economy obstructed the possibilities for governmental aid to
farmers. The Social Democrats, the staunehest supporters of
the Republic, hesitated to extend help to agriculture because
they feared that lügher food prices or higher taxes would
alienate their urban working-class supporters. Furthermore,
they were slow to recognize that the family farmers of western
and southern Germany differed significantly from the Junkers;
not until 1923 did the Social Democrats promulgate a more
attractive agricultural program. This situation allowed the
Nazis to argue tl1.at farruers, as a permanent minority in an
industrial democracy, could never gain satisfaction of their
just demands and that only in the coming Third Reich would they
receive their due.
The Weimar party system further facilitated the Nazis' triumph
in two significant ways. First, the liberal bourgeois parties
failed to organize in rural areas; they renained
Honoratiorenparteien, loose groupings assembled around local
notaoles. llhen their program and performance no longer appealed
and their local leaders endorsed nazism, there were no
organizational loyalties, no local offices, no party services
to slow the tide of voters away from their ranks. The local
bourgeois electoral alliances for communal and provincial
elections likewise offered easy pickings for Nazi infiltration
and demolition. Second, · the variety of bourgeois parties meant
that electoral results alone seldom determined the participants
in national coalitions; instead deals among politicians in Berlin
created governments. There was no umbrella party like the
contemporary CDU to amalgamate bourgeois interests.21
In contrast, the energy and organization of the NSDAP were
essential conditions of its success. The Hazis pioneered a
new style of politics. They essentially militarized politics;
an electoral campaign was like a military operation. It
penetrated into every village and sought out every potential
recruit. It saturated areas with propaganda and followed up
with personal canvassing. Meetings were planned like batt1es;
the logistics of moving troops (SA and SS) were carefully
attended to.
The !lazis also pioneered a new style of internal organization.
To a degree then novel in German politics, the Hazis constituted
a Volkspartei, a party appealing to all classes and groups. In
its ranks it enlisted not only its middle-class core, but
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workers, professionals, business executives, and the lumpen
proletariat; Catholics, Protestants, and the irreligious; urban
and rural elements. This uneasy coalition held together through
the hope of success, Hitler's charisma, and the tlazi exploitation
of traditional anti-Semitism among German peasants. To many,
the l-lazis represented the last prospect of social order,
national resurrection, and economic salvation. llitler personified
these hopes and ~ersonal loyalty to him time and again overwhelmed
internal opposition >and tension. Anti-Semitism offered an
effective target for the conflicting animosities of Hitler's
followers; workers need not clash with capitalists nor farmers
with urban consumers if Jews rather than structural arrangements
created the conflicts. Rather than fall into internal dissension,
all classes could unite against the one "foreign" element in the
community.
The Nazis sought to organize not merely a political party, but
an entire society. In 1930 Darre·; the party' s agricultural
advisor, laid out a strategy to gain control of the traditional
rural .i nterest organizations through infiltration at the grass
roots and established a special organization, the Agrarpolitischer
Apparat, to execute this task. The Nazis swiftly seized control
of the Landbund, the Chambers of Agriculture, and the rural
artisans' organizations, in effect carrying out a Gleichschaltung
of agriculture before Hitler came to power.22
Elsewhere Nazi propaganda appeals proved extraordinarily effective
with the rural population. To separate the content of these
appeals from the style of Nazi propaganda is artificial, for
the intensity and emotionality of the effort often outweighed
any substantive content; nonetheless it is essential if one is
to form a judgment about the motivations of Nazi voters.
The centerpiece of Nazi agrarian propaganda was the Agrarian
Program of !1arch 7, 1930. Based largely on the ideas of
R. \lalther Darre', the agrarian program began with a statement
of the centrality of agriculture and the peasantry for Germany's
future. It argued that the ~resent international situation and
the current German state made a restoration of agriculture
impossible; taxation, tariff policies, and the exorbitant profits
of Jewish middlemen and fertilizer dealers condemned farmers to
penury. The program then proposed a series of measures to ensure
farmers against the loss of their farms. It concluded by
emphasizing the ~aralysis of the existing interest organizations
and stressing that only the Nazi movement could save the farmers
and the country.
The Nazis courted the rural ~opulation with specific proposals,
but these proposals alone cannot explain their success. In
addition, they denounced Marxism, they attacked the liberalism
of their major rural opponents, condemning their emphasis on
individualism, profit, and internationalism. They held out the
prospect of an organic German community in which farmers enjoyed
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high status and esteem.
They also employed anti-Semitic appeals. The sparse and
anecdotal evidence available prevents precise judgments, but
it is clear that anti-Semitic attitudes were prevalent among
the rural population, although they seldom attained the virulence
typical of leading Nazi propagandists. The Nazis regularly used
anti-Semitism to appeal to economic self-interest; they castigated
the machinations of Jewish cattle dealers, shopkeepers, and
bankers as the source of all economic woes. They aroused
traditionalist feeling by censuring the encroachment of Jewish
entrepreneurs upon long-standing economic organizations; as
Noakes nicely says: "The Jews, who in the countryside tended
to represent the forces of the market in the flesh and who were
rightly seen as pioneers of modern ideas and forms in culture,
were made scapegoats for the dislike of modern developments in
general. "23 Finally, the Nazis spoke to the mos t irrational
elements of the personality, weaving lurid fantasies about
the depravity of Jews.
Just how effective these anti-Semitic ideologies were in
attracting support is difficult to judge. Noakes maintains
that in Lower Saxony "anti-Semitism appears to have been a major
theme between 1925 and 1930, particularly during the Mittelstand
campaign of 1923-30. After 1930, however, while remaining · an
important theme, it was used more as a background to a~peals
to economic interest and general political propaganda. 4
Pridham contends that in Bavaria
anti-Semitism did not form specifically one of the
major themes of party propaganda in the early 1930s,
but it often provided a leitmotiv for the major
propaganda themes since the NSDAP's appeal on economic
and political issues was frequently couched in antiSemitic terms. The majority of Nazi voters in the
elections of 1930-32 were probably little influenced
directly by the racialist ideology of the NSDAP, as they
were primarily voting for a change in circumstances,25
Similarly, in Schleswig-Holstein the majority of Nazi voters,
while susceptible to anti-Semitic propaganda, do not seem to
have anticipated the steps to which the Nazis would go. What
is striking is the voters' unwillingness to be shocked by the
violence and indecency of the Nazis' anti-Semitism and their
willingness to accept the Nazi explanation of the Jewish origin
of their economic and political troubles.
This brief survey indicates that rural Germans succumbed to
the ~SDAP for a variety of reasons. Both collectively and as
individuals, they succumbed to appeals based on economic selfinterest, fears of loss of status, antipathy to modern institutions
and culture, the desire for a national revival, intimidation,
anti-Semitism, and a host of irrational drives. The greater the
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economic and political uncertainty, the greater was their
susceptibility to irrational appeals and their tolerance for
Nazi violence. Finally, many simply yielded to the apparent
irresistibility of the J.lazi advance.
The Nazis triumphed, then, not because of the depression alone,
but because rural people interpreted their difficulties in the
categories of nationalist reaction. Uodern liberalism had made
little ideological or organizational impact upon their
traditional way of life and mental outlook. Steeped in
conservative, provincial, and anti-!1arxist prejudices, they
chose, particularly in Protestant areas, to blame their economic
problems on the deviousness of international bankers, Jews,
and Socialists rather then recognizing theM as the result of
severe sttuctural and cyclical crises and poor harvests caused by
bad weather. The reactionary nationalists, who had never
reconciled themselves to a defeated and democratic republic,
overwhelmed the poorly organized liberal forces. The sheer
energy and organization of the Nazi party allowed it to overcome
the few remaining scruples.
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5
Composition and
Evolution of the
Nazi Elite
JOHN NAGLE

A continuinß topic of debate on the nature of fascism is its
class composition within capitalist society. From the analysis
of the class nature of fascism follow theories on the connection
between fascism and capitalism and often speculation on the
likelihood of fascism as a general stage of capitalist development
or a possible capitalist alternative to liberal democracy. The
analysis presented here adds some further bits of evidence to
this discussion without pretense of being either comprehensive
or, as it turns out, particularly conclusive.
SOCIAL C0!1POSITIOH--EVIDENCE AND FIHDINGS

Previous studies of the Nazi movement have examined social
composition of its voters, its membership, and its leadership
at various levels.l Several points of emphasis have emerged
from this literature which may be summarized in thesis form
as follows:
1. The Nazi movement was drawn predominantly from the lower
middle class, those elements of society positioned
between the capitalist/big business and landowning class,
and the wage-working industrial proletariat.
2. The Nazi movement was drawn predominantly from those
elements of capitalist society that were most antimodern
and reactionary and threatened by the development of modern
industry and increasing employment uncertainty. This
would include small farmers, small shopkeepers and
artisans, and some lumpen (unskilled, unemployed, or
semi-employed) segments of the working class.
3. The Nazi movement was a mass vehicle of a broad range of
middle-class elements, a coalition capable of gaining the
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confidence of several established elites as an effective
weapon for suppressing the organized working class.
4. The industrial working class remained largely immune or
impervious to the appeals of the Nazi movement. They
remained with the SPD or the KPD. The social base of
traditional conservatism, among the business class, !arge
landowners, and ~easantry, also were relatively less
attracted to the NSDAP. They remained with Alfred
Hugenberg's DNVP, Hitler's eventual coalition partner.
Practicing Catholics from various strata, stayed with
the Catholic Center Party and were less attracted to
the NSDAP.
Earlier studies have amassed a good deal of evidence to develop
these theses on the basic character of the NSDAP. Analyses of
voting behavior by Lipset, Heberle, and Bracher, among others,
have developed, on the basis of aggregate voter percentages,
voter turnout, and some partial voter surveys, the growth of the
voter appeal of the NSDAP from 1923 (2.6 percent of the vote)
to the second election of 1932 (33.1 percent).2 Some analyses
have included vote totals from the first Reichstag election of
1933, held under circumstances of already sharply rising
intimidation or coercion, and a few have even studied percentages
of invalid ballots or nonvoters in the one-party "elections"
and plebiscites held after 1933. The rapid growth of the NSDAP
into a mass middle-class electoral vehicle and the collapse of
the middle-class DVP, DDP, and ~lirtschaftspartei (as well as
several other regional and minor middle-class parties) have been
well documented. The relative weakness of the Nazis in the biggest
cities and the apparent gains by the NSDAP from previous nonvoters
in the elections of Harch 1933 (but not ~articularly from nonvoters
in earlier elections) stand as additional basic findings of
electoral research.
A limitation on such studies, of course, is that they cannot be
used, except for sketchy analyses of nonvoting and invalid
ballots, after the suppression of all other parties in 1933. In
studies of the Nazi regime, election data can provide findings
on the social or class support of the Nazi movement primarily
up to the "legal revolution" of 1933. Conclusions drawn from
election data about the class nature of the Nazi regime need to
be supplemented with data drawn from the period after 1933, as the
Nazi movement in power selectively dropped earlier election
campaign programs,purged its social-fascist and "disreputable"
(Rl:lhm and the SA) factions, and developed a working partnership
in coalition with big business administrative and military
elites. 3
Some continuity has been gained from membership and leadership
analyses of the NSDAP both before and after achievement of
political power. Hans Gerth has reported on the occupational
background of NSDAP members in 1933 and 1935.4 Daniel Lerner
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developed his theme of "marginality" as the common attribute of
the Nazi elite from samples drawn from the 1934 Fllhrerlexicon
(a who's who in the early Third Reich).5 Uax Knight compared
the thirty-three cabinet members who served under Hitler from
1933 to 1945 with cabinet members from the earlier monarchy
(1890-1913) and Weimar (1919-1932) years. 6 ~lolfgang Zapf used
a composite of top-level political, administrative, economic,
and cultural elites drawn from the years 1925, 1940, and 1955
for developing his circulation model of German elites from
lleimar to Third Reich to the postwar Bundesrepublik. 7 The present
author has compared social and generational backgrounds of Nazi
Reichstag deputies with backgrounds of deputies from other
parties in lleimar and Reichstag/Bundestag deputy backgrounds
sequentially for the period of modern German history (1871-1972).3
Each of these studies of the NSDAP elite offers further opportunities to gauge the social composition of the Nazi movement,
although not every study has produced lasting insights. Lerner's
study, part of the !arger RADIR project at the lloover Institute,
compared subsamples of Nazi "propagandists," "administrators,"
and "coercers" with a randomly drawn control group. Lerner looked
for the frequency of certain middle-income skill groups
(engineers, lawyers, managers), whose skills were theorized as
necessary for any modern political system, revolutionary or
nonrevolutionary. He also posited the rise of the "alienated
intellectual" (teachers, journalists, artists) especially among
those classified as "propagandists" and the "plebeians" (of
lower-middle-class origins) among the "administrators."9 The
Lerner study was preoccupied, however, with developing the concept
of "social marginality" as the common underlying factor of the
Nazi elite (and, as part of the RADIR project, of revolutionary
elites in general).
11arginal status was defined as deviation from "predominant
a ttributes in his society. "10 By this defini tion, the Nazi elite
was heavily laden with "marginal men." This concept of
marginality has come under considerable challenge, however.ll
The primary question is whether political leaders who came from
Catholic backgrounds, or were born in the Rhineland, or had only
lower or incomplete higher education, or were enlisted men during
military service, or had farming occupations were necessarily
to be identified as "marginal." By this standard, all leaders
of the Catholic Center Party, most of the SPD leadership, and
the great majority of trade union leaders would have to be
categorized as marginal also. This would, however, lump these
very diverse but definitely nonrevolutionary elites into the
same conceptual container as the I~azi leaders. What Ler.n er
more accurately described was how the 1934 Nazi elite differed
in many characteristics from earlier German elites. The
Fllhrerlexicon, although it deleted about one hundred biographical
sketches of people purged in the June 1934 RBhm putsch,
represents a compilation of the prominent personalities (not
all Nazis) at an early stage of the Third Reich.
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Hax Knight's comparison of cabinet level elites in the monarchy,
Weimar, and the Third Reich, shows a good deal of continuity
in occupational backgrounds, with the addition of a strong
business, banking, and insurance executives component, and
greatly reduced proportians of lawyers and journalists in the
Third Reich as opposed to the Weimar period. Teachers, engineers,
and military men also figured more prominently in Ilitler's
cabinet. Overall, however, higher civil service backgrounds
continued to predominate as they had both in Weimar and in the
Kaiserreich. In terms of social orieins, cabinet ministers
under Hitler came more frequently from business (18 percent),
civil service (12 percent), landowner (12 percent), and military
(12 percent) families than from other categories. In some
respects, the social composition of the Nazi cabinet represented
an expansion of gains made by business strata during the Weimar
Republic, a partial return to top posts for members of the
aristocracy (through the military and civil service)~ and a loss
of the moremodest gains made by the working class.l
The
cabinet-level elite for the entire Third Reich era is a relatively
small group of individuals (N=33), clearly a coalition of Nazi
party leaders and coopted business, civil service, and military
elites. Hithi-n the first Ilitler cabinet, there were, for
example, six Nazi party leaders, and nine members who were not
leaders in the party, although most acquired party membership
durinß the Gleichschaltung of 1933.
Wolfgang Zapf's survey of elite circulation includes coverage
of fourteen different elite categories, including many
individuals especially among church, business, and some
administrative and military elites who in 1940 were outside the
Nazi leadership, although often acquiring party membership after
1933 for career considerations. Zapf's findings on those elite
groupings most closely identified with the Nazi movement itself
are in most cases consistent with other studies: The prominent
Nazi elites (circa 1940) were more likely to come from lowermiddle-class backgrounds, have some,vhat lower educational
qualification, have been born in southern Germany, and be younßer
by comparison to the same \Jeimar-era subeli tes (circa 1925).
lfuen Zapf combines all elite groupings together, however, for the
years 1925 and 1940, some surprises emerge. The average age of
the total German elite in 1925 (55.3) is little different from
that of 1940 (53.6). \.Vithin the political elite, furthermore,
cabinet ministers in 1940 were in fact older (59.0) than those
of 1925 (52.3). Most surprising, party leaders appear by Zapf's
reckoning to also have been older on average (43.3 years compared
to 46.0 years in 1925).13 Zapf also finds that the proportion
of those from aristocratic origins fell from 16 percent of the
total German elite in 1925 to 12 percent in 1940 and only 3
percent by 1955.14 If one looks at the social origins (measured
by father's occupation) of the German elite separated into the
major subgroupings used by Zapf, the Nazi regime seems to have
made the greatest social impact among the political elite,
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somewhat less among the economic elite, and least impact among
the administrative elite.

Table 5.1
Political, Administrative, and Economic Elite Social Origins,
1925, 1940, and 1955
Political Elite

Social Origins (percentages)
A

UM

LM

UL

LL

1925 (N=57)

9

44

33

12

2

1940 (N=64)

8

33

55

3

2

1955 (N=57)

7

39

39

12

4

(Tables do not equal 100 percent due to rounding)
Administrative Elite

1925 (N=65)

29

65

6

0

0

1940 (N=62)

27

58

15

0

0

1955 (N=56)

16

66

18

0

0

1925 (N=39)

15

77

8

0

0

1940 (N=25)

12

60

28

0

0

1955 (N=36)

14

64

22

0

0

Economic Elite

Source:
A
UM
LM
UL
LL

-

recalculated from Zapf (1965:180).

Aristocracy
Upper l1iddle
Lower l1iddle
Upper Lower
Lower Lower
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The political elite is also the only major subgrouping whose
social origins are significantly different from both 1925
Weimar and 1955 Bann elites. Among the political elite, we
see the rise of the lower-middle-class "plebeians" to high office,
the squeez·ing out of the small percentages of elites of workingclass origins, and some modest decline in representation of
upper-middle-class elites. Zapf's data thus can be interpreted
as strengthening the hypothesis advanced lang ago by Franz
Neumann (1941) that the Third Reich was a coalition of some
earlier business, civil service, and military elites with a
movement that arose from broader middle and especially lower
middle class origins. Zapf himself, utilizing a "totalitarian"
concept of the Nazi period contrasted with the pluralist democratic
ideals of Weimar and Bann, does not reach this conclusion, and
he earlier had summarized but rejected Neumann's earlier elite
analysis and conceptualization of the Third Reich.l5 Zapf thus
concludes that
all organizations are tightly bound to the party
through the means of a "cadre policy," that is, the
transferral of key positions to loyal party cadre.
Herobership and renown in the party become on the one
hand the only decisive path of social mobility, on
the other hand a decisive means of social contro1. 16
This conclusion and similar findings by like-minded observers
neglect evidence that runs in the other direction, namely, that
other nonparty elites, sharing a policy consensus with the NSDAP
top leadership over a range of issues, maintained their standing
intact while accepting Nazi party membership. For example,
Seabury has pointed out that of ninety-two top officials in
the German Foreign Office in 1937, thirty-three were indeed
NSDAP members, but only seven had joined the party before
entering the foreign service, In 1940, eight of nine senior
division heads in the Foreign Office were still career officials
who had joined the NSDAP after the achievement of power,l7
NSDAP REICHSTAG ELITES--EVALUATION
tfy own work has concentrated on the Nazi elite composition at
the level of Reichstag deputy, both over time and in comparison
to other party elites. The Reichstag membership level allows for
analysis of NSDAP elite composition both before and after 1933.
The Nazis did not abolish the Reichstag; rather they continued to
use it, not as an effective parliament, but as an assembly of
those who held important posts in other areas and as a public
sounding board for Hitler's oratory. After the Suppression (or
self-dissolution) of all other parties in 1933, single-slate
"elections" were held in November 1933 and again in 1936 and
1933 with an expanded Reichstag membership elected each time.
(A small number of Hitler's parliamentary coalition partners
of 1933, such as Alfred Hugenberg of the DNVP and Franz von Papen
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of the Catholic Center (Z) converted to Nazi membership and
retained their seats in the Reichstag as NSDAP deputies.)
As a political institution, the Reichstag, of course, declined
rapidly to insignificance after the Nazi takeover. Nonetheless,
judging from the individual biographic sketches of deputies in
sequential Reichstag handbooks through the 1930s, one notes
the continuity with which the NSDAP filled Reichstag seats with
party leaders of roughly similar standing after 1933 as before
1933. For the specific purpose of examining the evolution of
the NSDAP elite at this level from the last years of Weimar
through the transformative stages of the Third Reich, this
elite grouping provides a useful basis.
Between 1919 and 1938, in both Weimar and the Third Reich, over
twenty-four hundred individuals held seats in the Reichstag.
For each deputy, we have information (from parliamentary handbooks,
who's who registers, and other scholarly works) on year of birth,
birthplace, education, occupation(s), military service, religion,
and party affiliation. We will concentrate here on occupational
background. This informationwill be summarized for two purposes:
to compare on a global basis the social composition of NSDAP
deputies with deputies of other parties; and to trace the social
composition of NSDAP deputies from the period just before the
achievement of power through the 1930s in the development of
the Third Reich. To give some idea of how much the Nazi party
elite differed from other party elites in social composition,
we can compare the nonparty occupations of all NSDAP deputies
(N=llOl) with those of the two major blocs: the "bourgeois bloc"
in Weimar, principally the right-wing nationalist DNVP, the
moderate conservative DNP, the liberal democrat DDP, the Catholic
center Z, and the middle-class business iN (N=730); and the "left
bloc," including the moderate Social Democrat SPD, the more
radical but short-lived independent Social Democrat USPD, and
the communist I~D (N=583). This type of global comparison
has its shortcomings, but it may serve to indicate where the
NSDAP deviated from other established social sources of political
elite recruitment. It also compares the HSDAP to the two major
tendencies (bourgeois and working-class) within the Weimar system.
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Table 5.2
An Occupational Camparisan of NSDAP, "Left," and "Bourgeo is"
Party Deputies (in percent)
Occupation

NSDAP

Left

Bouq~eois

worker
white collar
military/police
big business owner
farm owner
small business
clergy
higher government
government employee
housewives
labor unionists
party managers
interest group leaders
business managers
writers
publishers
professors
lawyers
judges
teachers
doctors
engineers
unemployed
other, not
classified

13.9
16.5
7.4
5.4
12.3
5.8
0.1
2.9
5.5
0
0.2
2.4
1.0
3.8
3.5
1.0
0.6
2.9
0.1
3.6
1.3
6.1
0.5

24.0
4.1
0.2
0.9
0.5
1.9
0.2
4.3
0
2.7
17.3
13.2
0.7
0.5
20.4
0.9
0.7
2.2
0
1.9
0.5
0.2
0.5

1.2
0.3
1.8
7.1
19.6
5.3
3.6
16.7
1.2
0.3
7.9
0.4
5.1
4.1
3.7
1.5
4.4
6,3
1.9
1.8
0.5
2.6
0

2.3
N=llOl

1.2
N=533

N=730

O.ß

If we disaggregate the 36 percent of all Nazi deputies in the
general classification of workers/employees, we find that 14.1
percent were blue-collar workers or unionists (very few unionists),
while 16.5 percent were white-collar employees in the private
sector and 5,5 percent were government employees (but not
including higher, gehobene, officials). This is in strong
cantrast both to the left bloc recruitment of workers/unionists
(41.3 percent), white-collar employees (only 4.1 percent) and
government employees (nil), and to bourgeois bloc representation
(9.1 percent, 0 . 3 percent, and 1.2 percent respectively) in
these categories. This indicates the heavy influx of lowermiddle-class, white-collar employees into the Naz i movement elite.
Nevertheless, the still relatively prominent proportion (13.9
percent) of all NSDAP deputies from blue-collar occupational
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backgrounds, combined with the virtual absence of any unionists
among the Nazi Reichstag elite, reflects the partial success
of German fascism in incorporating anti-unionist worker sentiment
within its broad and often contradictory mass base. The
percentages of unemployed (0.5 percent) and "not classified"
(2.3 percent), while small, also contain, on closer inspection,
a number of "lumpenproletarian" types, men without any clear
work or vocation, unsettled in society since the front-line
days of \vorld \lar I, rabble adventurers who had found both
comraderie and a mission within the NSDAP.
Additionally, it should be noted that Nazi deputy recruitment
from small businessmen and artisans (5.3 percent) is only
fractionally higher than among the bourgeois parties (5.3 percent)
and that NSDAP deputy recruitment from farmer occupations
(12.3 percent) is lower than among the bourgeois bloc parties
(19.6 percent), although the Hazi group of farmer deputies is
quite probably more weighted with small holders than !arger
landowners.lß Representation of industrialists and big businessmen
is not much less than among the bourgeois parties (5.4 percent to
7.1 percent).
Also notable among NSDAP deputies is the relative frequency of
teachers, engineers, and doctors (11.5 percent taken together)
relative to the t~Yo other bloc profiles (only 2.6 percent on
the left, and 4.9 percent among the bourgeois parties).
Most striking on the low side is the total absence of housewives
(and warnen in any category) and the almost total absence of
unionis ts among i~azi deputies. NSDAP deputies also come less
often from lügher civil service positions than from either left
or bourgeois blocs.
The category of writers and party functionaries, prominent among
left party deputies, also contrasts sharply with the NSDAP
profile. lfany of these wri ters and party leaders for the SPD
and KPD were originally of working-class origins and advanced
through the union or the party into positions of journalism for
the left-union press or functionary positions in the party
organization. Other left writers, of higher educational
background and often higher social beginnings as well, represent
the left intelligentsia. Both of these types are much less in
evidence among the NSDAP Reichstag grouping.
There is in this global comparison an additional finding when
we disaggregate the single largest (that is, white-collar
employee) occupational grouping back to its originally coded
occupations; the overwhelming bulk of these fall into two
categories, sales personnel (kaufmHnnische Angestellte--9.5
percent), still a relatively broad category encompassing a range
of job roles, and bank employees (Bankangestellte--2.3 percent),
a relatively narrow sector of the white-collar ~•ork force.
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Interestingly enough, the NSDAP was essentially the only party
to recruit any number of its Reichstag deputies from among lowerlevel bank employees (several bourgeois parties did of course
include bank owners or bank directors among their deputy
factions), Out of 55 Reichstag deputies from 1371 to 1933
(of a total 4,565 deputies) who at some time in their careers
were ordinary bank employees, 47 were NSDAP deputies, The
selection of bank employees as Nazi deputies appears in sizable
numbers first between the two elections of 1933, when the
National Socialist dictatorship was being installed. The
question arises as to whether this particular group of Nazi
deputies represents part öf the general migration of the lower
middle class, especially the membership of such white-collar
employee associations as the liberal GDA and the rightnationalist DHV, to the Nazis during this period, or whether it
represents an infusion of contact men to safeguard banking
interests at a crucial point in the transformation of the NSDAP
program, which had often sharply attacked finance and banking
circles, into state policy. The :<SDAP would later abandon
this position in favor of an alliance with (non-Jewish)
private banking circles. There is a third synthesis of these
two possibilities: that the professional associations of whitecollar employees, including considerable numbers of bank
employees, acted to save themselves by going over to the Nazis
in return for some representation within Nazi ranks and that
some activist bank employees especially went over to the NSDAP
with the blessings of private banking circles.
Those occupational backgrounds among NSDAP deputies with
significantly higher representation than found in either left
or bourgeois blocs (including white-collar employees, lower
civil servants, military/police, teachers, doctors, and engineers-a total of 40.9 percent of all NSDAP deputies) were all quite
modern vocations that were not being automated or squeezed out
of existence between big business and big labor. \Jith the
exception of doctors (only 1.3 percent) these occupations are
middle-status positions, whereas the highest-status professions
(professor, lawyer, judge, top civil servant) are significantly
underrepresented compared to the bourgeois bloc parties.
This global comparison has the limitation of concealing any
significant changes in occupational composition over time,
either in the \leimar period or for the Nazi party throughout the
1930s. Longitudinal analysis of several individual parties
through the \leimar period illus trates some noteworthy trends.
The KPD, for example, underwent a radical "proletarianization"
between 1924 and 1930 during which the percentage of I~D
deputies from worker/unionist occupations rose from 41 to 79
percent. On the other hand, nearly all of the bourgeois parties,
in the immediate aftermath of the failed 1913 revolution, quickly
recruited some working-class dejmties into their Reichstag
factions. In 1919, 23 percent of Catholic Center deputies,
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15 percent of conservative DVP deputies, and even 14 percent
of right-wing nationa1ist DNVP deputies were from worker or
unionist occupational backgrounds. By 1923, however, at the most
calm period in l~eimar' s generally stormy history, these figures
had declined considerably (to 19 ~ercent for the Center, 7
percent for the DVP, and 7 percent for the DNVP). Shifts in
deputy recruitment are relatable in these instances to changes
in the orientation of each party within the changing ~·leimar
system: the KPD transformed itself from a break-away grouping
of former Social Democrats into the first mass-based communist
party in l~estern Europe, and the Catholic Center, the DVP, and
the DNVP reduced their worker/unionist elements after the
leftist revolutionary upsurge of 1913-1919 had been effectively
suppressed.
An examination of the evolution in the Nazi Reichstag elite
during the 1930s also reveals some interesting shifts. A first

Table 5.3
Trends in Nazi Reichstag Deputy Background, 1932-1938 (Rounded
to nearest percent for selected occupations)

Occupation

All new
NSDAP
1933-33

New
NSDAP
1933 I

blue col1ar

14

13

14

16

ll

3

3

7

6

7

6

9

farmers

16

12

19

14

5

7

white col1ar

lJ

19

ll

16

29

23

lower civil
service

5

6

3

6

7

3

ll

12

13

ll

ll

14

8

6

3

5

3

3

small business

engineers, doctors
and teachers
military/police

Hew
New
NSDAP NSDAP
1933 II 1936

New
NSDAP
1933a

All
NSDAP
1932 II

aFigures for 1938 exclude 70 Austrian Nazi deputies, who were
included in the 1933 Grassreichstag after the annexation of
Austria. The Austrian Hazi movement had a different social
base and should be studied as a se~arate entity.
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conparison between Nazi deputies in the last (1932 II) pre-Uitler
Reichstag and Hazi deputies who '"ere first elevated to deputy
status after the Hazis achieved state power shmvs a considerable
rise in the representation of whi~e-collar employees and a
decline in the representation of farners. By separating Nazi
deputies according to their first inclusion in the Reichstag
membership, these trends appear even more shar'?ly.
The decline in the representation of farmers be3an not immediately
after the :~SDAP achievement of state power, but with the 1936
and 1933 Reichstag "elections." For the firs t three years of
the Third Reich, the Hazis did try to implement, against the
wishes of big business and the military leadership, a program
for the strengthening of the small farm/rural sector of German
society. i1uch Nazi propaganda was anti-urban in orientation,
criticizing ci ty life as rootless, cosmopolitan, impersonal, and
a purveyor of immorality. The racist notion of Aryan biological
superiority was generally combined \vith idealization of rural
village life. tlal ther Darre~ the leading NSDAP ar;rarian
propagandist and later JUnister of Agriculture, expressed this
connection in his 1923 The Peasantry as the Life Source of the
Nordic Race and iüs 1934 New Nobility from ßlood and Soil.
At least until the first Four-Year Plan of 1936, the party
leaders attempted to put this "Blood and Soil" (Blut und Boden)
ideology into practice. A ruralization '?rogram was initiated,
which was aimed at eventually transforming Germany once again
into a predominantly nonurban society. Sale of public lands
to build Ul) the class of small independent smallholders, ti1e
founding of new rural settlements, and the development of a general
plan of land use \lere main elements of this program.
Nevertheless, the actual results of this program were quite
limited, and as the priority of rearmament and aggressive foreign
expansionism became more prominent, the party gradually downplayed its ruralization efforts. Unlike the quick victory of big
business over the more radical party elements on the banking
issue in 1933, the party only gradually divested itself, in
practice not in rhetoric, from its romantic-racist idealization
of village-peasant life, and then only under strong pressure
from its big business and military coalition partners.l9
Even with the shriveling of its ruralization program and the
decline in farmer representation in the Nazi elite, "'SDAP deputies
continued to come predominantly from rural and village origins.
The percentage of ~ NSDAP deputies born in rural/small town
areas was 65 percent in the first 1933 Reichstag, 67 percent in
the second 1933 Reichstag, 53 percent in 1936, and even 75
percent in 1933. Nevertheless, the gradual shift from ruralism
to even greater efforts at industrialization, necessary for
rearmament and foreign expansion in search of Lebensraum, are
mirrored in the decline of smallholder representation in Nazi
Reichstag deputies, especially in 1936 and 1933.
Protection of small business owners was another element of
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Nazi pre-1933 propaganda:
• • . the anticapitalism of the Hazified middle
groups was primarily a revolt against big business,
whether in manufacture, trade, or finance. The
demands were of a counter-revolutionary nature;
the anticapitalists wanted to replace big business
by small and to transform modern, large-scale
industries into a primarily handicraft economy.
If realized, anticapitalism would have spelled the
end of big business, and Germany would have
returned to a preindustrial economy.20
There is little doubt that the NSDAP owed much of its electoral
success among those small self-employed artisans, business
owners, and shopkeepers to its promises to battle big business
in their behalf. An important faction of the Nazi leadership
supported small business demands for closings of chain stores
and consumer cooperatives and that !arge firms be forced to
divest themselves of subsidiaries that competed with small,
independent firms. This was reflected in a modest but increasing
contingent of Nazi deputies from small business backgrounds. This
representation of small business owners at this level of the Nazi
elite, both before and after 1933, is about at the same level
as among the bourgeois bloc parties in \Jeimar, and it could
hardly be said that this contingent of the Nazi elite comnosition
constituted a radical departure from the 11eimar system. Unlike
the agrarian smallholder contingent, which clearly declined as
the ruralization program was phased out, the small business
elite recruitment remained relatively constant, even though the
"anticapitalist" faction of the party (and its program for
protecting small business and dismantling big cartels) was
politically defeated relatively early (mid-1933) in the power
struggle with big business interests and the less radical
mainstream of the NSDAP elite. The levels of both farmer and
small business representation among new deputies by the latter
1930s (7 and 9 percent respectively) would seem to indicate
modest, certainly not dominant, elements of Nazi elite
recruitment, not qualitatively greater, and for smallholders
perhaps even less than among lveimar 1 s bourgeois parties.
On the other hand, those occupations which were overrepresented
in our global comparison with both left and bourgeois bloc
deputies (white-collar employe~lower civil servants, engineers,
teachers, doctors, military/police) increased from 34 percent of all
NSDAP deputies in 1932 to 55 percent in 1936 and 43 percent in
1933. Thus the elite recruitment from broad middle-class
occupations not identifiable as antimodern or premodern
continued and expanded after the aclüevement of state power.
Nazi Reichstag membership recruited during and after 1933
(a total of some 330 deputies) still represented a diverse
coalition of social strata, including older lower-middle-class and
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anti-unionis t worl~er elements. The Nazi movement in power,
however, showed some signs in the 1930s of reorienting its
leadership recruitment toward those strata more consistent with,
or at least not opposed to, the interests of its political
alliance with big business, administrative elites, and military
elites.
SUMMARY AND SYUTiiESIS
These findings with respect to the social composition of the
Nazi Reichstag-level elite add some new nuances to earlier
studies summarized at the outset. The Reichstag deputy
analysis is in agreement with the thesis that the Nazi movement
was a mass movement of the lower middle class, if lower middle
class is quite broadly defined to include engineers and military
officers, as well as bank emplo.yees, small farmers, and lowerto middle-level government employees. Certainly, upper-middlecläss professions, especially lawyers and higher government
officials, are less in evidence among the Nazi Reichstag deputies.
Yet this thesis neglects the braoder character of the Nazi
appeal within the entire middle class and to important antiunionist and antileftist elements of the blue-collar working class.
Our findings are also in substantial agreement with the "antimodern" thesis for the pre-1933 period. There is evidence in
our data that the NSDAP attracted support from and mobilized
into political action smallholders, small businessmen, and
declasse sections of the proletariat. In the period after 1933,
the Nazi movement reversed its small business anticapitalism,
shelved its anti-urban ruralization program, and bloodily purged
its "disre.;mtable" SA street fighters. These policy reversals,
in the process of cementing an antidemocratic and antileft
coalition with existing business, military, and administrative
elites, are partially reflected in changes in the party elite
social composition, particularly in the decline of smallholder
representation. Hore important, however, is the considerable
expansion of recruitment from a range of middle-class occupations,
which were quite modern and functionally necessary to a modern
urban industrial society. These findings are more in accord
with the "broad middle class" thesis, including both older and
newer middle-class elements, but tending towards the more modern
strata after the achievement of state power. This thesis tends
to neglect the extent to which this broad faseist movement also
includes some elements of the blue-collar working class itself.
This caveat must be added to the fourth (immunity of the industrial
working class) thesis, which is nevertheless correct in relative
terms.
It is important to note, for all theses, the gradual but clear
evolution of the llSDAP leadership; the NSDAP, as a vehicle for
mass mobilization against the left and against the \veimar system
that legitimated leftist political and union activity, did not
remain frozen in its social composition after 1933, but it
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continued to change as the developmental stage toward achievement
of power had been surpassed, and the new party-in-power discarded
selected elements of its pre-1933 ~rogram.
Liberal democracies in prosperaus and peaceful times tend
towards demobilization systems with respect to elite recruitment. 21
That is, both bourgeois parties and left parties (including
today's Eurocommunists) tend to recruit more elites from higher
social strata. \Jorking-class and ordinary middle-class
representation in the pool of elite eligibility declines. The
\Jeimar system did not enjoy an environment most favorable to
stable capitalist democracy. The NSDAP, not initially favored
by the respectable elites of \Jeimar society, was able to prove
its ability to mobilize a broad mass base, primarily middleclass but including also lower-class elements, \vas able to
convince established elites that it would certainly act forcefully
and decisively to destroy the organized working class and the
lleimar democracy that allowed its ~olitical rights, and was
able, in 1932-33, to convince these established elites that it
would not, in all probability, act to destroy the economic or
social position of big business, the military, or the higher
civil service. The Nazi political elite is, in this view, a
mobilization elite of unusual comnosition compared with both
bourgeois bloc and left parties, an alternative political elite
for capitalism in crisis.
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6
The Rise of Fascism
in Germany
and Its Causes
REINHARD KÜHNL
Translated by Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann
INTRODUCTION
Uhy are we concerned with events that have taken place lang ago?
vlhy are we engaged in the science of writing history? A very
influential point of view claims that historical events do not
repeat themselves and that nothing can be learned from history.
If this were the case, the study of history would be mere
indulgence in the drama and diversity of historical events, and
one might just as well spend the time reading a thrilling
adventure story.
UNESCO, on the other hand, has a more sophisticated definition
of science. According to it, science endeavors "to recognize
and control relationships of causality" and "to benefit from
the understanding of processes and phenomena occurring in nature
and society"--for the welfare of humankind. 1 Science, then,
is anything but a purposeless activity. Rather, it is a form
within which human beings deal with objective reality in order
to subject this reality to reason and to purposely ernploy it
according to human needs. Science is here understood to be a
form of useful human labor, a part of human beings' practical
life acti vity. This unders tanding corresponds to that of Bert
Brecht, who says in "Galilei" that the purpose of science is to
"ease the drudgery of human existence."
The science of history is therefore concerned with events of
the past mainly because we wish to appropriate the experience
of earlier generations in order to learn how we can better manage
our o'vn current and future problems. Just as individuals can
learn from previous life experience (although the events, of
course, never repeat thernselves in exactly the same manner), so
humankind can learn from the experience of its history. History
is not only of interest because of its practical value in
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mastering concrete problems. It is of value also because--and
this is closely related to waat has just been said--it allows us
to a~propriate the results of previous generations' creative
activity (for example, in literature and architecture and in the
production of tools and scientific theories) in order to enrich
our mental and spiritual existence and to stimulate our own
creative potential. Ilowever, the ~ractical reason for engaging
in the science of history is certainly more important.
On account of its potential and real consequences for humanity,
fascism, in particular, requires urgent scientific examination.
In the areas of terror and mass annihilation, it has developed a
potency hitherto unknown in human history. Furthermore, it has
enmeshed the world in a war in which 50 million people lost
their lives, 30 million emerged as cripples, and in which-particularly in Europe--large areas were left with little but
ruins. Although in the summer of 1945 the major faseist powers
(Germany, Italy, and Japan) were crushed by the cornmon effort
of peoples of the world, fascism as a possibility and threat has
not been defeated once and for all. Fascist tendencies exist
in almest all developed capitalist states and threaten to become
strenger and moreaggressive especially during periods of crises.
And in areas peripheral to the capitalist world, parliamentarydemocratic systems have been liquidated by radically antidemocratic forces and replaced with dictatorial terror systems
in a number of countries (Greece 1967, Chile 1973, Argentina
1975-76, Turkey 19ß0, and other countries in Latin America and
Southeast Asia). Admittedly, these forces and systems contain
partial faseist elements. However, they can all be classified in
that group of right-wing radically antidemocratic forces that
were also responsible for the destruction of the Vleimar Republic
after 1930. It is, therefore, of pressin3 concern to closely
investigate the problern of fascism. In doing so, however, it
is insufficient to give only a factual account of events. This
would be a prescientific mode of analysis that would not correspond
to the UNESCO definition of science, since it would not be
concerned with relationships of causality and would not attempt
to determine the conditions that could have led to the success
of fascism. Given the frightening potential for destruction
that has been concentrated in today's military technology, the
prevention of such systems of domination has become a matter
of survival for the whole of humanity.
German fascism was that form of faseist domination which to date
has brought about the greatest amount of terrorist potency and
mass annihilation. This investigation is concerned with its
causes and perpetuating forces. This study can only be sketchy
and it will therefore only be possible to refer to a limited
amount of empirical material. It must, however, be pointed out,
that there exists a huge amount of available documentary evidence
and that, on the basis of this material, fundamental questions
can be answered clearly and conclusively.2 (The truth,
unfortunately, does not penetrate society easily, for the forces
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which supported and carried out German fascisrn have done everything
possible to prevent the discovery of its real connections.
These forces have prornoted instead the dissernination of a host
of rnyths; and since they were again very influential during the
cold war, they had considerable success in doing so).
In cornbination, there were a nurnber of factors that rnade German
fascisrn victorious. Three factors, however, were of particular
irnportance:
1. the behavior of the ruling strata of big business,
rnilitary and the bureaucracy
2. the growth of the faseist rnovernent, and
3. the failure on the part of anti-faseist forces.
In the following sections, only the first two factors will be
dealt with in sorne detail, since they were of prirnary irnportance
in the active prornotion of the fascisation process.
THE RULING CLASS
Research on fascisrn has established a far-reaching consensus
that fascisrn in Gerrnany or elsewhere could not seize political
power on its own.3 On the contrary, it depended on the support
of the leadership strata frorn industry, banking, the rnilitary,
and the state bureaucracy, that is, from the forces known as
"social elites" or "societal leadership strata" (by bourgeois
historians and social scientists) or as the "ruling class"
by Harxist scholars.4 The decisive role of these forces in
establishing the faseist dictatorship, as well as in the planning
and execution of its policies, was well dernonstrated as early
as the international rnilitary tribunal of 1945-46. And because
of the role these forces played, leadirig representatives of
the econorny and the rnilitary, in addition to leaders of the
faseist party, were accused of war crimes. Research which has
been done since has repeatedly confirmed this judgrnent.5 The
question rnust therefore be asked as to what goals and interests
determined the behavior of the ruling class and how did they
assert thernselves?
It is irnportant to note that the behavior of the German ruling
clas's, although different from other European ruling classes in
sorne irnportant respects, nevertheless reflected tendencies that
generally characterized capittalistic countries during this
period. By the second half of the nineteenth century, capitalisrn
in the advanced countries had becorne powerful enough so that it
began to hurst national boundaries in order to conquer new rnarkets
and areas with natural resources and to find new spheres for
investrnent and cneap labor. To realize this expansion, the
state made its political and rnilitary rneans available. This
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increased international capitalist competition, this transition
to an imperialist strategy, quickly lead to a nartitioning of the
world, particularly in Africa and Asia, which had not yet been
colonially occupied. Ideologically, the transition to imperialism
was also reflected in the emergence of racist ideologies and
their proliferation among the masses. These ideologies
distinguished between superior and inferior races, thereby
reducing the capitalist countries' domination over colored
peoples to nature's will.
In comparison with the general development of capitalist
countries, the German Reich had two characteristics that in
combination have generally come to be knmvn as the "extreme
aggressiveness of German imperialism." This aggressiveness
found its expression in the monumental plans for conquest
implemented during the First and Second ~.Jorld \1ars.
The first characteristic consisted of the fact that, in cantrast
to other advanced countries, German capitalistic development
was delayed. This was mainly the case because Germany--as Italy-became economically peripheral after America and the seaway to
India were discovered, resulting in a shift to overseas trade
and Stagnation in the development of German cities and the German
bourgeoisie. The delayed capitalist development was also caused
by the fact that the large feudal landlords' pm,rer remained
unbroken as the revolt of peasants and plebeian city dwellers
was crushed in 1525-29. Lastly, the delay was due to the Thirty
Years War (1613~1643), which mainly took place on German territory,
decimating the population by one-third, causing tremendous
destruction, and thus throwing the country far back economically.
The peace treaty resulted in splintering Germany into some two
thousand "independent" political units, further bindering
economic develop~ent.6
Only in the course of the nineteenth century, particularly after
1871 when a unified Reich (Reichseinheit) was created, could
the country catch up and.could capitalism fully develop. It
soon became apparent that huge resources were available,
which made rapid development possible. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the German Reich was leading Europe in
industrial production. At this point, however, German
capitalism's expansion began to encounter stubborn barriers,
since the imperialistic partitioning of the world had already
taken place. German capitalism's main problern was the discrepancy
between a strong potential and drive for expansion on the one
hand and the lack of real possibilities for expansion on the
other hand. The data in Table 6.1 illustrates this tension.7
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Table 6.1
Population, Irrdustrial Output, and Distribution of Colonial Lands
Population (in millions)
Germany
1870
1910

41
65

Britain
31

45

France
37
40

Share of the IJorld' s Irrdustrial Output (in percenta&es)
1870
1913

Germany
13
16

Britain
32

14

France
10
6

The Distribution of Colonial Lands in 19111
2

Area (million km )
Germany
France
Britain

2.9
10.6
33.5

Inhabitants (millions)

12.3
55.5
393.5

Because of this discrepancy, German capitalism developed its
demand for a new partitioning of the world, which it was also
willing to realize with force. The difference between the
German Reich and other capitalistic states, then, was not
between being imperialistic or peace loving, but between being
disadvantaged, hun&ry, and bent on change (and therefore being
aggressive) on the one hand, and being relatively saturated (and
therefore defensive) and bent on maintainin& the status quo on
the other. This aggressiveness of German imperialism was the
main structural cause of the First './orld llar. And the Second
\lorld ~lar was essentially a new at tempt with even more effective
means (and in alliance with other sir'lilarly disadvantaged
imperialistic powers like Italy and Japan) to realize a new
partitioning of the world, even if the first attempt bad failed
in 1913.
The second characteristic of the German Reich consisted in the
fact that the bour&eois revolution Has not victorious and that
its ideas of enli&htenment and human rights did nöt get realized.
That the revolution did not take place was due to the economic
backwardness described above, as a result of which the bour&eoisie
remained politically weak. The !arge landholders' social power
and the political power of the authoritarian ruler-state
remained unbroken until the beginning of the twentieth century.
(Thus it also sustained the ideological dominance of the Prussian
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military caste, its codex of virtues--discipline, duty, obedience
and authority, woich finally was also accepted by the
bourgeoisie.) The bourgeoisie renounced its political ideals
of freedom and tolerance in favor of great economic advantages,
which _it was granted by the emperor and his state. These included a
standardized economic realm after the creation of a unified
Reich (Reichseinheit) in 1G71, the political and military
support for its expansionary goals, and the suppression of its
rnain enemy--the worker movement--which grew ra>Jidly in the lß60s
and threatened not only the maximization of profit but also
bourgeois property relations.
As a result of this uninterrupted tradition of the ruler-state
and of Prussian militarism, the transition to an imperialist
policy and ideology could occur with relative ease and could
assurne particularly vicious forms.3 German ca?italism's unique
position and direction of ex~ansion implied, however, that other
European people had to be defined as inferior in relation to
the German master race. This was especially true for the Slavic
peoples who inhabited the Eastern sphere--the main direction
of the expansionary thrust--and who were defined as "subhuman."
In moderated form, this applied also to 11est European peoples,
who were competitors in the fight for domination in Europe. They
were thus defined as traders (in comparison to German "heroes")
and as "petty merchants" (in comparison to German "warriors"). All
this took place before 1913, that is, lang before the rise of
fascism. Social and natural scientists (particularly those
writing in the social Darwinist tradition) and writers (such as
Nietzsche) supplied the theoretical legitimation for this
tendency.
The radical form of the rnaster-race ideology and the extremely
brutal way in which it was politically realized in the First
ilorld IJar, and even more obviously in the Second IJorld War was,
of course, also tied to the tremendous importance given to the
conquering of non-German territories. If the goal was to
suppress all peoples from eastern France to deep into Russia
(First llorld lvar) and even from the Atlantic to the Urals (Second
llorld llar)--and in the case of the Slavic peoples to transform
them into work-slaves for the German economy--no means other
than those ranging from the most extreme brutality to rnass
annihilation could realize the stated goal. Only these means
were "adequate."
From this position, the ruling class systematically pursued two
main goals--although with different means, depending on the
circurnstances given.:.-from the Kaiserreich through the IJeimar
Republic to the faseist rule. Domestically, it worked to
solidify or re-establish an authoritarian form of domination
in order to guarantee capitalist private property relations and
the expansionary power of capital arid to hold back thcise political
forces that pushed for a democratization of society and hindered
the pursuit of the conquest policy. Externally, it worked to
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prepare and to realize the above-mentioned expansionary policy,
which required the concentration of all economic, political,
and ideological resources for military and war purposes.
The first attempt to realize this policy failed in November 1913
when the German Reich was defeated and the ruling class
simultaneously lost the emperor and his state apparatus as its
instrument of power. During the ) ~ovember revolution, the
worker movement succeeded in topplinp, the Prussian military
monarchy and replaced it with a parliamentary-democratic state,
However, it did not succeed in appropriating the ruling class's
basis of power. The economy, the life-blood of the whole
society, remained just as much in the hands of the ruling class
as did the military, the judicial system, the bureaucracies,
and a significant portion of the ideological pm~er apparatus,
ranging from the press to the universities and churches,9
Because of this, the imperialist forces, although weakened by
the military defeat and the November revolution, had not lost
the source of their power. After a defensive phase, during which
social and political concessions had to be made to the worker
movement, and after a consolidation of economic, political,
ideological, and military power was accomplished, they remained
strong enough to pursue the two goals already established before
1913. These goals consisted in undermining and reducing the
social and democratic rights instituted in 1918 and in moving
toward an authoritarian state, as well as in commencing a
renewed expansionist policy. The latter was perceived tobe
particularly necessary since, after the mid-1920s, German
capitalism was again confronted with the same dilemma it faced
before Uorld \var I and which was then a major cause of its extreme
aggressiveness. Again, the dilemma consisted in German capitalism's
enormous potential for expansion--it had once more become
Europe's leading industrial producer--and the very limited real
possibilities for expansion, which had become even more limited
as a result of the loss of colonies and the conditions imposed
by the Versailles treaty.
An investigation of the documentary material shows that, after
1913, decisive segments of big business and big banking, the
military, large landowners, and leading civil servants had always
aimed for the realization of both goals. They were neither
willing to accept the military defeat nor the parliamentary
democratic form of government, particularly not with the democratic
and social rights guaranteed to the working class. Differences
between the various factions were mainly limited to strategy and
method. Until 1929, the differences turned around the question
of whether or not t~e democratic constitution should be abolished
in one sweep (which after the Kapp Putsch of 1920 found only a
minority of supporters) or through "legal ways," ("Reichsreform"
a slow undermining of the constitution). A further point of
contention was whether or not the worker movement should be
suppressed with open means of terror (a strategy favored by a
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majority of new industries, includinr; firms in the chemical and
electrical sector) or integrated with certain social concessions
while suppressing only radical (revolutionary) segments of the
working class. As to foreign policy, the differences concerned
the extent to which the shackles of the Versailles treaty-which inhibited expansion--could be thrown off by negotiations
with llestern powers in combination with illegal rearmament or
whether freedom frorn the Versailles lirnitations could only be
achieved by open confrontation.
Once the Great Depression · of 1929 had set in, there soon was an
understanding that parliarnentary democracy would have to go and
be replaced by a rnore effective, authoritarian systern. Several
factors favored such a developrnent. First, the bourgeois parties
of the center and the moderate right--through whose help the
ruling class had hitherto been able to realize its interests
in parliarnent and the governrnent--lost the great bulk of its
supporters and the votes received by these parties fell frorn
40 rnillion to 10 raillion frorn 1929-1932. Thus, it was extremely
urgent and necessary that the ruling class realize its long-held
plans to establish a firm dornination, which was no langer
dependent on elections and parliarnentary rnajorities. Second,
the depression lirnited the nurober of social concessions that
could be rnade to the working population and induced capital to
irnpose the burden of the crisis on the rnasses ( through lowering
real wages and social expenditures) in order to rnaintain capital's
international capacity to invest, expand, and cornpete. Because
of these developrnents, a dorninating force was necessary, which
could assett itself even agairrst the needs and dernands of the
rnasses. Third, the crisis represented an opportunity to actively
exploit the fears and uncertainties of the population by denouncing
parliarnentary dernocracy as weak and unfit to solve cornplicated
problerns and by propagating the strong state as the solution
to present difficulties. As a consequence, a ~~hole set of
dictatorship notions were developed and entertained. They airned
not only at burderring the population with the crisis in the short
run (and preparing the political ground for doing so), but at
finding the proper form of governrnent caoable of also rneeting
the irnperialist, expansionist, long-terrn interests. In its
internal deba tes, the ruling class ~,ras now only concerned with
the form the authoritarian state should take and with the extent
to which repression agairrst the left was necessary. The rnajority,
particularly firrns in the chernical and electrical sectors, were
in favor of an authoritarian presidential regirne like the one
which was in power frorn 1930 to January 1933. This regirne based
itself primarily on the state power apparatus and the ernergency
powers of the president and was relatively independent of elections,
parties, and parliaraentary rnaj orities. llowever.., it left
parliarnentary forras and procedures intact insofar as all parties
and unians could voice their opinions and :nd opportunities for
rnobilization. On the other hand, strong forces located in heavy
industry and arnong large landowners pushed for a radical chanr;e
in the form of governraent, for an open dictatorship, and for a

The Rise of Fascism in Germany and Its Causes

101

complete suppression of the democratic and socialist forces. Since
the military coup of 1920 showed that an isolated military
intervention wit;1out mass support was of little promise (the coup
was defeated by a general strike), the problern of obtaining
the necessary mass support assumed decisive im~ortance. In
this regard, several dictatorship models were developed of which
the Schleicher government at the end of 193210 (involving an
alliance of defense associations from the nationalist Stahlhelm
to the faseist SA and the right wing of the unions and the SPD)
and that of the 1933 llitler government were the most important.
In discussions among big business and the military (as well
as among the producers of ideology in right-wing mass media and
theoreticians of state law), faseist Italy (which assumed power
in 1922) served as a role model. l!owever, the final decision
opting for the Hitler dictatorshiry model was only made after all
other models had proven to be insufficient or unrealizable.
The presidential regime proved to be inadequate because it could
neither solve the economic crisis nor prevent the left from
engaging in a class struggle; because it could neither acquire
a basis in mass support nor create the necessary preconditions
for a new expansionary policy. After facing the Great Depression,
the breakdown of '"orld trade, and t:1e grmving protectionism of
various countries that increased tariffs and introduced import
barriers, an expansionary policy became particularly important.
llowever, a military dictatorship and the Schleicher government plan
for mass support also proved to be unrealizable (because in
the final analysis the unions, SPD, and NSDAP could not be split).
After the election results of November 6, 1932--the last free
elections held during the Weimar Republic--agreement among the
various factions came about more quickly. First, it was evident
that the bourgeois parties that carried the Papen presidential
regime remained without mass basis (despite big business's strong
financial support). Second, the anticapitalist tendencies in the
country increased again (the KPD's vote increased from 14.6
percent to 16.9 percent and was now almost as strong as the SPD,
which carried 20.4 percent of the votes). Third, the NSDAP had
peaked and was on the decline (it lost 2 million votes; its
share dropped from 37.4 percent to 33.1 percent). As a result,
the ruling class feared that its last dictatorship model, based
on the Nazi party, might become unrealizable. The Nazi party,
therefore, had to be quickly brought to power in order to
stabilize it and its power base and in order to create an
accomplished fact. Von Schroeder, the banker in whose house
the decisive negotiations with Hitler took place in January 1933,
spoke to this issue when he was called as witness by the U.S.
accusatory body in 1945: "iJhen the IISDAP suffered its first
defeat on i~ovember 6, 1932, the German economy' s support was
particularly urgent." 11 In this way, the dictatorship model,
which since 1929-30 had been favored by only a minority of
factions, came to be realized in January 1933. The Hitler model
provided the following key advantages: First, on the key questions
of the destruction of democracy and the worker movement,
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establishing a dictatorship, and embarking on an expansionary
foreign policy, the party's leadership fully agreed with the
ruling class. Second, the Nazi leadership had proven itself
capable of gaining mass support for such policies--a capability
that big business and the military did not have and which the
right-wing bourgeois ~arties ltad lost i:J. tlte conrse of the
Great Depression.
TUE FASCIST !1ASS !10VE!1ENT
It is clear from what has been said thus far that the rise and
victory of fascism cannot be understood to be the result of an
autonomaus movement as has been proposed over and over by many
adherents of "middle class theories" (Mittelstandstheorien). 12
On the other hand, the strength of the faseist movement was of
great importance in liquidating democracy. It is therefore
necessary to investigate the causes and initiatives that led
to this movement's success.
Immediately after World \Jar I, faseist movements arose in
several countries. They mobilized parts of those groups that
became fanatic adherents to national1st and militarist ideologies
during the war and those who, as a result of the war, had become
derailed in their professional and civil life. The war's
brutality had turned them into uncivilized, crude (verroht)
individuals whose integration into society was made even more
difficult in the post-war crisis. They were often members of
armed groups such as free-corps citizen defense leagues and
defense associations. These groups were generally .used by the
ruling class to terrorize and destroy the revolutionary worker
movement, which, encouraged by the victorious Russian October
revolution, had mushroomed in many countries after the war. In
Italy, this development led to the creation of .a faseist
dictatorship in 1922. In Germany, it led to a considerable
increase of support for the NSDAP and similar groups as well
as to coup attempts in 1920 and 1923 in which parts of the
Reichswehr and its leadership were implicated (in preparations,
mutinies, and in refusing to oppose the groups involved in the
coups). In 1923 the same Reichswehr, however, destroyed the
last attempts by the left to overcome capitalism and to fight
for a socialist social order. In Harnburg it fought against the
communist uprising, and in Saxony and Thuringia it liquidated
the legally formed worker government. With the help of such
acts, the bourgeois republic was stabilized. These events,
tagether with the beginning of economic stabilization in 1924
(with the help of U.S. dollar loans) alleviated reasons to join
faseist and radical right-wing groups. The ruling class also
found fewer reasons to support and employ such movements; as a
result, they lost significant pol::_tical streng th and iPtportance.
With the coming of the. Great Depression in 1929, a fundamental
change took place. Mass unemployment and wage cuts threw
significant portians of the non-self-employed work force into
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socia1 misery (in 1932, on1y 33 percent were still fully employed,
over 44 percent were unemployed, and over 22 percent were on a
shortened work week), and the pro1etarianization of the selfemployed increased. People were gripped by fear and uncertainty;
they lost their confidence in parties that sat in parliament
and obviously had no solution and in par1iamentary democracy,
which obviously :noved incapable of putting an end to misery.
\Jith increased intensity, they searched for a way out, for a
real alternative. The forces on the politica1 stage began to
move. Hithin four years, the bourgeois parties of the center
and the right lost almost three-fourths of its voters. At the
same time, the NSDAP grew from a s~linter party (2.6 percent of
the vote) to the strongest party (37. 4 percent). Large changes
occurred also within the worker movement. The SPD lost almost
one-third of its voters to the KPD, which almost reached the
size of the SDP. Table 6.2 illustrates the changes between
1923 and 1932.13

Table 6.2
Changes in Voting Patterns from 1923 to 1932
1928
t1illion
Percent

Ju1y 1932
11illion
Percent

Uorker parties
SPD and KPD

12.4

40.4

13.24

36.2

Bourgeois parties
of the center and
the right

11.9

33.7

3.53

9.6

Catholic parties
Center party
and Bavarian
People's party

4.7

15.2

5.3

15.7

The or~g~n of the mass support now concentrated in the faseist
party can easi1y be discerned. It came mainly from those who had
abandoned the bourgeois parties and from those who had hitherto
not taken part in e1ections but who were activated by the crisis.
(Voter participation increased from 75 percent in 1923 to 82
percent in July 1932.) The worker parties not only did not lose
any supporters during this time, they actually gained almost
one mil1ion votes. This indicates, as has been shown by
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historical investigations, that llSDAP voters came from the
llittelschicht (small merchants, craftsmen, farmers) and from
those non-self-employed who--based on their origin, the ty;Je of
work, and ::>rivileges that they had, as o;Jposed to the workers-considered themselves as part of the "!1it telstand." They, for
the most nart, were salaried white-collar employees and civil
servants.l4 \·l hat drove these masses to the faseist rarty? \lhy
did they particularly believe that the HSDAP would have the
solution to their problems? In order to answer this question,
it is important to consider the ideologies and propaganda that
helped the ilazi party mobilize the masses. Essentially, the
ideologies were the same as those that had been disseminared by
German imperialism since the end of the nineteenth century in
order to legitimi~e its expansion and the suppression of democracy
and the labor mover.1ent at home and to mobilize for these goals
!arge segments of the ;:>opulation, the t1ittelsc;üchten in
particular. The ideologies included nationalism, racism, antiSemitism, militarism, authoritarianism, and--with the growth of
the worker movement--anti-l1arxism, coupled wi th promises of a
"German socialism." It was precisely this mass consciousness,
deeply engrained for decades (in 1913 first largely discredited,
but, with the grmving political and ideological power of the
ruling class after the suppression of socialist endeavors, soon
again massively disseminated), which was taken up by many
radical right-wing, nationalist and vl:llkisch groups that emerged
after 1913 and of which the :.JSDAP was the most successful.lS
The ~.JSDAP' s success was not due to its ideological tenets (as
compared to other nationalist, right-wing, conservative, and
militantly anti-communist competitors), but due to the ways in
which they were nropagated. In cantrast to other competitors,
these ideas were not propagated through elitist and selfaffirming honorary circles, appeals to top leadershi::> circles,
and a demonstrated disgust for the masses (as was customary with
most right-wing conservative forces from the Herrenklub to the
Tatkreis) but by taking over the methods of mass mobilization
(such as mass parades and mass gatherings), which had proved
successful in the worker movement. By presentinp, itself as
the party of the "small man," as anti-bourgeois and even
"revolutionary," and through its extreme simplification and
vulgarization of traditional right-wing conservative ideology, and
its aggressive posture, the organized terror that the NSDAP
displayed in meeting halls and street battles conveyed to its
supporters a sense of power and ability to assert itself.
The NSDAP built its agitation essentially around four ideological
complexes on the basis of which it promised the desperately
searching masses a brighter future:
1. The "annihilation of Marxism," the ;lSDAP announced, was
absolutely essential to enable Germany to recover and rise to
its former stature. Under "annihilation of the l!arxist pest," it
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meant the destruction of the ideas and organization of the worker
movement. llased on the thesis, pronagated for decades by the
dominant ideology, that the t1arxist workers' movement was
composed of enemies of the state and the people and was controlled
by rabble rousers, that is, destructive elements, it concluded
that these elements were to be anni:lilated without hesitation.
This thesis appealed to entrepreneurs and small, labor-intensive
businesses. For entrepreneurs, the organization of wage and
salaried employees represented an increase in costs which meant
that--especially durin3 the crisis--big capital's international
competitiveness was persistently threatened. For small businesses,
the workers' movement represented a direct threat to their social
existence. Although the latter's real problems mainly originated
in the ovenvhelming economic power of big capital, in their
consciousness, however, the culprits were those who demanded
lügher wap;es, be tter welfare provisions for the workers and
white-collar employees and who, in general, demanded the
abolition of an economy based on private property, which also
was the small entrepreneur's basis of social existence. In
addition, the thesis that !1arxism must be annihilated appealed
to those who, fooled by the nationalist demagoguery propagated
since the Icaiserreich, had ex:->erienced the First tJorld War as
Germany's wrestling for a "place in the sun," who therefore
considered the November revolution as a crime against the
German peoole, and who believed the worker movement to be
responsible for the ;,ovember crimes "and the resulting downfall
of Germany."
2. The secend ideological complex, the "disgrace of Versailles,"
combined well with the first. Germany would have a secure
future only when the "disgrace of Versailles" was eliminated,
the shackles of the Versailles treaty thrown off, the political
and military discrimination of Germany eliminated, and its
leading role guaranteed, to which it was entitled on account of
its economic output, population size, and racial quality. The
existing social misery was not believed to have been caused
by the social sys tem but by the ac tions of other countries
tal;ing advantage of Germany. The solution to the survival
problems of those people affected by the Great Depression was
therefore not seen to lie in a change of the domestic social
system but in the struggle of the "whole German people" against
the foreign enemy and finally in the conquest of new "living
space," new resource areas, markets for goods, and labor power.
This conquest was to be at the expense of other countries; in
short, it was suggested that imperialism was the key to solving
domestic social problems.
These ideological complexes drew on a tradition of thought
pursued by German imperialism up to 1913 and were, despite the
defeat of 1913, still seen to be a long-range goal. Although
the faseist party justified this goal more heavily from a racist
point of view, the substance of the imperialist ideology behind
it remained unchanged. In this manner, faseist agitation drew
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upon the fears and hopes of those masses touched by the cr1s1s,
and by distracting from the crisis's real causes, it lessened
the chances for social protest, while channellinp, the masses in
a direction corresponding to the ruling class's expansionary
goals.
3. Fascist agitation ~roposed in its third ideological complex
that the saving of Germany necessitated a strong state; a
dictatorship that would cleanse the nation of its rabble
rousers and the "l1arxist pest" and that would be in a position
to firmly engage in power politics abroad. Democracy was said
to be slow ~oving, incapable of acting, and unnatural, because
it did not distinguish between talents and achievement differences
among ~eople and could not solve the great problems relating to
the securing of the future. This uart of the faseist solution
also corresponded to the interests of imperialist forces. In
addition, it drew upon Germany's lonp,-standing authoritarian
tradition and on the particularly Mittelschicht view that
rescue must come from the top and til.at, especially in times of
crisis, only a strong state authority is capable of ~roviding
security.
4. All the faseist ideological complexes discussed thus far
saw the solution to pressing social problel'lS in a Germany of
world- power status. The realization of these ~romises and
predictions lay in the distant future. Creatinp, the precondition
for their realization, however, was an immediate domestic task.
It involved the creation of a dictatorship and the smashing of
democracy and the worker movement, lvithout, however, affering
any direct tangible social improvements. Anticapitalism and
anti-Semitism served as the ideological complex designed to
raise hopes--as well as to compensate for other weaknesses-that fascism would bring about immediate improvements. Anticapitalism and anti-Semitism, although of quite different origin,
-were thus closely connected functionally.
Fascisn's antica;:oitalism--presentinp, itself also as German
socialism or national socialism--was proof that the idea of
socialis~ attracted the r.1asses and that, particularly after
l'Jl3 and again during the Great Deuression, significant segments
of ti1e l1ittelschichten were also influenced by it. The desire
for a fundamental change, for a real alternative to the status
quo, through which one's o-wn ~ressinr; existential problems could
be solved, 1ms very widespread. The faseist IJarty, therefore,
presented itself as the radical alternative in comparison to the
established Reichstag ~arties, which were all seen to be im~otent.
I!owever, the faseist party did not only g-ive the imnression that
it would radically change the existing situation and create
something totally new. It gave its sympathizers concrete !10f'es
of being able to recover economically at the expense of the
hitherto privileged, big bosses, the "fat bourgeoisie."
The
small entrer>reneurs were led to believe that their social IJOSition
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would become secured at the expense of big business and that
they 1.rould be freed from debts and high interes t rates.
Unei.l;Jloyed vhite-collar employees (Angestellte) and the mass of
SA SU!>porters Here attracted by promises that, at the expense
of well-situated employees, they would receive secure government
positions ( as employees or soldiers). These expectations-counled \lith the vague idea of Volkseemeinschaft (sharing unity
of the people), in which all were to overcome the domestic and
foreign enemy in solidarity--constituted national socialism and
not, as one might think, the demand fo~ abolishing private
ownership of the means of production.lu
llopes for "average people's" socioeconomic security at the
expense of the hitherto privileged, hl'wever, were of potential
danger for the rulers, particularly since some segments of the
party's following and functionaries took the anticapitalist
dimension ~uite seriously. Therefore, the party had to do
something if it was not to risk losing big business's and the
military's confidence. The most effective solution was to direct
anticapi talist sentiments toward Je\Ys, who \Yere r.1ade the symbol
of capitalist exploitation. The distinction between Jewish
"amassing" capital and German "productive" capital eliminated all
faseist anticapitalist elements that could have irritated the
ruling class. Already in 1923, point 17 of the 1920 program
planning the "collectivization of land for common purposes
without compensation" was supplemented uith the follm.ring:
"Since the ilSDAP was in agreement with the private ownership
of the means of production, it is selfunderstood" that the
concern here was with "land which 1Yas ac~uired illegally or
which was not used for the \Yelfare of the people • • • •
This concerns primarily the Je1Yish firms speculating in land."l7
In the summer of 193J, the elimination from the party of the
circle around Otto Strasser to~k place. It had resisted this
Hazi trend on various ~oints.lu \Vith some sup!Jorters and
functionaries, the anticapitalist hopes persisted. After 1933,
they threatened to forcefully split the !)arty (they were a
Sprengkraft) and 1.rere therefore silenced through a mass murder
of tlle SA leadership, called the Rl:lhm affair, in the sununer of
1934.19
Anticapitalism was thereby made harmless by reducing it to antiSemitism. This, however, was not t:1e sole function of antiSemitism. It created--based on ex~erience--scapegoats and
diverted social dissatisfaction to1Yard Je\Ys and away from its
real causes. The creation of· scapegoats and the possibility of
not having to articulate one's real aggressions but being able
to release them instead in concrete action are common
characteristics of all reactionary and faseist forces. 1n1ich
religious, ethnic, or national minorities are to be treated
thusly depends upon tlle concrete conditions in a particular
country. The groups can vary from ~1onwhites to foreign workers,
to others. In Germany, anti-Semitism could take on this function
because it had been deeply entrenched in mass consciousness and
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had already been used under the emperor to divert social
dissatisfaction. In addition, special economic groups saw a
certain advantage for themselves in eliminating Jewish
competitors, particularly in petty commerce, ~rofessions such
as medicine and law, and in academia. Hithaut any doubt, there
is a connection between this self-interest and the
disproportionately high nurober among these professionals wi1o
supported fascism.
Certainly, faseist ideology contains a variety of gaps and
contradictions. l!owever, an internal unity cannot be disputed.
Particularly, the sys teinatically used biological paradigm of
the world and of human beings--whici1 legitimized the economic,
political, and domestic domination of a minority and the
subjugation and plundering of other peoples--formed a kind of
common thread throughout all of t:1e ideological complexes.
That the combination of these ideological complexes had such an
enormaus appeal, turning the :-ISDAP from the 1923 splinter group
into the strongest German party in l'J32, can, however, only be
explained in conjunction with the prevailing general conditions.
They consisted in the fact that all ideological complexes had
been develo~ed for decades, had been used to legitimize
imperialistic policies under the emperor, and had been pro')agated
again soon after 1913. Therefore, when the Great Depression
set in and the desperate and fearful population \laS searching
for a solution, the ground had already been ~repared, since these
tenets were deeply engrained in mass consciousness. Secondly, it
must be mentioned that the faseist party, in its agitation and
even in its terrorist activities against the left, was hardly
hindered and often was protected and encouraged. Antifascist
activities, on the other hand, were often blocked and punished.
In cases of conflicts between faseist groups and organizations
of the worker movement, police and the judicial system generally
punished comnunists, social democrats, and labor union members,
leaving the fascists untouched. This induced a strong feeling
of power and readiness to use terror among faseist supporters.
Both conditions favoring fascism structurally were the result
of til.e failure in 1913 to expell the ruling class from its
instrumental positions in the realm of economic and political
power (the judicial system, the civil service apparatus, the
military, and the police), so that soon it solidified its
ideological power again.
A third condition favoring fascism consisted in the weakness of
antifaseist forces. The masses, who desperately searched fora
solution during the Great Depression, were--despite the conditions
advantageaus to fascism just described--not pre-disposed toward
fascism. The outcome of their search depended significantly on
the democratic forces' (particularly those of the worker
movement) success in developing a convincing alternative and
presenting themselves as a force that was determined to fight
ro r a solution to their problems. As is commonly known, the
l•·lt rail.ed because neither the communists nor the social
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democrats really had an adequate analysis of the depression
from which a political strategy could be dcveloped. Ilowever, it
mainly failed because the worker movement remairred split, even
in the face of the rising faseist t:1reat. In order to show
the causes of this failure, it would be necessary to investigate
the nistory of the German worker movement since the Kaiserreich,
which cannot be done here.20 llowever, reference should be
made to the documents in which both branches of the worker
movement analyzed the mistakes and reasons for their defeat.
In particular, they are the documents of the Seventh \Vorld
Congress of the Communist International of 1935 and the Prague
llanifesto of the Social Democratic Emigration Council of 1.9 34. In
both documents, the worker parties arrived at a fairly realistic
analysis of the causes of their defeat.
The worker movement realized the practical consequences of the
devastating defeat of 1933 in the spring of 1934 in France and
in 1936 in Spain. Common action contained the faseist onslaught
in France and in Spain; it would no doubt have defeated France's
coup, had it not been for the powerful military intervention on
the nart of the German and Italian faseist superrowers--favored
by thc \Jes tern powers' declared "neutrality." Finally, the
consequences were drawn in the European ~eople's fight against
faseist domination during the Second \lorld \lar lvhich, from
Greece to France and from Italy to Yugoslavia, was larr;ely
based on tl1e idea of a people's alliance. It follows that the
ruling class on the one hand and the faseist movement on the
other can be detemined as the main forces which pur!_)osefully
worked toward the liquidation of democracy and which had
actively promoted the fascisization process. Politically,
however, they beca~1e allied only little by little. Although
llitler had aimed at an alliance with the established elites
since the refounding of the NSDAP and offered his services to
big business over and over21 in regard to battling Marxism and
facilitating the resurrection of Germany, he initially encountered
little interest and received little financial support.22 This
changed when the Great Depression set in; when the masses
deserted the bourgeois parties; when the NSDAP proved itself
capable of gathering the fearful and desperate and begari to use
them in its terror agairrst the left; and when the urge in the
ruling class was to move to authoritarian methods of domination.
The ruling-class faction that favored an alliance with the
faseist party grew rapidly and became dominant when, at the end
of 1932, the other dictatorship models proved to be insufficient
or unrealizable. From then on, all significant factions of the
ruling class favored the transferral of political power to the
leader of the HSDAP. The alliance which IYas then formed remairred
fundamental to the structure of domination and the policy of
German fascism until its breakdown. It was based on the common
interests and goals of the ruling class on the one hand and of'
the faseist leadershin on the other: The destruction of democracy
and the worker movement at home and the realization of a new
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expansionary policy by rearming with the goal of going to war
against foreign countries. As early as February 2 and 20, 1933,
the outlines of the program were drawn up in conferences with
military and business leaders. 2 3 Systematically, and using the
utmost brutality, the program was realized: The worker movement
was smashed and its functionaries jailed, tortured, and murdered
by the tens of thousands. (The concentration camps were built
for jailed members of the worker movement. Only later, after
the beginning of World \lar II, did Jews increasingly become the
main victims of faseist terror.)24 In the worknlace, the
dictatorship of capital was again fully restored: The entrepreneur
was named the "leader of the work~lace," workers and ••hite-collar
employees were deprived of all possibilities to articulate their
interests, and every move to the contrary was punished as a
crime against the state. The almost one-hundred-year-old
struggle of the worker movement was liquidated. Fascism
realized what it had announced: The extemination of t1arxism,
the securing of peace at the workplace, the elimination of the
class struggle, the creation of a shared unity of the people
(Volksgemeinschaft; and with power, political preconditions
were established in order to concentrate all efforts toward
re-armament and war). This manner of shaping society and the
relations between classes is the substance and essential meaning
of faseist domination. It has been the method used by all
regimes of faseist or similar nature--from Italy to Germany,
from Portugal to Spain, from Austria (1934) to Greece (1967)
and Chile (1973). Given faseist domination, it is obvious who
the victims are. I!owever, it is equally clear \Yho the
beneficiaries are.
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Conservative Concepts
of Dictatorship in the
Final Phase of the
Weimar Republic:
The Government of
Franz von Papen
ULRIKE HÖRSTER-PHILIPPS
Translated by ]ulia Watson with the assistance of
Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann
In historical evaluations of the last cabinets of the Heimar
Republic before the takeover of Hitlerian Fascism, there are two
fundamentally different interpretations.l The first is a type
of interpretation that tends to include most conservative
positions and sees the politics of conservative politicians
before 1933 as striving to tarne the faseist movement and party.
The second interpretation, derived mostly from the liberal or
socialist camp, regards the function of the last cabinets of
the \Jeimar years as fascism's "stirrup-holder" or as paving
the way for fascism.
The latter view is particularly prevalent with respect to the
second-to-the-last cabinet of the Republic, the government of
Franz von Papen. For the most part, Papen's political contacts,
the political strategy of his cabinet, and its relationship to
the conservative party spectrum and the conservative dictatorshin
models of the \Jeimar Republic have so far been largely ignored. 2
After Germany's military defeat in the First \Vorld War and after
constituting the Republic, two problern areas dominated political
discussion and political struggle in the \Jeimar years. On
the one hand, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to
surrender considerable territory, make reparation payments, and
limit weapons. On the other hand, the Republic as a form of
government guaranteed citizens the fundamental rights of a
bourgeois democracy, recognized the rights of unians to form
coalitions, to strike, and to bargain collectively, and
introduced the parliamentary system as the foundation for
shaping the processes of building political opinion and will.
After 1913, in numerous discussions, leading representatives of
the political, economic, and military spheres debated how the
entire Treaty of Versailles, or at least certain of its
stipulations, could be undermined or modified; they also
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discussed how the parliamentary system could be adapted to
their own interests.
Political discussion of these two questions intensified with
the outbreak of the world economic crisis. Just before the
Brllninß government (1930-32) took office, a political program
was introduced that implied a massive withdrawal of democratic
rights and a reduction in parliamentary ~owers. The majority
of big industrial leaders and bankers initially welcomed the
Brllninß government. The fall of the Ilermann-l1Uller government
of 1930 had deprived the Social Democrats of governmental control
and freed the way for a presidential cabinet3 which could govern,
on the basis of Article 48, with far less dependence on
parliament.4 Early on, however, the Brllning government was
criticized for its dependency on the Social Democrats'
toleration.5
After the spectacular electoral success of the I<SDAP in the
Reichstag election of September 1931), demands that ti1e so-called
"national opposition" be represented in the government grew
increasingly vocal. (The national opposition included the
rightist radicals .and fascistic forces from the German National
Peop le' s Party Li'iNV;E7 of Bugenberg, on up to the NSDAP.) The
national Opposition culminated in the Harzburg Front of 1931.
The circle of industrialists that had established contact with
the NSDAP and supported llitler financially and politically grew
significantly broader.6
Including the rightist forces in the Brllning government was
impossible. But only with the support of rightist forces could
the goals and interests be implemented that were cornrnon to
broad circles of big industry, bank capital, and big agriculture,
namely, a big business-oriented economic policy, 7 the revision
of the Treaty of Versailles, and the replacement of parliamentary
rule by an authoritarian state,3 which alone could offer
guarantees for economic and international expansion and for the
planned rearmament.
Papen's cabinet seemed to offer the best possibility for
implementing these goals. Its members, most of noble origin,
came from the conservative rightist camp. Papen, who had been
a member of the Catholic Center party and its delegate to the
Prussian parliament from 1921-1924 and 1928-1932, was politically
closer totheGerman National People's party (DNVP).9 Minister
of the interior, Baron von Gayl, a member of the DNVP and a
representative of East Prussia in the state council, held to
the reactionary Ilugenberg line.lO Reichswehr (Army) !1inister
Schleicher, generally considered the inspiration for the Papen
cabinet, personified the rearrnament plans of the Reichswehr
leadership.ll Nearly all the ministers belonged totheGerman
Gentlemen's Club (Deutscher Herrenklub), a fact which earned the
cabinet the nickname, "Ilerrenklub-Kabirtett" (The Gentlemen's
Club Cabinet).12
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The Gentlemen's Club has unjustifiably been portrayed in
writin§s as a harmless debating circle similar to an English
club.l
The purpQse for founding the Herrenklub in 1924,
however, was to gather tagether a "conservative elite," which
drew from the leadership of l)Olitics, the military, big
industry, and big agriculture. This elite sought to unify
conservative political positions in order to increase its ability
to realize right-wing, conservative policies.l4 The mentality
of the Herrenklub was characteristic::ally chauvinistic and antirepublican. The draft of its charter reads:
In its name the Herrenklub refers to our people's
his torical mission towards t:1e Eas t '"hich is
symbolic of the idea of an enlarged Germany. The
German Herrenklub intends to lay a foundation, as a
club, for convening persans with a Christian and
nationalistic orientation who have leading or
decisive political influence.l5
The German Herrenklub was closely related to a political
movement and deserved special attention as another aspect of
the development of the conservatives' models of dictatorship:
namely, the young conservative movement.
The young conservatives arose as a reaction to the First \lorld
and the November Revolution. After the collapse of the
Kaiser's empire in 1913, conservatives of the old stamp remained
true to the political views of the pre-\~orld War II days. But
the new conservatives criticized qmditions during ~Hlhelm's
empire and held it responsible for Germany's defeat in the war.l6
During the \Jeimar Republic the young conservatives published an
almost inexhaustible wealth of materials. Although these
publications differed from one another in numerous ways, all
shared three ideological core elements; the desire to create
a unified and internally strong German Reich; 1 7 the demand for
a new European order in which Germany would play a leading role, 13
and the claim that an internally and externally strong German
Reich would embody the true and specifically German form of
socialism. 19

\Jar

Franz von Papen never doubted that he should be re~arded as
being in the tradition of the young conservatives. 0 Leading
ideologues of young conservatives such as Heinrich von Gleichen,
Arthur l1oeller van den ßruck, and Max Hildebert ßoehm were
numbered among the founding members of the German Herrenklub,
which was led by Heinrich von Gleichen and Hans Bode von
Alvensleben.21
In cantrast to the NSDAP and to the Hugenberg wing of the DHVP
(which had generally pulled back from the German Herrenklub
after 1924), the Young Conservatives' and the Herrenklub
members' internal policy steered toward a gradual reduction of
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democratic and parliamentary rights through legal means. By
continually making alterations in the constitution, they hoped
to reach their long-term goal, a definitive revision of the
l~eimar Reich constitution.
As way stations to this goal,
they aimed at strengthening the position of the Reich president
and Reich government against the parliament. After 1930, these
means were put into practice by applying Article 43. The
Federation for Renewing the Reich (Bund zur Erneuerung des Reiches,
BER) had been presided over by the former Reich chancellor and
later Reichbank president, Hans Luther,22 from its founding in
1923 until 1930. The BER's drafts for a constitution most
nearly matched the Herrenklub's political thinking concetning
the constitution.2
Among the numerous political models for a constitution that
emanated from this circle areund the Herrenklub and BER,
the propos~ls of one man particularly stand out: Edgar Julius
Jung. He had a close relationship with Papen and htis work in
certain ways epitomized the Young Conservatives' models of
die tatcrship.
Jung, a lawyer by profession who was active in various rightist
radical groups and organizations since the First llorld War, was
made Papen's private secretary and the ghostwriter of his
speeches in 1932. In 1927 he had published a book entitled
The Domination of the Inferior, 2 4 in which he maintained that
the lveimar Republic had brought the inferior to power, while
letting the potential of Germany's intellectual and moral elite
go unused. According to him, it was time to put an end to
liberalism and individualism and to create a new Reich in which
an educated and cultivated leadership elite, drawn from the
bourgeoisie, would hold all power . Specifically, Jung voted
for a change in electoral rights to increase the minimum voting
age for unmarried persons, to revoke electoral rights for women,
and to give additional votes to fathers with several children.
He also supported the creation of a two-chamber system: the
first chamber was to consist of a leadership elite from the
economic, military, and political spheres, with the Reich
president selecting 75 percent of membership; the secend
chamber was to be composed of the elected representatives of
the Reichstag, who could not influence legislation or cabinet
formation, since the Reich president would appoint the cabinet
and maintain his own office for life. Jung also proposed
privileging the ministerial bureaucracy.25
Although they had certain unrealistic features (especially
concerning elections), Jung's constitutional proposals became
the foundation for the constitutional program of the Reich
government during the Papen chancellorship--a point to be
developed later. Already before 1932 these proposals had gained
recognition and support in certain corporate circles because of
their antiparliamentary and antidemocratic character. In
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particular, Paul Reusch, an industrialist in the Ruhr and general
director of the GutehoffnungshUtte in Oberhausen, a subsidiary
of the Haniel Corporation, was interested in Jung and helped
finance the publication of his book.26 Indeed, Karl Haniel;
Albert VHgler, the chairman of the board of United Steel Works,
Europe's largest mining and steel manufacturing concern; and
Fritz Springerum of the Hoesch Company of Dortmund were numbered
among the circle of Jung's supporters. 2 7
To this policy of a strong state--in which the broad mass of
the citizenry (the inferiors) were to be excluded from the
development of a political will and in which an institutionally
protected elite would govern--was closely linked to the plan
for a new European order under German leadership. Jung
emphasized the necessity of creating large economic spaces
because "the German of the second quarter of the twentieth
century (needed) economic sEaces, export territories, and
secure nutritional bases."2
The plan to create a middle-European economic domain was no
intellectual plaything for the Young Conservatives; rather it
grew out of the interests of German corporations and reflected
a development that had taken hold since the mid-twenties. Cartel
agreemerits in Europe, particularly with France, created the
economic foundation for business ties and cooperation among
various large European corporations. 2 9 By establishing the
"t1iddle European Business Day" in 1931, leading representatives
of chemical, electrical, and heavy iridustries created an
institution that was designed--by reducing tariff barriers,
developing trade relationships to southeast Europe, and
cooperating economically with France--to create a European
economic empire.30 Carl Duisberg, chairman of the board of the
IG-Farben conglomerate, the largest chemical concern in Europe,
and also chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry,
the top industrial association, introduced this strategy for
economic expansion to German companies: "Only a closed
economic bloc from Bordeaux to Odessa can give Europe the economic
backhone it needs to maintain its importance in the world."31
It was less openly mentioned that not only peaceful means, but
also military actions might conceiveably have to be employed
in order to reach this goal; but this point of view is both
evident in the definition of the goal itself and became clear
in the increasingly overt demands for rearmament.
Papen offered leading capitalist representatives a guarantee
that he would support their economic and political plans. Since
1928 he had been a member of the German-French study committee,
a coalition for encouraging economic and cultural cooperation
between Germany and France. The committee had been called to
life by Emile t1ayrisch, an industrial magnate from Luxembourg
who was general director of the Arbed Corporation, the second
largest m~n~ng and steel manufacturing concern in Europe, and
simultaneously president of the International Crude Steel
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Association (Steel Cartel). Fvom the German side, the committee
received influential representatives from big industry and
banking.3 2
The naming of Papen's cabinet on lfay 31, 1932, was heralded by
big industry and banking representatives. During the Reichstag
election of July 1932--as with that of November 1932--the
parties supporting Papen, DNVP, and DVP (Deutsche Volkspartei)
received massive financial support from heavy industry circles
in Rhine-Westphalia. Industrial magnates such as Vl:lgler of the
United Steelworks and Springorum of Hoesch; who in preceding
years had helped to support Hitler and the NSDAP and to make
them acceptable, were among the initiators of election funds
for Papen. 33
This fact has often been used to support the conclusion that
the industrialists named--and with them most of heavy industry
in the Ruhr--had no interest in establishing a faseist system of
domination; rather, they were more concerned with saving
co·nservatism from National Socialism, or at least with "taming"
the NSDAP.
But the following points should be observed: First, the NSDAP
was politically and financially supported by these powers long
before 1932.34 llitler had several opportunities to speak before
leading representatives of industry. After his famous speech
to the DUsseldorf Industry Club on January 27, 1932, he received
increased support from industrialists in the Ruhr district-and also from Vl:lgler.35
Second, in the summer of 1932, the goal of the industrial group
around Vl:lgler was aimed neither at neutralizing the NSDAP
politically nor opposing its antidemocratic, anti-union, and
chauvinistic demands; on the contrary, they wanted to include
the NSDAP in the government.36
Essentially there were no differences among the various
industrial groups on the views that the parliamentary system
should be removed and an expansive foreign policy should be
introduced. There was, however, disagreement on the methods
and persons to be employed and when the transition to a
dictatorship should be accomplished. Fritz Thyssen, the steel
industrialist, and the former Reich bank president, lljalmar
Schacht, wielded all their influence in order to affect transfer
öf the chancellorship to llitler.37
In contrast, the Ruhr representatives of heavy industry around
Vl:lgler were not yet prepared to .transfer full power to llitler.
They quite openly considered the time premature for various
reasons: For one, a too precipitous and direct course toward
an open dictatorship would invite resistance from the workers'
movement. Despite the deep split in the 1vorkers' movement
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between its social democratic and Communist winßs, the possibility
of a collective action in the case of a transfer of ~ower to
Hitler during the summe.r of 1932 was not to be dismissed, In
addition, Prussia--the largest and economically most significant
state (Land) witi1in the German Reich, and the one that commanded
a strong, social-democratically oriented police force--was
still ruled by a coalition government comprised of SPD and center
representatives. To a~point Hitler as Reich chancellor would
have resulted in the protests of the Prussian government.
Furthermore, Ilitler would have never been able to risk deposing
the Prussian government, as Papen in fact did.
Internationally, there were important decisions to be made at
the Conference of Lausanne. Since this group would ultimately
decide the fate of German reparations payments, it was unwise
for them to make uncautious moves domestically. In the face of
skepticism from without, particularly from France, the Lausanne
negotiations would never have been completed successfully had
Ilitler been chancellor.
In addition, the economic program of the HSDAP was unclear.
Although the NS-leadership had left no doubt that they intended
to cornply with the wishes and interests of big industrialists,
on questions of important details they lacked clear plans for
enacting economic measures, Precisely for this reason, the
so-called "ICeppler-Circle" was formed in the spring of 1932 in
which representatives of industry and the HSDAP worked out an
economic policy together. 33 These lvere the all-important reasons
for supporting the Papen cabinet in the summer of 1932 rather
than the NSDAP.
Papen's period of government can be divided into several stages,
each of which has a relatively clear major political content and
demonstrates specific characteristics pointing to the successive
developTI!ent toward an authoritarian, elitist system of domination.
The first phase, from Papen's inauguration up to the Reichstag
election on July 31, was characterized by the unwavering, drastic
reduction in social and democratic rights, On June 4, the very
day the government was declared, the Reichstag was dissolved to
permit Papen to govern "undisturbed" by parliamentary Opposition.
The first emergency decrees of the government, issued that same
June, contained a massive reduction in state expenditures for
social welfare (cuts in pensions, in benefits to the unemployed
and war veterans, and so on).39
Because of the "ordinance against political excesses" (extremism)
of June 14, the SA and SS, the paramilitary forces of the NSDAP,
were readmitted. 40 IDüle the (lazi paramilitary organizations
could freely engage in political agitation, administrative,
judicial, and police measures for taking action against republican
and socialist forces were intentionally strengthened,41 On
July 20, 1932, the Papen government delivered the greatest blow
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to the democratic process when, on threadbare pretexts, it
deposed the SPD and center government in Prussia. 4Z \lith this
coup-like move against a democratically legitimated government,
one of the last and most important republican bastions was
eliminated. A Reich commissioner installad by the Reich
government took over governmental business, and the Prussian
police force was placed under the command of the Reich.
Hereafter hardly any resistance was to be expected in Prussia
against the planned refashioning of the Reich into an
authoritarian, faseist state. For faseist forces, Prussia was
a test case in which the resistance of the workers' movement
to the destruction of the \leimar Republic could be measured. 43
The Reichstag election on July 31, 1932, closes the first stage
and introduces a second stage in which the attempt to include
the NSDAP in the government was the primary goal. With 37.4
percent of the votes and 230 Reichstag seats, the NSDAP became
the stronges t party, wiüle the parties that had supported Papen,
the ·DVP and DNVP combined could claim only 44 seats. Even before
the election the newspaper Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (DAZ)
which was aligned with heavy industry, called for a coalition
of the DNVP and NSDAP under the Papen chancellorship.44
Inunediately after the election, discussions among cabinet members
began on how the HSDAP could be made a participant in the
governraent.45 But the negotiations, which Reich president
Hindenberg conducted with Hitler on August 13, were a failure.
Hitler--pressured by Thyssen and Schacht--refused to accept a
secondary role; rather he insisted on the office of chancellor.
This deraand had to this point been rejected by the most important
forces in heavy industry.
After the failure of negotiations with the NSDAP, the third phase
of Papen's government commenced. In this stage the focus was
on developine and actualizing an independent governmental policy.
The main components of this policy were its economic and
constitutional reform programs.
The economic program, hammered out in lengthy and intensive
discussions from the end of July until the beginning of September
1932, was shaped with the participation of big business.46 Its
most important elenents were tax bonuses and hiring benefits
for entrepreneurs47 and the virtual elimination of the tariff
system.4G By introducing the voluntary labor service and direct
(but ineffective) ueasures for providing work, unemployment
was to be lowered.
This economic program paid not the slightest attention to the
distressed economic situation of large groups of the population.
Rather, it 1ms oriented exclusively toward the demands of big
business. Such a program could have been insured only when
the democratic rights guaranteed by the Weimar constitution were
restricted even further and the government in power was made
largely independent of !Jarliament and institutionally guaranteed
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such independence.
The plans to change the constitution, which Uinister of the
Interior Gayl developed in agreement with the cabinet, aimed
at liquidating "parliamentarism" and establishing a dictatorship.4 9
The plans depended heavily on the concept of the state developed
by Jung and other Young Conservative authors. Gayl proposed a
change in the electoral law. "Independent family providers"
(men and women), as well as war veterans, would receive an
additional vote, while the age limit for the right to elect and
to be elected would be raised to twenty-five years of age. The
proportional election system, in which ti1e electorate could
vote for a party and for individuals, was to be changed to a
system in which the electorate could only vote for individuals.
This suggestion, carried to its logical conclusion, would result
in doing away with the party system.
Article 54 of the Ueimar constitution, which gave parliament
the right to depose the government by a vote of no confidence,
was to be limited at once and eventually eliminated altogether.
The government was to be freed from the influence of elected
officials by introducing the kind of two-chamber system Jung
bad proposed. Finally, new laws changing the relationship of
Reich to the states ("Reich reform") would strenp,then the power
of the central government against the states.
If the constitutional plans of the Papen cabinet had been put
into effect, they would have replaced the parliamentary system
with a form of state and government in which every effective
democratic control was removed and an elite leadership group
exercised all authority (Herrschaft). Actualizing these plans
would have meant transforming the Weimar state into an elite,
authoritarian state with fascistic features, in which all
opposition could be shut out.
In cantrast to the NSDAP, the Papen government put little value
on mobilizing the masses in favor of its politics. As a result
of its policy, directed against the basic needs of broad
segments of the -population, and of its inability to agitate the
masses, Papen suffered a catastrophic election defeat during the
Reichstag election on l~ovember 6.
But the NSDAP, too--and this was actually the decisive fact of
the election--lost more than two million votes. It thereby
became clear that the NSDAP had passed the peak of its influence
on the masses. It was also evident that the low point of the
worldwide economic depression had been overcome. A new upswing
in the business cycle was about to begin in which op-portunities
for demanding sacrifices from the working population, in the
name of economic crisis, would be substantially reduced. No
one wanted to return to a parliamentary system. On the contrary,
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the cr~s~s was an opportunity that could be used to get rid of
that system.SO At this juncture, nitler's being placed into
power signified the last opportunity for the right-wing
forces from big business, banking, and the military to
decisively destroy parliamentary democracy. Uith hel!J from
the faseist dictatorship, they intended to accomplish their
long-held, chief interests: destruction of the labor movement
and removal of the rights of wage and salary earners, economic
expansion, reconquest of the lands lost during the First ~Iorld
\lar, creation of an integrated European market under German
leadership, and rearmament. In this situation, the important
heads of big business and banking were unanimous in demandinr;
that llitler be installed as Reich chancellor.Sl
True, after the Papen government there was a brief intermezzo-namely, the Schleicher government--but the rail switches for the
faseist dictatorship had already been set.
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wages could be cut by as much as 50 percent by firrns which
were in financial difficulty or which had a certain amount of
new employni.ent. For an overview, see also ll. Marcon,
Arbeitsbeschaffungspolitik der Regierungen Papen und
Schleicher: Grundsteinlegung fUr die Beschäftigunßspolitik
im Dritten Reich (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1974).
See Gayl's speech of August 11, 1932, in Schulthess'
Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1932, p. 139; Gayl's
Denkschrift of August 22, 1932, "Gesichtspunkte fUr den
Staatsneubau," BA Koblenz, Nachlass Gayl llo. 37, pp. 40-47;
Gayl's speech of October 23, 1932 in Berlin, Ibid., pp.
64-68. An abstract of this speech appears in Schulthess'
Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1932, pp. 139-91.
Article "Jena oder Sedan" in "FUhrerbriefe" of November 4,
1932, published by Ulrike HBrster-Philipps, ed., ~~er war
Hitler wirklich? Grasskapital und Faschismus 1918-1945
(KI:lln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1978), p. 151.
There was a petition of big industrialists, bankers and
large landholders requesting the Reichspräsident on November
19, 1932 to appoint Hitler as chancellor. See also minutes
of the big industrialist's "Langnamverein's" meeting of
November 26, 1932, Ibid., pp. 154-56.
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The NSDAP and the
German Working Class,
1925-1933
PETER D. STACHURA

Throughout the pre-1933 period, the National Socialist party
(NSDAP) projected an image of being a broadly-based Volksbewegung
whose aim was to restore the fortunes of all Germans regardless
of status or class. The party's ideological and propagandistic
appeal was modelled to attract to the swastika as many sections
of \~eimar society as possible. This approach made sense, after
all, if the NSDAP were to exoand its electoral constituency
to the point where it could establish a popular mandate for
power. Following the unsuccessful 11unich putsch in 1923,
Hitler renounced violent, revolutionary tactics in favor of a
long-term parliamentary strategy that would allow him to assume
governmental responsibility within the letter of the law. In
the end, of course, the NSDAP did win power legally even if it
constantly violated the spirit of the law. While failing to
attain an overall majority in Reichstag elections in July and
November 1932, the NSDAP, despite showing incipient signs of
having passed its peak, was ultimately brought into the
government, thanks to the last-minute interventionist power
politics of industrial and agrarian elitist groups representing
propertied, nationalist, and Protestant Germany.l
Contrary to Joseph Goebbels's assertion in early 1933 that the
!1achtergreifung signified "a revolution of a workers' movement,"2
empirical historical inquiry has established that by 1933 the
NSDAP drew its electoral support overwhelmingly from the smalltown and rural Protestant Mittelstand, comprising men and women
in roughly equal numbers, in northern, central, and eastern
Germany.3 Although by 1930-31 the lower 11ittelstand, particularly
of the "old" or traditional type, predominated among the
party's voters and members, the upper Hittelstand were beginning
to flock into the ranks in ever-increasing numbers in 1932,4
thus making the NSDAP more of a catch-all movement of middle-class
protest, a movement of bourgeois integration. Two identifiable
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groups were manifestly immune to Nazi blandishments: the
Catholics, who continued to vote solidly for the confessional
Center Party and Bavarian People's party, and the organized
industrial working class, who steadfastly maintained their
allegiance to the Social Democratic (SPD) and Communist (KPD)
parties. Changes in voting patterns among the organized workers
usually involved a switch by unemployed, unskilled or semiskilled urban voters from the SPD to the more radical KPD.s
Despite some success among workers in cernain urban and industrial
areas in \les tphalia, the Rhineland-Ruhr, Saxony, Thuringia, the
Pfalz, and ßerlin-Brandenburg, the NSDAP remained a party of
middle-class interests, and in terms of its membership, industrial
workers were also significantly underrepresented, especially
in the leadership cadres.6 In both proportionate and absolute
terms, the working-class element in the NSDAP's constituency
from 1925 to 1933 was small, and its claims to be a genuine
popular movement had, therefore, no basis in reality. This
is the scenario against which any discussion of the party's
relationship to the German proletariat must take place. This
chapter analyzes this relationship with a view to obtaining a
clear perspective on the principal reasons for the NSDAP's
failure to ••in much support among this particular group in
lleimar society.
Those industrial \VOrkers who did find their way to Hitler were
invariably located, for one reason or another, outside the
mainstream of working-class, organizational, and ideological
development and, in some instances, were drawn from the
lumpen proletariat. A small labor aristocracy of skilled workers,
depandent craftsmen, and workers with responsibility, such as
foremen, were as likely to end up voting for Hitler as not,
regardless of whether they were urban- or rural-based. They
were joined by another set of workers who did live in small towns
or the countryside and who, if employed, \vere not subject to
the supervisory control of a trade union or other kind of
workers' group. !1ost of them were employed in a semiskilled
or nonskilled capacity in small businesses and family concerns,
such as handicrafts, where the influence of the master/owner
and his family was often decisive. In such circumstances,
workers were expected to conform to the values laid down by
their superiors. In the period of spiralling unemployment
during the early 1930s, workers caught in this situation could
be reasonably expected to be more careful than usual not to
offend their employers for fear of dismissal. Similar types of
workers--weakly or not at all unionized--were also to be found
in public transport, especial~y the railways and trams; in
postal services; in the gas, water and electricity industries;
and among agricultural laborers in socially depressed parts of
eastern Germany. These workers lacked, therefore, a developed
proletariart consciousness, Which prevented them from identifying
with the traditional working-class movement. Their scholastic
and political education was of a very low standard, and they
quite often had no previous record of voting for either the
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SPD or KPD. 7 The younger members of this group, whether employed
or not, were particularly susceptible to National Socialist
emphasis on nationalism, egalitarianism, and the appeal to the
"dignity of labor," while the dynamic and pseudo-idealistic style
of the party struck a responsive chord in young, immature minds.3
At the same time, the style and vigor with which NSDAP
propaganda was conducted cannot be underestimated as a factor
in attracting workers in a depressed social and economic
environmen t.
Another, albeit indeterminate, group of pro-Hitler workers
were those fearful of losing their secure, if modest, economic
and social status in an era of uncertainty and vast unemp1oyment
and being relegated to the lumpen proletariat.9 Unskilled
or semi-skilled workers out of a job usually shunned the NSDAP,
but the younger, long-term unemployed in both rural and urban
areas were more favorably disposed towards National Socialism.10
Also, workers who were generally traditionally minded, patriotic,
and even anti-Semitic, rejected the international flavor of the
working-class movement and saw in the NSDAP the best opp0rtunity
of reestablishing the workers and their organizations within a
more "acceptable," that is, nationalist, framework. Brewery
workers provide an example of this category.ll Finally, the
NSDAP managed to win over small sections of organized industrial
workers in a few well-defined regions within the major industrial
centers of the country. In virtually all of these regions,
unusual industrial and social conditions prevailed, resulting
in a reversal öf normal voting inclinations. Chemnitz-Zwickau,
where small-scale textile manufacturing and a domestic system
predominated, is a well-known example of this type of environment.
Here, the NSDAP polled well above its normal, low average in
industrial areas: for example, 47 percent in the Reichstag
election in July 1932.12
It is impossible to precisely quantify the different sections
of the pro-HSDAP working class until a more detailed investigation
is made of local and regional electoral responses, but taken as
a whole, the aggregate was not significant. The political
motivation of any social group, especially one which in part
behaves contrary to accepted class patterns, is a complex
phenomenon, involving not only class and occupational status,
but other variables such as peculiar local and domestic
influences, emotional attachments, age, education, and personal
sensitivities.l3
The mass of organized workers was sufficiently disciplined,
socially and politically, to resist National Socialism. From
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the working class
had developed in an atmosphere of ostracism and outright
persecution, a sense of group and class identity which, if
anything, had been further solidified by the experience of the
First "llorld \lar, the November Revolution, and the economic and
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political vicissitudes of the Weimar years. In a society as
class-conscious as the Republic, where voting preferences were
rnainly deterrnined by class, social, and confessional allegiances,
the organized proletariatwas bound to shrug off the NSDAP's
advances more easily than most. Like the Catholics, the workers
constituted more then a mere segment of the po~ulation. They
possessed a distinguishable and mature subculture situated
firrnly within a variegated organizational structure. This
situation engendered feelings of class unity, solidarity, and
loyalty which, in turn, were reinforced by the effective
political representation of working-class interests at the very
highest levels of government through the SPD, KPD, and the
socialist trade unions. The Catholic working class likewise
had their representatives in politics and in the factories.
The influence of the SPD and Catholic parties also extended into
regional government. Prussia was controlled by the SPD for
most of the \veimar period, and in Bavaria, the Bavarian People' s
party reigned supreme. · These parties achieved material benefits
for their working-class supporters--higher wages, better
conditions of work, and improved welfare facilities. The
integrity and vitality of working-class life was thus protected
on many sides, at least until the onset of the depression in the
early 1930s.
The depression undoubtedly weakened the trade-union movement
at a time also when the SPD appeared to be politically paralyzed
at the national level and when the two major proletarian parties
were mutually hostile. As a result of wage cuts, short-term
employment, reduced consurner spending, inadequate unemployment
insurance, rising cost of living, intense competition for jobs,
and, of course, unprecedented levels of unemployment, the trade
unions suffered severely and in 1933 were in no condition to
resist National Socialist onslaughts.14 However, while tragically
split at the very moment of faseist resurgence, because of the
KPD's ultra-leftist strategy, which identified the SPD as
"social fascists," the working class rernained loyal to their
interests and organizations. There was no question of disillusionment with socialism among the vast majority of workers. The
boundaries of the National Socialist appeal were thus marked only
a few degrees inside the proletarian constituency. Racist
anti-Semitism, chauvinism, militarism, imperialism, and other
salient features of Hitler's doctrine were simply incompatible,
ideologically and historically, with the traditions and ethos
of the German working class.
On the other hand, it is wrong
to argue, as the Oxford his torian Timothy \l. !1ason has done, 15
that the NSDAP was a conscious crusade against the working class. 16
Similarly, Trotsky's cornrnent that Hitler's triumph was "the
greatest defeat of the proletariat in the history of the world" 1 7
falls into the same category of gross exaggeration. The interests
of the NSDAP and the German workers may have been, objectively
speaking, diametrically opposed, but it is quite another matter
to depict the Party as an actively antiworkers movement above
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all else. The NSDAP has to be understood instead as the spearhead
of a broader restorationist, racial-chauvinistic movement in
German society directed at the many facets of modernism:
industrialization, democracy, liberalism, Uarxism, urbanization,
and parliamentarianism. From a National Socialist standpoint,
the working class was but one social manifestation of modern
civilization. The social and politico-ideological dynamics of
National Socialism were multivarious and complex, and cannot be
reduced, therefore, to simplistic, one-sided explanations.
There is a large body of literature dealing with the theoretical
and empirical relationship between capitalism/big business and
fascism,lß This is a controversial area of debate among
historians, and it is not our purpose here to attempt a balancing
act between conflicting interpretations. Rather, in deliberately
rejecting a deterministic approach to the problem, this chapter
examines a number of empirical ~easons for the tenuous
relationship between the NSDAP and the German working class.
There were important deficiencies in the party's appeal to
organized workers, which largely account for its relative
inability to attract their support.
In the first instance, the failure of the NSDAP to offer a
coherent and convincing interpretation of its "socialism" was
a grave handicap. The party produced a plethora of radicalsounding phrases and slogans--often imitations of the SPD or
l~D originals--which were put across with considerable vehemence
but little sincerity, particularly during election campaigns
and in large cities and urban areas.l9 Taking a lead from the
proworker orientation of the NSDAP's northern wing in 1925-26, 20
a social revolutionary approach dominated the party's propaganda
until the Reichstag election in May 1923 as it sought to
establish in competition with the Socialists and Communists~
a secure foothold among industrial workers in major cities,Ll
When the results of the 1928 election made clear the almost total
ineffectiveness of this urban plan, the NSDAP's emphasis in
ideology and propaganda was fundamentally altered in favor of a
new middle-class, nationalist-conservative strategy,22 Between
1929 and 1933, when the traditional bourgeois party system
disintegrated amidst socioeconomic and psychological tensions
induced by the depression,23 the NSDAP was able to build up its
following among the broad range of the Protestant middle classes
on the basis of its new orientation, in which social revolutionary
themes were drastically toned down compared with previous years.
Even then, the party's socialism remairred vague and eclectic; in
essence, it was an expression of petty bourgeois reactionary
anticapitalism which, saturated with ultrachauvinism and racist
anti-Semitism, had nothing in common with the traditions of
Uarxist socialism. The NSDAP' s anticapitalism 1vas a counterrevolutionary, antimodernist ideology in the fullest sense.
Nazi socialism was rooted in late nineteenth century neoconservatism
of the kind preached by Adolf Stoecker and Friedrich Naumann and
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revived in the early 1920s by Oswald Spengler and others.
Spengler's concept of Prussian socialism, which articulated
the German intelligentsia's disdain of materialism and monetary
values, was most notably taken up within the NSDAP by Gregor
Strasser, who repeatedly stressed the need to combat these "evil"
influences of modern civilization: "It is the most distressing
feature of this capitalistic economic system that all values are
measured by rnoney, by means, by property! The decline of the
Volk is the inevitable result of the turn to this measure of value
because selection by property is the mortal enemy of race, of
blood, of life."24 The early diary of Joseph Goebbels25 and
the speeches and lvritings of Gregor Strasser during the mid-1920s
contain the most vivid examples of the party's radical rhetoric.
In 1926, for example, Strasser thundered in a fashion that would
not have disgraced a SPD or KPD spokesman: "lle are socialists,
we are enemies, deadly enemies of the present economic system,
with its exploitation of the economically weak, with its unjust
means of reward, with its immoral evaluation of people according
to their possessions. and money instead of according to their
responsibilities and achievernents, and we are resolved to destroy
this system in all circumstances."26
This was social denagoguery at its very worst and at its most
vacuous. Indeed, Strasser blithely remarked the same year that
"rational thought corrodes the foundations of life itself."27
This was not an encouraging view for those seeking an intelligible
expose'of his "socialism." Strasser demanded of others the same
emotional-mystical commitment to the cause which he had: "And
we know with a certainty which proceeds from the blood • • •
that our path is right. u23
His message was revelatory rather than explanatory, and in this
nonintellectual attitude Strasser was at one, of course, with
other party leaders.29 Just as the socialist parts of the
party' s official program of 1920 were left without adequate
explanation throughout the pre-1933 period, so the radical
pronouncements of leading NSDAP officials remained mere
invective, a device of dishonest propaganda, and a futile
stratagern to deceive German workers into following Ilitler.
Against the deep class-consciousness and socialist education of
the proletariat, the USDAP's social revoluti onary animuswas
inevitably seen to be the pathetic fraud it was. Only members
of right-wing paramilitary groups, nationalist-minded intellectuals
and students, discontented white-collar workers, the selfemployed, small and independent producers, and traders and
craftsr.1en supported this pe·c uliar "German socialism." All of
them, fearing proletarianization in an increasingly complex
and impersonal industrial world, clung hopefully and tenaciously
to their social and economic status in the face of expanding
capitalism and organized labor.
Hitler, unlike Goebbels and Strasser, never made any real
attempt to hide his contempt for the masses, especially the
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workers whom, he stated in Mein KaQpf, were tobe won over to
the NSDAP and the nationalist idea only because of the strength
of their nurnbers. The FUhrer undoubtedly appreciated the
importance of the llovember Revolution in rclation to the working
class. He explained the Revolution in ter!'ls of domestic
political problems rather than military shortconings, stressing
in particular the pernicious influence of lfarxists and Jews
on the German proletariat in 1917-19. If Germany were once
again to emerge as a world-class power, llitler reasoned, the home
front had to be made safe and stabile by integratina the
industrial work force into the national cornrnunity.3Ö He was not
interested in the social welfare or wider interests of the
workers; tl1ey were to be seduced and cajolcd into supporting
the i'lSDAP by bread and circuses, as llitler informed Jtto
Strasser.31 By emotional inclination and political instinct,
the FUhrer remairred the archtypal petty bourgeois. He unswervingly
upheld the principle of private property throughout his career,
tuthlessly purged so-called socialists from the party at
various stages after 1923, opposed for a long period the
establishment of aNational Socialist-sponsored trade union, 32
and ultimately came to power with the backing, among others, of
reactionary elements of big business. For Hitler, and the HSDAP
as a whole, socialism or anticapitalism simply amounted to an
extension of their anti-Semitic chauvinism: "Unproductive,"
that is, Je,üsh, finance capitalism was the enemy, not "creative"
German private capitalism.
The blatantly opportunistic and spurious nature of the NSDAP's
socialism largely accounts for the failure of its trade union
affiliate, the National Socialist Factory Gell Organization
(NSBO), to nal:e noteuorthv inroads into the ranl~s of the factory
proletariat before 1933.3'3 The NSBO's appealwas a rather
crude amalgam of nationalism and anticapitalism, as illustrated,
for example, by its llib-Aktion (Hinein in die Betriebe) in
1931. During 1932 the NSBO tried to sharpen its radical image
by organizing and participating in strike action by factory
employees and other groups of blue-collar workers, culminating
in the Berlin transport workers' strike in autumn of that year.34
This tactic vlaS unsuccessful. When the NSBO began at last to
expand its membership in 1932 from forty thousand to· over
three hundred thousand, this was achieved mainly on the basis
of recruitment among artisans, craftsmen, and lewer-grade
white-collar salaried employees in industry and the public
services. Only after 1933 did the l~SBO begin to attract
substantial numbers of ordinary workers and then in an
atmosphere of violence and wholesale assaults on the working
class and its organizations.35
The development of the NSBO epitomizes the wider ineffectiveness
of the mistakenly labelled "Nazi Left" among the German working
class before 1933.
The term "Nazi Left" occurs frequently in
the historiography of early National Socialism without ever
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being properly assessed. It is a loose and convenient
description, designed to cover all putative socialist and
anticapitalist circles in Hitler's movement, including the party,
SA, Hitler Youth (l!J), HSBO, and the National Sodalist
Students' League (NSDStB). This Nazi Left is usually assumed
to have existed from about 1924-25 until the so-aalled "Second
Revolution" was crushed durL1.ß the :lßhm Purge in June 1934.
Furthermore, Gregor Strasser, who was the NSDAP's chief of
propaganda (1926-27) and organization (1923-32), is invariably
referred to as the leader of this Nazi Left. The whole idea of
there having been a Nazi Left in any concrete form, whether
led by Strasser or anyone else, can be seen to be entirely
erroneous if the evidence is examined.
have already noted, and discounted as counterfeit, the
socialism of the NSBO. A similar conclusion may also be
reached about the alleged socialism of the SA. Despite drawing
most of its rank-and-file followers from the working class,36
the SA never sought to formulate a coherent ideological posture
consistent with the nature of its sociological makeup. A
programmatic statement of its socialism was never made,37 Instead,
the basis of the SA's socialism was merely a series of
passionate, radical, and often pugilistic remarks by various
leaders on the necessity of smashing Marxism, the Republic, and
Jews, and of creating some sort of ill-defined egalitarian
Volksgemeinschaft. The absence of evidence for a considered
or genuine socialist ethos is hardly unexpected in view of the
SA's combative and militaristic profile: It was a force designed
to capture and dominate the streets.33 Ideology mattered little
in these circumstances, and the socialism it is supposed to
have possessed amounted to little more than the ability to
organize soup kitchens, shelter, and clothing for sections of
the working-class unemployed in Germany's !arger cities. The
SA's radicalism is, in fact, a charitable description of its
inordinate capacity for thuggery on a grand scale. When the
Machtergreifung did not realize the career prospects, status,
and power ambitions of some of its personnel, the SA, under
the leadership of RBhm, sought a further extension of the Nazi
Revolution, This was an exercise in power; it ~•as not meant
to further the cause of socialism, in whatever guise. The
principal reasons for the events of the summer of 1934, which
saw the political emasculation of the SA, are hardly connected
with a fight for a secend socialist revolution.39

lle

The only party organizations to have possessed an authentic
attachment to a social revolutionary radicalism were, ironically,
of comparatively little political importance, the NSDStB and
HJ. In the mid-1920s the NSDStB was led by an earnest group
areund Wilhelm Tempel who, in a vague fashion, tried to bridge
the gap bebveen National Socialism and the poorer university
students. The attempt was as unsuccessful as it was short-lived,
however, for when Baldur von Schirach re~laced Tempel as
Reichsflihrer, the NSDStB began to adopt a conservative-nationalist
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i~SDAP' s post-1928 reorientation. 40

It was on this altered ideological and social basis that the

HSDStB went on very rapidly to a position of strength in
university politics.
The HJ's engagement with socialism was of slightly longer
duration, from its creation in 1926 until the dismissal from
office of its founder and leader, Kurt Gruber, in October 1931.
During that five-year period, the HJ, while emphasizing its
nationalism and anti-Semitism, gave juvenile expression to a
certain socialistic anticapitalism. However intellectually
shallow this connnitment was among the under-eighteen-year-old
members, it was at least sincere and motivated by an exuberant
youthful idealism, which aimed at breal::i_ng up class-ridden
Weimar society and replacing it with a true national connnunity. 4 1
This ideological inclination attracted a predominately workingclass membership. Only when von Schirach and Adrian ·von Renteln
took over from Gruber was the l!J's socialism and proletarian
composition diluted to some extent as the group's ap~eal was
increasingly guided towards the nationalist concerns of bourgeois
youth. Nonetheless, in 1933 the HJ retained enough of its
early character and ethos to remain the only National Socialist
organization still genuinely believing in some kind of socialism.42
But, of course, in terrns of political influence, the HJ hardly
counted. That influence lay above all in the hands of the NSDAP,
and it is with reference to the party that the socialist
credentials of the National Socialist movement before 1933 need
to be ultimately measured.
The ideological foundations of the "Nazi Left" are alleged to
have been !)rovided by the Draft Program forrnulated under the
supervision of Gregor Strasser in late 1925.43 In fact, it would
be misleading to regard the Draft as evidence of a socialist wing
in the NSDAP and equally wrong to see it as a !)rogram supported
by all shades of opinion among the party's would-be radicals.
The Draft merely amounted to a more precise and emphatic
reaffirrnation of the anticapitalist sections of the official
NSDAP program of 1920. Strasser's Draft accentuated the
radicals' cornrnitment to a brand of extreme nationalism and PanGerrnan imperialism to which l!itler and the bourgeois l1unich
section of the party could hardly have objected; at the same
time, the Draft's anti-Semitic content, while relatively
moderate by the Flihrer's high Standards in demanding the
deportation of all Jews who had entered Gerrnany since August 1,
1914, and the withdrawal of German citizenship from all
remaining Jews, was nonetheless in the mainstream of the NSDAP's
general attitude towards the Jewish question.44 As for the
Draft's proposals on nationalization, worker participation in
industrial management, profits and ownership, and agrarian
reforrn, these were uniforrnly tentative, nebulous, and indicative
only of the radicals' emotional ties to. a romantic version of
anticapitalism. The Draft foresaw a sort of mixed economy in
which all !)roperty belonged to the nation, but where individual
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citizens would continue to own property on a lease basis. This
was the Dra,ft's main proposal to effect a .redistribution of wealth,
but it clearly lacked either substance or sense. In reality,
the interests of industrial workers and agricultural laborers
were given paltry consideration. Ideologically, therefore, the
Draft, in spurning Marxism and formal capitalism in favor of a
fascist-corporative structure based on a national dictatorship,
was disappointingly unoriginal, It was simply another lucid
example of that petty bourgeois socialism so common in right-wing
circles in Germany during the 1920s. Even so, the Draft did
not have the unanimous backing ~f the party's radicals. While
the Strasser brothers and Goebbels seem to have inclined
towards a limited egalitarian, proworkers approach, others, such
as ex-Freikorps commander Franz von Pfeffer and the North Germans,
Ludolf Haase and Hermann Fobke, were more elitist in outlook
and wanted a society attuned to the concept of achievement
(Leistungsprinzip). 45 These differences were highlighted by
the discussion of the Draft at a meeting of the ~lorking Association
of tlte North l.;est German Gauleiter of the NSDAP (AG) in Hanover
in January 192646 and were not significantly reduced during
the remainder of the 1920s.
The Nazi Left was as disunited organizationally as it was
ideologically in 1925-26. The AG, which was set up in September
1925, might have furnished the basis for a permanently organized
faction within the NSDAP had not Gregor Strasser, under severe
pressure from Hitler following the Bamberg Conference in
February 1926, disbanded it. ~iliile in existence, the AG was a
loosely constructed body for discussion of ideological matters
involving those party leaders and officials who were anxious
to give greater weight to socialist principles. It is true
that Strasser was on friendly, personal terms with many of the
AG's more prominent personalit~es, but such bonds were not
necessarily translated into political alliances. In brief,
the NSDAP's radicals in 1925-26 did not possess a degree of
organizational or ideological unity that would justify the
vitiw that a Nazi Left existed as an identifiable entity within
the Party. The term "Nazi Left" is simply a convenient way of
referring to that small number of party members who displayed
an indistinct · form of anticapitalist radicalism, a viewpoint
firmly located in an anti-Marxist, petty bourgeois scale of
values in Weimar Germany. Developments among these members
accompanying the collapse of the AG--the formal withdrawal of
the Draft program by Gregor Strasser in tfurch 1926,47 the
embarrassing failure to support the SPD-KPD sponsored campaign
for the expropriation without compensation of the former royal
houses (FUrstenenteignung),43 and the acrimonious "defection"
of Goebbels--add substance to the tnesis that there was no
Nazi Left.
Moreover, the establishment and development in northern Germany
of the Kampfverlag under the direction of the Strassers did not
produce a more meaningful concept of a Nazi Left. The journal,
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NS-Briefe, was conceived by Gregor Strasser in the summer of 1925
as a forum for discussing programmatic issues arid generally as
a means of strengthening the cause of anticapitalist radicalism
in the party.49 Strasser repeatedly emphasized that the journal
was not questioning Hitler's authority, but only challenging
some of his political ideas. This aspect was poignantly
illustrated by the heated debate in 1927 between. Strasser and
Alfred Rosenberg over the definition and understanding of
"National Socialism."58 Rosenberg relegated socialism to a
peripheral role in his interpretation, while Strasser made clear
his fundamental disagreement with this view. However~ even
here, Strasser could not be precise about his socialism; his
differences with Hunichl it became apparent, were over emphasis
rather than substance. 5
Otherwise, the tone and style of
NS-Briefe and related publications of the Kampfverlag were
anticapitalist and antibourgeois,52 but they adduced nothing
more Substantive vis-a-vis soaialism than this. Indeed, the
main function of the Strasserite press in the mid-1920s was
to support the Party's attempts to attract industrial workers
to its ranks: A certain sympathy for the proletariat and the
need to bring it into the struggle for "national freedom" was a
frequent theme in its pages.53
\fuen the appeal to industrial workers was seen to have been a
complete failure at the Reichstag election in 1928, the
Kampfverlag circle and its radical supporters in the NSDAP
were put in an agonizing dilemma: Should they abandon socialism
and fall in behind Ilitler's new nationalist-conservative strategy
towards the middle classes, or should they press on more
vehemently with the old line? Gregor Strasser, for one, had
sufficient political sagacity to draw the obvious conclusions,
and he thereafter increasingly sought to distance hirnself from
his brother and a few other diehards who persevered.54 But
the publication in 1929 by Otto Strass.e r of the "Fourteen Theses
of the German Revolution" was another typically bombastic
statement that once again failed to clear the fog which engulfed
the radicals' socialism. If the 1923 Reichstag election dealt
a mortal blow to the NSDAP's radicals, the withdrawal of Otto
Strasser and his followers in 1930 has been rightly seen by
Reinhard KUhnl as the final act of the putative Nazi Left.~ 5
KUhnl, however, has reached a correct conclusion for the
wrong reasons.
In the first place, KU!ml is convinced of the existence of a
recognizable Nazi left in the NSDAP from 1925 to 1930, whereas
it has been indicated here that this probably is an erroneous
supposition. Secondly, Otto Strasser's political importance
has been exaggerated by KUhnl: He was always in the shadow of
his older brother, Gregor, and only made a name for hirnself
after he had left the NSDAP and established the Black Front
organization. Subsequently, .Otto's many (unreliable) writings
on the early NSDAP served to distort his own modest contribution
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to the party. 56 !1ore importantly, Kllhnl may be unaware of the
fundamental reason for the nonexistence of a Nazi Left by 1930;
namely, the dramatic transformation in the political and
ideological attitudes of the Nazi Left's alleged leader, Gregor
Strasser.
Strasser's identification with an emotional socialism and
anticapitalism had diminished since he became organizational
chief of the NSDAP in January 1923 and particularly since the
collapse of the urban-plan strategy in the elections of that
year. He began, instead, to evolve a broader, less sectarian
vision of \~eimar politics. 57 This bec?~e evident in his article,
"Der neue Ton," published in Die Faus tJ in February 1929,
in which he called for moderation and more emphasis on discussion
with opponents by the Party.59 At the same time, there were
whispers in certain circles within the NSDAP about Strasser's
changing priorities. A Party member, Friedrich, for example,
complidned to Theo Habicht, leader of the NSDAP in ~iesbaden,
that not only was the Party betraying socialism, but worse
still, Strasser had given into the "fascist tactics" of Hitler:
"Gregor Strasser was the brightest hope for a socialist NSDAP
and now that has been most regretfully lost. n60 His refusal to
join his brother, Otto, in Opposition to llitler in 1930, was the
first concrete manifestation of Gregor's changing perceptions; 61
further evidence appeared in 1930-32.
During the early 1930s, Strasser developed a wide and diverse
range of personaland political contacts outside the NSDAP,
including important circles in the Rhenish-\lestphalian Goal
Syndicate and the chemical conglomerate, I. G. Farben,
industrialists such as Paul Silverberg, various neoconservative
groups, among them the Tat Circle, Chancellor Heinrich BrUning,
General Kurt von Schleicher, and trade unionists. 62 Consequently,
Strasser enjoyed a substantial and favorable reputation among a
significant cross section of \Veimar politics at a time when
his achievementa as organization leader and public speaker
consolidated his standing within the NSDAP. He had emerged as a
powerful political figure in his own right. By 1932, despite
several well-publicized speeches with a radical flavor--like
that in the Reichstag in May 1932 when he gave voice to the
"anticapitalist yearnings" of the German people 63 --strasser
had come out as a firm advocate of a coalition course for the
NSDAP as a means of establishing a broadly structured nationalistconservative government,64 In this process of evolution from
abrasive party politician to conciliatory national figure,
Strasser's earlier socialism was no langer conspicuous. Although
he continued to enjoy a popular reputation as the NSDAP's
leading socialist, in reality, that earlier notable component
of his ideological armory had been superceded by other
tendencies. Anationalist disposition now transcended his narrow
Party allegiance, and the Nazi Left had lost its erstwhile
principle spokesman.65
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The total ideological and organizational vacuity of the idea of
a coherent Nazi Left was .unmistakably revealed by the NSDAP
crisis in December 1932, which culminated in Strasser resigning
his party offices because of his fundamental disagreement with
Hitler over strategy and policy. In his moment of supreme .
personal and political crisis, Strasser discovered that though
he may have had nurnerous friends and sympathizers in the
National S2cialist movement, including Gauleiters and Reichstag
deputies,6° he had few allies willing to follow him against the
FUhrer. There was no Nazi Left to come to his aid because,
contrary to the view of many contemporaries, including General
von Schleicher, such a group did not exist. And it never had.
Schleicher's plan to use the Nazi Left under Strasser's
leadership as an essential element in a coalition government
rested on a tragic illusion.67
The new chancellor did not perceive that socialism had long
ceased to be a viable political influence in any part of the
NSDAP, and in turn, he misunderstood the nature of Strasser's
personal development during the last years. Furtherrnore, .
Schleicher was ignorant of the organizational character of the
party, which effectively blocked the emergence of a Nazi Left
or any other faction. The loyalty of the Gauleiters was
ultimately to llitler: They depended for their position on
his support. Despite a rapidly expanding and complex
bureaucracy, which was directed by Strasser, Hitler was determined
to maintain his direct and personal relationship with the
Gauleiters. However much Strasser forrnally controlled
organizational affairs, the special link between the Gauleiters
and Hitler continued to function independently on the basis
of the FUhrer's charisma and authority.v3 In Decernber 1932 that
link held fast and virtually guaranteed the failure of the would-be
usurper, Gregor Strasser.
The refusal of the overwhelming majority of the German working
class to respond positively to National Socialism before 1933
can be explained in terrns cif the ideology, character, and strategy
of the NSDAP, we well as by the traditional class and politicoideological perceptions of the workers themselves. There was
an absence of basic empathy between the two sides. Within this
broader context, we have argued here that the whole notion of
a "Nazi Left" is erroneous, since there never was a coherent
ideological and organizational frarnework for such a group,
particularly after 1923 when the socialist orientation had
signally failed and Gregor Strasser began to trod a different
path in Weimar politics. The nonexistence of a Nazi Left thus
helps account for the NSDAP's inability to attract the working
class before 1933. Once Hitler was in pmver, the National
Socialists had to find alternative methods of reaching a modus
vivendi with the workers. Persuasion and electoral propaganda,
which had made little impact in the lleimar period, were
replaced, therefore, by outright terror and violence during the
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course of 1933 and supplemented thereafter by a mixture of
artful seduction (Schtlnheit der Arbeit--the "Beauty of work"
slogan and program), tight Supervision (German Labor Front),
and callous repression (Gestapo, SS).
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Revolution and
Alienation:
The Foundations
of Weimar
ELIZABETH H. TOBIN

The paradox of the German Revolution of 1918-19 is that it
promised so much but accomplished so little. Spontaneaus
popular demonstrations toppled national and local governments,
creating revolutionary councils in nearly every city in Germany.
Yet neither the provisional central aovernrnent nor local councils
produced meaningful changes in the economy or social structure.
The lleimar Republic replaced the Wilhelmine Empire, but the
imperial governmental structure--bureaucracy and military-remained largely intact. Furthermore, the process of the
Revolution itself alienated many of its strongest supporters-the Independent Social Democratic party (USPD), the Communists,
and a sizable portion of the working class--from the government
created by their revolutionary actions. Thus the Republic
began its history with significant enemies on the left.
This combination of revolution and alienation has led to
considerable debate about the nature of the Revolution. 1 Most
historians explain these events by studying the executives of
political parties and national governments; much of the research
on the Revolution concentrates on Berlin and Uunich.2 This
chapter relies upon a series of local studies, which provide
a fresh perspective on the Revolution--that of rank-and-file
revolutionaries. ßy directing attention to revolutionary demands,
the relations between revolutionaries and leaders, and the
interaction of local councils with both the 11ilhelmine
bureaucracy and the new national government, an attempt will
be made to provide new answers to questions about the nature
of Germany's Revolution: Did the working class genuinely seek
revolutionary change? Why were revolutionaries unable to wrest
power from the 1Vilhelmine governmental s tructure? How did the
Revolution's supporters turn into the Republic's enemies?
Historians have long argued about whether the events. of 1913-19

156

Towards the Holocaust

warrant the name "revolution."3 But the evidence from Germany's
cities demonstrates that workers were indeed revolutionary.
The Revolution was essentially a popular movement supporting
extensive democratization of the government, limited socialization
of industry, and the intervention of government in the society
and economy on behalf of the working class. A striking
similarity of workers' basic goals emerges from the diversity
of the revolutionary process across Germany. B~cause socialist
leaders, the provisional national and provincial governments,
and local councils all faltered in implementing these goals,
workers reaffirmed their demands loudly and clearly in the first
four months of 1919.
Yet these goals were never achieved. Other historians have
pointed to the failure of socialist leaders, in the SPD and
USPD and at the national and local levels, to take advantage
of their working-class support. 4 But the actions of socialist
leaders provide only a part of the explanation for the lack of
fundamental change. From tl1e local perspective, the ability of
Wilhelmine bureaucracies to retain power and to obstruct the
activities of revolutionary councils was even more important,
and the intervention of the new national and provincial
governments in this conflict proved crucial. The explanation
for the failure to implement working-class demands can be found
in the interactions among new and old governing bodies.
Workers protested in vain against the reassertion of bureaucratic
power and the eclipse of revolutionary goals. Disappointment
turned to distrust and alienation as the new government ignored
their demands and actively repressed their protests. Thus,
the process of the Revolution, whereby workers came to blame the
government they had helped to create for the frustration of
their ambitions, was itself responsible for turning many of the
Revolution's supporters into the Republic's enemies. One of the
long-term problems of the Weimar Republic was the fact that
the revolutionary dynamic had alienated much of its potential
working-class basis.
REVOLUTION
Evidence from cities all over Germany shows the revolutionary
intentions of the men and women who toppled their government in
November 1913. Revolutionary activity was not isolated to any
particular geographic area. \/orkers and soldiers in nearly
every city spontaneously created workers' and soldiers'
councils, without the prompting or even the knowledge of
socialist leaders. The pronouncements of these councils in
early November provide a good indication of workers' goals and
expectations; despite considerable variety in the political
orientation of revolutionaries in different cities, councils
consistently demanded a far-reaching democratization of German
government and society. Furthermore, workers repeatedly
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reaffirmed their support for these radical political goals
in the following months.
By November 1913 the ~lilhelmine Empire maintained control over
its citizens through military might alone. Even where workers
had demonstrated extreme dissatisfaction with the government
during the war, such as in Braunschweig or Dllsseldorf, they had
been subdued without difficulty through military intervention.S
\vorkers feared the harsh punishments meted out by military
tribunals and the drafting of "troublemakers" into the army.
Thus the Revolution appeared first in the military forces. But
once the mutiny of the armed forces had begun, it stimulated
revolutionary actions among workers and soldiers alike. The
initiative often came from outside, but in nearly every city,
the spontaneous actions of workers and soldiers overthrew their
local governments.
Darmstadt provides an example of a city in which the military
revolted without aid from workers. The soldiers acted alone in
electing a council on the night of November 3; at approximately
2 A.M., between five thousand and seven thousand soldiers marched
to the palace with the intention of taking the Grand Duke
prisoner.6 Even insmalland conservative Jlllich, soldiers
stationed there rebelled on November 3 by electing a council. 7
In towns where working-class discontent remained just below the
surface during the war, workers acted as soon as they were
satisfied that the military was incapacitated. In Harnburg news
of the sailors 1 revolt in Kielsparkedan unauthorized strike
in the shipyards and a meeting at which workers called for
democratic reforms and the abdication of the Hohenzollerns. 8
In DUsseldorf the arrival of sailors from Cologne on the evening
of November ü led to workers, soldiers, and sailors alike
roaming the streets, disarming officers, and freeing prisoners.9
In all cases, soldiers 1 and workers 1 revolts soon combined. The
day after mutinies in GBttingen and Nurembergi workers and
soldiers marched together through the cities. a In Hanau
workers provided the leadership, but soldiers also participated
in a demonstration on November 7; representatives of the SPD and
USPD formed the ~lorkers' Council and negotiated directly with
the Soldiers 1 Council to form a joint revolutionary organ.ll The
workers in Jlllich managed to create a ~vorkers 1 Council one
day after the military 1 s actions, despite the fact that no
working-class party had ever existed in the town. 12
Rank-and-file revolutionaries had acted on their own initiative;
socialist leaders were almost universally surprised at the
outbreak of the Revolution. Even those organized political
groups that had urged revolution were not responsible for its
outbreak. Spartacists in Stuttgart, who helped to engineer a
city-wide strike and the creation of a lvorkers 1 Council on
November 4, failed to control the movement in their city because
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their actions anticipated the military revolt. Spartaeist
leaders were arrested in Stuttgart on November 6 and only
released three days later, after a revolutionary eovernment had
been established without their participation or advice.13 In
DUsseldorf the USPD leaders did not even know about negotiations
between the police chief and an impDovised Workers' and Soldiers'
Council until they were nearly completed.14
Although councils were formed as a result of demonstrations and
demands by workers and soldiers, in most towns workers turned
to their traditional Socialist leaders when they set up official
revolutionary governments. In Dllsseldorf, for example, the
late-arrivine independents were able to place themselves at the
head of the Council. 15 Nevertheless, rank-and-file workers
and soldiers did hold council posts in most cities. Socialist
leaders who joined the Revolution did not immediately impose
their own goals upon the councils; especially in the early days
of the Revolution, council leaders simply appropriated the
demands of the workers and soldiers who had broueht them to
power. Thus the early statements issued by councils or made
by council leaders reflect the desires of Germany's rank-andfile revolutionaries.
All councils did not agree on goals for the Revolution. The
degree of radicalism among both workers and leaders varied
greatly from city to city. Few councils went as far as those
of Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz, which on November 3 jointly
welcomed the collapse of capitalism and the seizure of power
by the revolutionary proletariat. 16 But even less radical
councils expressed a commitment to significant chanee in the
governing system. In Darmstadt, the SPD-controlled Workers'
and Soldiers' Council demanded "the Republic, equal rights for
troops and officers, participation of soldiers in the power of
command and discipline."l7 In the town of Diez, outside of
Frankfurt, the Soldiers' and People's Council announced that
it would work towards "complete democratization, abolition of
militarism."l3 The Council in Nurernberg announced that it would
"do its utmost in order that the complete transformation of our
governmental and political situation take place quickly and
peacefully." 1 9 In Dortmund, the program issued by the Council
on November 10 proclaimed its long-term goals to be "political
and social revolution (UmwHlzung) in the sense of democracy and
socialism." Dortmunders proposed a variety of revolutionary
actions: a takeover of military power and creation of popular
security forces, and control by the Council of all industrial
firms, banks and transport institutions.20
The minimal program common to nearly every council was
"democratization" of the government, economy, society, and
military. Soldiers seemed to have the clearest idea of what
they meant by democratization; their demands typically included
part or all of the "Ilamburg points" adopted by the first
Congress of Councils, which encompassed the election of officers
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by soldiers, the exercise of comrnand over garrisons by local
workers' and soldiers' councils and the abolition of all insignia
of rank. 21 \lorkers' vision of democratization was less concrete,
but seemed always to mean the establishment of popular, democratic
control over the institutions of the government and the economy,
in order to make them responsive to the interests of the working
major±ty.
The head of the Council in G8ttingen, Sirnon St!idtler, provided a
particularly clear Statement of the basic goals of most of
Germany's revolutionaries. St!idtler had left the SPD for the
USPD in November 1913; a china painter by trade, he was a
soldier when the Revolution began. The first order of business,
according to St!idtler, was to end the war and put a stop to
militarism. The representatives of the monarchic "authoritarian
state," especially the Kaiser, had to step down to make way for
a people's state. For the time being, revolutionaries must
cooperate with the "representatives of the overthrown order,"
because their expertise and experience were required for military
and economic demobilization. Later, the structures of the
authoritarian "military and administrative state" had to be
"fundamentally altered" and replaced with democratic structures.
He also favored elections to a constitutional assembly that would
determine the form of Germany's parliamentary democracy. 22
St!idtler had no specific idea of how to implement these goals;
he certainly did not advocate the most radical path. But it is
clear he meant his revolution to bring about fundamental change.
St!idtler wanted not only to end the war, but to end militarism.
He wanted not only to set up a republic, but to change the
structures of the military and the administration. He was
willing to cooperate wi th the \Jilhelmine bureaucrats, but only
temporarily. Rank-and-file workers all over Germany shared
St!idtler' s goals. Al ti10ugh some revolutionaries demanded more,
this minimumprogram would have itself revolutionized Germany.
Once workers had established councils and made clear their
expectations, most drastically curtailed their direct participation
in revolutionary activities. In almest every city, leaders of
the socialis t parties took over the direction of the llorkers'
Councils; rank-and-file workers who remained active took
Subordinate positions. There is no evidence of dissatisfaction
with this trend; it allowed workers to turn their attention to
struggles in the workplace: increasing wages and decreasing
hours. The months of ~ovember and December were characterized
by strikes, demands and renewed demands for the eight-hour day,
an increase in wages despite the decrease in hours, and better
conditions on the shop floor. 23 Trade union leaders in
DUsseldorf found it difficult even to keep up with the varied
and rapidly changing demands in individual factories. 24 llorkers
in Dortmund also left trade unionists behind; with demands and
work stoppages they forced concessions on wages and hours from
their employers.25
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The transfer of activities from the political arena to the
workt)lace did not mean that workers ceased to care about attempts
to democratize the state apparatus. They were willing to show
their support for revolutionary changes whenever their leade~s
asked for it or when workers decided themselves that the gains
of early November were threatened. Usually such actions took
the form of a demonstration in favor of the local Workers' and
Soldiers' Council. \fuere councils came under attack from more
conservative parties or citizens, workers sometimes played a
crucial role in preserving the power of the councils by
demonstrating their support.
In JUlich, many workers turned
out for a public meeting called by the Center party, which was
known to be highly critical of the Council. They interrupted
the Social Democrat who defended the Council with frequent
applause and hooted down the speaker who attacked the Council
with riotous calls of "scoundrel!" and "counter-revolutionary!" 26
Although these expressions of class conflict in previously quiet
Jlllich must have astonished the town fathers, it was this
popular support that enabled the Council to continue its
existence until the town was occupied by Belgian troops on
December 2. In DUsseldorf workers turned out for three important
demonstrations; each defused serious Opposition. Several thousand
workers marched in support of the creation of the Council on
November 10. Thousands responded to the Council's call to
defend socialism and freedom against the Counterrevolution on
December 11. The local newspaper reported that many SPD members
took part, despite the fact that the SPD had officially left
the Council . On January 13, many workers put down their tools
in order to participate in a series of mass meetings sponsored
by the Council, which was now controlled by the Spartacists.27
In Erfurt, where moderate independents worked comfortably
tagether with the SPD in the Council, workers went beyond the
requests of the Council in order to defend the Revolution. On
January 14 workers learned of the planned departure of troops
from Erfurt for Berlin. Fearing these troops would be used
against revolutionaries by _Ebert's 3overnment, they called a
one-day general strike; twenty thousand marched in the streets
and the Council agreed to prevent the departure of the troops. 23
The evidence from worker demands and council pronouncements shows
the revolutionary nature of workers' goals. Revolutionaries all
across Germany consciously and consistently defended their
radical policial demands, despite the fact that workers expended
most of their energy in November and December on the improvement
of their position in the workplace. But after the early days of
the Revolution, they required either a specific request from
their leaders or serious provocation be~ore acting on political
issues. Having made clear in the first days of the Revolution
the framework in which they expected their leaders to operate,
most workers trusted their political parties to formulate and
resolve questions concerning the state. Hore importantly, both
rank-and-file workers and their socialist leaders assumed that
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the Revolution was over in early i~ovember and that the transition
to a democratized state and society could proceed without further
battle. This assumption promoted the turn away from politics
to the workplace and explains why a working class that genuinely
desired revolution left the transformation of the state in the
hands of its leaders.
THE STRUGGLE FOR PmmR
The seizure of power had not actually been completed on November
3 or in the days following. The llilhelmine governmental rnachinery
was still intact, under the control of bureaucrats loyal to the
old order. Dur±ng the months of November and December, councils
and local bureaucracies struggled over the extent to which workingclass demands for democratization would be satisfied.
Councils had drastically different perceptions of their functions.
Some, frequently those dorninated by the SPD, perceived
themselves as caretal:er administrations, holdin3 power only
provisionally. Because the SPD's policy was to await national
elections before undertaking democratization, its representatives
in the councils tried to follow a caretaker approach, regardless
of demands expressed by workers. Those councils that did not
act as revolutionary agents concentrated instead on maintaining
order and the well-being of the population. The Soldiers' Council
in JUlich announced it was only empowered to maintain calm and
security in the town, and the committees set up by the Workers'
and Soldiers' Council there were directed exclusively towards
the temporary concerns of the population: security, housing for
returning troops, and distribution of food and clothing. 2 9 In
Cassel, the \lorkers' and Soldiers' Council sought to work with the
existing City Council rather than to replace it. Two Council
members became alderrnen of the Cit3 Council and were responsible
for military and civilian affairs. 0 In G8ttingen two Council
members joined the town government, but only in an advisory
capacity, despite the previous agreement that all decisions of
the local government had to be countersigned by a Council member.
The Council's actions all concerned temporary problems--control
of the black market and closing down dance halls in order to
conserve light and heat.31 The mixed Council in Erfurt, composed
of both USPD and SPD members, concentrated on a formal control
of tne bureaucracy, securing of order, and providing food. It
allowed the continued temporary employment of prisoners of war,
and used its mm security force to guard the city's banks.3 2
In Dortmund the Council acted only with the approval of the
local government, completely disregarding its earlier radical
resolutions.33
Those councils that adopted a caretaker approach failed to begin
the task of democratization. But this did not mean that such
councils were useless or helpless. Not only did they aid the
bureaucracy in the process of demobilization, but they also
demonstrated their ability to override the bureaucracy when

162

Towards the Holocaust

they saw fit. GBttingen's Council authorized confiscation of
food stuffs obtained illegally. 34 Although Frankfurt 1 s mixed
Council was careful not to interfere with the internal
administration of the city, it established committees that sought
to control the operations of the police and the post office.
Local officials were initially unable to dispute the Council's
control of the regional railroad agency, while the Council worked
towards the complete q·ansfer of the state railway into the
hands of the workers.3)
councils considered themselves the rightful organs of
governance and tried immediately to begin democratization at the
local level. These councils were often strongly influenced by
the USPD and were located in cities where a high concentration
of armaments industries had restructured the local economy and
attracted a large nurober of workers during the war. Activist
councils pursued directly the goals expressed by workers in
November. "Interference" (Eingriffe) in the government or the
economy, as it came to be called by those who opposed it, was
frequent and often successful in the early days of the Revolution.
In the Thuringian towns of Gotha and Gera, the \lorkers' Councils
dissolved the lViihelmine City Councils . In Leipzig the Workers'
Council disbanded the City Council and threatened the local
bureaucracy with a takeover of the Reichsbank if it refused to
pay Council salaries with public funds. The Council in
Braunschweig officially ended the Duke's power by declaring the
property and estates of the ducal family tobe state property.36
Some councils sought direct democratization in the economic and
military s~heres. The Council in Hanau took over the management
of a powder mill on November 9, at the same time hiring
shoemakers and tailors to supply clothing to the population. On
November 14 the Council forbade the firing of anyone in the
city . 37 In Dllsseldorf, during the first few days of the
Revolution, the Council deposed the police chief for his harsh
behavior towards the Socialists during the war, announced its
intention to establish its own system of justice, and dissolved
the political section of the police force.38

A~tivist

Even activist councils, however, reduced their direct action
after the first days of victory. Few revolutionaries, leaders
or rank-and-file, seemed to fear the ability or the will of the
bureaucracy to thwart the Revolution, and nearly all council
members shared the view of St~dtler in G8ttingen that local
bureaucrats possessed expertise essential to the period of
demobilization. The DUsseldorf Council, relying on its ability
to control its former enem3~ invited the police chief to resume
his position the next day.
In Nurernberg the Council madc an
agreement with the may<or that "municipal colleagues" would
remain at their jobs "under the terms of the laws in force."40
Councils in general contented themselves \vith supervising the
city and county governmental apparatus. The typical pattern
was for one or two revolutionaries to be placed in the office of
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the mayor and county president and sometimes on the city
council. Often council committees assigned to certain problems-such as housing or clothing--coordinated their activities with
the lnlhel:mine department also responsible for that area. In
most towns, the councils or their delegates carried out the
function of "overseer" in a remarkably casual fashion.
It is apparent that the failure of the councils to satisfy
working-class demands was in part the fault of the councils
themselves. Especially in the first days of the Revolution,
councils could wrest power from local governments, although the
political composition of a council frequently determined whether
it sought such power. Activist councils that moved rapidly were
able to establish considerable authotity. Even councils that
worked in cooperation with the local Wilhelmine government often
succeeded in carving out their own sphere of control. Thus those
council leaders who failed to take advantage of the revolutionary
power given them by workers were to some extent responsible for
the paucity of change. But this failure of leadership is not
the whole story. ßoth caretaker and activist councils met
significant resistance in their attempt to make changes. Local
bureaucracies and the new national and provincial governments
hindered the councils 1 ability to implement revolutionary demands.
In virtually no case did local civilian authorities resist the
Revolution at its inception. Host mayors, city councils, and
county presidents announced not only their willingness to
cooperate with the revolutionaries, but also their acceptance
of the councils as the high es t local authori ty. They "stood on
the ground of the Revolution," as the contemporary phrase had
it. But this capitulation was a curious one. lfany Wilhelmine
officials couched their acceptance of the new order in language
similar to that of District Commissioner (Landrat) VUllers from
Jillich:
I explained to him /the head of the JUlich Council7
that under the current conditions I would have to give
way to coercion, and that I was ready to support the
\lorkers 1 and Soldiers 1 Council, insofar as it concerned
the maintenance of calm and order, and the securing of
food for the people. But otherwise I would be true
to my oath of office, sworn to my king, and would
carry out my duties to the best of my knowledge and
conscience • • • • 41
The district commissioner intended to limit his cooperation
with the revolutionaries as much as possible; his suoport for
the local Council, as he explicitly stated, had been obtained
by force. For VUllers and the many bureaucrats who shared
his attitudes capitulation was a tactical maneuver that allowed
them to retain control of governmental machinery. They used
the freedom of action afforded them by the councils 1 policy of
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oversight to influence council policies in a moderate direction,
to obstruct specific council plans, and to reassert their right
to determine policy.
Bureauerats were of .t en successful in persuading revolutionaries to
follow certain policies, as in Jlllich where the Council members
had few plans of their own. 4Z In lüesbaden the mayor convinced
the Council to let him proof the list of potential members of
the new security force in order to screen out a large number of
Leftists.43 Even in more radical cities, councils were subject
to persuasion. The Harnburg Council chose to re-establish the
city legislature after representatives of banks and commercial
firms convinced the Council head that the action was necessary
to facilitate credit for the city.44 Where persuasion failed,
local authorities sometimes tried to use their continued control
over the governmental machinery to prevent council activities.
In Erfurt and Leipzig, the city governments tried to prevent
specific Council activities by withholding funds.45 Vllllers
in Jlllich simply refused to sign regulations placed before him
by Council members.46 The most common means of obstruction,
however, was to argue with the council over each new policy
decision, questioning whether the policy was correct and whether
the council had the authority to implement the policy. The
lViihelmine departmen ts in charge of DUsseldorf' s clothing and
food distribution disputed at every step the Council's right to
make decisions in these areas, and this considerably slowed
the Council's actions.47 In Nurernberg a member of the Council
described the problem: "If the l~orkets' Council wanted to da
something, the officials always restrained it."48
This gradual revival of the particular powers of the bureaucracy
led to a reassertion of its primacy in the governing sphere.
In Hanau the Council appointed one of its members, Dr. Wagner,
as provisional district commissioner. Wa3ner constantly
conflicted with the local county commissioner, Schmid, about the
proper division of duties. \fuen the Council asked Schmid to
resign, he refused, and at the end of December, he moved his
office to Frankfurt in order to be able to carry out his duties
without 1/agner's or the Council's interference.49 Schmid ceased
altogether to acknowledge the authority of the Council.
Councils reacted to the bureaucracy's reassertion of power in
different ways. The Council in Jlllich did not tr to force the
recalcitrant district commissioner to cooperate.5
But other
councils fought back. Although responding to repeated attempts
at obstruction took up an increasing amount of energy, councils
were sometimes successful. The Dllsseldorfers took over the
city's clothing and food supplies despite bureaucratic
objections; the Council confiscated and redistributed blackmarket goods found in house-to-house searches and at factories,
in the face of bureaucratic insistence that s~ch actions should
be reserved for the "legitimate" authorities. 1 In Gelnhausen,
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SchlUchtern, and Biebrich-Wiesbaden in Hesse-Nassau, district
commissioners lost their jobs due to council actions.S2 In
Nurember g , the mayor agreed to the early retirement of a police
official who had made hirnself particularly unpopular with the
working po~ulation.S3
Councils also sought to prevail over their local adversaries
by appealing to the new national government in Berlin. The
Council in Erfurt complained to the Council of People's Commissars
on December 30 that the local government refused to pay the sum
previously agreed upon for the creation of the Volkswehr.54 The
national government was particularly appropriate as an arbiter
between councils and the Wilhelmine bureaucracies, because both
parties recognized it as the highest national authority.
Unfortunately for activist local councils, however, the new
government, even when headed by a coalition of USPD and SPD
members, was disinclined to countenance "interference" by
councils in the affairs of local bureaucracies. When in
December a BUrgerrat was founded in Elberfeld in explicit
competi tion wi th the \vorker s' and Soldiers' Council, the la tter
forbade all activities of the former. Members of the BUrgerrat
complained to the Central Council in Berlin, which supported
the BUrgerrat on all points. 55 The DUsseldorfers' attempt to
create a special courtwas forbidden by the Council of People's
Commissars. 56
The attitudes of the new provincial governments, usually although
not always dominated by the SPD, served as well to stiffen the
resis tance of local bureaucracies. \vhen Dis trict Commissioner
Schmid from l!anau complained to Berlin in December about Council
encroachments on his duties, the Prussian Uinistry of the Interior
responded that the Council was to "enable the District Commissioner
Schmid to resume his duties again in their entirety." The needs
of demobilization and food distribution required that the
administration in l!anau remain in "trained hands."57 Wilhelmine
school authorities in DUsseldorf fought the Council's attempt
to end religious instruction; the Prussian Ministry of Education
decided the Council was "not empowered to interfere in the
educational system."S8 The provisional governments of Saxony and
Baden promulgated regulations on November 16 and 13, respectively,
restricting the functions of \vorkers' and Soldiers' Councils
to those of control and advice. 5 9 The new Prussian government
issued a series of rules in November that officially protected
local \lilhelmine governments from changes initiated by councils. 60
These regulations were welcomed by city governments, who wasted
no time in bringing the weight of the provincial and national
governments to bear in their struggle with local councils. On
January 21, 1919, the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Hannover,
firmly controlled by the SPD, summed up the situation by
complaining "that recent decrees of the Reich and Prussian
governments in effect curtailed the activities of the councils
and prevented their representatives from doing useful work."6l
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Under cover of their capitulation to the revolutionaries, city
governments were extremely effective in retaining power and
limiting council activities. The determination and strength
local bureaucracies demonstrated in November and December
explains to a !arge extent the inability of councils to begin
democratization. In the long run, USPD-dominated councils, which
actively sought to restructure the local governments, were hardly
more successful than the SPD-controlled councils. Instead of
making good on activist statements and plans articulated in
early November, councils found it necessary to expend their
energies on battles with the bureaucrats. In these battles,
however, the bureaucrats had powerful allies. The national and
provincial governments used their influence repeatedly to defend
the position of the local Wilhelmine governments. By January
1919 the outcome of this struggle for power was apparent: The
goals of democratization and limited socialization remained
unfulfilled.
ALIENATION
In the winter and spring of 1919, increasing numbers of workers
began to recognize that neither local councils nor the national
government were implementing the goals expressed so strongly
at the beginning of the Revolution. \Jorkers began to return
to the political arena to protest the lack of progress and to
reassert their demands. Ultimately, the fact that their
leaders, particularly the SPD, ignored or repressed these renewed
demands for democratization led to working- class alienation
from those leaders and from the Republic that they had established.
But this process was a gradual one.
Most workers apparently still had faith in their traditional
party on January 19, 1919, when they elected representatives to
the Constitutional Assembly. Nationally, the SPD far outdistanced
the USPD, although the latter party had been far more vocal and
active in its support of democratization. As can be seen in
Table 9.1, this was evident even in Ilamburg, where the local
chapter of the SPD had openly opposed direct democratization.
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Table 9.1
Percentage of Vote Given to Socialist Parties, January 19, 1919
(Selected Cities)
SPD

USPD

GBttingen
Harnburg
'Hanau
Erfurt
DUsseldorf

37
51
31
21
15

1
7
27
37
25

All Germany

37.9

City

Sources:

7.6

Popplow, 234; Comfort, 55; Struck, 414; Gutsche, 195;
Dllsseldorfer Volkszeitung, January 21, 1919; Morgan, 443.

In the radical cities of Erfurt and Dllsseldorf, the SPD's showing
was more respectable than might have been expected. Despite
widespread worker support for democratization and for the
councils, most workers had voted in traditional patterns. Since
workers had never abandoned their original goals, it seems likely
that they expegted their prewar leaders to recognize and implement
their demands. 2
Yet even as the SPD was celebrating its election victories,
workers began to express their disappointment with the slow pace
of change. Workers made their views known with widely varying
methods: complaints, demonstrations, strikes, and putsches.
In most cases, the goals behind these diverse actions were
similar to those expressed in November. The more radical
methods employed in the spring of 1919 were a response to the
earlier failure of the Revolution to satisfy its supporters.
In many towns, disappointment with the lack of democratization
of the state and military were mildly expressed. In Gl:lttingen,
workers demonstrated on lfarch 5 about the inequitable
distribution of food; at the same time they demanded that "the
officials should declare themselves for democracy, or resign;
social reforms should not only be promised, but also realized. n 6 3
In February, the Huremberg Soldiers' Council used the occasion
of Kurt Eisner's assassination to issue a ten~point program
which would "finally" secure the Revolution; the program included
demands for the creation of socialist ministries, thorough
scrutiny of officials, abolition of the privileges of the
aristocracy and the wealthy, and immediate socialization of the
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largest factories.64 In Badenastate conference of councils
held in January announced that the councils would continue
to exist until the success of the Revolution was guaranteed by
the National Assembly; that is, until local elections could
take place, the democratic republic and the eight-hour day
were securely established, the people 1 s army created on a
democratic basis, and the process of socialization begun in
appropriate industries.65 These demands fairly sum up what
Germany 1 s working-class revolutionaries had expected all along.
Elsewhere workers 1 dissatisfaction \vith the results of the
Revolution erupted in unorganized demonstrations and riots. In
Hanau serious disturbances followed a meeting on February 17 in
which the new national government was criticized. The next day
the county court and police jail were stormed; ration cards were
taken from the town hall, thrown in the street, and burned;
food was stolen from the storage center. The following day the
chateau be].onging to the Landraf, the district President, was
plundered. 0 6 In Harnburg unrest broke out on several occasions.
\lorkers demonstrated against the occupation of Bremen by
Gustav Noske 1 s troops in February; in April a demonstration of
the unemployed turned into a two-day riot; and in June workers
rioted over the quality of food produced by local manufacturers.
\fuen the first detachments of Noske 1 s troops arrived in June,
they were disarmed by the workers.67 Although these spontaneous
actions by enraged workers did not always have direct political
aims, even demonstrations about food were directed against the
moderate policies of the new government and against the
unwillingness of the bureaucracies to respond to the needs of
the workers.
In a large number of cities, workers were alienated enough to
progress to concerted action in the form of putsches and strikes.
In DUsseldorf, the fifteen-hundred mansecurity force incited the
radicals in the Council, both Spartaeist and independents, to
reverse the slow decline of the Revolution by taking over the
Council and the city government on January 7. Leaders of the
putsch accused members of the bureaucracy of counterrevolutionary
actions and the old Council of indecisiveness. "In order to
secure the Revolution," the reconstituted Council took direct
action: Hostages from the bourgeois±e were seized, the police
disarmed, banks and the telegraph office occupied, and the
police chief, mayor, and county president replaced by appointees
of the Council. The new Council also took a more activist
stance towards DUsseldorf 1 s material problems, overruling the
bureaucrats on issues of foo~ distribution, relief work, and
housing construction. Although the leade~s of the putsch used
more radical and violent methods than the revolutionaries in
November, their goals were not substantially different:
democratization of the government and subsequent inteß"aention
in the economy in the interests of the working class.
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These strikes and putsches, the better-known revolts in Berlin
and Hunich, plus the declarations of soldiers in Nurernberg
and workers in GBttingen, show that rank-and-file revolutionary
activity was not confined to November,69 Attempts to impose
revolutionary changes extended into the spring of 1919, when
workers reiterated their former demands with more forceful
methods.70 Theinability of socialist leaders of all parties
to secure those initial goals caused these actions against the
new governmen t.
The SPD-dominated national government responded to these renewed
demands for democratization and socialization by ignoring or
repressing them. Neither the provisional government in Berlin
nor the elected government in Heimar ever implemented the
Congress of Councils •· vote favoring democratization of the
military; democratization of the bureaucracy never got off the
ground. The recommendations of the Commission of Nine about
socialization of coal mines in the Ruhr were ignored; in Halle
concessions concerning factory councils made to coal miners in
February 1919 were rescinded in May.71 The sweep of Noske's
troops from Bremen through the Ruhr and into central Germany
and Munich left rap,e and resentment against the government in
its wake. Government troops occupied Gotha on February 13
because of the strength of the radical workers' movement there;
workers responded with a general strike that lasted until
t1arch 8.72 In other places, such as the Ruhrand Munich,
armed workers resisted the advance of government troops. The
new national government directed soldiers to end strikes and to
fire on stubborn workers if necessary. These actions proved
conclusively to many workers that the SPD government did not
represent their interests. The use of troops against workers
was the last of many steps on the path from revolution to
alienation.
Many workers demonstrated their changed attitudes at the next
national election in June 1920. The SPD's share of the vote
in Harnburg dropped to 33 percent, while the USPD' s rose to
15 percent.73 In DUsseldorf the SPD's votes declined to 7 percent,
and the USPD's increased to 36 percent.74 All across the nation,
the increase in the independents' share of votes (from 7.6 to
18.3 percent) and membership (from approximately 100,000 in
1913 to 900,000 in September 1920) reflected working-class
disillusion with the SPD's stewardship of the Revolution. 75
Indeed, it could be argued that the use of troops against the
very supporters of the Revolu.tion had the effect of repressing
radicalism only in the short run. !1any of the occupied cities
later became centers of strong communist influence. Hanau,
for example, became a "primary strong-point of the communist
movement for a wide area in southwest Germany."76 The extent
of workers' bitterness also became apparent in the aftermath of
the Kapp Putsch in March 1920; workers in the Ruhr struck to
save the Republic from the right-wing coup, but then used the
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occasion to reestablish workers' councils and to reiterate
demands for socialization and democratization, especially of
the army. A portion of the Red Army formed to fight counterrevolution turned against government troops. 7 7 The Weimar
government continued the provisional government's policy of
repressing revolutionary protests; as a result, it had to bear
the hostility of a significant part of the working class.
The fact that many members of the working class failed to value
the Weimar Republic as crucial to the defense of their interests
surely contributed to its instability. This alienation had its
institutional reflection in the fact that approximately half of
the members of the USPD, the party most supportive of the
Revolution, joined the KPD, a party committed to the overthrow
of the Republic. 73 \-leak working-class support may well have
been part of \leimar' s inability to resist Nazism. As the
strength of its right-wing enemies grew, the Republic could 111
afford the alienation of November's revolutionaries.
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The Failure of
German Labor in
the Weimar Republic
RICHARD GEARY

In talking of the "failure" of labor in the \veimar Republic,
two points of clarification must first be nade. This discussion
does not address itself to the question of the failure of the
revolutionary Left to bring about a socialist revolution in
Germany in the aftermath of the First World \var: for that is a
question which is not peculiar to Germany but has relevance for
the whole of Europe outside Russia and has been treated elsewhere.l
Ilowever, t:wre is one way in which the upheavals in Germany
between 1913 and 1923 do relate to subsequent develo?ments;
namely, the failure of the revolutionary forces to purge the army,
judiciary, and civil service of antidemocratic elements. It
can be aruged that the German Social Democratic party (SPD) could
have allied with popular democratic pressure from workers' and
soldiers' councils to institute such a pur~;e. This it chose
not to do, but rather threw in its lot '~ith the German General
Staff against not only the threat of "bols:tevism" but against
popular protest more generally. In so doing, the leadership of
the SPD not only betrayed its socialist goals, but helped to
undermine the prospects of successful democracy and can itself
be held responsible for the creati.o n of a mass conununist movement,
alienated from the new Republic, in these early years. 2 For in
Aus tria, where the Social Democrats relied on armed workers
and did not employ Freikorps to smash the left, the political
arm of the labor movement remained united.3
A second qualification must also be made: In many respects
labor did not fail in the \veimar Republic. For despite the
survival of antidemocratic elites and capitalist property
relations, the new Republic conferred substantial benefits on
the German \vorkin3 class or at least on its representatives. At
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the local level, many municipalities under Social Democratic
control embarked upon housing schemes, the provision of adult
education, and the building of parks, stadiums, and the like.
At the national level, the law concerning factory councils
recognized the role of the trade unions as official counselors
and negotiators, freedom of assembly and coalition was
constitutionally guaranteed, and a system of state arbitration
in wage disputes leading to binding settlements upon both
employer and unionwas established.4 In fact it was precisely
this last system that gave rise to opposition from industry and
led to a head-on confrontation with the state in the great
lockout in the Ruhr iron and steel industry in 1923, when the
employers sought not just a particular wage settlement but the
destruction qf the whole apparatus of compulsory and binding
arbitration.5 The \leimar Republic further guaranteed the right
to work, instituted unemployment benefits, and even provided
social securi ty payments for those lvorkers (about 250,000
of them) locked out in the Ruhreisenstreit of 1928.6 The
enormaus change that such legislation initiated, when compared
to the harsher realities of industrial conflict in the Wilhelmine
period, goes some way to explain the SPD's attachment to
constitutional forms of struggle in the early 1930s.
The central concern here is the failure of German labor to prevent
the demise of the new Republic, from which it derives certain
benefits, and to halt the Nazi seizure of power. On one point
things are relatively clear: The Weimar Republic did not collapse
because the German industrial working class deserted it for
the National Socialist party (NSDAP). The Nazi industrial
worker was atypical both as a wcrrker and as a Nazi. That this
should have been so is at first sight perhaps surprising. The
Party began as a workers' party in 11unich, called itself the
National Socialist Horkers' party, and until the late 1920s
addressed its propaganda largely to the working class of Germany's
large industrial towns. 7 Its Left ~nng, around the Strass er
brothers (and in the early days, Joseph Goebbels), stressed the
anticapitalist elements of Hazi ideology and criticized the SPD
for its "betrayal" of the working masses both after the First
World Uar and in the early 1930s, when the SPD tolerated the
government of Chancellor BrUning and failed to offer any
alternative to his deflationary economic policies,3 As an
alternative, the Nazis suggested a job-creation scheme of public
works.9 They also established their own factory cell organization
(NSBO-National Socialist Factory Cell Organization), which
claimed only three thousand members in January 1931 but had
three hundred thousand by December 1932.10 According to some
aommentators, this effort reaped rich dividerids: Max Kele has
claimed, for example, that by the beginning of 1933 the Nazi party
was a party primarily of workers, be they blue- or white-collar. 11
It is certainly true that there were places in which the NSDAP
won a significant percentage of working class votes: in parts
of the Ruhr (especially in t~e area araund Essen), in parts of
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Berlin, parts of Thuringia (especially Chemnitz-Zwickau),
Brunswick, Hanover, and Breslau.12 Claims have also been made
that the Nazi paramilitary organization, the SA, recruited
primarily from workers (63 percent of its memQership were
workers according to Conan Fischer).l3
All such calculations need to be treated with extreme caution.
Even Kele admits that the Nazi party was not proletarian in
its social composition for most of the 1920s and other commentators
agree.l4 Secondly, the membership of the NSBO in the early
1930s lagged way behind that of the trades unions, which had
traditionally represented labor and most of which were closely
associated with either the SPD or the Catholic Centre party,l5
Furthermore, the NSBO enjoyed greater support among white-collar
workers and public employees than among the industrial working
class of areas such as the Ruhr. 16 Indeed, this points to a
major problern of definition: Nazi membership lists do not
differentiate between artisans and factory workers when they
talk about workers; and there is evidence that it was to the
former rather than the latter that Hazi propaganda was most
appealing. 17 An independent nonparty source attempting to
differentiate alone these lines in 1930 significantly came to
the conclusion tnat, in the DUsseldorf branch of the NSDAP,
artisans constituted 34 percent of the membership and "industrial
workers" only 14 percent. 13 Furthermore, if one compares the
social composition of the Nazi party with the structure of the
German population at large in this period it becomes clear
that, whereas white-collar workers and the self-employed were
overrepresented, the industrial working class was underrepresented
in its membership. 1 9 Even the apparently proletarian nature of
the SA is open to question: It has been claimed that Fischer's
statistics do not stand up to close scrutiny for they are collated
from very different data and depend partly upon the composition
of SA men arrested, when, of course, the lower-class elements
within the organization might generally be expected to
predominate among the ranks of violent militants. 20 In any
case, even if it were true that the SA was predominantly workingclass in its social composition, we would still be left with
the problern of identifying what "working-class" actually meant
in this context. It should further be noticed that the ideology
of the SA was markedly different to that of the more petty
bourgeois party organization.21
Analysis of voting returns throughout the Reich also suggests
that the Nazis did not find their major support from the working
class of the great industrial centers. Indeed, it was precisely
for this reason that from 1927-23 the party's propagandawas
turned away from the factory worker towards the peasant, small
businessman, and shopkeeper. 22 The NSDAP was most successful
at the polls in rural areas and small provincial towns, not in
the large cities;23 and in areas that were Protestant, not
Catholic.24 Thus the combined vote of the SPD and the German
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Communist party (KPD) remained more or less constant at araund
37 percent of the poll, despite the electoral triumphs of
National Socialism. 25 l~hen industrial workers did desert
social demo~racy, they gave their support to the KPD and not to
the l'azis; 2o and the same · seems to have applied to Catholic
workers who had previously voted for the Center Party.27 This
further gives lie to the myth that it was the unemployed manual
workers who flocked to the Nazi colors.28 Unemployment was
concentrated in !arge industrial towns of over 100,000
inhabitants; that is, in precisely the places where the NSDAP
fared relatively badly at the polls.
That some industrial workers supported the Nazis cannot be
doubted; but they constituted a decided minotity of the factory
proletariat. In fact, working,-class nazism took root only in
those places that lacked strong traditions of trade union
organization; among workers who had not voted before, often in
small towns, among public employees who may have had an elevated
view of their own status, and perhaps among some who had tried
other political medicines to eure the ills of ileimar--even
communism and anarcho-syndicalism--which had failed.29
That this was so can itself be explained by the specifics of
Nazi propaganda and the NSDAP's social composition. The fact
that the movement was lower-middle class in composition and
that it supported higher food prices tax cuts, as well as
wage and social service reductions,3Ö can hardly have made it
attractive to industrial workers. Against this background the
ability of the combined left-wing vote (SPD plus KPD) to maintain
itself is scarcely surprising. It should further be added
that the manual working class employed in factories constituted
a lower percentage of the total labor force than might be
imagined. After the First World War, the industrial working
class ceased to grow as a percentage of the active population,31
while calculations of itz size vary from about 30 percent to
about 40 percent of the total work force.32 On the other hand,
white-collar workers, who were more highly organized than their
blue-collar colleagues by the early 1930s,33 grew in number at
a fairly rapid rate,34 and the number of independent artisans
and small shopkeepers still stood at 3 million in 1925. Tagether
with their helpers they constitued something like 13.6 percent
of the population at large.35 Furthermore, one-third of the
German population was still dependent upon agriculture for its
living in one way or another in the 1920s.36 When, in addition
to the above, it is realized that women voters outnumbered their
male counterparts in the Weimar Republic and that their voting
behavior was markedly more conservative, 37 then the ability of
the Communists and Socialists combined to poll more than the
Nazis in the second Reichstag election of 1932 is quite
extraordinary. It is even more so in light of the fact that
manual industrial factory workers actually declined in number
as a result of intensive rationalization in the period of
so-called stabilization (1924-1923) and continued to decline
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because the depression hit industry disproportionately hard
in the early 1930s.33
Thus, when Hitler assumed the chancellor's mantle in late
January 1933, the Nazis confronted what was in the main a hostile
workinß class in Germany's industrial centers. As we have seen,
the combined electoral strength of the SPD and the KPD was
greater than that of the National Socialist party in late 1932,
while the Leftist paramilitary organization, the Reichsbanner,
recruited far more men than did the Nazi SA.39 There is also
evidence of considerable rank-and-file pressure within the
Reichsbanner to take up arms against the forces of reaction,
especially at the time of Chancellor von Papen's dissolution
of the Social Democratic government in Prussia in mid-1932.40
\~e are therefore confronted with the question:
Why did the
apparently powerful labor movement fail to translate its
numerical strength into potent anti-Nazi action in the early
1930s?
The classic answer to this question has been that the division of
the labor movement into antagonistic socialist and communist
wings destoyed its capacity for united action and that the prime
responsibility for this sorry state of affairs must be laid at
the feet of the KPD and its instructors in t1oscow. 41 It is true
that Russian influence within the German Communist party became
increasingly strong after ThHlmann assumed the leadership of
the party in 1925;42 and further that instructions to abandon
cooperation with Social Democratic elements and pursue an ultraLeftist line of open hostility to the SPD were crucial in the
determination of communist policy in 1927-2843 and again in
1932.44 It could also be argued that the Stalinization of
German Communism in the mid-1920s45 removed internal party debate
and thus made the party extraordinarily inflexible and insensitive,
both to the needs of the moment and to the interests of the
German working class, as distinct from the interests of Soviet
Russia. In the wake of the disastraus destruction of the Chinese
Communist party (1927) at the hands of the Kuomintang, with
whom Stalin and the Garnintern had advocated close cooperation
previously, and with a swing to the left in Soviet domestic
policy associated with the first Five Year Plan and the drive
against the Kulaks, the Garnintern declared a policy of "class
against class," that cooperation with reformist and centrist
elements was to cease and that an age of revolution was at hand.
This swing to the left was then reinforced by the onset of the
world economic depression, which Stalin and his cronies chose
to see as the final crisis of capitalism.46 In this third
period, fascism and social democracy were identified as twin
pillars of the captialist establishment, as tools of the
bourgeoisie, and thus social democracy became social fascism.47
According to the Comintern, capitalism was about to collapse.43
Uence fascism itself could not survive and thus was not to be
overestimated, as ThHlmann was still saying in 1931.49 Only if

182

Towards the Holocaust

the SPD misled the working class away from the revolutionary
goal, therefore, would the triumph of socialism be prevented;
and thus the first task of the KPD 1vas to unmask Social Democracy
and only then to fight fascism.50 The KPD, therefore, was to
conquer the mass of the German working class against the SPD
and, for that matter, the old trade union organizations.51
It is obvious that such short-sightedness was to prove fatal.
Clearly the KPD underestimated both the ability of capitalism to
survive and the strength of the Nazi threat. Its open hostility
to the SPD and its creation of a separate trade union organization
for Communists (RGO) further served to divide the labor movement
and undermine the \1eimar Republic. There were even occasions
when Nazis and Communists cooperated, as in the referendum to
remove the Social Democratic government in Prussia and in the
strike of Berlin transport workers in the autumn of 1932. 52
Furthermore, the KPD developed a kind of Lagermentalität, an
obsession with defending its existing constituency, which
weakened its appeal to other groups. 5 3 Havirtg said this,
however, the blame for the tragic division of German labor and
its failure to prevent the Nazi seizure of power cannot be laid
exclusively on the shoulders of German Communism. In the first
place it is simply untrue to say, as some have done, 5 4 that the
Communists did not take up arms against the Nazis. In fact
they bore the brunt of the street fighting of the early 1930s
and continued to do so in the Ruhr, for example, way into the
first half of 1933. 55 In 1932 the KPD became less committed
to the social faseist line,56 though it did not abandon
the line completely.57 In some parts of Germany Communist
and Social Democratic organizations collaborated against the
Nazis, while individual KPD members disapproved of the violent
campaign of vituperation against the SPD. 5 ß
This apart, it is perhaps more important to realize that the size
of support for the KPD grew enormously59 at precisely the time
that the party adopted its Leftist stand; which would suggest
that the social fascism line was not simply a foreign importation
but made sense to a significant section of the German working
class in the early 1930s. In fact the hostility of the KPD
to the SPD had domestic origins and considerable historical
foundation. As we have already seen, bet1veen 1918 and 1923 the
SPD was responsible for the bloody Suppression of leftist
insurrections, often in collaboration with reactionary elements.
Furthermore, the SPD, often in the shape of social democratic
police chiefs and local authorities, continued its anticommunist
campaign into the last days of Weimar. In Prussia, Communists
were dismissed from public office by the Social Democratic
government,60 while members of the KPD in llamburg, who tried
to initiate a strike when Hitler became chancellor, were
arrested on the instructions of the local SPD authorities.6 1
Host famously of all, the Berlin Chief of Police, Karl Ztlrgiebel,
a Social Democrat, banned the Uay Day demonstration of 1929. The
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Communists ignored the ban but suffered a !arge number of
fatalities and arrests at the hands of police.6 2 In such
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the KPD was loathe
to build bridges to the SPD. Furthermore, the Confederation of
German Trade Unions (ADGB), which was closely affiliated to
the SPD, also mounted an anticonnnunist campaign in the depression, 63
and, it has been suggested, even entered consultations with
General Schleicher, chancellor in late 1932, and the Left wing
of the Nazis concerning plans for a corporate state.64 Thus
the designation of social faseist seemed not wildly untrue to
some workers, who actually greeted the overthrow of the social
democratic government in Prussia in 1932 with applause.65 Such
feelings were further reinforced by the .SPD's close association
with a republic that seemed to offer no hope to the unemployed
in the early 1930s, by its toleration of the government of
Chancellor Brllning from 1930 to 1932 and of his deflationary
policies, which entailed cuts in wages and unemployment benefits,
and by the deepening of the depression. They were also
strengthened by the ADGB's support for the economics of
rationalization in the mid 1920s, which entailed permanent
unemployment for some sections of the working class. Such support
for rationalization even went to the extreme of enthusiasm for
the wonders of American capitalism, as witnessed by Fritz
Tarnow's visit to the United States to "see for himself." 66
The above helps to explain why the split in the ranks of German
labor was not easily healed in the \leimar Republic. It is
also important to realize that the leadership of the SPD,
although most firmly committed to democratic principles, was
itself guilty of misreading the situation in the early 1930s
and of a failure to take action against nazism. There is
considerable evidence that both the ADGB and the Social Democratic
party underestimated the Nazi threat.67 So, for that matter,
did the institutions of the Catholic working class.68 Furthermore,
the SPD inherited from its survival of Wilhelmine persecution
an almost fatalistic belief in its own invincibility and ultimate
victory.69 This fatalism was reflected in a number of ways.
Otto Wels claimed that "we were overtaken by the force of
circumstances,"70 while the SPD and especially its leading
economists, Rudolf Hilferding, placed their faith in a revival
of the capitalist economy and thus failed to offer an alternative
to Brllning.71 In this context, the ADGB was rather more
adventurous and developed an ambitious scheme of work creation
and public spending to counter the recession.72 However, this
the SPD refused to adopt;73 and it was this refusal that was in
part responsible for the Free Trade Unions' willingness to
enter discussions with the Right of German politics.74 A
further reflection of the fatalism of the Social Democratic
leadership can be seen in its response to Papen's coup against
Severing's administration in Prussia: Rather than fight this
outrage by extraparliamentary means, the SPD preferred to sit
back and hope ,for victory in the forthcoming parliamentary
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elections.75 This reflects two other aspects of SPD attitudes
that constrained the party at this vital juncture:
constitutionalism and organizational fetishism. The SPD was
the party of the \~eimar Republic76 and was conunitted to its
constitution, which it sought to defend against both left and
right. In a sense, it simply lost sight of the possibility of
unconstitutional action or was horrified by the prospect of it.
Equally, again partly as a result of developments under the
Second Empire, German Social Democracy had become increasingly
introverted, possessing the same kind of Lagermentalität as
the KPD, but perhaps in a more exaggerated form. Both the SPD
and the ADGB were gripped by an obsession with the preservation
of their organizations, an Organisationsfetischismus, as Rosa
Luxemburg had dubbed i t before the First \~orld \~ar. Thus as
late as January 1933, Theodor Leipart, the chairman of the
Gonfederstion of Free Trade Unions, could say "organization,
not demonstration, is the word of the hour"77 while the SPD
and the ADGB rejected the Conununist party's proposal for a united
front in t!1e aftermath of the Reichstag fire (February 27, 1933)
preciselB because they were afraid of forfeiting their legal
status.7
The ability of German Social Democracy to respond to the Nazi
threat was further constained by its humanism, its fear of
bloodshed, arid its horror of the prospect of civil war.79 Such
hostility to violent action was not purely a matter of principle,
however; it was also tactical. For some members of the SPD
believed that the prospects of victory were remote, given the
way the police and army were likely to respond.30 Such fears
were well-founded when one considers what transpired in Austria
in the following year: In 1934 a united labor movement was
destroyed in a bloody civil war by the combined forces of
clerical conservatism, fascism, and the army. The SPD leadership
was aniO loathe to aCt without the guaranteed SUpport of the
ADGB,
and this \vas simply not forthcoming. 32 It is true that
the Free Trades Unions did develop a work-creation scheme as an
alternative to the deflationary policies of Brllning. However,
such economic initiatives were not matched on the political
front. Obsessed by the need to preserve its organizations in
the face of falling membership rolls and financial difficulties,
the ADGB was even prepared to enter negotiations with General
Schleicher and some members of the :.<ational Socialist party to
discuss the possibility of establishing some kind of corporate
state.33
This last point, however, leads to the major explanation of the
paralysis of German labor in the early 1930s and its fragmentation-the depression itself. It is remarl~ble how two recent articles
on the Left at the end of the Weimar Republic devote a great
deal of attention to the immobilism and paralysis of the SPD,
for example, yet fail to mention the economic constraints under
which left-wing politics had to be conducted in the last days
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of Weimar. 3 4 As others have realized, however, the depression
had a profound effect upon the ability of the German Left to
resist fascism.35 As Stephen Salter remarks, "the reasons for
this relative passivity on the part of the working class and
its organizations are largely to be sought in the effects of
the economic crisis of 1929-33 on the German labor movement. n86
Germany was hit disproportionately heavily by the world economic
crisis;87 and within Germany it was the industrial sector that
suffered most.38 In February 1932 unemployment reached a peak
of 6,128,000, an official figure of the registered unew~loyed,
which therefore probably constitutes an underestimate. 0
In
the iridustrial sector, something like ~0 percent of male workers
were without jobs, while another 16 percent were employed parttime.90 Such high levels of unemployment meant . that large numbers
of workers were robbed of industrial muscle: they were simply
unable to strike; while for many of those still working, it
became increasingly risky to engage in industrial action with
such a large reserve ar~y waiting to replace them. The
paralyzing effect of such unemployment was magnified by the fact
that unemployment was especially marked in sectors that had
traditionally formed the backhone of labor militancy, for
example, metalwork and the building indus try, 91 and because the
trade unions saw 50 percent of their membership jobless.9 2
Unemployment further increased the rate of fluctuation of Communist
party membership,93 which increasingly recruited from the ranks
of the dole queue. By 1924 the KPD had become the party of
the unemployed, and by 1932 over 30 percent of its membership
were without jobs.94 Undersuch circumstances, the KPD was weak
in the factories95 and forced to develop a politics based upon
the neighbourhood.96 Thus the Germanlabor movement had been
robbed of its industrial muscle by 1932. Under such circumstances,
there was no likelihood of a repetition of a general strike such
as that of 1920, \lhich had defeated the reactionary Kapp Putsch.
Employers resorted more frequently to the lockout and with higher
rates of success,97 while the trade unions forsook strike
action and resorted to arbitration.9G
In addition to weakeriing labor, the depression had another
profound consequence: It exacerbated divisions at the very base
of the labor movement. To a certain extent, the gulf that
separated the Communist party from the SPD increasingly
corresponded to a hardening of their separate constituencies.
The KPD had always possessed a higher percentage of unskilled
workers in its ranks than had German Social Democracy,99 and
there is evidence from Frankfurt that it was becoming increasingly
dependent upon the support of the unskilled by the late 1920s.l00
More importantly, however, the KPD, as we have seen, essentially
became the party of the unemployed, whereas employed workers
tended to cling to the SPD, only 30 percent of whose members were
unemployed in 1932, compared to the üO percent of the KPD.101
Now this division between employed and unemployed might not have
had such serious consequences had there been prospects for
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re-employing most workers in the foreseeable future. But in
the early 1930s this simply was not the case. The factor that
caused such a deep cleavage in the ranks of German labor
was permanent unemployment. For those in jobs, the situation
was not ideal, in so far as real wages declined by about 20
percent during the depression, 102 but their interests were
manifestly different, at least in the immediate future, to those
of the workers who were permanently unemployed and had nothing
to thank lleimar for and nothing to lose by its destruction.
In a sense the intensity of the anger directed by Communists
against the SPD reflected this situation of despair. As the
Austro-Marxist Max Adler remarked with great insight at this
very time: "The working class itself has been burst asunder.
By. its loss of unity and striking power, its lack of direction
and its weakness in its most powerful section, the German working
class • • • has dug its own grave instead of being the gravedigger
of capitalism. • • • /jhe source of thi§7 is the differentiation
within the proletariat • • • which had existed for decades
at the upper levels, but has also become especially marked at
the lower levels since the world crisis and its long-term
unemployment. "103
To this might be added the consequences of the intensive
rationalization of German industry in the period between 1924 and
1928, a process which made the economy less flexible in the face
of the world economic crisis.l04 This rationalization entailed
the closure of inefficient units, the amalgamation of giant
companies, as in the case of I. G. Farben and the Vereinigte
Stahlwerke, and the use of new techniques of mass production,
especially the conveyor belt.lOS It also entailed a restructuring
of the German work force, creating a clear division between
the interests of those laid off in the process of rationalization
and those who remained em~loyed and benefited from the increased
productivity that ensued. 06 Germany entered a period of high
structural unemployment, especially in the metal industry;l07
and significantly, employed metalworkers disappeared from the
ranks of the KPD in Frankfurt.l03
The hardening of divisions within the working class also
correlated to certain developments outside the factory. To a
certain extent, the antagonism of Socialists and Communists
reflected a conflict between the generations, for the membership
of German Social Demo.c racy was noticeably older than that of the
Communist party.l09 This conflict extended even to different
styles of leisure and different attitudes to criminality.
Increasingly the SPD came to be associated with the respectable
working class, housed now in different neighborhoods than their
rougher brethren.llO Thus, for example, whereas patterns of
illegitimacy within the working class had been fairly uniform
in the \lilhelmine period, a clear difference between the
behavior of skilled and unskilled workers emerged between the
wars; and this difference also correlated with different
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111
residences and even KPD membership.
Furthermore, youth's
alienation from the \leimar Republic may relate not only to the
fact that the unemployed were often the young but also to the
extent to which the young unemployed w.e re increasingly subject
to harassment on the part of the state authorities, not only at
the hands of the police but also of welfare officers, distributors
of unemployment benefits, and so on. 112 Once a3ain, therefore,
hostility towards the Weimar Republic and the SPD, which was so
closely associated with it--the authorities youth encountered
in Prussia, for example, were soaial democratic forees--was
not simply a consequence of admittedly misguided Communist
instruction.
It may well be that there is no perfect match between the two
left-wing parties beaause of these divisions at the root of the
labor movement. The point, however, is that the depression
robbed the German working class of its industrial weapon and
fragmented it at its very base. In this, as much as in the
political divisions between Social Democracy and communism,
lay the real origins of impotence.
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11
N azism in the Eyes
of German
Social Democracy
RICHARD BREITMAN

A campaign poster used by the Social Democratic party of Germany
(SPD) in 1932 displays a muscular worker with a hammer raised
over his head. In front of him, as if mounted on an anvil,
is a three-dimensional swastika, one segment of which has
already split off. The intent expression on the worker's face
and the posed haiiDTier make it plain that he intends to demolish
the swastika beneath him. 1 This picture reflected the political
self-image of the SPD in 1932, not its political behavior. For
a variety of reasons, the SPD was unable to devise an effective
strategy to combat nazism in 1932-1933.
!lost scholars who have written on the SPD at the end of the
\~eimar Republic take the view that the SPD' s long-te rm problems
contributed substantially to its failure. The SPD and the
socialist trade unians ·had accommodated themselves to the existing
political, social, and economic order. Horeover, their leaders
were suspicious of mass action. Left-winß critics argue that
the Social nemocrats had diluted their socialism too much; many
non-Marxists believe that the SPD's revolutionary and classconscious rhetoric frightened off nonsocialist parties and voters
alike.2 But both sides agree that the SPD elite, protected in
many ways frora internal and external challenßes, became too
passive long before 1932.
In one res~ect, at least, the analysis has been incomplete.
Much of the literature is concerned with the strength of ti1e
worker in that poster or with the hanmer in his clenched hand.3
But did he know what to strike at? · If not, why not? Would not
his image of the swastika influence his choice of hammer and his
angle of attack? Although there is some research on socialist
and communist intellectuals' conceptions of fascism,4 there is
very little work on the views of the SPD and the socialist unions.
The period before 1930 is usually overlooked, and there is room
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for further analysis of Social Democratic imap,es of nazism even
after that date. Such analysis may help to pinpoint lvhich of
the weaknesses of the Social Democratic movement were salient
in 1932-1933, for errors in perception are sometimes the direct
result of psychological defects. :1y hope is that this chapter
will stimulate further research and discussion in this area.
Contrary to one recent claim that the SPD enp,aged in no real
discussion, let alone analysis, of fascism during the 1920s and
even into the 1930s,5 some party authorities saw a parallel
between Italian Fascism and the extreme rip,ht in Germany as
early as November 1922. Virulent nationalism and attacks
against the democratic system, use of paramilitary forces for
political purposes, and attempts to draw the working classes away
from socialism established a pattern that the SPD could hardly
ignore after Uussolini's successful march on Rome. Yet the
Nazis were not the only German group to be labeled fascist.
The Bavarian Social Democrats, for example, tended not to
distinguish among the many folkisil groups, even when the latter
were quarreling amonp, themselves.6 The most striking attribute
of the Nazis seemed to be their description of themselves as a
workers' party. Still, it is significant that on the occasion
of the collapse of the \lirth government in November 1922,
Rudolf Breitscheid warned the SPD Reichstag fraction that forcing
new elections might lead to .a faseist takeover of power.7 Thus,
at least one important SPD deputy regarded the new right as a
serious threat.
Earlier that month Bavarian party and union representatives had
held a conference to discuss the danger of a l~azi putsch and the
need for countermeasures. The delegates concluded that such a
putsch would threaten not only Bavaria, but the entire Reich.
However, they recommended against the establishment of a
working-class security force unless it had government support.
After the experience of early 1919, when left-wing radicals
terrified many middle-class Bavarians and provoked a repression,
SPD and General Federation of German Trade Union (ADGB)
offleials wished to avoid measures that would drive the middle
classes to the right. One suggestion was that the printers,
railway workers, and postal workers might quietly prepare to
seal off any area affected by a Nazi putsch. The conference
urged the Reich p,overnment to take stron3er action against the
Nazis, and Peter Grassmann, a member of the ADGB executive,
sent the results of the meeting to SPD Cochairman Hermann
UUller.3
In early 1923 the ADGB executive asked local union organizations
to supply information about the strength and composition of the
Nazi movement, with particular attention to whether workers were
joining the NSDAP. Host local respondents saw little evidence
of workers deserting the socialist camp for the Hational
Socialists. llowever, the returns indicated that the NSDAP
was unusual in its ability to mobilize so ~ny diverse groups:
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forrner officers, students, young people, artisans, commercial
employees, teachers, and civil servants. (One may conjecture
that Social Democratic officials reßarded this diverse
constituency as a weakness, rather than as a source of strength.)
The two cities where the Nazis were apparently attracting
substantial numbers of workers (although not socialists) were
l!unich (2, JOO) and K8nigsberg. In l1unich the union cerrespendent
noted that some forrner left-win~ radicals from 1919 were now
caught up in the Hazi movement.
This comment was not the last
Social Democratic observation that the Nazis and the Communists
had overlapping support and a common cause. For both parties
were opposed to the parliamentary-del!locratic system, to which
the SPD had committed itself.
For the most part, however, SPD authorities linked the Nazis
with other groups on the right. In April 1923 Hermann
~1Uller-Brandenburg (SPD), Regierungsrat in the Thuringian Ministry
of the Interior, assessed the battle strength of the various
counterrevolutionary organizations, placing the NSDAP at the top
of the list with 24,000 troops in Bavaria, \lUrttemberg, and
Thuringia. The total nurober of counterrevolutionary troops was
estimated at 71,000, which out•1eighed the police forces of the
reliably republican states. 11Uller-Brandenburg concluded that
the position of the arrny would be decisive in any civil war
and he urged further efforts to re~ublicanize the military. io
Like the Bavarian Social Democrats !:Jreviously, !1Uller did not
recommend direct Social Democratic action against a right-wing
coup. The state itself bore primary responsibility.
Despite the actions of the SPD-led Prussian government against
the i~SDAP, the lVilhelm Cuno government in the Reich refused to
override the Bavarian government's resistance to curbs on Clazi
Storrn Troops. The Bavarian Social 0emocrats reluctantly responded
by forrning their own centralized force, the Social Democratic
Order Service (SOD), recruiting some six to seven thousand men
to defend political meetings and conduct demonstrations.
Initially, the force was unarrned, but it later acquired some
weapons. The SPD's reservations about this force are well
illustrated by the offer to dissolve it i f the Reich government
would bring about the dissolution of Hitler's SA. In September
1923 the Gustav Kahr government in Bavaria banned the SOD without
touching the SA.ll
In the fall of 1~23 a three-man Social Democratic delegation
from !1unich went to Berlin to warn the SPD ministers in the
Stresemann government of the danger of a faseist coup in Bavaria.
According to an account wri tten much la ter by ~lilhelm lloegner, .
one of the delegates, Finance lfinis ter Rudolf llilferding, agreed
with their assessment and favored Reich intervention to arrest
lli t ler. Ilowever, Interior Minister llilhelrn Sollmann disagreed,
for he was more concerned about the possibility of a coup in
and areund Berlin.12 In any case, the SPD ministers were unable
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to persuade the cabinet to intervene against the will of the
Bavarian government.
One consequence of the Reich's apparent inability to protect
itself during 1923 was the decline of SPD opposition to a
republican volunteer defense force. Otto l!Brsing's emergency
force in !1agdeburg was expanded to 25,00::>, and in October
l!Brsine (SPD) made plans to supplement the efforts of the
Reichswehr and Prussian police against a right-wing putsch.
By early 1924 the SPD executive collllilittee was willing to sanction
the establishment of a new national organization along these
lines.l3 Its hope was that a republican organization, as
opposed to a Social Democratic one, would not alienate the middle
class. Eventually, the Reichsbanner Black-Red-Gold attained a
membership of three million, but it was more effective in
political marches and demonstrations than useful as a defense
force.
In one respect, the :<azi Beer-l!all Putsch in Hunich in November
1923 should have impelled the SPD to refine its view of nazism.
The "reactionary" ßavarian government and police prevented the
Nazis from achieving even the first step in their plan to
seize ·control of Germany. Yet Social Democratic spokesmen
continued to denounce the Bavarian government's lenient treatment
of the Nazis before and after November 1923. SPD experts on
nazism such as \Jilhelm Hoegner placed more emphasis on the ties
between the Uazis and the Right than on the differences.l4
Rudolf Hilferding predicted at the SPD congress in 1924 that
"the /restoration of thg7 monarchy 1wuld come first after the
supression of Social Democracy, of the republicans, and /It would
be7 supported by the illegal bands and death organizatio;:;s,
dripping blood and filth like Italian Fascism."rs Hilferding
in effect turned nazism into an auxiliary force for the
monarchists. Paul Kampffmeyer published a study in 1924 entitled
"National Socialisu and its Patrons." 16 Although he accurately
described clazi ideology as racist and antidemocratic, he too
lumped many of the SPD's foes togetller and stressed the Nazis
turn to the bourgeoisie and particularly to heavy industry for
support. The NSDAP. had apparently failed as a working-class
party and was seeking a new identity.
The Beer-Hall Putsch, the NSDAP's poor showing in the Reichstag
election of December 1924 (3 pe;rcent), and the economic
stabilization caused many SPD officials to dismiss German
Fascism during the mid-1920s. In a 1925 speech Otto l~els
derided the Nazis as folkish clowns.l7 Rudolf Hilferding
expressed some concern about fascism in his main address to
the SPD congress in 1927, maintaining that the former struggle
between the uonarchy and the republic had been transformed into
one between fascism and democracy. Yet Hilferding really
argued that the traditional right (DNVP) had changed its
direction; he had little to say about fascism itself as a
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separate movement. Ililferding merely used the Italian example
to lecture left-wing critics about what would occur if the German
working class pursued only its economiic interests and failed to
defend democracy. Since fascism was a continuing threat, the
SPD could not revert to its pre-1913 position of opposition to
the political system.l3
Ililferding also lauded the achievements of the SPD-led Prussian
government in protecting the lleimar Republic.l9 Prussia's
record of dealing with the Nazis had been tougher than the
Reich' s. In late 1922 Prussian Interior tlinis ter Carl Severing
had banned the NSDAP under the terms of the Law for the Protection
of the Republic, but Nazi reorganization maneuvers and subsequent
court decisions blunted the effectiveness of this measure. On
November 3-9, 1923, Severing mobilized the Prussian police in
the event that a llazi putsch succeeded in Uunich . 20 Nor did
Prussia overlook the HSDAP thereafter. \.fuen Hitler gave a speech
in Munich in 1925 in which he foresaw passing over the corpses
of his euernies after he gained power, the Bavarian government
imposed a ban on his speaking in public. Prussia quickly
followed suit.21 An aaalysis of radical right-wing movements,
written in early 1927 in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior,
emphasized the danr,er posed by the SA and urged further legal
action against the NSDAP. Yet there were other voices within
party ranks. SPD Reichstag deputy ;(urt Rosenfeld recommended
in 1927 that the speaking ban imposed on Ilitler be lifted, and
the SPD's central newspaper Vorw!irts stated overconfidently: "It
would please us if Hitler • • • were allmved to rave against the
Jews, as he loves to do. "22
SPD criticism of restrictions on civil liberties, along with the
poor showing of the NSDAP in the 1928 Reichstag election
(2.6 percent) may have induced Prussian Interior Hinister Albert
Grzesinski (SPD) to lift the speakiag ban on Hitler in September
1928. The Interior Ministry actually issued a press release
in which it stated that the Nazis no longer represented a ser~ous
danger to the Republic. 23 l.fuether or not this s taterneut is
taken as sincere, even those who continued to show concern about
the ;;sDAP focused only on its capabilii:y to carry out a putsch. 2 4
Despite lifting the speaking ban on Ilitler, Grzesinski urged
Prussian llinister-President Otto Braun (SPD) and Reich Interior
Ilinister Severing in December 1923 to ban both the Nazi and
Communist paramilitary forces.25
Few inside the Social Democratic ranks perceived the significance
of Nazi efforts during the mid-1920s to construct a strong
political organization, develop new techniques of propaganda,
and recruit new social groups. ßut as the Nazis gained strength
in state, looal, and student elections during . l929, and as the
economy deteriorated, some SPD analysts took another look.
Ilowever, Social Democratic disdain for nazism interfered with
perception. One party brochure, for example, desctibed the
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Nazis as the successors of tl1e anti-Semi tic parties and the
Pan-Germans. The Ilitler movement was said to contain not a
single new idea; it represented the hopes of social reactionaries
and monarchists. Anti-Semitism was simply a reflection of Hazi
economic stupidity.2D Although noting the NSDAP's ability to
mobilize the rural and urban llittelstand, another SPD writer
described the Nazis as the tool of heavy industry.27 In early
1930 SPD Cochairman Otto Wels charged that capitalists and
possibly foreign faseist nations were subsidizing the Nazis. 2 3
Such historical analogies and cui bono reasoning were
counterproductive, because they led SPD officials to underestimate
the novelty and independence of the Hazi movement.
Better information was available by 1930. A detailed analysis of
the NSDAP's finances, apparently written in the Prussian !1inistry
of the Interior, cliscounted the significance of !arge donations.
After breaking down llSDAP income from dues, public assemblies,
and the press, ti1e author observed: "It may be correct that
various big businessmen such as rardorff, Ilutschrnann-Plauen
/sic7, and also some !arge landowners give substantial
contributions. Even if these should reach the ten thousand
level in individual cases, this . would represent only a minor
fraction of the total income of the party from its own sources."29
A few SPD officials were also complaining .that the party as
well as the Reich and Prussian governments were not active enough
agains t corrosi ve ilazi propaganda. llowever, their proposed
remedy, more vigorous use of the Law for the Proteerion of the
Republic,30 was likely neither tobe effective nor sufficient.
By r.üd-1930 some very nerceptive cotmnentators raised new concerns.
In an article in the socialist journal Die Gesellschaft, Carl
liierendorff pointed out that, with a truly national organization,
the !lazis were making substantial inroads among the middle
class (bUrgerliche l1ittelschichten): employees, small farmers,
students, and in places, young workers. !1ierendorff emphasized
that the HSDAP had greatest success with previous nonvoters,
many of whom were either indifferent to ~olitics before or
disgusted with it now, 'i'he colorful, emotional activities and
language of the Nazis reached these alienated citizens, whereas
the SPD' s agitation assumed too much knowledge and insight on
the part of the voters. Mierendorff doubted that the Nazis
would fade away lil~e the anti-Semitic parties of the Second Reich
or collapse as the result of internal dissension; the SPD needed
to campaign actively a~ainst them.31 Another report, again
apparently from within the Prussian Interior Hinistry, projected
that an increase in Nazi parliamentary strength night lead to
paralysis of the Reichstag and the various Landtaße, which
could only increase citizen disaffection for the political system.
If the Nazis could gain access to the government, they might
use their power to destroy the state and establish a dictatorship.32
Despite these strikingly accurate forecasts, most Social
Democratic observers took le~s alarmist views. i<azism was still
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seen as a new form of conservatism supported by those social
strata adversely affected by the Drocess of economic
concentration. i:ioreover, the parallel between Germany and Italy
was not exact, because Germany was far more industrialized.
That meant that the working class '.VIlS stronger, the antimodern
eleraents of the middle classes far lveaker. !1ussolini 1 s Italy
actually bore more resemblance to late-nineteenth-century
Germany.33 Hhereas Social Democrats had once feared nazism
because of its efforts to recruit workers, the belief that its
constituency was substantially petty bour3eois was reassuring.
rlazism seemed to represent no lon3-term threat in Germany; it
was the initial product of neculiar ßavarian conditions and was
now spread by t:l~ economic ~risis. 34
The Reichstag election results of September 14, 1930, thus came
as a colassal shock to most Social Democratic officials.35 The
NSDAP's 6,4 million votes (18.7 !)ercent) and 107 Reichstag
seats not only established this party as the second largest
bellind the SPD; they also abruptly altered tl1e SPD's conce;:>tion
of the danger. Julius Leber described in his menoirs the
depression and helplessness of Social Democratic deputies faced
with both the threatening flags of nazism and Communist victory
cries as well. Even weeks after Septembe:r- 14, he said, the most
inflexible pacifists in the SPD fraction lvalked throu~h the
halls of the Reichstag asking everyone whether the Reichswehr
could be relied upon in case of a putsch.36 Carl Severing, once
again Prussian interior minister, soon added to the gloom by
telling the SPD executive committee that he doubted whether the
Prussian police could maintain control in the event of a Nazi
putsch and Communist O!Jposition to a united front against nazism.37
Yet the possibility of a Nazi coup was no longer the only serious
SPD concern. The problern now was not to recognize the danger;
i t was to figure out a r.1e t\lod to deal wi th all of the dangers,
including that of Nazi entrance into a coalition government in the
Reich. Once again the SPD leaders looked first to the government
itself for assistance. Lacking influence over President
Hindenburg, the SPD's hest hope was working with Chancellor
Heinrich BrUning, a leader of the Center narty. In October
1930 party officials concluded that BrUning's government
represented the lesser evil, and the SPD began its controversial
policy of toleration of BrUning , 33
This policy rested on a number of judgments, most of which were
not within the SPD's power to validate. First, the SPD had to
decide that the defense of democracy against fascism was its
highest priority, Second, the alternative to JrUning had to be a
governnent that included Hitler. (This may not have been the
only alternative.) Third, the chancellor had tobe induced to
cooperate with the SPD on some key issues; otherwise the party
might lose too much support. Finally, the Prussian government
had to maintain sufficient leverage to protect the Re!)ublic
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against a Nazi putsch. Although thß SPD took the first step
in October 1930, the other requisites of toleration were lacking.
The deepening depression and BrUning's misguided social and
economic policies alienated the trade unions, the left wing of
the ~arty, and some others as well.39 The SPD's fear of losing
mass support made it increasingly uncomfortable about tolerating
BrUning. But to break with Brlining was to risk political
isolation, not only in the Reich, but also in Prussia. The
loss of its Prussian stranghold would have been a severe blow
for the SPD. By the spring of 1931 the debate within the 9arty
over toleration became qui te angry, and the death of Hermann
Mliller at the end of Harch deprived the SPD of its most skillful
conciliator.
The party congress held in Leipzig at the end of May and in early
June focused on fascism and the SPD's toleration policy. The
party leadership tried to educate its critics about the nature
and dangers of fascism, while defending the toleration policy.
Left-wing spokesmen denounced the BrUning government and urged a
more vigoraus SPD policy inside and outside the Reichstag.
The speeches and discussions at the congress indicated that a
number of misconceptions about nazism prevailed on both sides.
After Otto llels announced at the outset that the Nazis intended
to restore the monarchy through terror and force,40 Rudolf
Breitscheid, cochairman of the Reichstag fraction and the best
speaker in the party, analyzed nazism in his main address
entitled "Overcoming Fascism."41 He pointed out that loose
usage of the term "fascism," for example, describing BrUning' s
emergency ordinances as "fascist," only made the struggle against
real fascism more difficult. He could not resist the comment,
however, that there \~ere many similarities bet\veen fascism and the
political system in the Soviet Union. Perhaps this was a
rejoinder to Communist attacks on the Social Democrats as "social
fascists." Breitscheid's definition of fascism included
overthrow of democracy, establishment of a dictatorship or
privileged elite, and rejection of the demands of a classconscious working class. He said that consciously or not,
fascism served the interests of capitalism.
Breitscheid compared the development of fascism in Germany and
Italy. The slower pace in Germany after the war he attributed
to better organization of the rival parties (especially the
working class) and greater public expectations of the new democratic
system. Only after voters became disillusioned with the Weimar
system and after the economic crises brought widespread suffering
and resentment did fascism turn into a pmverful nass movement.
Breitscheid related Hazi ideology to antirationalist and antipositivist currents, but he claimed that the lack of real theory
and program in tlational Socialism represented a major weakness.
\lhen one considered the high le.vel of industrialization in
Germany, it seemed unlikely that fascism would endure there. But
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the short-term threat at least was quite serious. Because of
Nazi inroads on the nonsocialist parties, there was increasing
danger of the Nazis gaining influence .over the government and
administration throup,h legal political methods.
\fuat is most striking about Breitscheid's presentaticn is what
is missing: a detailed analysis of Nazi ideology, party structure,
leadership, and methods. There were plenty of sources available,
including Hitler's Mein Kampf. But Breitscheid did not use them,
and his concept ·Of fascism was extremely general. His omissiqns
are all the more worthy of note in that he wished to convince
the congress that the danger of fascism justified the SPD' s
toleration policy. Breitscheid's own uncertainties about the
policy may account in part for his lack of forcefulness.4 2 But
judging from his other remarks, o:1e may also conclude that he
still underestimated the danger of nazism and felt that the
SPD could outlast it. Even the title of his address, "Overcoming
Fascism" (Die liberwindung des Faschismus) has a slightly passive
sound. One wonders whether an im!)assioned warning that a Nazi
government \vould mean another world war would have had greater
impact.
Yet Breitscheid's approach was sophisticated compared to that of
Hax Seydewitz and Ernst Eckstein, two of the Left opposition
spokesmen. They argued that monopoly capitalism, fearing that
it would not be able to obtain its objectives throug:1 the
democratic system, had created fascism to pursue them more
effectiveli. The ßrllning government was also an instrument
of capitalist interests. So the only •eal difference between
fascism and ßrllning was one of method; Brllning's policies were
already fascist.43 Advocates of such views could not abide the
SPD's toleration policy, and a number of the left-wing diss~dents
had already violated fraction disci!)line on votes in the
Reichstag. They were soon expelled from the party, which led
them to found the Socialist ~vorkers' Party of Germany.44 Although
another schism certainly did the Social Democratic movement no
good, the SAPD did not become a significant force.
\lilhelm Sollmann also defended the ~eichstag fraction's stance
against the left-wing critics. He tried to shmv that the SPD's
policy resulted directly from its own democratic principles and
from the danger of a legal takeover of pmver by the fascists. Yet
Sollmann too had a tendency to deprecate the Nazis in such a way
that his listeners might easily mis!Jerceive their intentions:
Adolf Hitler may be a very modest political brain, but
in the twelve years of his political activity his
capitalist donors have at least taught him, through
extra-help sessions (Nachhilfestunden) that storm
troops • • • cannot overrun a modern state . • • • The
Hational Socialism which has grasped this appears to
me to be a much greater danger than the ridiculous
putschism of 1923.45
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Even though Sollmann argued tha t ti1e SPD' s only choice was
between ßrtlning and a faseist dictatorship a thousand times
worse,46 his audience got little sense of precisely why nazism
was so dangerous. To know that it was directed agairrst
the working class and parliamentary democracy was enough reason
to oppose it.
Yet from within the Social Democratic camp Alexander Schifrin
had already analyzed the autocratic, militaristic, demogogic,
and neonationalist elements of nazism; he underestimated only
anti-Semitism. Moreover, Schifrin !1ad corni!lented astutely on
the authoritarianism of the movement and noted tliat its social
composition did not determine its goals and policies. Nazism
was neither simply a technique nor a congeries of social strata.4 7
A number of socialist intellectuals to the left of the SPD also
wrote perceptively about nazism in the early 1930s.4 3 Little
of this analysis seems to have reached the party elite.
Otto Landsberg's comments in.early 1931 were not aty~ical of
the SPD's upper ranks. Landsberg saw a difference between the
Nazis and reactionaries. The Nazis were more violent and would
certainly repress their opponents more taoroughly if they gained
power. ßut the reactionaries were in some ways more darigerous,
because it was unlikely that the Nazis could maintain power. 49
The tendency to compare its present enemies with its past enemies
was strong in a movement that regarded itself as having history
on its side. But lack of understanding of nazism's unique
features and its psychological impact upon the public hindered
the SPD from adopting proper countermeasures earlier, including
effective political agitation • . Previous SPD concerns that nazism
might become a rival working-class movement led to constant
denunciations of the NSDAP as the tool of capitalism. Such
attacks hardly sufficed to win middle-class voters away from
nazism. ßy late 1932 ~Vilhelm Sollmann hirnself recognized one
basic cause of the problem: "tle would have been spared many a
surprise, the sudden onset of the brown flood of nazisrn being
not the last, if our eyes and ears :1ad reached far enou~h outside
the ranks of our organization and our loyal followers." 0 The
Social Democratic movement's delayed reaction to nazism was
linked directly to the former's insularity and the latter's
willingness to exploit the resentments of diverse groups.
Even after the danger had been perceived, the SPD worked
primarily to keep the proletariat a'vay from Hazism. It was hard
for the party to shift gears, particularly during the
depression. l1any Social Democrats felt that the nonsocialist
parties would have to do their part with the rest of the
electorate, at least until the economic crisis abated. Otto
Uels proclaimed at the SPD congress in 1931: "Part of the German
middle class may, lil~e cowards, bow to fancy oratory; large
landowners, heavy industrialists, bank and stock market kings
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and all such royalty may turn to this workers' party !'the :~SDAP7;
the German workers' party is and will be German Social Democracy,
and it will prevail. n51 Rather than demean those who were
attracted to nazism, Uels might have tried to recruit some of them .
But the SPD's toleration policy placed it in a nosition where
it could offer little in the way of alternatives. Even antifaseist
activity was less than vigorous. 0nly at the end of 1931 did
the party leadership reluctantly sanction the establishment
of the Iron Front, an antifaseist umbrella organization of
Social Democratic and Reichsbanner forces. Even .then the Iron
Front, like the Reichsbanner, failed to develop a significant
military capability, partly because of the SPD leadership's
opposition. Nor were there specific plans to coordinate the
work of the volunteer forces with t!1e Prussian police, although
the idea had long been broached.5 2 All extraparliamentary
efforts, particularly those involvine the use of force or the
threat to use force, were rejected because they might drive
BrUning and the nonsocialis t parties into the arms of the llazis.
But with ßrUning excluding the Reichstag from decision making,
the SPD could hardly make use of its parliamentary strength.
Franz von Papen's Staatsstreich. against the Prussian government
on July 20, 1932, left the SPD in a cul-de-sac. Deprived of its
governmental stronghold, the SPD simply waited for an end to
the depression and hoped for the best.
Social Democratic passivity during 1932-1933 was not the product
of bureaucratization and inadequate leadership alone. It was
also the result of a ileltanschauung that forecast eventual
victory over the foes of socialism and made it hard to distinguish
among those foes. The SPD accurately considered nazism as one
expression of a broader European current called fascism. But
the party's concept of fascism neither explained nazism
sufficiently nor provided a clear sense of the differences
between fascists and reactionaries. Samething could be learned
from a comparison of Hitler and Hussolini. ßut to compare Hitler
with \lilhel!a n 5 3 was ridiculous.
Given the difficult strategic situation of the 1~eimar Republic' s
last year, 5!~ the SPD could not deal wi th all the dangers facing
itself and the parliamentary democratic system. It chose to
protect its working-class base and to avoid risky experiments,
not realizing that inaction itself carried major risks. Such
thinking allowed the Social Democrats to disclaim responsibility
for the rise of nazism, but it did not prevent the Nazi triumph .•
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Between the Ghetto
and the Nation:
Catholics
in the
Weimar Republic
JAMES C. HUNT

"For the Catholics in the Empire it is like Germany in its foreign
policy, onl~' enviers and enemies, only scorn and ridicule,"
declared t1atthias Erzberger, the young hotspur of political
Catholicism, in 1914.1 The dual perception of German isolation
and Catholic isolation expressed the dileruna of German Catholics.
To be a loyal German and a loyal Catholic--in whatever terms one
defined these concepts- - was in a world of enemies both a goal
and a burden.
The !lOSt-l<apoleonic reorganization of Germany in 1314-15 left
the bulk of Catholics as minorities under Protestant rulers.
Catholics experienced discriminatory treatment and frequent
conflicts between canonical and state l aw, especially in cases of
religiously mixed marriage . The Prussian solution t o German
unification excluded Austria and left the Catholics a permanent
minority at around one-third of the population. The I~ulturkampf
(struggle between Church and state) of the lß7Js was a n a ttempt
to break the power of th e Catholic hierarchy and to loosen
the ties between Germany and Rome . Chancellor Otto von Bismarck
branded the members of the Catholic Center party Reichsfeinde,
" enemies of the Reich, " lumping them with Poles and Socialists .
The open f-ulturkampf backfired, actually solidifying Catholic
unity, but Catholics con tinued to suffer the humiliations of
the "little" or "silent Kulturkampf": legal restrictions on
Catholic church services and processions; discriminatory state
funding of schools, parishes, and ecclesiastical salaries;
battles over cus todv and reli gious education in mixed marriages;
the requirement in Saxony that school chilJren attend Protestant
reli gio us instruction if Catl1olic instruction were not available
wit:1 the proviso t!tat~ if they did so until age twelve, they
we re then Protestant ~ L
Catholics used such expressions as via dolorosa,

"exile," or
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"ghetto"--the term most often used in German Catholic
historiography--to characterize their situation. Yet Catholic
spiritual and political leaders accepted the Catholic situation
as the fate of a minority of believers in a hostile world;
redress of ßrievances would come about only through legality:
through slow arduous labors in the courts, the legislatures,
and the press. Uonarcilical loyalty was always a powerful force
among the Catholics, and national1st loyalty reenDorced it as
the older dreams of a Habsburg-led Grassdeutschland faded and
more and more young Catholics grew to adulthood within the
Empire. Stung by accusations of :1alf or divided loyalty, they
sougilt to demonsttl.ate their patriotism by supporting the
government on the national (military and colonial) issues and
by opposition to socialism. The outbreak of the First \~orld
Uar seemed to sweep aside all barriers, to end Catholic
isoiation at the !Jrice of almost complete Germanie isolation in the
world. Catholic theologians and writers identified the war with
the will of God and the scholastic conce~t of a just war. But
Catholics continued to bear the stigma of belanging to an
international church or to suffer the insinuation that Pope
Benedic t XV favored Germany 1 s enemies and the insulting
identification of Hartin Luther and the Reformation with German
national destiny.3 In practical political terms, the Protestant
suspicion was unjustified, yet in another sense it was justified:
as long as they remained in an international cimrch and adhered
to the rationalism inherent in canon law and scholasticism,
German Catiwlics could not compete with Protestants in an
ideological national1st fanaticism.
Catholics did not expect nor want the end of the monarchy in
the fall of 1913, but its collapse brougnt them relief.
Under
the Weimar Constitution, legal restrictions on religious activity
fell away--the first Corpus Christi procession on Berlin's Unter
den Linden created a sensation--but the church continued to
enjoy s~ate funding, now administered more equitably. The
Center party, as the party of the middle, became the indispensable
coalition partner in the government of t!1e nation and the !arger
Ulnder. Party members held the chancellorship in six of the
fifteen cabinets between 1913 and 1933, while non-Centrist
Catholics, llilhelm Cuno and Franz von Papen, headed two cabinets.4
Anti-Catholicism continued, however, and took an increasingly
right-wing orientation in reaction aßainst the Centrist role in
the Re!Jublic. EneLlies of the Republic branded its controversial
flag as the banner of the three Internationals: the Red
(Socialist), the Gold (Jewish), and the Black (Catholic).
Anti-Catholicism bad long since taken organizational form in
various groups, particularly the Protestant League for the
Protection of Geman-Protestant Interests, created in 1339. Witi1
its 300,00J members the League embraced a high percentage of
Protes.t ant clergy, teachers, and officials; it flooded Germany
with cheap anti-Catholic and anti-Socialist tracts.S
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Protestants frequently justified their anti-Catholicism
intellectually through discussions of Catholic inferiority. The
modern world of freedom, science, scholarship, technology, and
industry was identified with the Protestant nations. One
Protestant pastor noted that the Protestant Horthern st!ates had
defeated the "Southern Catholic states" in ·the American Civil
\lar, freeing the slaves! 6 At around the turn of the century,
Protestant writers had underscored the higher German Catholic
rates of fertility, infant mortality, death, and criminality to
show Catholic inferiority while Catholic writers countered
with the higher German Protestant rates of divorce, suicide, and
illegitimacy. By the 1920s the clash over "moral statis tics"
was somewhat passe~ and the higher Catholic rates, for example,
of fertility and infant mortality, were declining to close the
differential. 7
But the Catholic population continued to be disproportionately
concentrated in rural areas and underrepresented, es~ecially
in the larger cities. Catholics worl:ed in dis!Jroportionate
numbers in farming and traditional handicrafts. They were
underrepresented in banking, commerce, technical industry, and
professional pursuits. Among bankers, brokers, army officers,
university professors, and certain categories of engineers,
Catholics had as much as 50 percent underrepresentation. On
the other hand, several marginal and vulnerable pursuits such
as vintners, agricultural laborers, seamstresses, and unskilled
construction workers had as much as SO percent overrepresentation.
In the crucial coal-mining and steel industries, Catholics
dominated all levels of both white-collar and manual employment
because these industries were located in Catholic areas (Silesia,
Saarland,, the Rhine-Ruhr basin). Yet ownership and management
rested predominately in Protestant hands. Further evidence
indicates that Catholics paid less taxes than Protestants because
they earned a lower average income, that within particular
industries and crafts Catholics had a lesser degree of technical
education and occupied less responsible positions, and that
Catholic craftsmen and retailers were economically marginal,
employinR little help and relying disproportionately on family
members.u
The origins of the Catholic deficits are beyond the scope of this
chapter; their political effects, however, are of consequence
here. The marginality and vulnerability of the Catholic
occupational structure suggests a potential susceptibility to
radical movements. Fascist, radical-Right, and anti-Semitic
movements are widely supposed to have their social bases among
the peasants and in the lower middle class (KleinbUrgertum)
of retailers, craftsmen, and petty officials. Stauding in
opposition both to big labor and big business, these social
classes are assumed to become radica~ized out of a perception
of relative or absolute deprivation.
This analysis was based
on the historical fact that German Protestant ~easants and
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KleinbUrger deserted the liberal and conservative parties en
masse, givinr; their votes by 1932 overwhelmingly to the Nazi
party. Catholics, by contrast, continued to cast their ballots
for the Catholic politiciü parties to the number of 5.5 million,
although perhaps 6.5 million gave their votes to· all other
parties combined. A populist anti-Semitism, based on resentment
of Jewish wealth, was to be found in Catholic ranks especially
among the southern agratian wing. The anti-Semitism might link
up with anti-socialism or a general repudiation of modern culture,
but it was by no means identical with antirepublicanism or
sympathy with nazism.lO
Occupational and class analysis from Aristotle on has appeared
to provide the most pertinent explanations of political behavior.
But we must continually place political behavior in its full
social context and explore the ways in which family, school,
ahurch, ideology, age, deference, association, and region may
mediate, modify, or focus the demands of social class or
economic interest. Why did German Catholics demonstrate a
relative immunity to the appeals of fascism? On the other hand,
why was this relative immunity not sufficient to allow them to
develop an effective resistance?
If we reinterpret economic marginality as attachment to
traditional occupations and limited mobility, marginality may
have screened Catholics from certain types of antirepublicanism.
Proportionately few Catholics were the colleagues of conservative
antirepublicans in the officer corps, the university professoriate,
the higher bureaucracy, or the management of heavy industry;
those that were, did not act very differently from their
colleagues. Conversely, Catholic miners and steelworkers
adhered to their labor unions, had job and class interests in
common with their Socialist or Communist colleagues, and suspected
the reactionary nature of Ilitler's movement. Catholic peasants
appear to have specialized less than Protestant peasants,
practicing a more traditional mixed agriculture. Thus despite
relative poverty, their economic vulnerability may have been
less.ll Priestsand a few substantial farmers still provided
the social leadership of the villages. Even after 1933 in many
Catholic villages, Nazi members were scarce, and Nazi organization
weak. 12
If Catholics were less susceptible than Protestants to the
influence of new, radical movements, one major reason was that
Catholics, like Socialists, had created their own social and
cultural environment, which filtered the impact of general public
op~n~on.
Driven into the ghetto of political and social
isolation by the l~ulturkampf, choosing an intellectual ghetto
to maintain the purity of the faith from the cl1allenge of
liberalism and the cult of science, Catholic notables had created
Verbanrlskatholizismus_, "associational Catholicism." In the 1340s
associations were formed to support Catholic journeymen, lending
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libraries, and rnissions, and to hold annual national Catholic
Rallies (Katholikentage). In the 1360s Catholic student
fraternities were created. During the Kulturkarnpf, fearing
permanent exclusion frorn the university professoriate, Catholic
scholars founded the Gtlrres Society for the Cultivation of
Schalarship in Catholic Germany. Frorn the 138Js on, Gatholic
newspaper publishers, peasants, workers, schoolteachers, artists,
and art dealers (the "Gerrnan Society for Christian Art"),
white-collar ernployees, booksellers, and ferninists organized.
Verbandskatholizismus was a creative response to the new
opportunities provided by the liberal freedorns of speech and
assernbly. It ensured that German Ca tholicisrn would rernain a
Volkskirchel3 __ a "church of the people." Yet Verbandskatholizismus
also linked tagether the Catholic nat.a lUes ( the clergyrnen,
nobles, lawyers, and publishers) through mutual association in
the fraternities, GBrres Society, and Center party, an associatian
further cernented by clase ldnship cannections especially along
the Rhine-!ffiin axis of German Catholicisrn. Rallying and
arganizing the braod rnasses of the laity, Verbandskatholizismus
represented a use of liberal freedorns to create an antiliberal
rnovernent on a basis that was sirnultaneously po~ulist and
hierarchical--the nasses of the excluded rninority led by their
"natural leaders." Anti-Sernitisrn rnight theoreticclly have been
an ideological elernent of such a rnovernent, but, after sorne
initial wavering during the Kulturkarnpf, Catholic leaders had
the political wisdorn ta support the rights of all religious
minorities.l4
As the \leirnar Constitution gave new opportunities to the church,
it also allowed the final rich unfolding of Verbandskatholizisrnus:
arganizations for Catholic youth, high school students, housewives
and rnothers, university graduates (Akademiker as opposed to
scholars /Üissenschaftler7, officials, and even industrialists.
Yet a subtle shift was occurring: whereas the older associatians
worked for the econamic and social interests of their rnernbers,
the newer ones generally cultivated liturgy, sociability, and
the Catholic \leltanschauung. They rnay be regarded as a final
massive atternpt to organize and to isolate the Catholic population.
For the leaders of German Catholicism were alarrned. For
decades rnore German Catholics had converted to Protestantisrn
than vice versa. The net Catholic lass thraugh the "canversion
balance" jurnped frorn 4,000 a year in araund 1900 to 7,000 a
year in the years 1925-30.15 Hore alarrning still, of evecy
100 Catholics rnarrying in 1901, 12 had selected a non-Catholic
partner, while by 1925 the figure rase to 13. In the diaspora
of the north German cities, as rnany as 70 out of 100 rnarrying
Catholics taok vows with a non-Catholic.16 The negative conversion
balanc~, the pattern of rnixed rnarriages (rnore Catholic man
marrying Protestant warnen than the reverse), and the consistent
Protestant rnajority (about 55 percent) of the baptized children
in rnixed rnarriages showed that Catholicisrn lacked respectability.
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Upward mobility could be fostered, especially in the diaspora,
throup,h conversion or more commonly throup,lt marriage into a
Protestant family. Hore p,enerally, growing numbers of Catholics
were making their individual union ~lith the nation, ip,norinp, the
religious split in disregard of t:1e teac:lings of church and
school.
For a large minority_ of Catholics, the Church now served
essentially to mark the rites of passap,e: baptism, marriage,
and burial. Of those counted in the census as Catholic (a
measure based on birth and baptism), areund 60 percent partook
of the oblip,atory Easter communion-..,-a figure t!-lat remained
constant from 1915 through 193G and was greater than double the
corresponding Protestant percentage.l7 The percentage of
communicants remained at higi1er levels in solid Catholic areas
but declined to much lower figures in the dias?ora.
If three out of five baptized Catholics remained faithful to the
church, onl~r three-quarters of these fai thful Catholics remained
loyal to political Cati10licism. Durinp, the height of the
Kulturkampf, over UO percent of Catlwlic voters supported the
Center party, a fip,ure that declined to areund GG percent by the
turn of the century. For the elections of 1919 through 1924
an average of :i4 percent of Catholic men and women voted for the
Center and the Bavarian People's parties; in the elections of
193J-33, areund 45 percent.l3 The extent of the decline was
masl~ed by the introduction of proportional representation, which
brought out the Catholic vote in the diaspora and the religiously
mixed regions, and especially by the introduction of women's
suffrage--a meas.ure which the prewar Center had opposed. While
the faithful Catholic women voted overwhelmingly Centrist or
Bavarian, their husbands, if religiously indifferent, voted
Socialist or, especially, Communist, and if religious, increasingly
supported the German Nationalist party or the regional peasant
parties.l9
Thus, the ~-leimar Republic provided new oppoxtuni ties for German
Catholics, but intensified the old temptations of assimilation
to t:w Protestant najority. Common to tl1e opportunities and
temptations was the possibility of escape from the ghetto and
union with the nation. Conversion, intermarriap,e, or opposition
to the Center party formed individual paths of union. But the
Catholic notables had long been urging a collective path of
union, a collective uplifting of ti1e Catholic population based
upon cooperation \vith the national government and demonstr.ations
of national loyalty.20 The generation of Center leaders who came
to the fore in tl1e 1390s had continued to fip,ht to overcome the
liabilities of the Kulturkampf. But they had also takan a hard
lock at the deficiencies of German Catholics in education,
income, and occupational status. They proclaimed to young
Catholics that it was their "duty" (Pflicht) to study harder, to
werk harder, and tobe more ambitious, while the nexus of
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Verbandskatholizismus was to provide moral supC~ort, schalarship
funds, and an old-boy network to advance the bright young
Catholics. Center leaders documented discrimination in the
civil service and the universities. They then lobbied with the
Prussian and imperial governments to increase the numbers of
Catholics appointed, emphasizing Catholic national and monarchical
loyalty, and at least tacitly tradinß Center political support
in return for appointments . 21
\lhether such efforts bore fruit or \~hether Catholics profited from
a general upsurge of educational and economic opportunities,
progress could be charted between 1900 and 1930 in the growing
nurnbers of Catholic secondary pupils, secondary schoolteachers, and
university students, the Catholic "deficit" dwindling or even
disa~pearing among these groups.
During the Weimar Republic, the
Socialist and Centrist coalition partners in the state of Prussia
collaborated in political patronage, and the Catholic deficit
arnong politically appointed officials disappeared.22 ßut fiscal
restraints upon hiring as well as the seniority of Protestant
officials perpetuated the Catholic deficit among tenured civil
servants.
The Catholic gains were also bougnt at a price. As limited as
they were, they provoked a hostile reaction, wilich centered
areund the Protestant League, Protestant civil servant associations,
and the Hationalist and German People's parties.23 Protestant
officials found in the Catholic gains yet another reason or
pretext to drift away from t;1e Republic.
And the Catholic nouveaux arrive~ assimilated themselves to the
views of the conservative Protestant circles tlley entered·. For
example, the Catholic historians Heinrich Finke, Aloys Schulte,
and Hartin Spahn drifted further and further a\..Tay from the
Center party with which they had been associated early in their
careers. Finke supported the right-winp, proan;1.exationist
Vaterlands"artei du ring \lorld \lar I, whilc Sl)ahn became a
Nationalist Reichstag deputy and eventually joined the Nazi
caucus. 24 To these men, t1at thias Erzherger, who had never
at tended a uni versi ty, who had enginee red bhe Peace Resolution
of 1917, signed the arrnistice, and led the Center into alliance
with the Left, represented all that had gone wrong with political
Catholicism. Uax \lallraf also hated the "disastrous"
(Unheilvoll) Erzberger. A high official in the empire whose
career owed much to the lobbying of Centrist politicians, .,.Jallraf
became a Nationalist Reichstag deputy. He regarded the
antirepublican Hationalist party as "Christian, social, and
national," embracing all classes and both Christian
denominations--but not Jews. 25
ßy the 1920s several Catholic families were amone; the greatest
industrialists in Gerrnany: the Thyssens and ral::lckners in steel,
and the ten llompels in cement. \fuereas the older Thyssens,
August and Joseph, had belonged to Catholic social and cultural

220

Towards the Holocaust

organizations, August's son Fritz would ')rovide Ilitler with
money and contacts. The KH!ckners and ten Hompels remained
loyal Centrists, but their presence in the Reichstag caucus
created friction with the Catholic labor unions. The Reichstag
deputy Rudolf ten Ilompel disliked the "Super democrat" Erzberger,
even proposing, af ter Erzherger' s la•1 sui t agains t Karl Heinrich
Ilelfferich, to exclude him from t:Je caucus. A vigorous critic
of tbe Christian unions, ten Ilompel favored a right-wing
coalition, ~yen a dictatorship, to lead Germany out of the
depression. -b
If the Spanns, ~lallrafs, or Thyssens represented individual cases
of defection from political and associational Catholicism, signs
of large-scale dissolution were present. t1embership in the
worker-oriented People's Association for Catholic Germany
(Volksverein fUr das katholische Deutschland) declined by
perhaps 50 percent between 1922 and 1933. 2 7 The Christian unions
likewise dwindled in numbers in ti1e later Ueimar years. The
voting base for l)Olitical Catholicism slm1ly nhrank, while the
Bavarian Catholics in 1920 created their own Bavarian People's
party in opposition to the policies of fiscal centralization and
alliance with the Left of the national Centrist leadership. The
Bavarian Populis ts allowed t;1eir s tate to become a haven in the
early ~leimar years for all varieties of antirepublican movements
from the terroris t Organization Consul to the ;~azi party. In
1925 they endorsed the Protestant Prussian General Paul von
Hindenburg for president against the Catholic Rhinelander ~ilhelm
Harx. After having created such havoc, the Bavarians drifted
back toward the l)Olitical middle in the later ~leimar years.
Few bishops were as outspokenly antirepublican as was l1ichael
Cardinal Faulhaber, Archibishop of 11unich, at the 1922 Catholic
Rally. Condemning the November Revolution as "perjury and high
treason," he blamed Germany' s distress on the tleimar Constitution.
The episcopacy in general, however, opposed the most extreme
right-wing organizations. The Fulda Bishops' Conference,
embracing the Prussian bishops, warned Catholics in 1924 against
membership in the paramilitary organizations and forbade
participation by the clergy. \lliile the warning applied in
theory to the republican Reichsbanner as well as the right-wing
groups, the Centrist press tended to ignore this, and public
controversy centered around the unsuccessful attempt by Catholic
nobles to have the ban on the Stahlhelm lifted. 2S The hierarchy
likewise stood firm against another attempt of right-wing
Catholics to assimilate themselves into the culture of German
nationalism, refusing to lift the ban on duelling among university
students. In 1930-31 all German bishops, including Faulhaber,
issued warnings against National Socialism "as long and insofar
as it adheres to a religious and cultural program which is
irreconcilable with Catholic teaching," or with other qualifying
provisos . 29 But the connection bet1veen episcopacy and Center
party, always problematic, became more distant. The bishops,
generally conservative monarchi.s ts in seatiment, were mostly
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elderly men from rural or small-town backgrounds who had studied
and frequently taught theology or canon law (rather than secular
subjects), sought to avoid offending the growinp, nurober of devout
Catholics who had switched froB the Center to the parties of the
Right.
Thus, in tl1e \veimar Republic, Verbandskatholizisr.ms was already
beginning to decline at the moment of its fullest unfolding,
at the very moment when it had perfected the ghetto. All
Catholic spokesmen and social strata were breaking out of the
ghetto, seeking union with the nation by many paths. The gains
made along these paths by Catholics did not suffice to convince
Catholics that they were . no longer stepchildren in the fatherland,
yet they also provoked politically dangerous Protestant hostility.
In several newspaper articles in 1924, the Catholic writer
Peter Hust had proclaimed "The Return of German Catholicism out
of Exile." Ile conder.med the "anxious and nervously cramped
defensiveness," the "cramped and ashamed" Catholicism of tl1e
Kulturkampf generation and its successor of the 139Cls. He
declared that at around 1900 Catholic youth such as hirnself had
thirsted after a "strengthening, refreshening spiritual drink"
because they all vere "heirs" of Friedrich Nietzsche. German
Catholicism for bim had gone over to a spiritual offensive
based on its achievements in philosophy, literature, and
politics.3J Wust's enthusiastic vagueness and his invocation
of Nietzscite as well as the vociferous and confused controversy
that he provoked suggest the turn to "vitalis111," the vague,
enthusiastic Lebensphilosophie among many younger Catholics,
a broad, but foggy path toward union with the nation. Catholics
increasingly spoke of adhering to the Catholic 11eltanschauung
rather than Catholic Lehre (teaching or doctrine), even their
terminology reflecting their assimilation to the national norms.
Yet the Catholic spiritual and political leadership remained in a
limbo between ghetto and nation. In the death throes of the
Republic, the Catholic leadership reverted to extreme parochialism.
The perennial Centrist role in the governing coalitions had not
sufficed to overcome the Catholic deficits. In April 1931 the
Centrist caucus in the Prussian Landtag introduced a bill in
support of--to use the current American term--"affirmative
action": a favoring of Catholic candidates until the deficit in
the civil service vTas overcome.31 The bill found no support from
any other !:larty, yet provoked severe Protestant hostility. In
Baden in 1932 the hierarchy and the Centrist leadership pushed
through a concordat at the price of destroying the last democratic
majority in the Landtag. The Reich Concordat of 1933 was a
desperate attempt to salvage Catholic rights at the expense of
abandoning political Catholicism and giving Ilitler his first
foreigh-policy triumph. Severe social, geographic, and religious
cleavages made Germany a congeries of unequal minorities, and
most of them in 1932-33 pursued a policy of sauve qui peut;
Catholics were no different.
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But the leadership also desired union with the nation. The
Centrist caucus in the Reichstag, after sharp internal debate,
voted unanimously for the Enabling Act in 11arch 1933. The
bishops only days later had withdrawn the warnin~s against
llational Socialisn, while admonishin~ against illegal and
subversive activity (that is, resistance). The trauma of
having been .branded Reichsfeinde continued to work its pernicious
effects.
ßoth strengths (Verbandskatholizisrnus, group cohesion, the
continuity and conscientiousness of leadership) and weaknesses
(marginality, siege mentality) kept political Catholicism a
major force to the end of the Republic--but a force crippled by
minority consciousness and by a longing for acceptability,
respec&ability, and union with the nation. In normal times-before 1914 or during the mid-\leimar years--Catholics could work
hard at overcoming their own deficits and at tasks for the
common good, but in the years of crisis--1913 and 1933--they
passively submitted to the force of events and to the initiatives
of others.
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The Double Exile:
Weimar Culture and the
East European Jews,
1918-1923
STEVEN E. ASCHHEIM

\leimar society continues to fascinate us partly because of the
ironic connection between cultural creativity and political
brutalization.l As unwelcome "insiders" of an unwanted Republic,
German Je1•s were located at the very center of this dialectic,
the concrete link tying these polarities. Their real and symbolic
role in the disposition of \leimar Germany has been am!Jly
documented.2 lluch less attention :1as been given to the role of
the :>ast European Jews (Ostjuden) in Germany during this period.
This constitutes a serious gap. Ostjude;1 were the first and
mos t vulnerable targets of the newl~r radicalized anti-Semi tism.
As a highly visible foreign minority, they were obvious victims
of the growing climate of political violence. At the same time
they greatly complicated German Jewry's mm e~osed situation
and, in many ways, conditioned its responses. llecause the
Ostjudenfrage (~uestion of the Eastern European Jews) was
portrayed as a German Schicksalfrase, it was transformed into a
probler.1 of vital popular and national concern. No treatment of
the relationship between \Jeimar culture, the Jews, and antiSemitism would be complete without it.
To be sure, tl1e problern of East European Jews was not new to
Germany. The geographical proximity of Po land to Germany was a
special circumstance attending the course of German Jewish
emancipation. German Jews were never able to forget that they
shared a comnon border with the unemanci11ated Eastern ghetto
masses. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth
century, German Jewish historywas conditioned by this presence,
both as myth anJ reality. Indeed, the articulation of a distinctive
German Jewish identi ty 1-Tas inseparable from the j uxtaposition
with the gi1etto Jew of Eastern Europe.
If most nineteenthcentury IIestern Jevs looked asl:ance at their primitive ghetto
cousins, German Jeus articulated the negative conce11tion of
the Ostjude with special intensity because they felt the rift
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mo$ t acutely. 3 This was true too for man~' non-Jews. Elsewhere
in \Jestern Europe tlle Ostjude was regarded as an irritant--in
Germany he became a major preoccupation, at times even an
obsession.4
This concern reached its height in the immediate post-\lorld Uar I
period. The shock of defeat, the fear of revolution, and
unparalleled economic hardship provided ne•1 credence to the old
slogan "the Jews are our misfortune!" For the first time in
twentieth-century Germany, anti-Semitis~ achieved political
respectability and gained mass support. J lnlile the anti-Jewish
onslaught •.o~as generalized and clearly included native Jewry,
the alien and defenseless nature of the Ostjuden made them
particularly salient victims of t:1e attack. Hothing, after all,
concretized the Jewish danger more effectively than this
s trange, repellent ghetto creature. Ili tler' s rmrported "discovery"
of tiw Jewish problem, let us not forget, occurred when he
encountered the dirty, smelly East EUJ;opean Jew, "an apparition in
a black caftan and black hilir locks. nll Ostjudentum, as it
filtered into German space and consciousness, kept alive the
historical memory of the mysterious and brooding ghetto presence.
This was a resonant tradition that became especially effective
in a time of mass confusion, political chaos, and economic
collapse. llo wonder tnat in the rhetoric and actions directed
against the Ostjuden the post-\lar brutalization of the Jews
was most acute and achieved its first real success.
All myths, if they are to function, must have some basis, however
tenuous, in social reality. Right-,•ing accusations of an invasion
by ghetto Jews were made plausible by the fact that during the
war, 70,000 Eastern Jews--workers, prisoners, internees--were
added to the prewar population of ')1J,OOO. 7 In addition,
thousands more sought refuge from the brutal pograms that
rocked Eastern Europe after the war. Although by 1922 the
majority of war-arrivals had left the country, their presence
was still noticeable. Against the background of defeat and
economic disintegration, it was easy to present this as a mass
flood posing a fundamental threat to German morality, economy,
sexuality, politics, and culture.3 Old accusations took on new
significance. The Shylock myth was revitalized by constant
accusations of ruthless Eastern Jewish enrichment at the expense
of poor and honest pat:riotic folk. Radical right publications
regularly enployed parasi tological language in their descriptions
of Ostjuden. Thus in 1920 Theodor Fritsch's Die Hammer wrote:
A horrible sight, these faces of animals of prey: in
them there is nary a sign of hunan feeling • • • they stand
before us as the embodiment of Jehova's promise: Thou
shalt devour all other Hations! Yes, devour greedily,
pitilessly. The myth t;1at J.ews were forced to become
usurers and liars by their environment is exposed the
minute these Ostjuden take their first step into our
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land • • • they are the conscious products of
Talmudic crininal schools.9
These themes meshed effectively with the fear of radical
political change. After the success of the Russian Revolution,
bolshevism, that alien export, seemed palpably close to Germany.
The nrominent role of Jews in the Russian Revolution and Bela
Kun' ~ radical regime in HungarylO lent plausibility to the
equation of bolshevism with Judaism. After all, since the
beginning of the century Ostjuden such as Rosa Luxembourg,
Israel llelphand-Parvus, Leo Jogiches, and Karl Radek had been
in the forefront of radical activity in Gernany. !1oreover, in
the postwar Berlin and !1unich revolutions, the figures of
Luxembourg and Eugen Levine were notoriously prominent. Even
radical figures who were clearly not Ostjuden were branded as
such. Thus Kurt Eisner, the ßerlin-born leader of the Bavarian
Socialist ;lepublic, became widely known as a "Galician Jew,"
symbol of the Jewish revolutionary, "a Shylock • • • with a
dirty yarmulke covering his :1ead."ll
l!ard-line anti-Semites were not bothered by the great distance
that divided traditional Talmudic Jews fron professional
revolutionaries who were radicaily disaffected from their origins.
!1odern revolution, wrote Alfred Roth of the Deutsche Schutz
und Trutz Bund, was merely tlte conspiratorial Jewish means to
sew discontent among the nations, thereb'{-1 guaranteeing the
ultimate triumph of Talmudic \lOrld rule. ~
In the new polari~ed climate, even conservatives began increasingly
to ignore the distinction between modern, assimilated German
Jews and the Eastern ghetto masses. There were, however,
exceptions to this rule. Thus Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski
attempted to deal \lith the Jewish problern by making a principled
distinction between Eastern European and r~rman Jewry. The
forner were "legitimate" targets of animosity, the latter were
not. !Iotions of "international Jewry," he wrote, were palpably
absurd. This distinction between cultured, assimilated German
Jews and backward Ostjuden was obvious. llothing established the
point better than German Jewry's own pronounced antipathy. Did
they not support moves to keep the Ostjuden out of Germany
(Grenzschluss)?l3 l!ere was an explicit attempt to deflect
anti-Semitism onto the Ostjuden and away from the German Jews.
Indeed, on the eve of Nazi accession to power, ßronikowski
sharpened his attack on the Eastern Jews (and Zionists).l4 But
the distinction had never been clear in the minds of the different
anti-Semitic groups, and the conservative Deutsch national
Volkspartei was split on the question. The majority probably
linked the two Jewries and regarded Ostjudentum as a massive
reservoir for the constant revi talization of IIestern Jewry .15
For all that, the success of anti-Semitic propaganda against the
Ostjuden was not a function of their alleged identity with
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\les tern Jews.

Rather its effectiveness derived from the ongoing
resonance which the traditional stereotype of "the ghetto Jew"
still evoked. Ti1e ghetto Jew symbolized an age-old cultural
tension. Uoreover, Eastern Jews--alien, visible, vulnerable-could be attacked with greater impunity than native, enfranchised
German Jewry. Election posters in r,ermany and Austria constantly
exploited these fir;ures in caricature. Thus in 1920, the Austrian
Christian Socials portrayed a sna!~e with the head of a repulsive,
side-locked Ostjude st~angling his victim to death. Similarly
in 1919 a German Uational Democratic party drawing tapped
ancient fears of the dar!~ ghetto. It pictured a priest, candle
in hand, wall~ing in front of a sim01le German worl~er who is pulling
a coffin through the streets. Beilind the coffin walks a gloating
Ostjude. Th~ only escape from this danger was to vote National
Democratic.lu
Of course the anti-Semitic camp attacked the Eastern Jew with
particular vehemence. But what of other sectors of 'leimar
society? In a time of mass upheaval and a noticeable Eastern
Jewish presence, how deeply had the stereotype of the ghetto Jew
penetrated? \li t:1 conservati ves like Bronil~owski, the answer is
clear. Among vl:llkisch acti vists like Hermann Popert, 17 founder
of the Vortrupn youth movement and obsessed with reinvigorating
a degenerating Germany through alcohol abstinence, there was a
similar response. Popert--himself a half Jew--was deeply concerned
with German racial hygiene. But his notion of race was territorial,
not genetic. All Germans could be legitimate members of the Volk
if t:1ey fulfilled national demands. His movement explicitly
disavowed racial anti-Semitism and insisted that anti-Jewish
activity not touch any German citizens. llut this was not
applicable to Ostjuden, whom he portrayed in gross stereotypical
forms. Ghetto Je\lS--wi th their filth and unclean sexual habits-were fundamentally undesirable elements. They were the cause of
German anti-Semitism.l3 Journals such as the Jesuit Hochland, also
actively opposed to racial anti-Semitism, made clear distinctions
between negative ghetto Jews and German Je1vs.19
The strength of the anti-Jewish onslaught during this period enabled
it to decisively influence ti1e nature of political discourse and
to exert pressure on, and successfully penetrate, previously
unaffected sectors. Even the bastions of opposition to antiSemitism, the liberal and Social Democratic parties, were
affected. The German Democratic party maintained its public
stance against all manifestations of anti-Semitism. Their
decision to nominate fewer Jewish candiates was, however, a
concession not only to the mood of the times but to the opinions
of individual party members as well. liany conveniently attributed
anti-Semitism to the presence and behavior of the Ostjuden.20
Otto Fishbeck, ti1e party's Prussian minister of trade and commerce,
publicly OCJposed the unsavory presence of Eastern Jews but
insisted ti1at this did not make anti-Semites out of the Democrats,
who deeply respected the law-abiding German Jews.21 In this
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manner sorne of ti1e rnore dernocratically inclined political forces
sought to concentrate the anirnus an Ostjuden and away frorn German
Jews. This had always been a rnore respectable position and,
under the new circurnstances, obviated the need for an exarnination
of the dee::>er sources anirnating t:1e vTidespread racist agitation.
The response of the Social Dernocratic party to the Ostjudenfrage
illustrates the nature of the cornpeting forces at work. Both
during the war and after, there were certain elernents in the
party who expressed general anti-Serni tic convictions but t:1ese
never becarne a dominant factor. Indeed, to the end, the Social
Dernocratic party ~•as the German Jews' "wost irnportant source of
organized support in German society. " 2 ~ llith regard to the
Ostjudenfrage, however, the ::>icture is slightly nurkier, the
arnbivalence more evident. Ta a large extent this was related
to tne fact that in war-tarn Germany the presence of Ostjuden
constituted a real social problem--yet another burden an an
already overloaded economy. In the pre-war period, the party
had defended t:te rig:tts of Jewis:1 aliens in Gerrnany and urged
Eastern European Jews to actively ::>articipate in the class
struggles that would bring about an age of universal socialist
ernancipation. There can be no doubt about this human1st
orientation. But, like other groups in Germany, it is equally
true that the Left accepted the negative conce::>t of the ghetto
and its products. 23 Thus l~arl I~autsky, although utterly O!Jposed
to all racist conceptions and a proponent of East European Jewish
ernancipation, regarded Judaism as a reactionary factor . Its
natural home was the giletto, which I~autsky, fitting into a
lang tradition, saw as the symbol for the distinction between
progress and reaction, enlightenrnent and obscurantisrn.Z4
The ~ostwar response of the Social Dernocrats to the Ostjudenfrage
in Gerrnany rnust be seen in its overall historical context. The
democratic parties were caught between the necessity to come to
terms with popular opinion while at the sarne time maintaining a
reasonable, cornpassionate policy. Certain individual rnernbers
did indeed succumb to exploiting the stereotype as a justification
for excluding Ostjuden from l~eimar Gerrnany. 25 But the dominant
argument held that Gerrnany's problern had objective socioeconornic
roots and that, apart from a few profiteers and black-rnarket
operators, the small rninority of Ostjuden could not possibly be
blamed for the country's woes. Anti-Sernitic assertions that
they were Germany' s forernost danger v1ere disrnissed as absurd.
The i~overnber 1919 edict concerning the Ostjuden, signed by
Halfgang Ileine the Prussian rninis ter of the in terior, exernplified
this approach. After extended consultations with Jewish
organizations, t:1e Prussian government undertook to resolve
Eas tern Jewish problerns in an orderly and cornpassionate fashion. 26
llorking through the Jewish \Jorkers Helfare Organization,
ernployrnent for ti1e Ostjuden would be procured--even where this
could affect employment of local workers. Of course, this was
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predicated upon the assumption that the Eastern Jews would move
on as soon as possible. Those Ostjuden who had committed a
crime or were deeiUed a threat to law and order were to be
forthrightl~r expelled--although this too was to be done together
with Jewish organizations who would protect the rights of the
affected persons. !1oreover, the Je1•ish ~.Jorkers \lelfare Organization
had ~riority in finding work for une~ployed aliens. This would
then avert the legally required expulsion of unemployed aliens.
Anti-Jewish forces quickly interpreted the edict as evidence of
a plot to favor foreign Jewish workers over German workers. The
pressures on the Social Democrats in this regard were obvious.
The edict was remarkably free of anti-Jewish Sentiments, despite
lleine's past, which was not.27 Yet, in other contexts, I!eine
referred to the Ostjuden as "half-barbarian"23 and only one
month after the :->ublic:ation of the edict !'lade his ambivalence
a matter of public record. ~ile attempting to temper the
political agitation against the Ostiuden, he conceded, in a
speeclt to the Prussian Parliament, 29 tltat the ~roblem was getting
worse and asserted that unsympathetic Jewish types could no longer
be tolerated in German cities.
These remarks epitomized an unresolved split in Social Democratic
attitudes. The traditional .compassruon and humanity of the
Left was pitted against the equally ingrained distaste for the
"anachronistic" ghetto Jews. Kautsl~y's formulation rer.tained
normative. It was only with Eduard ßernstein's postwar
publications30 that there was any inclination at all to give the
ghetto Jew a measure of intrinsic value. Indeed, the tlovember
1919 edict was itself partly the product of German Jewish
protests against previous anti-Eastern Jewish actions undertaken
by the Social Democratic government. In a memorandum to the
Foreign Office in April 1919, the Zionist Julius Berger--hirnself
a Social Democrat--objected to widespread expulsions of Ostjuden
from all areas of Germany and especially Prussia. These
expulsions he wrote, were carried out wi th unprecedented
brutality.~l The grounds for these expulsions (unemployment,
black-marketeering) were flimsy excuses for what Berger considered
to be a basically anti-Jewish policy that dominated all levels
of Prussian bureaucracy.
Expulsions were not the only actions perpetrated agatust the
Ostjuden by SD officials. In early 1920, security forces, under
the command of Social Democratic Police President Eugen Ernst,
engaged in a full-scal:e raid on the Berlin ghetto. Under the
pretext that it was m!cessary to ferret out black-marketeers
and Bolshevist agents, the Berlin Eastern Jewish quarterwas
cordoned off, and between seven hundred and one thousand people
were arrested. Of these, three hundred were placed in a
concentration camp at J.i"uensdorf. Ernst had inforrned I!eine that
the Ostjuden were a cancerous sore on the national body, a real
danger to Germany and, he warn:ed, unless they were moved to
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intern camps, he would not be able to control the growing tide
of anti-Semitism. Although all those arrested \lere eventually
released and the SD journal VorwHrts condemned the incident
(while simultaneously putting the blame on the army), this incident
was firmly imprinted on Jewish--especially Eastern Jewish-consciousness.32
There were, to be sure, lawbreake rs among the Ostjuden. Not only
anti-Semites praised the action. The liberal Berliner Tageblatt
welcomed the initiative to rid the city of its "pests."33
nut, as one sympathetic Jewish observer noted, the overall
situation was conducive to economic lawlessness. German Jews,
non-Jews and other foreigners were all implicated. To make
the Ostjuden singularly responsible was shameful. 34
This critique (of scape-goating powerless outsiders) also occupied
nonparty social critics and dramatists on the far Left.
Typically, these were German-Jewish intellectuals who had little
sympathy for the inner world of t;1e Eastern ghetto Jew. The
famous novelist Alfred Doeblin was one of the very few disaffected
Left Jewish intellectuals to discover the world of Eastern Jewry
on its own terms and to record his appreciation of its intrinsic
merits. His Reise in Polen (1925) was, however, quite atypical.
The Ostjude was most often used as a foil to uncover some of the
major hypocrisies of post-\~ar German bourgeois morality and
society. Thus l~urt Tucholsky--certainly no lover of the ghetto-bitterly caricatured lleimar's system of judicial and social doublestandards by which Eastern ghetto Jews and native aristocrats
were treated for the same offences in his caustic Avrumele
Schabbesueckel Und Prinz Eitel-Friedrich Von Hohenzollern (1921).35
At the same time he mocked the pathetic efforts of middle-class
German Jews--as exemplified by the philistine Herr ilendriner-to justify anti-Semitism when it was aimed at Ostjuden.36
The most controversiial statement of this type was the expression1st
\lalter Mehring' s play "The !1erchant of ßerlin" (1929), produced
at the prestigious avant-garde Piscator theatre in ßerlin.37
This tragicomic reconstruction of early ~leimar inflation propelled
Eastern Jewish reality onto the stage with uncompromising force.
Sirnon Chaim l~aftan (!) comes to ßerlin in the midst of the 1923
inflation. He is a typical creature of the ghetto who,
throughout the play, talks in his native Yiddish. In partnership
with a German Gentile, l~aftan exploits the inflation and soon
becomes a millionaire. Yet the stereotype is softened,
humanized by the fact that in the end Kaftan is brought down-like everyone else, a victim rather than creator of circumstance-while the German remains victorious and maintains his sway at
the expense of others. This conclusion of course, scandalized
the national1st and anti-Semitic press. 33
Poised between these Eastern Jewish outsiders and the broader
society were Germany's Jews. Organized German Jewry had always
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been ambivalent in their collective expressions and actions
concerning Ostjuden. Protective and dissociative modes operated
side by side in uneasy alliance. On the one hand they had always
provided charity and aid to their distressed East European
brethren (a fiact lvhich served usually to emphasize rather than
diminish the distance between them), while on the other they
sought the most efficacious ways in which to rid Germany of
their unseemly presence. For liberal, middle-class German Jews
the Ostjuden were suffused with symbolic significance.
They
constantly reminded German Jews of their own Jewishness. They
also reinforced the reality of anti-Semitic stereotypes and
were regarded as impeding the successful disposition of German
Jewish assimilation.39 This dialectical tension--between
responsibility and denial--was built into the normative German
Jewish liberal a~proach to the Ostjuden.
ßy and large, the same was true for the \leimar period. The
war, however, had disillusioned many German Jews, who were now
less able to attribute anti-Ser.litism merely to the East European
presence. 4J Efforts on behalf of the Ostjuden lvere made with
renewed vigor. To be sure, this was not a disinterested effort
but was also an attempt to contain and defuse the animus ?imed
against German Jews themselves. Still, for the first time,
liberals and Zionists were able to lVOrk together on a common
platform. A concerted effort was made by representatives of
the major Jewish institutions to protect the rights of Eastern
Jews and provide them with employment and housing.41
The general perception of Jewish interdependence weighed heavily
on German Jewish leaders. ßecause the radical right had succeeded
in maldng the Ostjudenfrage into a burning national issue,
German Jews had to define the balance betlVeen Jewish responsibility
and German loyalty with added caution. Paul Hathan's formulation
was typical of the leadership's ap~roach. It was clear, he
wrote, that given Germany's desperate situation, the presence
of foreign groups was undesirable. The agitation for expulsion,
however, would be neither effective nor morally appropriate.
Deportation would be an un-Germanic act and harm the country's
international reputation.42 A speaker for the Centralverein,
the liberal representative organization of German Jewry, scoffed
at absurd anti-Semitic claims about Eastern Jews yet, almost as
a matter of course, added: "That the German Jews do not encourage
this immigration must be obvious to all reasonable people."
Ostjuden would move on as soon as circumstances permitted.43
Berlin's Reform community also accepted responsibility for
Ostjuden already in Germany but, as one typical article put it,
no one could deny the abundance of "dubious" elements in their
ranks. The majority of Germans clearly did not desire their
presence. Reform Jews had more in common with Christian Germans
than the Ostjuden, whose spirit and character was so alien.44
These positions reflected ti1e continuing unresolved ambivalence
of most liberal German Jews toward the Ostjuden. There were,
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to be sure, other positions on the continuum. Certain individuals-unhampered by the constraints of official communal respönsibility-voiced the historic distaste in a rnuch less ambivalent rnanner.
Arnong the rnost prominent were the novelist Jacob \lasserrnann45
and the philosopiler Constantin Brunner.46 For thern, Ostjuden
were wholly alien, generative of anti-Sernitism and, because they
constantly brougnt the ghetto and forgotten rnodes of Jewish
exclusivism back to Germany, the prirne inhibitor of successful
Gerrnan-Jewish integration.
11ax i~aurnann' s srnall but vocal Deutschnationale Juden rnade such
Sentiments its official policy. Founded in 1921, this group
clearly reflected the postwar collaiJSe of liberal certainties.
It atternpted to placate the fury of the right by appropriating
sorne of its key values and advocating SU!1port of the conservative
Deutschnational party. For Naurnann, as he constantly repeated,
there was only one political criterion: the welfare of the
German Fat!~erland. Ostjuden \vere clearly antithetical to that
welfare. It was not, wrote ;laurnann, that he disregarded the
responsibilities of Jewish solidarity: "But it would rnean the
abandonrnent of Deutschturn if, out of syrnpathy for foreign Jews,
we allowed the German Fatherland to corne to grief."47
If rnany \leirnar JeHs believed that the Ostjuden \vere the real
cause of the prevailing anti-Sernitism, they voiced this conviction
privately. Naurnann' s group, however, rnade the East->lest Jewish
distinction the critical pivot of its argurnents and atternpted
to siphon anti-Jewish hostility ontö the Eastern Jews. At
tirnes alrnost nothing distinguished their pronouncements an the
issue from the anti-Sernitic press. Ostjuden, they wrote, were
totally unassirnilable. They were swarrning into Germany, cheating
and dernoralizing everyone in tlteir way. They were ruthless,
noisy, and uncultured. Their rapid departure from Gerrnany was
to be encouraged.
Naurnann's group focused on yet another Jewish enerny: Zionisrn.
For ~ationaldeutsch Jews, Zionists and Eastern Jews were
practically synonyrnous. Both ernbodied the Jewish national
sensibility and contradicted the prernises of Deutschtum. They
represented alien, disloyal elernents. As the German Zionists
had always been the rnain supporters of Eastern Jewish rights in
Germany, this was a plausible association. Indeed, to the
chagrin of liberal Jews generally, rnany young German Zionists
had initiated a veritable cult of the Ostjuden. Martin Buber's
prewar Hasidic writings ligitirnized this growing trend, In a
radical inversion of irnages, Ostjuden were held to syrnbolize
Jewish authenticity, comrnunity, and lost spiritual v.alues, while
\lestern Jew.s were pictured as philistine, undignified and
deracinated.49
In between all these cornpeting forces were the Ostjuden
thernselves. ßetween 1913 and 1923 it was they who felt the
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full force of the lleimar crisis. Expillsions, violence, internment
in special ooncentration camps,SO police raids: All these were
apart of Eastern Jewish reality during these years. The attack
on the Ostjuden reached its climax in 1923, when economic suffering
also reached its height. Between ;~ovember 5 and 8, Germany's
first twentieth century pogrom began. \lith over 10,000 people
roaming the streets of the Eastern Jewish quarter, the
Scheunenviertel, an orgy of looting and violence proceeded.
Only with the insertion of massive police reinforcements was
order restored.:.il The november pogrom merely culminated a whole
series of anti-Jewish outbreaks which had occurred that year in
Hunich, Beuthen, I~oenigsberg, Nuremberg, Saxony, and elsewhere.
Almost always the Eastern Jews, visible and vulnerable, were the
prime targets of attack.
As one transplanted Eastern Jewish intellectual, Zalman
Rubaschoff--later Shazar, president of the State of Israel--noted
at the time, Ostjuden in Germany found themselves in a state
of double exile. Far removed from the cultural world of the
German workers, the Eastern Jewish proletariat had precious
little in common with bourgeois German Jews (this even applied
to their relations with German Zionists). The very presence of a
Jewish proletariat in Germany was anomalous. 5Z !1inority life
was rendered doubly difficult.
This was reflected in the disunity, apathy, and fragmentation
that hounded the only organization of Eastern Jews in Germany,
the Verband der Ostjuden. Its leaders constantly oomplained
that despite the concerted attacks upon them, Ostjuden refused
to make a serious, unified response. Ilow, they asked, could
German Jews be expected to defend them when they did not even
bother to defend themselves?53 In the rnidst of the anti-Semitic
agitation, their journal lamented: "We are a Galut (Exile)
within Galut, pathetically dependent upon the goodwill of
others.~The positionwas further weakened by the defection
of leaders who, as soon as they could, escaped the stigma of
the Berlin ghetto.SS These who remained, exhorted their
brethren "to learn the basic principles of political and social
life. \·l e have to start at the beginning and learn the elementary
ABCs. \Je hold ourselves to be very intelligent, children of
the Bock, yet we are illiterate. 'le do not knmv how to deal with
the most im~ortant, critical and dangeraus aspects of our
existence."j6
The constellation of forces at werk between 1913 and 1923,
however, was well beyend the control of a transient, powerless
community. It was only with the post-1923 econornic recovery that
life for these East European Jews became more tolerable. m1en,
however, the final storm arrived ten years later, it became
obvious to all tnat, for the radical right, the attack on the
Ostjude had been only the beginning of a massive onslaught against
all Jews.
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Class Struggle around
the Hearth:
Women and Domestic
Service in the
Weimar Republic
RENATE BRIDENTHAL

One aspect of fascisrn that has continued to puzzle historians
is its relationship to warnen. Though fewer warnen than rnen voted
for Hitler, the question rernains af what drew some warnen into
protafascist and faseist political groups, when these appeared
to be so overtly rnisogynist. One ~ossible answer rnay be the
deterioratian of wornen's material condition during the Weimar
Republic despite sorne constitutional gains. This cantradiction
sponsored reactionary irnpulses, particularly among the rniddle
class .1 This chapter ~>Ursues that hypothesis thraugh a study
of the actions and ideology of a particular group, chosen
because it represents a significant portion af the rniddle class:
the organization of urban housewives. More importantly, their
fight agairrst organized dornestic servants will be traced as a
particular aspect of the class struggle of this period: the
conflict over which warnen, that is, the warnen of which class,
would do the work af social reproduction of the bourgeoisie.
It is beyond the scope af this chapter to consider the variaus
schernes for the socialized reproduction of all classes. Rather,
I argue that the actual historical conflict over service was
part of the overall class struggle and of the crisis of
capitalisrn that debilitated the petit bourgeoisie and may have
led ta National Socialism.
The Housewives Union was one of the largest groups inside the
Federation of Geman \lomen's Assaciations and, just by being
there, pushed the umbrella group rightward in the palitical
spectrurn.2 Since the ideology of the Housewives Union was
traditional, holding that wornan's ~lace was primarily in the
harne, its claim to the label "feminist" is doubtful. Ilowever,
a sumrnary overview of the history of the r~rrnan wornen's rnovement
indicates that, in concext, the claim is not entirely rnisplaced.3
From its beginnings in the revolutions of lß4G ta the start of
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War I, German feminism was weakened by division and diluted
by oonservatism. It was divided mainly between bourgeois arid
socialist fe@inists, despite occasional attempts at alliance.4
The bourgeois wing was conservative, partly because of legal
intimidation5 and partly because the German idea of feminism,
like "the German idea of freedom,"6 suffered frorn the dependence
of and constraints on the middle class that believed in it. The
socialist wing, operating from within an originally revolutionary
movement, also differed from and opposed the bourgeois
individualism of Anglo-American feminism, though for different
reasons.7 Thus, German feminism as a whole rarely surmounted
the notion of women's duties on behalf of women's rights. At
best, it argued for women's rights in order to better pursue
those duties. Only a small proportion of the women's movement
mobilized araund suffrage.3
~lorld

After the quasi-revolution of 1913 and during the ensuing
smoldering civil lvar endemic to the ~Teimar Republic, the bourgeois
and socialist women's movements becarne increasingly and overtly
antagonistic. The socialist women's movement split into two
major groups: those following the majority Social Democratic
party and those following its former women's leader, Clara
Zetkin, into the newly formed Communist party. The bourgeois
women's movement continued its prewar trend toward increasing
conservatism and the Federation of German \lomen' s Associations
became almost paralyzed as a unified political pressure group.9
Considerable activity thus devolved upon its component interest
groups, of whom the Ilousewives Union lvas the largest. Hardly
feminist at the start, it came to employ the rhetoric of women's
rights to defend its particular interest, broadly construed
as "housewifery," and used the German idea of feminism to put
gender politics into the service of class politics. Its practical
methods, borrowed from active feminists, and the dissemination
of its ideology became an important ingredient of the Nazi
solution to "the woman question."
The Housewives Union defined itself as a professional organization,
originating in several local housewives' associations of the
llilhelmine Empire,lO These had formed araund several issues,
not the least of which was the collective mobilization against
newly forming unians of domestic servants, most of them under
socialist auspices.ll llorld Har I enlarged the housewives'
goals and led to centralization. On May 22, 1915, in a kind of
feminist Burgfrieden, a disparate assortment of women gathered
in the Lyceum Club in Berlin to create tne Housewives Union.12
Iledwig Ileyl, daughter of the faunder of )!orth German Lloydl3 and
herself a faunder of the oldest Berlin home economics courses
dating back to 1835, became honorary head of the new group,l4
but its first president was i'1artha Voss-Zietz, a suffragist and
representative of the Federation of German Women's Associations,
which seems to have taken the initiative for the centralization,l5
Also present were Dr. Agnes von Zahn-llarnack, one of the first
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historians of the r.erman women's movement and last oresident of
the Federation,lG as well as Anna Blos, future Reichstag delegate
for the Social Democratic party.l7 In the next two years, the
I!ousewives Union also attracted leaders of the separately
organized Rural ilousewives Associations, including aristocrats
such as Countess Schwerin-LI:Iwitz and Countess Hargarete von
Keyserlingk, representing agricultural producer interests
whose presence brought an attack from the press and forced the
I!ousewives Union to leave the \lar Commission for Consumer
Interests.lß Fourteen associations entered the I!ousewives Union
at its founding and fifty-one more joined in the first year, for
a total of about forty-five thousand members.l9
Uhat brought them all tagether at this time was, of course, the
national emergency. Tiley saw their tasks to be advising
housewives on wartime consumer problems, il!lproving the transportatton and distribution of foods, influencing the price structure,
and "solving" the servant problem.20 The latter broke open with
the end of the general Burgfrieden in 1917, when the Central Union
of Domestic Employees petitioned the Reichstag to lift the semifeudal regulations, the Gesindeordnungen, which determined their
work conditions, and demanded to be included instead in the
Industrial Code applying to other workers.21 That action marked
the resumption of an old struggle, around which domestic servants
had first organized in Nlirnberg in 1906, led by the socialist
I!elene Grlinberg, 22 and which was to persist throughout the ~leimar
Republic. At issue was the legal status of hausehold employment
relations, a protracted conflict conducted mainly by women, in
which the Housewives Union represented t;le bourgeois household,
an imperfectly commoditized sphere of class reproduction,
characterized by patriarchal relations, and defended it and
themselves from encroaching capitalist relations.23
Before 1913, fifty-nine regulations that varied from region to
region determined the rights and obligations of hausehold help,
called Gesinde. Since the thirteenth century, Gesinde law had
developed as a service contract between free persons, in which
one party promised service and the other promised provision for
a limited period. Socially, however, servants were Subordinate
for that amount of time to the head of a household, who was
also their legal guardian. With the development of central
state institutions, the legal conditions of Gesinde worsened,
especially in eastern Germany, where they were commonly employed
as agricultural laborers on large estates. Stein's 1310 edicts,
eliminating serfdom in Prussia, led to recodification of other
dependency relations there, and other German states followed
the model. Exception laws were drafted, however, extending work
obligation indefinitely and allowing the withholding of wages,
as well as physical punishment and police coercion .o f recalcitrant
servants. Virtual serfdom re-entered through the kitchen
door. 21f
The Civil Code of 1896 did little to alleviate the conditions of
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Gesinde, leaving their specific regulation to individual states,
historically the worst offenders. The Civil Code did make some
aspects of its general codification of service contracts
applicable to Gesinde, such as prohibition of physical punisl1ment;
mandatory wage payment (though it mi~ht be in kind rather than
in cash); the right to prime creditor status in case of the
employer's bankruptcy; the right to room and board and to
reasonable, but unspecified, rest ~eriods; protection against the
garnishee of wages for property damage; care in case of illness
for up to six weeks, to be paid by the nm< obligatory sickness
insurance. However, these mitigations, impressive on paper, were
virtually nullified by the still effective Prussian Gesinde law
of 1310, which drastically, and with police enforcement, limited
servants' rights to terrninate their contracts.2S Thus, when the
Council of People's Re~resentatives decreed an end to all Gesinde
laws on November 12, 191G, and on January 24, 1919, issued a
temporary ~ecree putting agricultural labor under the Industrial
Code, private household service alone remained unregulated. Here
organized housewives, acting as legal deputies of the male lteads
of households, fought organized domestics in a specifically female
arena of class struggle.
\lOHAL'I' S
SERVICE

\lORI~

IS imVER DüNE: TUE PRJßLE!1 OF REGULATING D0!1ESTIC

From the statt, the opponents were unevenly matched. In 1919,
the Central Union of Domestic Employees claimed about thirty-one
thousand me~bers, a figure it never reached again, while the
llousewives Union peaked at two hundred and fifty thousand
members in 1922.26 In addition to numbers, the Housewives Union
had far more resources at its command: money for travel to
conferences, publicity, and social connections to facilitate
their political work. Hot originally feminist, the Housewives
Union nevertheless soon was manipulating newly accessible levers
of power, such as the right to elect and be elected to public
office, to serve as judges on labor courts, to lobby, and so on.
They used access to the media to project their definition of
woman's contribution to national life as one of unending service
and sacrifice, regardless of class, pointing out that today's
servants were tomorrow's working-class wives. Paradoxically,
while the Central Union of Domestic Employees rarely used the
language of gender, their atternpts to limit household work to
certain hours, rather than have it absorb all available time,
was potentially much more feminist. The confessional unions of
domestics tended to parrot their mistresses in this regard.
Long stretches of "work-readiness" (Arbeitsbereitschaft) versus
a shorter and well-defined actual working period was the major
item of contention between the housewives and the domestics
and was also the key to distinguishing precapitalist notions of
service, in which the servant rented out (literally for Uietgeld)
his or her person, from capitalist relations of labor, in which
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the worker contracted to give a specified amount of labor power.
The old regional Gesinde laws and even the more enlightened
national Civil Code did not specify any number of hours of work
or rest due domestic workers. ilaturally, that became the first
item on the agenda when the revolutionary Council' s decree made
it negotiable. For domestics, chan3e was crucial. A 1917 survey
showed titat ab out half of them served sixteen 'i tours a day. 27
At first, in the absence of formal legislation, "model" contracts
were drawn up between local organizations of domestics and
housewives, analogaus to the parity agreements between workers
and employers in the industrial sector. The parameters of
negotiation were immediately apparent. On February 12, 1919,
the Uagdeburg local of the Central Union of Do!'lestic Enployees
negotiated a contract with the local Housewives Union for a tenhour worh:da~' for urban domestics and, for rural domestics, nine
to eleven hours, depending on the season.2Ü "Red Bavaria" even
promulgated a state law fixing domestic service at ten hours.29
By contrast, the llerlin city employment agency issued a model
contract for thirteen hours of "worl~-readiness," inclusi ve of
two interruptable hours formeals and rest.30 A similar one from
Cassel, reflecting a local agreement, petitioned the Labor
Hinistry for legal status.31 Between these two poles, the
ultimately unresolved debate continued throughout the Heimar
period.
Twice, in 1921 and 1927, the government drafted legislation to
regulate hausehold service. Ilopes for its passage wet'e highest
the first time around, and considerable energy '"ent into the
discussion of details. It got the most exhaustive consideration
in ti1e Temporary Hational Economic Council, tlle politically tamed
successor to the revolutionary councils and supposedly a forerunner
to a permanent economic parliament, never actually established,
to parallel the political parliament. Hodelled on the parity
councils of employers and workers that emerged from the original
revolutionary councils, the economic parliament added a third group
of "consumers," who tended to split their votes between the two
major contenders. This temporary institution lacked even
effective advisory power, but its records bear witness to the heat
of many battles and offer invaluable details of them. Here, in
the Social Policy Committee, Luise IZ!ihler, representing the
Central Union of Domestic Em:>loyees, fought steadfastly for a
ten-hour day, while Charlotte HUhsam-\lerther, an "expert witness"
to the Commi ttee, though not a formal member, represented t;1e
Housewives Union and was equally adamant about thirteen hours of
"work-readiness. "3~ Elisabeth Vurtll!'lann, representing the
llational Union of Fernale Domestic Employees of Germany, the
Christian orp,anization, kept .a low profile and rarely engaged
in debate.
The argument for ten hours, rather than eight as established by
the new Industrial Code, included one concession, namely that

248

Towards the Holocaust

domestic service differed from industrial work in not being
continuous labor and that two hours ~ight therefore be added as
buffer. The- argument for thirteen Jwurs, potentially expandable
to even more, came from the interpretation of hausehold work as
limitless by definition because it 1~as geared to family needs.
Domestic service, it was said, was fine training for a workingclass marriage.33
But even before the debate over hours took place, the opponents
engaged over the very definition of a domestic employee. The
first paragraph of the government draft distinguished between
two categories, "household assistant" (Hausgehilfin) who was in
residence, and "household worl•er" (llaushaltsarbeiter) who was
not, droppine; altogether the derogatory term "servant"
(DienstmHdchen and Dienstbote).34 The distinction mattered for
the do~estics, who, if they were not residents, might share
in the somewhat better conditions already achieved by nonresidents,
free of the Gesinde law in the first place.35 ßut the distinction
also mattered to the housewives, w:1o wanted nonresidents included
in ti1e legislation, since resiuential service was declining
sharply.36 There were several reasons for this trend. In the
main, domestic service shrank as tae industrial production of
consumer goods narrowed hausehold chores primarily to maintenance.
The same process of industrialization and urbanization also
gradually dried up the rural source of domestic labor, though
hausehold service still retained some of its historical function
as a bridge for young country -.;.10men coming into the city. 37
A historically more specific reason for the decline in residential
service in C',ermany 1vas the impoverishment of parts of the middle
class, who sometimes preferred to rent out the maid 1 s room and
save on the expense of caring for i1er as the Civil Code required.
Another was the increasing unwillingness of potential servants
to live under onerous and degrading conditions liTith little
personal freedom, when other options were open to them.3G In
periods of high unemployment, with fewer choices, women might
enter, but also soon leave domestic service, creating the
paradoxical impression of both a servant shortage and a large
pool of potential domestics whose very existence ham~ered effective
collective bargaining. So embattled was the question of
definition, that the Committee deferred voting on it,_ pendine;
discussion of other parts of the draft legislation.3~
The prolonged debate was over hours of work. eiere the government
draft proposed - tllirteen hours of "work-readiness," with designated
Sundays off and other leisure time. l~hler moved to amend to
ten hours for adults and eight for minors under eighteen. 11Uhsam
supported the government draft, arguing that many housewives
now also worked and needed more help in the hause. A spokes~an for
the worl•ers 1 side pointed out broader ramifications: In commerce
and transport, the term "work-readiness" was being used to
prevent fixing hours; it was an assault on labor in general. The
Labor llinistry 1 s representative defended the government draft
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on the grounds that fixing hours for domestic labor would
destroy the middle-class family, mainstay of German spiritual
life. But feisty Luise I:.lihler retorted earthily that many
housewives were already fixing hours for their servants to use
the toilet. So much for spiri tuali ty. Still, she lost her
amendment by eleven to ten votes.4J
The issue of hours remairred embedded, however, in the definition
of who was to be covered by this lalv, the vote on which had been
deferred. So when it was raised again at the end of the first
reading of the entire law, Klihler l)leaded fervently to have
nonresidents excluded, on the ground that no one should expect
thirteen hours of work from a person who also l1ad to travel
to and from the workplace. Again she lost, fourteen to nine.41
Still, she \Jould not give up. On second reading of the bill, she
argued that hausehold workers, like laundresses and cleaning
women, did exhausting work and should not be expected to do it
langer than the eight hours, to which their current legal status
entitled them. Again, her motion was first deferred and then
defeated.42 On the major issues, then, of who was tobe covered
and how long they were to work, the housewives and their allies
on the Committee won.
But the other issues of contention in this bill p,ive an even
clearer indication of the level of struggle and its bitterness.
In seven months of debate, long hours and many speeches went
into justifying or denying demands for Sl)ace and furniture
specifications for resident domestics and their access to a
heated room during rest periods; wi1ether the meals to which they
were entitled need only be healthy and sufficient or also of
comparable quality to tlle employer's; the extent of sick care to
be expected, including at childbirth; the inviolability of night
rest and vacation time; the proportion of wages that might be
garnished for property damage; conditions for and notice of
termination; and finally, special identification of employees
with photographs, a remirrder of the prerevolutionary work record
(Dienstbuch) that had singled out servants from all other workers
and was considered a humiliation by them. The score on all these
other points, when the Committee had finished its deliberations,
favored the domestics. Bilt when the bill came to a final vote on
l~y 4, 1922, the dissatisfaction of all parties was registered in
its defeat: Employers opposed it, the Catholic Union of Domestics
supported it, and the Central Union of Domestic Eml)loyees abstained,
I<lihler saying ti.1at ul tima tely she couldn 1 t supl)ort a bill for
thirteen hours. 4 3
Still, the bill was forwarded to plenary session of the Temporary
National Economic Council, where it had three more readings,
in which I<lihler and her allies tried again to restore the original
government draft defining the category to be covered. Here, too,
they failed. llorse still, at the very last reading of October 13,
1922, the employers' group won back some earlier concessions and
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gained even more in hours. Night rest was reduced from eleven
to nine hours, leaving fifteen hours of "work-readiness," sick
care was curtailed, vacations shortened, reasons for dismissal
without notice extended, and the :1ated photo identification,
symbol of servitude, was restored. Now the employers 1 group
was ready to support the bill4 it passed by 103 to 97 votes.
Disgusted, I:.lihler walked out. 4
Organized domestics now put their hopes in the political
legislature, where the bill was next headed, hoping worker
interests would be better represented there than in the economic
quasi-parliament with its parity structures in which worker
interests could command only one-third of the votes. But it
never got there. On December 22, 1922, the Reichsrat tabled it
and it never reached the Reichstag. The reason given was the
pressing economic crisis.45
Five years later, a second attempt to legislate for hausehold
service met the same fate. A modified version of the first
billwas sent to the Reichstag at the end of 1927, but remairred
in comrnittee until June 193~, when the Reichstag itself was
dissolved. Debate araund the second bill was even more vituperous
and politicized than araund the first. The Harnburg loeal of the
Ilousewives Union, headed by dartha Voss-Zietz, one of the founders
and now a member of the Fatherland Party, protested the bill at
a plenary of the Temporary National Economic Council on
September 19, 1923. Sl1e argued that state regulation would
interfere unduly in the private hausehold and would materially
darnage both the middle class and the servants it would consequently
disemploy. Cosigners of the protest were the Stahlhelm
Frauenbund of Greater Berlin, the National League of Large
Families (Reichsbund der Kinderreichen), the Deutscher
Frauenkampfbund, and the National Association of Ernployed
Ilousewives (Reichsvereinigung gewerbetreibender Hausfrauen).46
Concretely, the ilousewives Union was disappointed that the
modified bill had dropped the photo identification, limited
garnishee of wages for damages to only half a month's pay, and
had assured some Sundays and vacations for domestics--especially
troublesome to large families. In a strange distortion of a
fernirrist argument, they opposed the protection of young domestics
from employment by persans previously convicted on a morals
charge, asserting that housewives, not husbands, should be
considered the actual employers. aowever, after more revisions,
they were relatively satisfied that there ·1o7ould be no hausehold
inspections of work conditions, that employee references were
mandatory (though not detailed enough), and, most importantly,
that only nine hours of rest for adults and ten for minors were
mandated, leaving fourteen to fifteen hours -of ''.10rk-readiness,"
inclusive of meals and rest periods. Overall, they voiced
appreciation for the attempt to restore farnily-servent relations
of old, and they regretted the bill's ultimate demise.47
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By contrast, the Central Union of Domestic Employees, haviqg
repeatedly pressed for the first bill's revival with the support
of the Social Democratic party in the Reichstag, applauded the
appearance of a new bill, still ho~ing for improved conditions.43
A questionnaire ~olling over four thousand domestics showed that
nearly half had only ten hours of night rest, nearly a third had
only nine hours, and most had very few days off, including
Sundays. 11 9 The union soon observed that the new bill would give
little, if any, relief. lfuile it was being discussed, a
sympathetic analyst compared its provisions to the status quo
pertaining under !:lrescriptions of the Civil Code. On the positive
side, he noted gains such as some legal determination of work
hours, some guarantee of rig:1ts usable in law, protection against
dismissal without notice, and some vacation allowance. On the
negative side, he counted lasses such as the infamaus photo
identification (ultimately dropped), fines for damages, sick
care chargeable against the employee's earnings, and unclarity
about reasons for dismissal.SO The worst--increase in work hours
to fifteen--was yet to come. Small wonder the bill's demise
was unmourned by the domestics. \fuile t;1ey had wished for
regulation and the housewives had not, in the end the latter
would have felt better served than the former, had the bill
passed.
OLD WINE IN NE\v BOTTLES:

IIOUSEIIOLD APPRENTICESHIP

The struggle sharpened further after the first _b ill had failed.
Runaway inflation in 1923 severely damaged working-class
organizations and eroded the thin line separating already
precarious parts of the middle class from the working class. Not
only did middle-class daughters find themselves ruhhing elbows
with working-class daughters in the new women's professions,
sales and clerical work,Sl but the unwelcome leveling also
occurred in the harne. For middle-class households, the thin line
of social respectability was represented by nm• barely affordable
servants, a situation which worsened in the Great Depression.S2
For middle-class housewives, ever more was at stake: the work
itself. 11odern technology affered some help--the pages of Die
Deutsche llausfrau, organ of the Housewives Union, were liberally
sprinkled with advertisements fo~;_ modern appliances--but it also
foretold an unwelcome future: Housewives were about to reolace
their servants with themselves. In Uarxist terms, the work of
social reproduction of the middle class, hitherto assisted by
members of the working c1ass and peasantry, was falling more
directly onto the warnen of this middle class, at least of its
lower strata, threatening to "proletarianize" them.
Desperate, the llousewives Union beaame creative. It developed
bhe idea of a hausehold year for all girls, with the quasi-feminist
rationale that housewifery was a profession like other professions,
requiring skill, training and an apprenticeship. The latter, not
coincidentally, would enormously widen the pool from which

252

Towards the Holocaust

hausehold help could be drawn. The idea was not altogether new.
In Stuart England, young pau~ers were fre~uently hire~ as
"apprentices to housewifery" for only room and board.J3 In
Germany, it appears to have originated in the 1390s with Ida von
Kortzfleisch, a rural pioneer for hone economics. In 1912,
organized Catholic women called for universal compulsory preparation
for women 1 s domestic calling.54 But it was the war that finally
swung the balance of the German women 1 s movement into supporting
a National Service Year for women, complementing the male draft,
though it was neither compulsory nor confined to domestic labor.
Rather, under the leadership of the Faderation of German \lomen 1 s
Associations, working closely with government, the National
Service Year became a major home front auxiliary, providing
social services for soldiers 1 families and coordinating women 1 s
employment with war needs.55
But there was a revolution simmering inside the German household.
\lhen the demobilization office advised the Labor !Unis try in
January 1913 that it had "a lively interest" in the demobilization
of women from defense industry to domestic labor and wished to be
consulted in any determinations of lvork conditions, the Labor
Hinistry forvarded the letter in !1ay to three major housewives 1
organizations, but not to the domestics 1 unians. I t asked them
for materials on the urban and rural servant situation, employers 1
needs, servants 1 potential demands, and how far housewives would
be willing to meet those demands.56 Before the response was in,
a revolution had occurred--or so it seemed. The "servant question"
was suddenly altered by the abolition of the Gesinde laws and
r.
requests for guidelines started pouring in to the Labor Ministry.J 7
A long-range solution was proposed by Anna Blos, a faunder of
the Housewives Union and a future Social Democratic Reichstag
deputy. She advocated half a year 1 s additional compulsory
schooling in home economics for all female elementary school
graduates, costs tobe cove·r ed by the state and communities. 58
This was in keeping with the viewpoint of the Central Union of
Domestic Employees, who saw schooling as a way of upgrading their
profession. t1eanwhile, women unionists pointed out that
qualifications alone would not guarantee good jobs and reminded
domestics to organize also.59
By June 1919, the political tide was turning. The Association
for the Development of Horne Economics, a predecessor of the
!Iouse1vives Union and one of the groups ~ueried by the Labor
!1inistry over a year earlier, had its solution ready, It, too,
advocated schooling, but supplemented that with a practicum to
be carried out in an actual household. It appended a model
apprentice contract.60 Domestics immediately recognized the
"practicum" as a form of cheap labor, exploitinr; youth and
endaugering adult employment. \Jhen the Central Union of Domestic
Employees held its tenth anniversary meeting on September 21-25,
1919, in Berlin, still hopeful about negotiating a better future,
it warned against the signing of apprentice contracts.6 1
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l1eanwhile, the !lousewives Union thoußht of a still eheaper
and more controllable labor source: an exchange of daughters
(IlaustBchter) amonß themselves. This notion, harking back to
medieval aJJprenticeships, gave rise to some perplexing questions,
of which t:1e most interesting regarded payment. In 1925, Die
Deutsche Hausfrau asked its readers to suggest answers as ~
whether a girl's parents should pay for her training, or whether
the hausehold apprenticing her should pay her an allowance like a
daughter, or whether she should simply get room and board in
exchange for her "education." The answers were cool-headed: She
might get a little pocket money if she were over seventeen and
had some special sl~ill; she should simply get room and board i f
freshly out of school but willing to commit herself for at least
one year; and she might pay up to one hundred marks a month
for specialized education including "social improvement."62 The
exchange of daughters seems to have offered hoJJe for upward
mobility and possibly marriage through apprenticeship to "higher
circles"--for a price. But this feudally inspired idea did not
take hold in the crisis-ridden 1920s, as Luise Kl:lhler, wise in
the ways of domestic service, predicted.03 Not only did the
young ladies complain, but they a!so fai1ed to meet the work
expectations of their mistresses.ll4 The experimentwas soon
dropped.
Ilowever, apprenticeship of girls from the WO·l iking class not only
took hold, but became predominent. By 1921, it had spread
alarmingly, helped by the fact that welfare relief legally could
Supplement apprentice wages. 05 The terms were often brutal. A
"model" apprentice contract proposed from l~Bnigsberg in Prussia
for fourteen-year-old girls just out of school included
thirteen-and-a-half hours of work, with half-hour breaks for
meals, every other Sunday off, and ten marl~ a month in wages
for the first year. Deference was expected: A ßirl could be
dismissed for repeated disobedience, for tending to immorality,
which included lying or nibbling between meals (naschen), or
for speaking ill of the household. She could terminate the
contract, but in that case her family had to pay compensation.
It was all dangerously close to the old Gesinde 1aws, desEite
some improvements, such as vacation and social insurance. 6
By 1922, the economic crisis had developed to such a degree
that regular domestics' wages were cut in half, making the
stalled legislation moot, in any case, and making the apprentice
year "popular." It became a revolving door for hausehold help
drawn from a generationally inexhaustible supply.6 7 The Central
Union bowed to the inevitable and began trying to improve rather
than fight apprenticeship. On December 17, 1924, the Prussian
Trade l1inistry gave legal recognition to an apprentice contract
between the Ilousewives Union and various domestics' unians that
allowed twelve-and-a-half hours of work for those over seventeen
and orily eight for younger girls. ßut in the later recession
of 1927, the llouse\7ives Union negotiated to have the latter group
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also work twelve hours.6ß Actual conditions were even harsher. A
1930 questionnaire distributed arnonß approxirnately three hundred
students between the ages of fourteen and seventeen in a threeyear vocational school for dornestics showed that over half worked
between thirteen and sixteen hours a day with nonresidents
better off at closer to eleven hours. Nearly half the resident
dornestics slept in attics, one-third of which were unheated.
Srnall wonder that nearly half the students responding admitted
to having changed jobs rnore than once.69
Ueanwhile, the Ilousewives Union stepped up its carnpaign to
elevate housewifery by elaborating on harne econornics training,
cornplete with theoretical and practical preparation and degreesall the criteria for professionalization, including tracking
by social class. The goal was ·not rnerely to raise the status
of housewifery, though that provided the major rationale; the
goalwas also to control the "profession," lest the unians control
it. ßut econornic crisis weakened the latter in any case,
without particularly irnproving the servant shortage, since needy
warnen often chose public assistance over the notoriously onerous
and hur.rlliating dornestic service. The housewives' rnain purpose,
then, was still to enlarge the pool of donestic help by enforcing
harne economics training and apprenticeship for the rnajority of
warnen.
At the tenth anniversary of the Housewives Union in 1925,
its second president, Anna Gerhardt, spoke in the auditoriurn
of ßreslau University on the organization's present and future
work. ßeginning with a historical overview, she noted that
housewives had learned the value of collective work through
their war effort and tnat their rnovement owed a debt to the
wornen's rnovement for bringing thern together.
The first
professional warnen who had banded tOßether had allowed housewives,
whorn they helped to organize, to see themslev.es as professionals
also. Gerhardt adapted the notion of Beruf to wornen's role in
the harne, drawing on cultural-religious rneanings of the word
"calling:" an inner voice for a holy rnission, demanding
renunciation, self-sacrifice, discipline, education, and, above
all, service. lHthout these, the indispensable energies of
rnaternalisrn, Germany could not recover. l~ile stressing the
spiritual, Gerhardt nevertheless acknowledged the material value
of househol\l labor. The labor of housewives, she said, while
often coerced and exploited, is not to be translated into "vile
payrnent" (schnllde Bezahlung), but should be recognized as a
contribution to the national well being. She then outlined
the plan: first, a full year of harne economics in the now
cornpulsory vocational schools (Berufsschulen) (but not the
Gyrnnasia, attended by the daughters of the well-to-do); then,
apprenticeship in a household, followed by an exarnination
qualifyinß poor girls "frorn all social groups and educational
backgrounds" for a newly elevated legally recognized profession
of "household caretaker" (llaushaltspflegerin). This profession
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could be exercised not only in private hornes, but also in
institutions, an area of jurisdiction that had been hotly
contested b~r unionized public service workers in 1919.70
The plan was elaborated further in later y.ears. Professional
wornen organized in confessional associations feared that horne
econornics training, which they did not oppose in principle, would
cut into time needed for other vocational training. llence, they
requested the Reichstag in 1926 to rule that attendance in
vocational schools be lengthened frorn three to four years, that
hausehold apprenticeship irnrnediately follmv elernentary school and
not be counted toward secondary school, and that secondaryschool horne econornics classes not rnix regular students with
tiwse planning to becorne dornes tics. 71 l1eanwhile, the I!ousewi ves
Union tried to get state grants-in-aid for apprentices, a bald
request for public rnmlies to support private services, with the
justification that the training of fut~2e working-class wives
and rnothers was for the national good.
Class conscious and rnore
ferninist, Die Gewerksci1aftliche Frauenzeitung, organ of the wornen
unionists in the general German labor federation, asserted that
not every wornan airned to becorne a housewife and that the state
should not be expected to train servants for big estates, whose
owners didn't even pay their full share of taxes.73
Still, the I!ousewives Union generated further plans. It develoned
a hierarchy of training for two socially distinct groups of new
professionals. "Simple, but excellently prepared personnel" for
private households could rnove frorn dornestic assistant
(Hausgehilfin) to hausehold caretaker (llaushaltspflegerin) and
beyond that to licensed housekeeper (Hirtschafterin), the last
also being open to experienced housewives. The other group rnoved
toward degrees of Haster (Heister) and Horne Manager
(\lirtschaftsrneis terin), which led to higher rnanagerial status.
These required sorne secondary education, an additional year and a
half of school, and a rninirnurn age of twenty-four on taking the
exarnination, all of which effectively took these degrees out of
the reach of rnost proletarian farnilies. By 1930, the Housewives
Union could report 296 graduates with Masters in 26 cities.74
The Central Union of Dornestic Ernployees, defeated in its
legislative hopes and having had to capitulate to the apprenticing
systern, was reduced to airning for representation on the exarnination
cornrnittees and to securing prornotion to the higher titles.75
And the worst was yet to corne.
The Great Depression rnade hausehold help cheap again. In
Breslau, the local I!ousewives Union organized "training workshops"
for girls who, on pain of losing their unernployrnent or welfare
checks, had to sew six hours a day for thirty-six days, rnending
their own clothes one-third of the time and second-hand clothes
for welfare recipients two-tilirds of the time. ltunich had a
sirnilar system. 75 11\lorkfare" had arrived. Furtherrnore,
disappointed that BrUning's emergency decree lowering wages did
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not include the category of dornestics, the Housewives Union began
urging reduction of social taxes on dornestics' paychecks, which,
though norninally shared by ernployer and employee, were actually
sent in by el'lployers after ne gotiating a "net" wage with
ernployees.77 This wasdonein 1933. Jubilantly, Die Deutsche
Hausfrau proclairned: " i'lothing is impossible in the new Gerrnany!"7<l
The labor rnarket continued shifting in their favor. Hith
unernployrnent soaring and relief rneasures cut, warnen again becarne
willine to serve, even as resident dornestics, for roorn and board
and no wages at all.79 Ilaust8chteren were again exchanged, drawn
frorn the ailing sections of the rniddle class, but were now
expected to offer rnore: languages, rnusical skills, even a
driver's license, for the privilege of residing with a "better"
farnily. 30
~lhile

the warnen unionists 1 newspaper ran increasingly alarrning
headlines about the Uational Socialist party, the housewives'
journal rernained steadfastly "unpolitical," even letting Hitler's
accession to the chancellorsitip in January 1933 !JO unrernarked.
But the llay issue celebrated Labor Day with a paean of praise to
German reconstruction and published the notorious blueprint by
l~gda Goebbels for the sexual division of labor in the new
German state. It had. three ~arts:
1. llork lvhich \vornen rnus t undertake, such as \Velfare,

teaching, and other nurturant activities, specified by
wornen's nature.
2.

~lork

which warnen ~ undertake, such as factory and
office work and certain kinds of professions such as
pediatrics, laboratory assistance, and other careers not
alien to wornen's ternperarnent.

3.

~lork

which rnen alone should do, such as defense, law, and
politics, which required a cold, clear objectivity alien
to wornen's ~Varrn and sensitive nature.31

In June, Haria Jecl:er, third and last president of the Housewives
Union under the >leirnar Republic, brought her organization into
the German llomen's Front. Expressins gratitude for Hitler's
interest in a dornestic service year--"Ho earlier regirnes
listened to us," she said--Jecker presented a rnodified plan,
dropping formal schooling, now acknowledged to be too costly to
the stateA and substituting the parental home as a place of
training. u2 By August, the ilousewives Union stood corrected
in its "narrow" definition of warnen '·s service to the liational
Socialist state,33 The dornestic service year was to becorne a
general service year (Dienstjahr), lvithin which hausehold service
was rnerely one option of several. Gleichschaltung had arrived for
the ilousewives IJnion.
Still, it had won irnportant material and ideological gains.

By
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1933, there were 160,000 more domestics working in private homes
than there had been in 1933 •.34 And the ~.lazi regime sponsored as
its own the Union' s view of women' s place, for wltich they had
well prepared the German public.35 In most ways, they stood
confirmed.
CONCLUSIOH
In conclusion, the official i~azi program for "the woman question"-though pragmatically manipulated later to suit ~var needs--was
not drawn out of an ideological hat alone, nor was it built solely
on national nostalr;ia for lost "havens in a heartless world,"
but rested firmly on a long-standing public effort by an organized
interes t group in the conservati ve IVing of the women' s movemen t.
The Housewives Union was dedicated not only to enhancing the
status of housewifery, in an adaptation of German feminism, but
to securing a steady supply of cheap hausehold service. Their
goal was not merely ideological; it had a material base.
Due to the ~istorical feminization of hausehold service, it was
warnen who fought out this particular battle in one of the last
strongholds of patriarchy against capitalist social relations.
The reactionary llousewives Union, by using gender rhetoric for
its class interests, helped to prepare for fascism in Germany
and felt itself confirmed by Hazi ideology.
Some women, by virtue of their class interests, contributed to
the rise and temporary success of fascism in Germany by using the
bourgeois feminism of their day as an ideological tool. The
notion of woman's unique mission and nature was easily co-opted
and ultimately absorbed by the Nazi state, which muted class
struggle, araund the hearth as elseiVhere, with force.
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15
Is
Domestic Happiness":
Mass Working-Class Sex
Reform Organizations in
the Weimar Republic
~~satisfaction

ATINA GROSSMANN

Girls! Is your fiance's income adequate for marriage? llo? So protect both of you so that you don't have any
children before you can afford to feed them,
\lomen! Are you willing to once again serve as voluntary
birth machines providing the state with cannonfodder
for a new war and industry with new unemployed who can
lower wages even further? - No? So let yourself be
counseled and avoid abortions that can destroy your bodies ••••
Proletarians! The more you love your children, the more
you should think about their welfare and your responsibility!
Come to us!

\le will help you prevent unhappiness!

(leaflet distributed by Reichsleague for Birth Control and
Sexual Hygiene, c. 1930.)
Werking-class lay sex reform organizations in the \leimar Republic
began as a capitalist scheme in the early 1920s--an advertising
gimmick by clever birth control manufacturers seeking a
guaranteed market for their mysterious, highly profitable, and
often unreliable products. ßy 1932, shortly before their wholesale
destruction by the National Socialists, the organizations had
developed into a genuine mass movement for social change,
claiming over 15·},000 membersl and espousing simultaneously
neo-Halthusian and socialist politics. They fulfilled a
manifest need for a proletariat reeling under the pressures of
mass unemployment and drastic cutbacl~ in social welfare services-a proletariat already relying on quack birth control remedies,
coitus interruptus, and illegal abortions in its desperate
attempts at family limitation.
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The practical success of these lay organizations in ~roviding
their membership with safe, inexpensive contraceptives and sexual
and family counseling contrasted sharply with their ~olitical
failure. They were unable to unite into a nationwide organization
strong enough to overturn the \veimar Republic's repressive sex
crimes code, which criminalized abortion and the publicizing of
contraception. i~or were they able to withstand the Nazis's
onslaught on sexual self-determination and family planning.
The tortu:red twists and turns of their develo~ment reflect the
history of lleimar working-class politics and culture as a whole.
Their success reflects the strength of worldng-class social
organization in Germany; their failure the fate of a workingclass movement that was fragmented into ~olitical impotence,
Lay sex reform groups, with their illustrated journals filled
with advice on sexual technique, contraception, eugenic hygiene,
health, and the ;:>rotection of mothers; their centers for the
distribution of contraceptives; and their many therapeutic
question-and-answer lectures, were an integral and crucial part
of the working-class subcul ture of the \leimar Republic. Relying
on the trad±tions of self-help and folk mcdicine, the various
leagues for birth control and sexual hygiene (or similar sounding
names) provided material aid and psychological guidance for a
societry in transition--a society dissolving the customary ties
to church and extended families and slowly adjusting to professional
medicalization and economic rationalization,
\lorking-class groups attempted to apply the insights of "enlightened, nonjudgemental, modern" medical science and
psychoanalysis to "modern" problems such as overly laree
families and sexual dysfunction. Ironically, this was often
done against the anxious protest of the very groups--doctors
and ~opulationists--whose knowledge and techni~ues they were
appropriating and popularizing. In the absence of a national
health-care network that included family planninp, and mental
health, working-class men and women began to demand such services
at the same time as they generated lay self-help organizations
to meet their immediate needs in an era of econolilic, political,
social and population crisis.
Proletarian sex reform must be considered in the context of the
changed economic and political circumstances of the Republic.
"Population crisis," the "new woman" and the "new family" were
central and explosive themes in Weimar political discourse and
activity. Although the birth rate in Germany had been declining
since the middle of t;1e nineteenth century, the trend towards
smaller families did not appear as a mass phenomenon among the
p:coletariat until after the First lvorld 'lar. Only then did it
begin to arouse public and governmental concem about the survival
of the Volk and the labor and rnilitary potential of the coming
generations.2 The traditional birti1 rate differential between
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rich and poor had become ominously narrow.3 Although women were
continuing
get married--indeed in greater nroportion than
ever before --and to bear children, families became distinctly
and iutentionally smaller. According to the 1925 census,
~
working-class families averaged only 3.9 persans per household.J

zo

The "new woman" was not only the intellectual with Uaennerschnitt
or the young white-collar worker in flap!)er outfit so familiar
to us from the eroticized products of the \leimar mass media, but
also the young married factory worker who now cut her hair short
into a practical Bubikopf, no langer baked and canned, only
cooked one warm meal a day,6 and tried by all .available means to
keep her family small. This represented a rationalized
reproductive strategy in a modernizing society faced with an
acute housing shortage and a significant proportion of married
women engaged in \vage labor. 3 By 1930, with all of these trends
intensified by the depression, it was estimated that there were
1 milÜon abortians with 10,000 to 12,000 fatalities annually.
Abortions exceeded the number of live births and averaged out
to at least two abortians over a lifetime for every woman in
Germany.9
In analyzin3 this situation, population experts differed according
to their political orientations. Leftists were able to ~resent
definite proposals for practical solutions, while government
experts found themselves in a paralyzing double bind. The
latter bemoaned the lack of three-children families considered
necessary for maintaining adequate population levels, but
simultaneously recognized that laree families, given the reality
of female wage labor and decreasing social services, would
probably only be poverty-stricken and "degenerate." Such
families could not therefore provide the sturdy base required for
an efficient technologized economy and a secure national defense.lO
On the other hand, Communist "sex doctors" like l1ax Hodann and
\lilhelm Reich called for mass response to the "sexual rnisery of
the !)roletariat." \loridng-class sex reforrners, both doctors and
lay people, insisted that proletarian sexuality was severely
inhibi ted b~r social condi tions such as the lack of privacy,
sanitary facilities, and leisure time. They painted a dismal
picture of couples forced to make love half-clothed in constant
fear of being disturbed, the need to share rooms and sometimes
beds with relatives and boarders, the early exposure of children
to quick and brutal sex, lack of access to medical care or sex
education, the double burden of wa~e labor and housework for
many women, and the constant tensions of worrying about material
survival. In short, they asserted that ~sychic-sexual conflict
and the living condttions endured by the proletariat \Vere
inextricably connected. The supposedly "natural" working class
was actually sexually more deprived than a bourgeoisie witn its
access to medical contraception and safe abortions.ll
Lay sex reform leagues therefore mobilized class hatred and
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working-class resentment of its assigned role of carrying the
burden of reproducing the next generation without the resources
for a clecent stanuard of livine . T!te leagues aimed to hel')
families manage the pressures of econornic need by providing
affordable, easily available birt:<-control remedies that neither
involved resorting to hazardous and/or costly abortions nor
necessitated techniques such as withdrawal or douching irnrnediately
after intercourse, with hindered sexual gratification. The
subversive premise of working-class sex reform was t:1at sexual
enjoyment without the punitive consequences of continual
pregnancies, should no longer be a privilege of the bourgeoisie.
The sex reforrn movement interverred on two levels to facilitate,
channel, and control social developments that were occurring
in any case. On a practical level, lay groups, often connected
to business interests in the burgeoning birth control industry,
offered the workinß class--and particularly the "new woman"-quick solutions to its need for fertility control. And on a
political level, organizations like the comnunist party and
parts of the Social Democratic party attempted to discipline and
unite the rnass lay mover.1ent. In association with medical sex
reformers, they tried to add a social class analysis to the
single-issue, lleo-tlalthusian focus of local groups and to
introduce medical controls and exT>ertise. The >mrking-class
parties provided one of the few arenas where socially cornrnitted
physicians gath.e red. In a sense, tilerefore, the sex reform/
political organizations affiliated \/ith the KPD and SPD acted
as mediators bet\veen medical and lay sex reform activists.
The pre-llorld \lar I sex reform move1aent had been initiated by
liberal and socialist intellectuals advocating reform of the sex
crimes code and a new ethic of sexual morality.12 The first
postwar birth-control leagues were established on an entirely
different basis in 1922 by the Bund der Taetigen in Bavaria,
Silesia, and Saxony. They were basically covers for business
interests, but were already adorned with anticapitalist, neollaltimsian rhetoric tha t a ttracted wcrrking-class people in areas
where access to medical birth control was very difficult. :3y
1923-24, cornnercial groups began to lose power' as the first
independent workinp,-class organizations were established.
Two groups based in Saxony (Chemnitz and Dresden) united to form
an Association for Sexual Hygiene and Life-Style Reform (Vereine
fllr Sexual-Hygiene und Lebensreform, VSL). They quickly gained a
combined meabersilip of thirteen thousand. The Saxon union set
the tone for future proletarian leagues by clearly distancing
itself from the tactics of conunercial groups. In order to
eliminate ')rofiteering, each local purchased birth control
products t:tat were dis tributed at t:te membership at cos t. Activi ty
was no langer lir<ited to distribution and sale of contraceptives
but also encompassed political and sex education, sexual counselinp,
for rnenbers, and the struggle for lep,al reforiTI.
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llanufacturers continued to try to exploit the !jrowth of the
movement by expropriating its names and styles. For example, a
r.mnufacturer named Hofbauer also established a VSL. The
phannacist: !Ieisser formed the Harke:cs Leagues for Birth Control
(Arbeiter-Vereine fUr Geburtenregelung, AfG) in 1924-25 to sell
his mvn special brand of contraceptive paste.l3
By 1925, working-class groups, all at least vaguely col!lffiitted to
socialism, solidly controlled sex reform. The Silesian groups in
the Saxony based VSL split off in 1925 to form their own People's
Association for the Protection of Hothers, (Volksbund fUr
Hutterschutz), centered near Goerlitz and Leignitz.I4 They
quickly produced their own journal, \leckru~ which served nineteen
thousand subscribers. In 1927, Hofbauer' s association revolted
against his profiteering and joined the original autonomaus
VSL, bringing in ten thousand members.lS
The lay working-class oreanizations were now numerically the
strongest segment of a broad \leimar sex reform movement, which
also included an elite scientific and medical wing with international connections, gathered tagether in organizations such
as tl1e \~orld League for Sex Reform (\lLSR), Hi In addition, there
were certain municipal health insurance s ~rstems and health
departments in large cities, frequently staffed by Socialist
and Communist doctors, including many women 1 7 and the social
welfare associations of the SPD and Y~n.l3 Competing .and
overlapping as the groups were, they shared a conEitment to
reform of a bourgeois legal code that institutionalized the
subordinatilion of warnen within marriage and criminalized abortion
and sex education. The common slogan was "better to prevent
than to abort," and they all asserted women's right to sexual
enjoyment and the importance of the responsible conception of
healthy offspring,
The various groups continually fought among themselves about
general political allegiances as well as about which devices
were safest and cheapest. Medicall;r directed groups, aspiring to
the latest in scientific correctness, tended to provide women
with the approved mechanical/chemical combination of diaphragm
plus spermicide. llore militant lay groups simply dis tributed
suppositories or creams on the theory that couples would be more
likely to use the least complicated method requirinß no medical
intervention. Doctors and other exnerts associated with the
\lLSR wanted to ensure that the entire complex of birth control,
eugenics, and sexology remained in the hands of the trained and
competent, safe from both unscrunulous businessmen and excessive
politicization, I~D- and SPD-affiliated groups demanded both
medical control and politicization--a difficult goal in a society
with an extremely conservative medical establishment.
The various wings of the movement, both lay and professional,
joined, influenced, and pressured each other. Again and again,
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the experts were shocked and inspired to fight for reform by their
experiences in ti1e health centers located in working-class
neigi1borhoods. The existence of such centers themselves was a
response to the pressures of the lay movement. Doctors and
social workers were daily witnesses to t;1e fierce determination
of proletarian women to prevent preßnancies. Dr. Alice VollnhalsGoldmann, director of the l1aternal Care Program of the Berlin
Hunicipal ilealth Insurance System, reported in 1927:
On the basis of our experience, we must say, if a
woman regards her pregnancy as unwanted and wants
to be freed from it, she will lmow how to free
herself of the preßnancy by all means, even at the
cost of her life. All legal threats of punishment
are illusory agairrst the terrible state of need and
prevent no one from having an abortion.l9
For their part, the mass lay organizations slowly abandoned their
mistrust of science and academic medicine. \iorking-class
parties began to preach the dangers of quack abortions and
overpriced patent medicines. The idea of lay self-help became
less a matter of principle than an unfortunate necessity blamed
on the lack of social responsibility demonstrated by the vast
majority of German physicians. The lay leagues were painfully
aware of the damaße to their reputations due to association with
cornmercial outfits and the disadvantage of not having access
to the latest developments in contraceptive research. And some
doctors were willing to establish closer links, partly in the
hope of gaining influence over a grassroots movement that
seemed to have grown dangerously large and out of control.
The establishment of the Reichsleague for Birth Control and
Sexual Hygiene (Reichsverband fllr Geburtenregelung und
Sexualhygiene, RV) in 1923, the first truly nationwide umbrella
sex reform organi2:ation was an example of this potentially
frui tful symbiosis. Ti1e RV was founded by several smaller lay
organizations trying to liberate ti1emselves completely from
ties to birth-control manufacturers, in cooperation with the
Society for Sexual Reform (Gesellschaft fllr Sexualreform, GESEX).
The GESEX, with its predominantly medical membership, provided
the RV with scientific information ahd credibilit~Ö also
affording some protection from police harassment.
The RV
grew rapidly. From 136 locals in 1923, it expanded to 192 by
1930, with 15,526 subscribers to the new central journal
Sexualhygiene (Sil). 2 1 Edited by a former GESEX board member,
it carried simply written and attractively laid out educational
articles and was nationally distributed for free or for 20
pfennigs.
The journal also featured a regular advice column by the wellknown Communist sex reformer, Dr. Iiax llodann. It is indicative
of the degree of cooperation between sex reform groups that a
committed Communist doctor could write and agiLate for an

"Satisfaction Is Domestic Happiness"

271

organization loosely identified with the SPD. Indeed, one is
struck again and again by the many Connections between sex-reform
physicians of differing political persuasions, particularly at
a time when Communists and Social Democrats were otherwise
actively fighting each other. The circle of doctors willing
to fight for birth control ·and abortion reform was so small that
mutual respect and commitment to the cause overrode political
differences. This tolcrance most. definitely did not apply to
the lay functionaries, which raises interesting. questions about
the relationshi~ between a doctor's professional and political
identification. 2
The RV/GESEX Counseling Center in a proletarian district in
ßerlin was run on a volunteer basis by two GESEX doctors. A
storefront, it was jointly financed by contributions from trade
unions, leftist Social Democrats and anarcho-syndicalists.
Donated samples of diaphragms and cervical caps were fitted and
distributed. Both married and unmarried women 1vere treated, in
accordance with what were perceived as socialist principles.23
Ueanwhile, the Harnburg RV local reported in 1931 that it had
organized fifteen hundred members in less than two years. They
met every fourth Tuesday of the month for lectures on such themes
as "Introduction to Population Politics"; "Anatomy and Physiology
of the Sex Organs"; "Theory and Teclmique of Contraception";
"Race Theory, Eugenics and Sterilization"; and "The Extermination
of Unfit Life."24 The stress on eugenics and racial hygienewas
typical of sex-reform groups and suggests the complex ambivalent
relationship between right-wing nationalist population policy
and leftist sex reform . This relationship cannot be fully
developed here, but it is certainly true that a belief in the
necessity of establishing "scientific" norms for the healthy
and the unfit, the wholesome and ti1e degenerate, was common to
both groups.
The lla!'lburg branch in a traditionally liberal and international
port city, had good and close connections with the local SPD. Two
SPD me111bers of the City Council sat on the RV's board, assuring
police cooperation, and the medical director, Dr. Edward Elkan,
was also a SPD member and committed Socialist. Dr. Elkan
recalled that his insurance and welfare gynecological practice
in a working-class housing settlement on the outskirts of
Harnburg quickly developed into an official RV counseling center
when the word spread that he was willing to provide condoms,
diaphragms, and cervical caps.
Unlike ßerlin, ti1e Harnburg RV had no clinic of its own. Dr.
Elkan's office served as the medical center, and contraceptive
distribution tooi~ place in a private apartl'lent. The RV's major
activity encompassed lectures with blackboards, slides, and
exh:lbitions of contraceptive t!evices. The use of birth control
was explained in great detail by doctors at mass meetings; women
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were given the address of the distribution center and invited to
examine the exhibition samples. Thus, it was possible to reach
many more people at one time than would have been feasible in a
doctor's office.
This mass approach was necessary because on the whole, the medical
profession remained "opposed and apathetic." As Dr. Elkan recalled,
"German doctors were no socialists; sex reform really did not come
from the medical profession, it was a popular movement."25
Indeed, physicians like Edward Elkan and 11ax Ilodann were very
rare. Host established German doctors, while familiar with
surgical abortion techniques, were blissfully i gnorant of
birth control.26
Even the RV, which attracted the most support from physicians,
was forced to set up "flying counseling centers" (fliegende
Beratungsstellen), where a single doctor accompanied by a
traveling league functionary, visited outlying areas in Saxony
and Thuring:.a at regular intervals. Franz Gampe, the former
Nurernberg oarpenter who was the head of the RV, complilined in
1931:
It is a regrettable disadvantage for the proletarian
class struggle that those leagues for birth control
which have an undeniable class struggle character
and are under scientific medical control in all
questions relating to contraception, are still thrown
into one pot with shady profiteering organizations
by the broad massas.27
That a worker such as Gampe was chief of the RV indicates that
even medically influenced lay organizations retained their "lay"
character insofar as medical personnel served as resources and
performed a service, usually on a volunteer basis, but did not
determine political or organizational policy . ßut many lay
organizations were eager to establish their medical reliability
by insisting that only medical doctors be allowed to examine
warnen and fit contraceptive devices. ~lith the exception of in
large cities, however, the "your doctor knows best" :oolicy was
difficult to enforce, because of the shortage of trained doctors
willing to engage in activities so noorly remunerated and so
suspect to their colleagues. Medical services were still often
provided by nonmedically trained folk healers and homeopaths.
Althoup,h the lay and scientific factions were moving closer to
each other, there were still strong separatist currents. In
response to the continuing Opposition of the medical establishment
and as a direct competitor to the socialist medical RV, the lay
League for the P·l lotection of 11others and Social Family Hygiene
(Liga fUr Butterschutz und soziale Familienhygiene, Liga) was
established in 1929, only one y ear after the successful unification
of the RV. The Li ga, which became the largest lay group in
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Germany, was determinedly apolitical and insisted that all of
its radical elements had been purged.
The Liga captured the attention of rightist population groups
and government experts in a way that the SPD-connected RV had
not. Police monitared the Liga as being strengest in very poor
industrialized reg:Lons like the Hansfeld area of Thuringia,
but also in Catholic areas such as Bavaria, ~luertemberg, and
Hhinelanu-lles tphalia. A report to the l1inis try of Real th
(Reichseesundheitsamt, RGA) in 192J from a member of the League
for Large Families (Bund der Kinderreichen, ßl~R), which encouraged
the official state policy of increasing the birth rate, described
the popular res!Jonse to a Liga/Bund Meeting in }Zlberfeld:
l!undreds s igned up to j oin the organization .i us t to
acquire the contraceptive offered, for the mass of
oppressed women are clamoring for birth control remedies
and one can only get them throup,h the Bund. You should
have seen the faces of these working-class \Wmen, who
hung on every ward of the lecture as if hypnotized ••
What will we come to if these products are distributed
in such a mass way ? 2ß
The Blm complained that the Liga contraceptives were harmful
to health, manufactured in uncontrolled fashion according to
secret formulas, and overpriced. The Ministry of the Interior,
sharing the concern about sex reform's resonance among workingclass women, noteu that birth-control leagues could not be
prosecuted under Paragraph 134.3 a law prohibiting ti1e public
advertizing of contraceptives because the products were only
affered to members, and admitted to frustration because it was
so easy to gain membership by paying a minimal fee. 2 9 The RGA
worried helpless ly:
These groups which hide behind many different names
have because of ti1eir extremely disturbing efforts
against population policies and health regulations
frequently come to the attention of police and also
given cause for court investigations. l!owever, the
latter have only in very exceptional cases led to
convictions because those involved are highly skilled
in getting araund legal regulations.30
The Liga continued to function and finally set up its own medical
clinic in Berlin in 1931. It retained its unsavory reputation,
and the clinic's medical director, Siegfried Levy-Lenz, is
remernbered unfavorably by his colleagues as an abortionist.31
In contrast, however, to the avowedly socialist RV/GESEX clinics,
where allwarnen were provided with birth control without personal
questioning, the Liga required indications for contraception.
The questions, interestingly, were phrased in such a way as to
be aduressed to the husband and not the woman herself:
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Can I without decidedly lowering my standard of living,
bring up my children so that t;tey will have a certain
chance of ge tting on in life? \lill the health of my
wife suffer from pregnancy and confinement? \-/ill the
future cltild be healthy?32
The Elbersfeld meeting was probably more typical of the work of
lay working-class, sex reform organizations than either the RV
or Liga clinics.
That the lines between public service, business, and politics were
not always tightly drawn is illustrated by the following tr:tal
transcript. A 1930 court case in Bochum, in the heavily
industriali;:ed and Catnolic Ruhr region, offers us an unusual
insigltt into the labyrinthirre and ambivalent worl~ings of a lay
sex reform league caught between commercial considerations, the
need to suoply political education and contraceptive services
to its membership, and the pressures inflicted by state legal
authorities. The three defendants were members of an organization
functioning under the name of Verband fUr Sexualhygiene und
Uutterschutz and numerous similar sounding titles, presumably
designed to complicate police surveillanc·e. The organiaation
was contractually obligated to distribute the products of the
firm Dr. \lilling and Theves, which carried the peculiar name
of Drei t1tlnclts (Three t1onks) Antispermin and had formerly been
marketed as "Zufriedenheit ist h1:lusliches GlUck" (Satisfaction
is domestic happiness)!
According to tlte terms of the contract, the company sold the tubes
to the league at the wholesale price of 1.25 mark to be resold
to the organization middlemen for 1.50 mark who in turn sold to
the members for 2 marks. This system affered particularly active
members an opportunity to earn some extra income on commission
and was undoubtedly also an attraction for proletarian and/or
unemployed men. The regular sales price was supposedly 4
marks, so tltat members received the tubes at half the drugstore
price.
TI1e defendant, t1r. F. was accused of holding a series of birthcontrol meetings in the region for which he received travel
expenses plus an honorarium of 3 to 5 marks for each lecture.
The mechanics of birth control were explained and demonstrated
with the aid of a slide show, and the speaker insisted that the
blessings of many children should be reserved for the ruling
class. lle also remernbered to add that Three t1onks affered
excellent protection against venereal disease. The audience
comprised about 30 to 100 people with free admission for members
and a 20 to 40 pfennigs charge for guests. Two warnen members,
including Mr. F's wife, also spoke. One slide demonstrated the
insertion of the tube into the vagina, and in another, a pregnant
woman was shown on her knees before a nurse (begging for an
abortion?) while the nurse held a tube of Antispermin in her
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hand, with a r.aption that read, "And why don' t you use Three
tlonks?"
The defendants all admitted that the facts as presented by the
prosecution were correct but insisted that they were not in
violation of Paragraph 184 . 3 because the visitors at the closed
meeting had already become members of a ;:>rivate society by
signing up and paying their dues, thereby obviating any claim of
"public" advertizing. They furthermore claimed that their
actions were legal under the provisions of the Law to Combat
Venereal Disease, which allowed publicizing of products serving
to prevent VD, a loophole commonly used by birth-control advocates.
The court was not impressed, deciding that the defense arguments
were invalid because Three Monks was not primarily intended to
serve as an anti-VD product. llaving disposed of the VD-law
defense, the court also ruled that the defendants had violated
Paragraph 134.3 because the meeting had been publicly advertized
and because admittedly, guests were allowed to withdraw from
their "membership" after the lecture.
The references to the unjustness of Paragraph 213 and the
organization's orientation toward married couples (who presumably
would have no cause to fear VD?) further indicated that the
product was intended as a contraceptive. If the speaker had
alluded to anti-VD properties, he had assuredly only done so to
mislead the inevitable police spy. And finally, disregarding the
previous argument about the appeal to married couples, the
court judged the product as "useful for indecent purposes"
because it could be used and acquired by unmarried as well as
married people. In conclusion, it was noted that the manufacturer
had furnished the league office space in his company headquarters,
supplied leaflets, and that a firm employee handled the league's
business matters--all the privilege of contracting to exclusively
distribute Three l1onks Antispermin. Ur. F was judged guilty
of violating Paragraph 134.3, and the two warnen were convicted
of aiding and abetting the violation.33 ~uite ignored in the
legal judgment was the interesting and for the residents of the
Ruhr region particularly crucial revelation that the league's
products had been certified safe and effective as birth control
by a medical expert!
By 1930, with the economic crisis starting to have a debilitating
effect on the sex reform movement, the need for unity and
consolidation became even more apparent. llembership and dues
were suffering as people withdrew from organizational burdens in
the financial crunch, while at the same time, the need for
delayed marriages and family limitation become more urgent.34
A preparatory unity conference was convened in ßerlin in January
1930.35 Representatives from the RV, the Liga, and several
smaller groups from all over the country, as well as from medical
committees for birth control36 and the HLSR established a Warking
Group of Sex Reform Leagues (Arbeitseemeinschaft der Verblinde
fUr Sexualreform). They pledged to coordinate events, exchange
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speakers and information, jointly pressure manufacturers to lower
their prices and improve safety, fight against commercial
competition, establish a common press office and journal, and
provide aid to victims of sex laws. Uisely sensing the multiple
problems attending sucn a centralization project, they also
suggested setting up an arbitration court to regulate conflicts
among the various squabbling groups. The RV clearly took the
lead in demanding a supra-party-politics (Uberparteilich)
organization based on "socialist principles."
The actual unity congress originally scheduled for April was
postponed numerous times until it was finall y held in Berlin on
June 20 and 21, 1931. Fifty-five delegates representing over
55,000 members from the Liga, RV, and six other smaller groups
were present. After one and a half days of continual haggling
and frustration, it finally collapsed into what one of its most
dedicated and disappointed participants termed a "fiasco."
Althouth the central questions related to the complexities of
joining the two big rivals, RV and Liga, the conr.;ress was
dominated by the unexpected and disruptive appearance of an entirely
new group--the Communist Unity League for ProletarianProtection
of Hothers and Sex Reform (Einheits-Verband fUr proletarischer
llutterschutz und Sexualreform, EpS). The EpS had been formillly
established only one week before the conference precisely for
the purpose of unifying all proletarian sex-reform organizations
under disciplined class-conscious leadership.
The EpS claimed to represent ten thousand members in the lower
Rhine and Ruhr regions and was outraged that only three of their
delegates were recognized. The other groups were furious that a
brand-new upstart organization, which according to them had no more
than three thousand members, could march into their conference
and der·1and the dissolution of groups with over fifty thousand
members into a ne\l organization dominated by Communists. The
conference response offers a good example of the kind of anger
and resentment l~D politicization tactics often nrovoked.37
The EpS in turn asserted that only Communist leadership could
guarantee a class-struggle perspective, firmly rejecting any
connections with capitalist interests and petty bourgeois neoMalthusianism. EpS delegates comr>lained that the participants
were too concerned with petty organizational rivalries and not
enough with the needs of the proletarian masses. They charged
that the congress failed because of "horsetrading" among the
groups and that unity was impossible to achieve among the "pettybourgeois, reformist and anarcho-syndicalist leadership cli<jues."
They denounced ti1e other groups for being willing to "sacrifice
sex reform demands on the altar of coalition. politics with ßrUning's
Catholic Center government."33 From the point of view of the
other groups, the EpS was sabotaging years of hard, practical
work, with which it had not been involved, for the sal~e of
abstract political rhetoric.39
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The Congress finally fell apart on the trivial issue of whether
the local groups should pay dues of 10, 13, or 15 pfennigs monthly
to the central organization--in reality of course, not merely a
financial, but a local control issue. ~~en the congress decided
on the higher levy, the RV walked out, leaving behind an impotent
rump and an accusatory EpS. The GESEX continued to press for
unity at least among the remaining smaller groups. It finally
split from the RV in protest and joined with the smaller AfG,
an outgrowth of the league established by !leiser in 1925. The
conference thus resulted not only in the failure to unify, but
in ti1e breakup of the RV /GESEX, w:üch had been the most organized
and sophisticated of the national groups.
The Communist party, rather than continuing the struggle for
unity, cried "SPD betrayal" and charged the other groups with
being nothing more than fronts for birth-control manufacturers
and indiscriminate dispensers of contraceptives in a situation
where "pills alone could not cure."40 In accordance with its
general strategy, the iG'D withdrew from the mass base of the
movement and created its own separate opposition organization,
just as it was withdrawing from the SPD-dominated trade unions and
establishing its own RGO.
The KPD proceeded to attempt to build the small local EpS
organization into a national grouping that would attract workers
away from the oti1er reformist grou?s and towards the party
according to the "United Front from below" tactic. In fact
however, the immediate EpS demands, based on the Soviet model,
were not so different from the RV program:
1. decriminalization of abortion.
2. procedure to be performed during the first trimester
by a doctor, funded by health insurance.
3. medical prescriptions for contraceptives to be paid for
by health :tnsurance and municipal welfare.
4. establishment of sex-counseling clinics by insurance
systeMs and local authorities.
5. doctors to be trained in the techniques of birth control
and safe abortions.
6. state control and production of contraceptives in the
interests of working people's health and to eliminate
commercial competition.41
But the long-range program was indeed different and more farreaching. Explicitly class-struggle oriented, it posited sexuality
as one of the few pleasures the working class could claim for
itself and therefore supported the right to sexual expression. As
stated in the EpS pamphlet Liebe Verboten, the demands furthermore
included:
fight pimps and sexual abuse, not prostitutes; abolish
all bourgeois marriage and divorce laws; aid for
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collective childrearing; abolish all punishment
for sexual deviations • • • commissions of specialists to
develop perspectives on how to avoid sexual neuroses and
dysfunction; free treatment for sexual disturbances
caused by capitalism and the bourgeois family(!)42
This was indeed a radical vision for a transformed society--very
much the vision of \lilhelm Reich' s Sex-Pol theories which
attempted to make psychoanalysis palatable to orthodox Marxism.
Nevertheless, by raising the demand for state control of the
contraception industry, the Communist party had moved a long
way from its position against state intervention into the lives
of the proletariat, a position sharply articulated as recently
as the 1927 Reichstag debates on ti1e passage of the VD Law. Then
the KPD had argued that limiting the right to treatment of the
sex argans to licensed medical doctors would paralyze the
proletariat's possibilities for self-help and only extend the
police powers of the state into workers' personal lives. By
demanding state financing and Supervision of sex reform, by
attacldng the other lay organizations as being not only
insufficiently political but also dangerously unscientific,
by positing the medical model of sexual deviance, and by insisting
on medical control of their own EpS sponsored clinics, the
Communist party was indicating a major step toward approving
the medicalization of the human body, as well as condoning an
abstract principle of state intervention.43
It is impossible to determine the impact the ideological analysis
had on the 1vomen who came to the clinics for immediate aid. 44
Possibly there was a distinction made between the appeal to women
who could be reached for further political education, and other
clinic clients who might just be subjected to some waiting-room
propaganda.45 There are, however, indications that most of the
EpS clients were women 1vl10 were already members or closely
connected to the party mass organizations.46
The EpS was unquestionably organizationally successful in the
heavily industrialized and Catholic Ruhr. In January 1932, the
police counted 32 local groups with 3,35J.members. By April 15,
there were already 6, 011) members. 47 The authorities concluded
resignedly that "considering the bad economic situation of the
worldng po;mlation, we must expect an :L.ncrease in membership. n43
The Berlin EpS functioned as part of \Hlhelm Reich' s Sex-Pol
activity, the only moment in the history of German working-class
sex reform where Reich appears to have had much of an impact.
Reich lectured on the politics of sexuality at the Marxist
Evening School (HASCH), spoke at numerous meetings on "The
Sexual Question in Bourgeois Society,"49 and ran the Berlin
clinic. In general, Sex-Pol was more of a theoretical idea than
an organization; the EpS was its or3anizational expression.
Unlike his other sex reform colleagues, Reich applied psychoanalytic
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principles and peer-counseling techniques oriented towards
working-class youth in his clinic, Young workers, while
expressly instructed to refer all questions about abortion and
VD to the doctor hirnself, were free to advise clients about
birth control and rnasturbation, handing out "rnountains" of
free prophylactics and vaginal jellies,50 They reassured clients
that everyone, even \Jilhelrn Reich hirnself, had rnasturbated and
that it was nothing to worry about, provided it did not .rnake
you lazy or becorne a substitute for "normal" sexual relations.Sl
The Cornrnunist party and its rnass organizations like the ARSO and
the IMI constantly debated the political contradictions of
prov.iding alternative service networks for the working class
while sirnultaneously dernanding that a state beset by econornic
and political crisis take responsibility for publicly run and
funded centers. They recognized the lirnitations of their
pr.actical work and the relatively srnall nurnber of people who
could be served in their storefronts. The best they could hope
for was that warnen patients would assirnilate a little political
education about the inhurnanity of capitalisrn, along with learning
how to use a diaphragrn. 52
The EpS had been established at a very late date in Weimar history,
and the very necessity of its creation was an indication of the
KPD's isolation frorn rnuch of the rnass base of the sex reforrn
rnovernent. The EpS was an atternpt to capitalize on the general
rnass strength of the lay organizations and to rnaintain the
rnornenturn of a coalition established in the drarnatic winter 1931
carnpaign against Paragraph 213 and for tl1e release of two
doctors arrested for having perforrned illegal abortions,53 By
!1ay of 1932, however, after the fall of the BrUning regirne, the
police were breaking up and closing down .EpS rneetings at the
very rnornenz that other lay groups were atternpting a unified
corneback. 5
Both the RV and the Liga joined rnedical sex reforrners in a central
working cornrnittee for birth control on January 23, 1932,55 A
last-ditch effort finally reunited the GESEX, RV, and AfG into
an enlarged RV, based in Berlin-Brandenburg, in Uarch of 193z . 56
At the very last rninute, in the shadow of rnounting ~ational
Socialist strength, 1932 and the early rnonths of 1933 were
filled with urgent frenzied activity, including joint rneetings
of the Liga, IAH, andl Eps. 5 7 Dr. Hans Lehfeldt estirnated the
1932 circulation of the three rnost irnportant lay organization
journals at Liebe unJ Leben (Liga), sixty thousand; Weckruf
(Volksbund fUr l1utterschutz und Sexualhygiene), thirty thousand;
and Sexualhygiene (RV), twenty-one thousand. He added that,
"these figures prove that the lay orp,aniaations had a rnernbership
of way over one hundred thousand, especially when one considers
that generally every hausehold only received one copy."53
A unified sex reforrn rnovernent that brought tagether doctors,
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intellectuals, and working-class lay members was just beginning
to succeed at the heig:1t of the Depression and at the end of
the Weimar Republic. Ue cannot knm.r how it might have developed.
It was a painfully brief period of momentum and experimentation,
abruptly and brutally cut off by the National Socialist seizure
of power. The irony of the situation of course was that the
various groups had much more in common than they were willing to
admit. Doctors like Lehfeldt noted that the actual practice in an
EpS or an RV center was hardly very different--they all distributed
and fitted contraceptives, and offered sexual counseling.S9 As
someone asked \lilhelm Reich at an EpS meeting in February 1932,
"can you tell me the difference between a Social Democratic and
a Communist uterus?"60 Certainly the Nazis made no such fine
distinctions when they systematically dissolved all sex reform
groups and arrested whatever leadership they could find in
Hay of 1933.
In conclusion, it seems that the members of the working-class
sex-reform leagues were decidedly less interested in ideolo3ical
or organizational struggle than they were attracted by being
able to obtain inexpensive and convenient access to contraceptive
information and products, with a minimal membership fee and
journal subscription. It appears that regional variations may
have been at least as important as political lines in determining
the strength of the various groups. The EpS was very successful
in the industrial, well-organized Ruhr; the RV in the eastern
provinces of Saxony and Thuringia as well as in Harnburg and Bremen
in the north; other smaller groups in Kassel and Hannover.
The lay leagues were often most successful in small towns and
rural areas, where direct medical aid was not easily available
and women were forced to abort themselves or to rely on the
often exploitative practices of local quack abortionists or on
those few local medical practitioners who were willing to perform
abortions. Indeed, doctors often preferred to continually
subject women to D and Cs rather than offer them the possibility
of controlling their own bodies by educating them in the use of
contraceptives.61 Furthermore, the provisions of Paragraph 184.3
outlawing advertising tended to be more rigidly enforced in
smaller towns than in !arger cities. \n1ile the penal code did
not expressly forbid the sale or use of contraceptives, it did
create a situation in which anyone wanting to buy the expensive,
commercially sold item had to go to the pharmacy, overcome all
embarrassment, and demand by brand name precisely the specific
product wanted--an even more demanding endeavor particularly, of
course, for women in a small town or village where neighbors
tended to know each other very well.
It is also no accident that membership rose, and the sex reform
movement flourished most dramatically during the depression years
just before the i<azis came to power. The lay movement represented
another side of trade unionism for many working-class families. It
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ciffered them the possibility of de:>loying reproductive strategies
to insure family survival at a time when collective struggle
for employment and a decent living wage was becoming increasingly
fragmented and difficult. With the Communists and the Social
Democratic movements battling each other, unemployment causing
a shift in the political arena of struggle from the workplace
to the home ·and within the aommunity, and women fulfilling an
even more critical role in assuring economic survival and family
stability, the individual "reformist" solution to birth control
became an important weapon in the class struggle.
Dr. Elkan noted in Volksgesundheit, a proletarian people's health
journal, that the "individual contemporary head of the family
understands the limitation of his.family as an act of selfdefense against his environment."ll2 This notion of birth control
as an act of self-defense in the context of a class struggle for
economic survival may help to explain why men were so much in
the forefront and leadership of these sex reform organizations,
whose major reason for existence after all was to distribute
contraceptive devices for women and to educate men in sexual
techniques that were supposed to satisfy women. As the ostensible
breadwinners for their families, men felt responsible to limit
these families and therefore saw contraception in the first
instance not as a sexual but as an economic problem. However,
their main interest was to discover methods of achieving that
goal without resorting to abstinence or other birth-control
methods, such as withdrawal, which were considered particularly
uncomfortable for the male.
The lay organizations offered the ~ossibility of alleviating
economic distress by limiting the nurober of mouths to feed, but
they also helped to stabilize and harmonize male/female relations
wi thin the working-class family. If sex reform aimed to reduce an
economic burden, it also intended to increase the pleasure
quotient in proletarian daily existence--in a responsible,
rational fashion. Just as trade unionism and party organization
imposed a certain political discipline on the working class, so
the sex reform leagues also facilitated the internalization of
"bourgeois" sexual self-discipline. In that sense, it is
significant that much of the leadership of the leagues was
composed of skilled, though often unemployed, workers. At least
in terms of their oonsciousness, they were concerned not only
with economic survival, but with the possibilities for upward
mobility, education, and training for the limited nurober of
children they would have. They themselves did not want to fit
into the mold of the "degenerate kinderreiche" (rich in children)
family; they wanted to share in the bourgeois privilege of small,
healthy, and well-cared-for families. Perhaps that vision of
respectability, domestic happiness, and stability is what prompted
the Communist groups to criticize other lay organizations as
being "petty-bour3eois." Certainly such consciousness would
be the analogue to Lenin's definition of "trade-union reformism"
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as opposed to revolutionary consciousness among the working class.
The lay sex reform leagues primarily fulfilled a necessary service
function in a society that despite the myth of the socially wellprovided-for German working class, could not meet the needs
of its people. The lay organi?.ations also had an important
education and therapeutic function. Lectures and meetings affered
access to general health information and care for poorer families
who did not have much contact with the medical profession. The
lay movement not only provided birth-control information and
remedies, but also supplied information on natural healing,
common health problems such as whether or not an operation was
advisable, sports, gymnastics, nutrition, and body care, as
well as potential connections to sympathetic and inexpensive, even
free, doctors. Communist physicians, for example, were well known
for their willingness to perform illegal abortians safely and
at a reasonable fee.63
The sex reform leagues affered possibilities for serious
experimentation with alternative life-styles. The term
"Lebensreform" in some of the league titles implied a commitment
to a people's health movement that included nudism, natural
healing, organic diet, vegetarianism, and abstinence from tobacco
and alcohol--simultaneously a radicalized life-style vision and
a means of enforcing discipline and respectability. Some
observers spoke of the lay movement as a kind of "ersatz religion,"
but it could also be termed "ersatz therapy."64 Some ·Of the
meetings rather resembled modern encounter groups or group
therapy--a place to share problems in a nonjudgmental atmosphere
while receiving concrete hel!J. Indeed, the movement did serve
to popularize the tenets of psychoanalysis; that repression is
unhealthy and that better sex has the potential of creating
better people, better families, and better children.
The fact that birth control and sex-education were so clearly
class and not "merely" women's issues represented the simultaneaus
strength and weakness of the sex reform movement. The great
advantage was that the class emphasis affered the possibility
of unity with men within a mass and highly organized workingclass movement, with access to party apparatus, journals,
propaganda, funds--an entire infrastructure. It was possible to
locate sex reform with a general social analysis pointing towards
the necessity of revolutionary change. The glaring disadvantage,
of course, was the lack of an authentic powerful feminist
perspective.
It is extremcly difficult, indeed impossible, to determine
women's quantitative and qualitative participation in the sex
reform movernent. Lehfeldt's comprehensive 1932 survey of lay
sex reform organizations spoke of a total membership of 113,000
but noted:
The actual number is considerably higher, first of
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all because several splinter organizations have been
overlooked but most importantly because in various
leagues, the wives of the members who are often
especially active in the movement have been
overlooked.65
The difficulties of uneavering women's quantitative role in the
movement reflect the hierarchy of men's and women's participation.
Men were visible in the movement; their names appeared as bylines in the journals, they were speakers at lectures and
conferences; they were listedas directors and business managers
of tl1e various organizations. Women' s work was once aga in more
in the nature of "invisible housework." They may very well
have attended the lectures, urged their men to join, avidly
read the journals that were subscribed to under their husband's
or father's name, but the documents rarely recorded that activity.
It is clear that the discourse and activity araund sexual reform,
about sexuality, and eugenics, about chosen mötherhood and
population policy, about orgasm and its multiple functions as a
stabilizing measure for family and state, were centered araund
a male-defined and male-oriented heterosexuality.
Ironically,
given the preoccupation with female sexual function and enjoyment,
it was directed more towards men than warnen. Women were assigned
the major responsibility for contraception because it was still
believed that men's commitment to birth control could not be
trusted. The traditional belief prevailed that female sexual
passivity assured that warnen would "maintain their head"
during lovemaking, whereas the man might be earried away by
passion and raging hormones. But on the other hand, the very
fact that so many men were active, suggests how very central
the questions of sex reform and contraception were to the daily
lives of the working class; how much they were not merely a
secondary soc.i al-welfare or women' s issue, but absolutely
critical to the economic survival of the proletarian family.
Indeed, one might say that family limitation was such an
important issue that men were not only involved, but dominant.
The medicalization and politicization characterizing the sex
reform movement had contradictory effects for warnen. It surely
represented an advance in health terms, but was in a certain
sense a setback for women's autonomy in controlling fertility
and sexual behavior. Warking-class women may well have feared
the spread of contraception because it would deny them their one
good reason for refusing sexual advances from brutal, drunken,
or simply insensitive mates.66 The attempt to reduce quack or
self-induced abortians by the introduction of more sophisticated
contraception as the diaphragm, cervical cap, and in some cases
even the lUD, meant that men were involved in the persans of
doctors, lay functionaries, or salesmen.
Fernale sexuality was recognized and encouraged by the sex reform
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leagues, but on male heterosexual terms--in defense of the family.
The contradictions are not simple. It does seem to be true that
warnen did benefit from this new recognition of the need for
female as well as male sexual satisfaction; that heterosexual
couples' lives did improve with the availability of sex advice
and contraceptives. But warnen were never really given the chance
to try and begin to define, envision, and experience their own
sexuality. Furthermore, the rationalization of sexuality by
the sex reform movement, lay as well as medical, meant that the
right to birth control, abortion, and sexual pleasure was not
defined in terms of woman's individual right to control her own
body and 11 fe, but rather in terms of general class, state,
and social welfare. As noted earlier, eugenics questions were
central to the entire movement. There was indeed a certain
motherhood/Eugenics consensus that transcended customary left/right,
progressive/conservative distinctions, It posited that motherhood
was a natural desire for all warnen, simply repressed by economic
necessity; and conversely also identified certain people,
categorized by pseudoscientific norms of hereditary disease-including TB, VD, alcoholism, epilepsy, schizophrenia--who
should under no circumstances reproduce, and who were hence
targets for sterilization.
Therefore, the way was left open, ideologically if not
organizationally, for an overlap and confusion between reproducti~e
rights--never defined as such--and ~opulation control. While
the National Socialists proclaimed the virtues of health,
eugenics, and racial hygiene, birth control in Germany was forced
to go underground and illegal abortians continued to be performed
at even greater risk than before. The GESEX/RV was dissolved
by police order in May 1933 as the works of sexologists and
psychoanalysts were being burned on public pyres.67 As a
Gestapo report from August 1933 noted:
It is especially important to demonstrate the
connections between the Jewish-!1arxist spirit and
the signs of decay so present under the previous
system in the areas of sexual science (sex reform
such as campaigns against Paragraph 213, pornography,
communist workers sexual journals plus modern art and
pedagogy). 68
And yet, even as the National Socialist terror brutally
repressed sex reform groups, confiscating all sexual literature,
arresting the leadership or forcing it to flee, persecuting
with particular vengeance the many Jewish doctors involved in
the socialist and sex reform movement,69 birth control counseling
centers were retooled into racial hygiene clinics carrying out
forced sterilizations and fulfilling in grotesquely distorted
and horrific form, some of the sex reform movement's eugenic
goals.70
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Generally accepted figure, cited in Proletarische Sozialpolitik
(hereafter PS) 5, no. 8, p. 254.
For example, "the urban proletariat has relinquished its
function as the strata of population increase." Hans Harmsen,
Praktische ßevl:llkerungspolitik (ßerlin: Junker & Dunnhaupt,
1931), p. 22. The Prussian minister of the interior, Severing,
complained in the first session of the Reichsausschuss fUr
Bevl:llkerungsfragen on January 2,), 1930, that "The rejection
of childbearing has virtually become a public movement ••
a national problern that is closely connected to the future
organization of the labor market and Germany•s· position
as an industrial state." Bundesarchiv I~oblenz (hereafter BA),
Reichsgesundheitsamt (hereafter Rß6) 2369(2), p. 34.
In 1909, the affluent Tiergarten area of ßerlin registered a
birth rate of 15.2 per 1,000 population compared to 31.8 in
the working-class Uedding. By 1923, the figures were 9.5
for the IIedding and 6. 7 in the Tiergarten. Annemarie
Hiemeyer, Zur Struktur der Familie, Statistische Uaterialien
(Deutsche AkadeMie fuer soziale und p~dagogische Frauenarbeit,
Forschungen Uber Bestand und ErschUtterung der Familie in der
Gegenwart, ßerlin, 1931), p. :1!l. !1etropolitan Berlin boasted
a birth rate of 43.1 in the years 1371 to 1'330; by 1923 the
figures had drastically decreased to 9.4, making "sterile
Berlin" the city with the lowest birth rate in Europe. Ilarmsen,
Praktische, p. 22.
In 1907, 34.7 percent ofthefemale populationwas married,
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in 1925, 39.4 percentandin 1933, 42.7 percent. Ilelen L.
Boak, "Tlomen in Weimar Germany: The 'Frauenfrage and the
Fernale Vote' ," Richard J. ßessel and Edgar J. Feuchtwanger,
eds., Social Change and Poli tical Development in :<[eimar Germany
(London and New York: Croom Helm, 1931).
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Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 406/1, Volks-, Berufs- uad
Betriebszahlung vom 16. Juni 1925, p. 2ß.
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1933), pp. 19-30. See also the s tudies in Uarie Baum and
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Familie taeglich zu leistende Arbeitspensum, Vol. 5, Deutsche
Akademie fUr soziale und p!:ldagogische Frauenarbeit, (Berlin,
1931) and the first-person reports in Deutscher
Textilarbeiterverband, Mein Arbeitstag--mein \Jochenende,
150 Berichte von Textilarbeiterinnen (Berlin: Textilpraxis,
1930).
The term "rationalization," meaning the application of birth
control and sexual technique, was applied not only to industry
and housework, but also to fertility behavior and sexuality.
This is exemplified by the statement, "There can be no doubt
that the limitation of birth is Tvilled. Sexual relations
are rationalized at least for the majority of the population,"
in "Denkschrift: Der Geburtenrueckgang, seine Folgen und
seine Bek!:lmpfung," Preussisches !Unis terium fUr Volkswohlfahrt,
September 14, 1923. BA Reichskanzlei (hereafter R43) Vol..
I/1973, p. 12. See my forthcoming article in Snitow,
Stansell, Thompson, eds., The Politics of Sexuality (New York,
1932) for further discussion of the discourse areund
rationalization of sexuality and population.
Of all women industrial workers, 43.3 percent were married.
Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, Vol. 403, Volks-, :Se:rufs- u:1d
Betriebszlihlung vom 16. Juni 1925, p. 139. In 1907, 25.3
percent of all working women were married, 31.9 percent
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34.5 percent widowed and divorced. Niemeyer, Zur Struktur,
p. 109.
Statistics on illegal abortians were hotly disputed, but these
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and against Paragraph 213. Frauenwelt, no. 9 (May 3, 1930)
p. 201, and Hiemeyer, Zur Struktur, p. 95. For further
discussion of the debate areund abortion, see Atina Grossmann,
"Abortion and Economic Crisis: the 1931 Campaign Against
Paragraph 213 in Germany ," Uew Ger-man Critique, (Spring 1973),
p!J. 119-37. See also BA Ri36/ 2379 on SchwangerschaftsUnterbrechung and 2330 on Fehlgeburtenstatistik. Also
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Sigismund Peller, Fehlgeburt und BevHlkerungsfrage,
(Stuttgart: Ilippokrates-Verlag, 1930).
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Verhandlungen der lleltliga fllr Sexualreform, IV. Kongress,
\lien 1931) (Vienna: Elbemllhl, 1931), p. 36. See also Max
Ilodann, Geschlecht und Liebe (Rudolstadt: Griefenverlag,
1927).
l1agnus Ilirschfeld' s Scientific Humanitarian Commi ttee
(\lissenschaftlich-humanit!lres Institut) had been battling for
reform of Paragraph 175 outlawing homosexuality and other
sex crimes sections of the penal code since 1097. See James P.
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The precise reasons for this transition are :not clear. Perhaos
it was aided by the economic stabilization and the 13olshevization
of the I~D. The new l~D slogan "Heraa an die !1assen" (Go
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to the Hasses) articulated by Zrnst Th!ilmann at the 1925 Party
Congress in Frankfurt, while it stressed workplace organizing,
did free many members to work in community groups. Or
alternatively, the Bolshevization of the party may have
prompted disillusioned members to seek other organizing
outlets, such as in the lay sex reform movement. Police
reports indicate that many Communists were members of the early
lay groups. :3A ReichssicherheitshauptaMt (hereafter R53 I 323,
police report Berlin, August 3, 1936.
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Deutschland und im Exil (Frankfurt, 1931); ~lolff, Hindsight,
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and Interessengemeinschaft flir Arbeiterkultur (IFA). See
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Sexualhygiene (hereafter SH), no. 13 (193()), p. 1J3.
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weird by his colleagues. \fuen told that Reich had supposedly
gone insane towards the end of his life, Elkan retorted,
"~1ell, he always was."
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situation for \vell-connected warnen in !arger cities was of
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BA RSß/328, Bolice rept. August 1933.
Dr. Elkan of the RV in Harnburg was almost beaten to death
in his consultation room at the beginning of 1933 by a gang
of Nazi thugs who attacked him as a Jew, Socialist, and birthcontrol adi\Tocate. He was dragged from prison tö ~rison and
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colleagues. Lehfeldt interview. l1any of the emigre' physicians
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16
Prefigurations of Nazi
Culture in the
Weimar Republic
ROB BURNS

Long before l!itler seized power in 1933, the National Socialists
had declared their movement to be the spearhead of a revolution
and in g:e.neral historians have not been notably reluctant to
acce~t that designation.I It is as well tobe clear, however,
in what sense the term is to be used, for--pace David Schoenbaum2 __
to speak of the c'iazi "social revolution" is to imply a thoroughness
of transformation that is belied by the social structure of the
Third Reich. The configuration of economic interests underpinning
\leimar Germany was barely challenged, let alone transformed by
the Hazi reeime, and to argue, as Sebastian l!affner has recently
done,3 that the i'iSDAP was in essence a "socialist" party is
merely to blunt the conceptual tools of ~olitical analysis. The
real llational Socialist revolution was carried through on two
fronts but in pursuit of a single goal, namely the total control
of the individual. On the one hand, this entailed an
administ.rative revolution that created a state within a state.
National Socialisra did not smash the existing state apparatus as
the Leninist orthodoxy of revolution would demand; rather it
created another one, parallel to and ultirnately superseding the
administrative machinery bequeathed to the regime by the now
defunct Ueimar Republic. The SS state' s "revolution of nihilism,"
to use Hermann Rauschning's celebrated phrase, 1vas complemented
by a cultural revolution, the goal of which was the total control
of the individual through the systematic organization and mass
dissemination of ideology.
The essence of the Nazi cultural revolution lay in its manipulation
of consciousness, a process whereby the status of various groups
in society (such as male workers, married women, German youth, and
the peasantry) was not actually chaneed but the attempt was made
to transform their perception of that status. To this end the
Nazis eenerated a broad set of innovative cultural organizations
and practices, the aim of which was ~he restructuring of leisure
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time and its transformation into a state-cöntrolled instrument
of National Socialist ideology. The pervasiveness of such
practices was epitomized by the "3trength through Joy" movement,
which within two years of its inception had expanded in scope
to such an extent that virtually no form of organized recreational
activity lay outside its purview. The role of the various Hazi
cultural organizations was complemented by what Halter Benjamin
designated as fascism's "aestheticisation of politics,"4 that is,
the attempt to legitimize political rule through the ritualization
of public life and the integration of aesthetics and politics.
In particular this was exemplified by the political liturgy of
fascism that encompassed not only the mass rallies and party
conferences of the NSDAP but also the creation of National
Socialism'~ own calendar of specifically devised customs,
ceremonies, and celebrations. The totalitarian character of
the Nazi cultural revolution was thus revealed in its ultimate
goal, that of abolishing the distinction between society and
the state. That is to say, the massive reorganization of public
life brought about hy tlle llazis in the Third lleich had but one
aim: to politicize the everyday by eliminating the private life
of the individual and substituting for it state controlled
patterns of communal activity. As Robert Ley, the leader of the
Labor Front, put it: "There are no private citizens any more
• • • • Only sleep is a private affair."5
It is, then, a central premise of this ci1apter that an
appreciation of the role of culture is essential for a full
unders,t anding of fascism. 6 ~-lational Socialism must be seen as
in part a cultural movement, that is to say, a movement that
brought culture directly into the !JOlitical sphere, where it was
made to serve the formation of mass consciousness. As the following
analysis of certain aspects of \veimar culture seeks to demonstrate,
however, the roots of that cultural movement extend back well
beyond the seizure of power in 1933. For it was fuelled in part
by a particular cultural tradition in Germany which, it could be
argued, had helped prepare the ideological ground for fascism
in the first instance.
Indeed, in one sense the term "Nazi cultural revolution" might
seem somewhat inappropriate if by that is meant an absolute break
with the immediate past. Certainly, the innovative drive of
National Socialisn was directed not towards the sttucture of
ideology but towards the mode of its mediation, and Kurt
Sontheimer hardly exaggerates in his claim that the Nazis did
not make any original contribution to the antidemocratic thought
of the time. 7 Tilis is attested not only by the paucity of
National Socialism's ideological writings but also by the wholly
derivative and eclectic nature of those works such as Uein !(ampf
and Rosenberg's ver Mythos des 2J. Jahrhunderts, which comprised
the ideological canon of the movement. As Hitler hirnself
confirllled in his acknowledgment that Hazism "takes over the
essential fundamental traits of a general vHlkisch world view,"3
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the ideological foundations of National Socialism had been laid
long before the NSDAP was officially formed. The status of
vßlkisch thought--by which is meant the writings of nineteenthcentury cultural critics such as ~lilhelm Riehl, Paul de Lagarde,
Houston Ste\vart Chamberlain, and Julius Langbehn--as the
ideological precursor of National Socialis~ has been corroborated
by much recent research and needs rio further elaboration here.9
In essence vßlkisch ideology constructed a catalogue of enemies
and scapegoats that was virtually indistinguishable from those
identified by ;~ational Socialism. It was implacably opposed to
liberalism and democracy, which were seen as corroding the very
life-force of the Germanie Volk. It asserted the primacy of
race among the determinants of history and national character,
and as a consequence singled out .the Jews as Germany's ultimate
racial antagonist. This anti-Semitism also encompassed a
romantic anticapitalism, which saw the modernizing tendency of
bourgeois materialism and industrialization as inimical to the
main repository of vßlkisch values, the natural organic community.
As an antidote to these destructive forces, both the Germanie
and <'lational Socialist ideology prescribed a vßlkisch Reich,
united and ruled by a charismatic leader and pursuing a vigorous
policy of expansionist aggression.
It was the achievement of National Socialism to wed this ideology
to political organization and thus to make it the basis of a
mass movement. The task of developing these ideas into a form
appropriate to the circumstances of the '~eimar Republic, however,
was fulfilled not so much by the Hazis themselves as by a group
of writers residing under the collective rubric of "the
conservative revolution." Their significance was, as Fritz Stern
states, that "they served as cultural middlemen, transmitting
old ideas in new combinations to later generations."lv The
most influential of these writers was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck
who, in his work Das Dritte Reich (1923), did much more than
simply equip the Hazis with the name for their "Thousand Year
Reich." Rather the book presented in modernized form many of
the principal theaes of vßlkisch ideology.
Central to 11oeller's tnollght is the notion of race. \fuile it is
true that 11oeller conceived of race primarily in spiritual
rather than biological terms, he nevertheless exhibited the
typically vßlkisch tendency to psychologize the concept of the
nation, presenting it as a living entity and imbuing it with
specific characteristics. Accordingly, he differentiated between
two types of peoples, the old and the young, arguing that the
future of European civilization was dependent on the victory of
vital emergent nations such as Germany over the culturally
effete representatives of the old order, England and France.
Although anti-Semitism played a minor role in Moeller's
philosophy,ll this was more than offset by his assault on the
other main object of vßlkish animosity--liberalism. Confronted
in the \leimar Republic with the embodiment of everything these
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thinkers rejected, Moeller railed in populistic vein against
the democratic system and the repercussions of Versailles. Above
all, he gave currency to what was undoubtedly the most corrosive
antidemocratic slogan of the lleimar Republic, the "stab-in-theback-legend." To liberalism' s belief in man' s inherent humanity,
l!oeller counterposed a crude Social Darwinism that conceived of
historical development as a fight for survival "in which the
victor is necessarily in the right. "12 This vie\-7 of struggle
as ai1 ennobling process not surprisingly led Hoeller to see war
as "the national expression of the struggle for survival,"l3
and in the introduction to Das Dritte Reich he appended a somewhat
prophetic footnote when speculating on the possible outcome of
that struggle. The Third Reich, he conceded, could prove to be
an illusion and, indeed, one which might \vell bring about the
nation's destruction. i'levertheless, he insisted, it 1vas far
better to strive for an illusionary goal and to be destroyed in
the process than to remain in the r>resent state of national
sterility and cultural decline. llhat better example of Fritz
Stern's "politics of cultural despair," nanely the leap from
cultural pessimism to agßression, from idealism to nihilism.
It was, though, in his advocacy of imperialism that Hoeller
formulated his most resonant contribution to the vl:!lkisch
conceptual framework. Germany's social problems, he declared,
derived in the main from its excess population, and a policy of
expansionism, therefore, would satisfy the need for Lebensraum
and at the same time unite a nation spirutually divided by the
inherent discord of the party political system. For l1oeller
this strateßy amounted to nothing less than a "National
Socialism." Adopting Spengler' s sloßan, "every nation has its
own socialism," he predicted that the new Germany would take the
form of an hierarchical society in which class antagonisms would
be harmonized within a Germanie "socialism of entrepreneurship."
The sip,nificance for Nazism of Hoeller's reinterpretation of
socialism as the Subordination of the individual' s interests to
those of the community--a view already adumbrated in an earlier
work, Der Preussische Stil (1916), and ~choed four years later
in Oswald Spengler's Preussentum und Sozialismus (1920)-scarcely needs any laboring.
Despite the title of his book, Moeller was more concerned
with a critique of the present than with providing a blueprint
for some future society. \lhatever the metaphysical tenor of his
writing, the same cannot be said of Ernst JUnßer's celebration
of totalitarianism, Der Arbeiter (1932). In it JUnger rejected
the belief that man is the architect of his own society, positing
instead the primacy of irrational, elemental forces. Ile decried
democracy and the institutions of liberalism as the pusillanimous
efforts of an enfeebled bourgeoisie to contain these primordial
powers and disguise them as rational intercourse. This attempt
was a futile one, however, for it was the elemental forces
unleashed by the First ~lorld llar that, according to JUnger,
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were now in control. The precarious structures of bourgeois
society, he predicted, would soon be swept away and replaced by
a "work-state," founded on the twin physical manifestations of
these elemental forces, the worker and technoloßy. Although
in his terminology JUn3er took over the Uarxist idea of an
unbridp,eable schism between two classes, the workers and the
bourgeoisie, he did so only in order to defuse the terms of
any concrete sociopolitical connotations. In JUnger's scheme,
as was soon to be the case in the Third Reich, the status of
the worl~er was defined not by property relations but by a state
of mind. The future work-state would be a dictatorship .but
not one in the conventional sense, for "the worl~er knows no
dictatorship because for him freedom and obedience are identical. .. :4
The actual organization of labor would follow the model of the
Russian Five Year Plan, which JUnger praised for its imposition
of a "strict and sober discipline" and for its denial to tne
workers of even the most basic rights.lS Unlike the Soviet
model, hm,.rever, it would be neither necessary nor desirable to
abolisil private y>roperty, for as lone as industry subordinated
itself to the state, andin particular to the work-state's
ultimate aim, the "total mobilization" for war, private capital
would be left intact.
Apologists for JUnger have tended to see in Der Arbeiter a
purely predictive as opposed to prescriptive piece of writing.
The book's closing lines, however, reveal it tobe not simply
the diagnosis of an age but an explicit program of action. \!ritten
on the very eve of the Third Reich, it was JUnger's metaphysical
justification for the strategy of war preparation outlined
two years earlier in the essay "Die totale 11obilmachung" (1930).
In his vision of an authoritarian society in which class
contradictions are reconciled not on the basis of material equality
but througi1 the ideolo3ically induced ex::>erience of uniformity
and whose ethos and social goals are governed by the "total
mobilization" for war, JUnger prefigured all too clearly the
militaristic and pseudo-egalitarian corporate state of the J:'hird
Reic;l. ilhatever his subsequent reservations about Hitler' s
regime, it is nevertheless difficult to resist the conclusion
that objectively a work such as Der Arbeiter was performing the
ideological groundwork for t•ational Socialism. m1at both JUnger
and 11oeller van den Brucl~ had in common, along with certain
other conservative writers in the ~ leimar Republic, was their
particular conception of revolution: for them this was a passive
process, a "Revolution sans :;>hrase,"l6 that would be effected
by spiritual not political means and that would have as its
final goal the inculcation of a specific state of mind. In
short, what they advocated was essentially a cultural revolution.
Both in theory and historical practice, such a revolution has
been confronted by two related tasks: the selective appropriation
of the nation's cultural heritage and the development of new
forms of cultural expression as appropriate vehicles for an
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ideology asp~r~ng to ascendancy. The Nazi revolution, however,
was unusual in seeing these two tasks as representing distinct
areas of cultural practice: while bouridless innovative energies
were channelled into ti1e sphere of mass culture, in the realm of
high culture the Hazis were content~and large merely to
extend certain artistic traditions already prominent in the
lleimar Republic,l7 In fact the lines of continuity between the
lleimar Republic and the Third Reich are apparent in virtually
all sectors of artistic activity.
In no other branch of the arts except the cinema was that stranq
of continuity more apparent than in literature. llaturally 1933
marked a rupture in the German literary tradition in one sense-as it did in all the arts--for the thorou3hgoing purge of the
cultural institutions that followed the l~azi seizure of power
had as its most üm.Jediate consequence the exodus from Germany
of some two thousand writers, while numerous others sought
political asylum either in literary silence or in the ideological
opacity of "inner emigration." And yet there was one vibrant
voice among the myriad literary utterances of the lleimar Republic
that was anythin3 but muzzled by t;1e advent of llational Socialism,
for the fictional form too proved an effective vehicle for
vlllkisch ideas and the twenties yielded a rich harvest of such
literature. Indeed, it is one indication of the literary
continuity between the lleimar Republic and the Third Reich that
of the twelve best-selling authors in 1932 seven (l~erner
Deumelburg, Hans Grimm, Hermann Stehr, Hans Carossa, Edwin
Erich Dwinger, Step,uweit, and Ina Seidl, all of whom can be
legitimately assigned to the v!:llkisch tradition) were subsequently
sponsored by the Hazis.lß
The Nazi c11non of literature praised three types of writing,
which were basically grouped around the themes of militarism,
race, and the move~:~ent.l9 Only the last of these, which in the
main consisted of functional literature dedicated to particular
Nazi celebrities or special occasions in the r•ational Socialist
calendar, was unique to the Third Reich; the other two had their
roots in the tradition of vlllkisch thought. The most important
was the theme of nationalistic militarism. The First llorld llar
spawned a considerable body of literature in the lleimar Republic
that testified to the centrality of the war e~erience for
writers of radically differing persuasions. Alongside the
pacifist portrayals of war as a dehumanizing exercise in
des truction (exemplified mos t notably by Remar<Jue' s Im llesten
nichts Neues), there developed another strain of literature
that celebrated war as a force of spiritual and national
regeneration. In the early 1920s this mystical idea of conflict
was expressed in the works of writers such as Ilans Carossa, while
the last four years of the :leimar Republic witnessed the emergence
of a whole series of novels and dramas that derived their
inspiration from the Great \lar (among them Edwin Erich Dwinger's
trilogy Die deutsche Passion Ll929-J~7, ;~erner Beumelburg' s Die
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Gruppe B8semtlller /l93Q7, Ernst von Salomon's nie Geächteten LI93Q7,
and Hans Z8berleinTs Der Glaube a:1 Deutschland /19317). However,
the author whose work epitomizes the glorification of wat: is
Ernst JUnger. Both his fiction and quasi-philosophical writings
of the period are suffused with ima3es of war that attribute to
combat a dynamic, life-giving force and acclaim physical struggle
as "the masculine form of procreation."2J Since, as JUnger
repeatedly avers, it is only in tne exhila~ation of battle that
life can be experienced to the full, war must always remain
outside the parameters of mere moral adjudication, for it "is
as much a feature of human life as the sexual urge. It is a law
of nature. • • • To live is to kill. ,.zl The antidemocratic war
novels of the IJeimar Republic thus articulated many of the ideals
propounded by National Socialist ideology: the idealization of
physical struggle, the depiction of the enemy as an agent of
national unity and a catalyst of aggression, and the veneration
of the male collective at the battlefront which, by virtue of
its authoritarian leadership structures, its socialist character
(in the !lazi sense of uniting men from different social classes)
and the selfless idealism of its individual members, prefigured
the Volksgemeinschaft of the :lational Socialist community. It
was hardly surprising, therefore, that after 1933 such novels
were extolled as paradigms of Nazi literature.
The other pillar of the Nazi literary edifice, so-called
volkhafte Dichtunr,, was in effect a residual category in that it
was broad enough to accommodate virtually any text that
attracted the iml)rimatur of the custodians of 1\lazi culture. And
yet, as with the war novels, the exemplars of this genre (such
as the mystical, pseudo-metaphysical writing of the prolific
Hermann Stehr, the romanticized outpourinr,s of Erwin Guido
Kolbenheyer, or the historical and mythological novels of Hans
Blunck) were mainly written prior to the founding of the Third
Reich. IJithin this somewhat diffuse grouping, one particular
area merits attention, namely what has become known in general
as the literature of Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil). Its
romantically stylized image of the rural community, exalting
the simple, natural values of the ~easantry, and its mystical
relationship to the fertile native soil, accorded perfectly with
the antimodernist elements of Nazi ideoloßy. The antecedents
of such literature go back to the !Jrovincial Heimatdichtung at
the turn of the century, which yielded many popular novels
similar to Der Blittnerbauer (1395) by IHlhelm von Polenz and
Hiltfeber der Deutsche (1912), whose author, Hemann Burte,
was upheld by Nazi liter<iry criticism as one of the very first
National Socialist writers. Polenz's book--which Hitler claimed
had profoundly influenced his political thinking--tells the story
of a peasant whose mystical bonds with nature are severed by
the encroachment of industrialization (represented here by a
Jewish finance capitalist). Socially and spiritually uprooted,
the peasant hangs himself, his eyes staring at the soil, "the
soil to which he had dedicated his li fe, to which he had sold

302

Towards the Holocaust

his body and sau!. "22 The 1920s ~roduced a plethora of pastoral
idylls from the pen of such writers as Friedrich Griese, Richard
Billirrger, and I~arl Heinrich \Jaggerl. But by far the single mos t
influential example of the entire genre was Hans Grinun 1 s Volk
ohne Raum (192G) which, despite its twelve hundred pages, had
sold over half a million copies by the mid-193Js. The almost
biblical status bestowed on this most turgid of tomes is larßely
attributable to the fact that its title furnished the Nazis
with a legitimate slogan for their expansionist foreign policy,
even though, paradoxically, Grimm's proposed solution to the
problern of Lebensraum, namely colonization, was not in fact the
policy Hitler pursued when in power. 23
The culture of the \leimar Republic thus encompassed a rich vein
of v!:llkisch literature that the National :>ocialists were only
too grateful to exploit. Indeed, by com~arison the literary
output of the Third Reich itself seems positively jejune. Two
reasons suggest themselves for this imbalance: firstly, those
authors who dominated the literary stage under Hational Socialism
(Stellr, Blunck, D'~inger, Griese, Beumelburg, Grimm, and so on)
had by 1933 apparently reached the end of their creative powers,
a literary silence, one hastens to add, that in no way betokened
disal)proval of the Nazi reßime. Typically Ilanns Johst, who as
president of both the Reichsschriftumskalll!'ler and the Akademie
der ;)ichtung occupied the two most prestigious positions that
National Socialism conferred on · any single author, eschewed
writing almost completely after 1933, preferring to assume the
full-time role of state functionary. More importantly, perhaps,
the meagerness of literary production after 1933 to a certain
extent reflects the priorities of the overall cultural policy,
which seemed al tagether more concerned to appropria te a pas t
cultural tradition than to create a new one.
This was certainly true of the thea ter, for although the typology
of fiction outlined above had its equivalent in the sphere of
drama, by and large it was t:1e classics that occupied pride of
place in the theatriaal repertoire of t:1e Third Reich. The
cultural heritage was plundered in order to construct a pantheon
of dra!'la compatible with National Sodalist values. llhere these
cultural excavations uneavered unassimilable works by otherwise
estimable authors, then such plays "ere either ignored or
dismissed as aberrations. Schiller and Kleist ,.,ere ;:Jarticularly
revered, for the heroism and sense of national pride evoked in
such plays as Hilhelm Tell and Die Hermannsschlacht could be
readily acco!'lillodated within the ethos of the Third Reich. Hor
were these efforts at stage management without success, for
state intervention in the theater was not only of an ideoloßical
nature. The regime provided an abundance of subsidies,
commissions and, literary pri7.es and the lavish productions
that these facilitated attracted both large audiences and critical
acclaim.
There was, however, one area in which it
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had made an original contribution to the dramatic att form and
that was in their evolvement of t:1e ThingspieL This was theater
in the broadest sense of the term, a grandiose fusion of
agitprop, pageant, choral chant, connunal song, dance,
gymnastics, circus, and military tattoo. Its overall character
was essentially that of a cult, a modernized celebration of
Germanie rites, the aim of which was the creation of a mass
spectacle. One of the first such performances took place in
llerlin in October 1933 before an audience of sixty thousand
and with a cast of araund seventeen thousand, including entire
battalions of the SA and l!itler Youth. The cult effect was
further enhanced by the setting for these occasions: special
ThingstMtten were constructed, open-air ampitheatres often sited
on ground associated with ancient Germanie shrines.
Despite its popular appeal, the Thingspiel was relatively shortlived, having virtually disappeared from the cultural calendar
by 1937. The reason commonly advanced for this evanescence is
that since it came more and more to resemble a purely political
event, the Thin&spiel gradually lost its distinct function and
in effect merely duplicated the llazi parades, mass meetings,
and party rallies.24 Stnce the prime mover behind the development
of the Thingspiel had been no less an authority than Goebbels,
who was convinced that it represented something uniquely National
Socialist in character, it seems unlikely that the supposed
functional redundancy of the Thingspiel was the sole cause of
its demise. In fact, the Thingspiel _was by no means as original
as it was claimed, and consideration of one of its antecedents
suggests another reason why it eventually fell into disfavor.
Althour;h it was the spectacle element that the ilazis particularly
cultivated, the ideological backhone of the Thinfjspiel still
remained the text, which more often than not was a chorus
delivered in quasi-liturgical fashion by a speech choir. The
development of the speech choir had been one of the signal
achievements of the working-class cultural movement in the l~eimar
Republic. There too it had often been incorporated, along with
other art forms such as dance and song, into the spectacular
enterprise of the l1assenspiel, where it served as a simple but
effective medium of proletarian solidarity, a collective
articulation of shared class experience and political aspirations.
Wlile the ;lazis took over the outer form of the proletarian
speech choir, they clearly intended it to fulfil a quite different
function. It nml" became the vehicle of manipulation, an
instrUMent for the inculcation of authoritarian consciousness
as the following quote from the introduction to a collection of
v8lkisch speech choirs shows:
The speech choir group has always to deliver itself
up comple tely, as it were, to the speech choir leader.
Subjective feelings and views are to be dispensed with
llere • • . • In speech choir training there lies an
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excellent way of cultivating in men the spirit of
loyal obedience and devotion to authority.25
In short, the relationship of the speech choir to its leader
was conceived of as re~licating at a cultural level that between
the masses and their FUhrer. Clearly, however, the speech chcir
was so inextricably bound up wi th the working-class cultural
tradition of the lleimar Republic that this particular attempt
at Gleichschaltung did not wholly succeed; a fact acknowledged by
the Hazis themselves in 1936 when the speech choir was officially
banned as a form of cultural expression.26 It is also significant
that the subterranean anticapitalism of 3azi iueology was still
resonant in many of the texts written for both the vHlkisch
speech choir and the early ThingspieL 2 7 Uoreover, the SA, the
main repository of anticapitalist sentiments within ~-ational
Socialism as a wnole, was one of the principal actors in the
Thingspiel movement. :3y the end of 1934, with the "revolution"
officially declared by llitler tobe at . an end and the SA
politically emasculated as a consequence of the RHhm purge, it
was perhaps forseeable that the Hazis would temper their
enthusiasm for a cultural form which, however residually, still
bore the imprint of left-wing Uational Socialism and revived
notions of an anticapitalism that even from an ideological point
of view was now redundant.
Unlike literature, the visual arts \vould appear to represent
an area of German culture in whose historical trajectory the
Third Reich can only be seen as marking a massive disruption.
After all, the many and various forms of modernist art that
emerged and blossomed in the supportive climate of the Heimar
Republic--expressionism, dadaism, surrealism, the Bauhaus group,
Neue Sachlichkeit, and even futurism which, paradoxically, in
Fascist Italy enjoyed semiofficial standing~-were all summarily
cropped by a llazi regime that branded anything remotely smacking
of the avant-garde as "uegenerate" and a manifestation of "cultural
Bolshevism." And yet antagonism to modern art existed long
before the cultural watchdogs of the Third Reich elevated it to
the status of an official aesthetic. Even in the ~Jeimar Republic,
influential organizations such as the lfunich Artists' Association
and the t1unich Guild of Visual Artists made little attempt to
disguise their lack of sympathy for modernism, while elsewhere
combat leagues of German culture were formed with the aim of
countering modern art's allegedly pernicious influence. Chief
among thesewas the FUhrer's Council of United German Art and
Cultural Associations which, founded in 1~30, boasted a quarter
of a million members and served as a cooruinating body for the
multifarious cultural organizations of the vHlkisch movement.
Painting had occupied a special place in the hierarchy of
vHlkisch ideals ever since the appearance of Langbehn's Rembrandt
als Erzieher (139•)). Although barely discussed in detail,
Rembrandt is championed by the .rrol'het of the Germanie faith as
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the embodiment of VolkstUmlichkeit, the simple organic artist
who gives spontaneaus and intuitive expression to the unique
character of his people and its traditions . It was the purported
timeless quality of such painting that Hitler exhorted the
artists of the Th±rd Reich to emulate, for they would thereby
be laying "the foundations for a new and genuine German art. "2u
Concretely this meant a revival of nineteenth-century genre
painting. In place of modernism's preoccupation with style and
technique, tlational Socialist art was to return to themes as
its creative principle. These were drawn not from the potentially
hazardous terrain of National Socialist reality but from the
secluded domain of vßlkisch idylls: romanticized laridscapes and
still-lifes, pastoral and domestic scenes of healthy rural
simplicity, portraits effusing racial purity. In short, a form
of painting was advocated which, although insistently representational, was, by virtue of its tendency to mythologize and
dehistoricize, the very obverse of realisl'l.
It is important to stress, however, that despite the impact of
modernism in the 1920s, this was nevertheless a tradition to
which many artists in the lleimar Republic still subscribed. For
example, the prestigious German Art Exhibition of Uunich held
in 1930 listed nearly 950 painters and sculptors, only a dozen
or so of which could legitimately be catep,orized as modern.
Horeover, roughly 250 of these artists subsequently appeared in
the catalogues of the Nazi-sponsored Great German Art Exhibitions
of 1937, 1938, and 1939. 2 9 Such statistics invite the conclusion
that the supposedly "new" German art merely fed on existing
traditions and continued certain trends established long before
the founding of the Third Reich. As Berthold Hinz argues, "all
it did was reactivate those artists who had been left behind by
the development of modern art but who were still active after
1933 and who seized the opportunity to move into the vacuum once
modern art had been liquidated."30 That is to say, ~'lational
Socialism did not create its own art, rather it created pictorial
continuity.
In the case of film, those lines of continuity would probably
have been equally apparent even had the !lational Socialists
chosen not to intervene in so direct a fashion in the worldngs
of the German cinema. In view of the Ueimar Republic's
reputation as a ~eriod of great cinel'latic distinction, this
judgment might seel'\ somewhat surprising. The screen classics of
this period, however, derive almost ~holly from the years 1919
to 1926. Thereafter, as Latte Eisner points out,31 the number
of quality films, let alone those of a stature comparable with
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919) or Metropolis (1926), was
probably limited to four or five per year at the most. Certainly,
as far as the structure of the film industry was concerned, 1933
in no sense constituted a break, for des!Jite the National
Socialists' rhetorical commitment to small business, the Third
Reich witnessed merely a continuation of the trend, already
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well established by the latter stages of the ~leimar Republic,
whereby Ufa (Universum Film AG) cemented its monopoly position
and small film companies went bankrupt. 32 Even the censorship
law of 1934, which decreed that the screenplay for a film had to
be submitted to Goebbels for approval before production could
begin, was only a modification of the censorshi~ apparatus that
had operated in the lleimar Republic since 1920. 3 As for the
films themselves, we need only coasider Siegfried Kracauer's
persuasive argument that the German film industry played a not
insubstantial part in helping prepare the ~jround for !Ia tional
Socialism. 34
From 1Y25 onwards, and in particular durinß the last three years
of the \leimar Republic, the German cinema was in part characterized
by a ~jnoup of films which, broadly speaking, can be seen as
supportive of nationalistic and authoritarian values. These
films encompassed a wide range of ideological motifs exploited
by the Nazis, but two themes gained particular prominence: those
of charismatic leadership and nationalist rebellion. In the first
category belong a nurober of films, which in their portrayal of
the past, reduce the idea of historical ;.>rocess purely to the
intuitive actions of exceptional individuals. By far the most
popular subject of these hagiographical narratives was Frederick
the Great, for between 1922 and 1933 there appeared no fewer
than seven films devoted to his ex;.>loits, a series which was
directly continued by the cinema of the Third Reich. The image
of the Prussian monarch that emerges from these films is summed
up by Kracauer in his analysis of Arsen von Cserepy's Fridericus
Rex (1922):
This screen Frederick is given two major virtues. He
appears as the father of his people--a patriarchal
ruler using his absolute power to mitigate legal hardships, further general welfare and protect the poor
from exploitation by the rich. Simultaneously, he
appears as the national hero who through several successful wars elevates little Prussia to the rank of a great
power. The ~•hole construction overtly aims at
convincing the audience that another Frederick might
not only prove an effective antidote against the virus
of socialism but also realize Germany's national
aspirations.35
In the Fridericus films of the Third Reich, such as Johannes
Heyer's Fridericus (1936) or Veit llarlan's Der Grosse K1lnig (1942),
the parallel is ~uite explicitly drawn between Frederick the
Great and Adolf ilitler, the implication being that Germany's
need of a charismatic leader has now been fulfilled,36
A second ideologically coherent group <if films centered on the
theme of rebellion. Uost of them drew on the :.< apoleonic wars
in order to present Prussia as the agent of a national uprising
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and the protagonist of a united Gennarr nation. This portrayal of
nationalism as a revolutionary force is illustrated ::>erfectly
by Luis Tren~er's Der Rebell (1932), a film which was to attract
particular praise from Goebbels. Trenker hirnself plays the
part of a Tyrolean nationalist who returns to his horneland to
lead a peasant uprising agairrst Na::>oleon's anny of occupation.
As J(racauer points out, the film constructs an obvious analogy
between the Tyrol 's revolt and the :iational Socialis t movement,
for Trenker "only reflects what the Ilazis themselves called a
national uprising."37 Gustav Ucicky's York (1~31) draws an
even more revealinp, parallel between the Ilapoleonic era and
the Weimar Republic. General von York commands an anny corps
assigned to Napoleon by Wilhelm III of Prussia. Under pressure
from the young officers to renege on the tenns of the treaty and
to attack the French, York at first remains loyal to his monarch's
wishes, ohly finally to rebel when he learns of Napoleon's defeat
in Russia, an act whicil thus initiates the \lar of Liberation.
As K.racauer shows, the film differentiates between two types of
mili tary rebel: York' s impetuous officers closely resemble the
kind of soldier who after World War I provided the nucleus of
the Freikorps and the Nazi movement, while York hirnself
anticipates the response of the Reichswehr High Command, rebelling
only "when it become a!Jparent that J<apoleon is on the decline
and that therefore any further loyalty to him might prove
disastraus to Prussia."3G The topicality of this film would
scarcely have escaped a German audience by now fully accustomed
to regarding the \leimar Republic as being in a state of perpetual
crisis, and in 1932 there followed an additional five films on
this same subject of national uprising.
Another genre favored by the filmmakers of the Third Reich, the
so-called Blood and Soil films, also had its forerunners in the
\leimar Republic. In their celebration of the elemental power of
nature, their romanticized view of a mountain world intrinsically
superior to urban civilization, and their positing of a mystical
bond between the peasant community and its natural surroundings,
films such as Arnold Fanck's Stllnne Uber dem Montblanc (1930),
Trenker's Berge im Flammen (1931), and above all, Leni
Riefenstahl' s Das Blaue Licht (1932) gave lyrical expression to
ideas that formed a central plank of National Socialist ideology.
The idealized portrayal of the First World War experience that
has already been identified in literature also had its counterpart
in the cinema of the lleimar Republd.c. In addition we must note
with Fritz l1arburg39 the undercurrent of anti-Semitism in certain
films of the late-1920s and early 1930s, as exemplified by Peter
Lorre' s caricature of a Jewish reporter in J(arl Hankl' s FPl
antwortet nicht (1932).
In no other art form, then, did 1933 constitute so little of a
break as it did in the cinema. And yet, that continuity does
not derive solely from the fact that the lleimar Republic produced
a substantial body of films wi thin ~mich ~•ere insci:ibed some of
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the central tenets of !~ational Socialis t ideology. It is also
a reflection on the cinerna of the T!ürd Reich itself, which
Goebbels adamantly refused to let become merely a form of
"drarnatized party program." ltather the cinerna was to fulfill its
ideological function in clandestine fashion and for the simple
reason that, as he put it, "the moment propaganda is recognized
as such it becomes ineffective."4:) The best propaganda in
Goebbels 1 s view lvas that "which as it were works invisibly,
penetrates the whole of life without the public having any
knowledge at all of the propagandist initiative."41 This notion
of covert propaganda seems, incidentally, to have been altogether
too sophisticated even for Hitler hirnself since on more than
one occasion he criticized Goebbels's film policy for its failure
to produce "Hational Socialist films."42 In fact, Goebbels's
attitude to the cinema was wholly consistent with his overall
cultural policy: his concern was not primarily in the creation
of a new and conspicuously National Socialist art but rather in
the mode of its dissemination. Ile wrote:
1-le are loaded down altogether too much with tradition
and piety. lle hesitate to clothe our cultural
heritage in a modern dress. It therefore rernains purely
historical or rnuseum-like and is at best understood
by groups within the party, the Hitler Youth or the
Labor Service. The cultural heritage of our past
can be rendered fruitful for the present on a large
scale only if we present it with modern means.43
His aim, then, was "to bring art to the people," to transform
the cultural terrairr so that "art no langer stands aside from
the people and the people aside from art."44 In this objective
the i~azis attained no small measure of success. By 1942 cinema
audiences had grown from the 1932 figure of 250 million to over
a billion. Even allowing for the fact of a worldwide growth in
film audiences at this time, such a boom, which by the early
1940s made the cinerna the fourth largest industry in the Third
Reich, was, to say the very least, spectacular. Similarly,
the National Socialists provided much greater public access
to the visual arts generally, while in the theater audiences
were mobilized on an unprecedented scale. In short, high
culture, formerly experienced as the preserve of the bourgeoisie,
was now presented as the property of the masses.
The ~lational Socialists, however, were not the first in Germany
to recognize the political potential of cultural activity, för
in the \leimar Republic the organized working class had likewise
developed its own cultural movement, and this had generated
modes of cultural practice which, in form at least, were not
dissimilar to those evolved in the Third Reich. 45 T11e difference
in impact between the two movements lies partly in the fact that
since the working class never achieved state power in the ~.Jeimar
Republic, their cultural activities always remairred at the level
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of a counterculture. The Natd.onal Socialists, on the other
hand, aithough they did little in the way of developing prefigurative models, were able after the seizure of power to
throw the full weight of the state and party apparatuses behind
their activities and were thus in a position to determine directly
the shape of the dominant culture in the Third Reich. It almost
goes without saying, however, that the high degree of popular
support that the Nazi regime secured in the Third Reich cannot
be attributed wholly--or even primarily--to its cultural policies.
For to isolate the role of culture under llational Socialism
from economic and political factors (such as the elimination of
male unemployment and the spectacular successes of Hitler's
foreign policy) would be to lapse into idealism of the most
crass ldnd. Equally, an analysis that ignored or underplayed
the totalitarian character of culture in the Third Reich would
be untenable. This returns us to our opening re~rks on the
dual nature of the National Socialist revolution, for the
assimilation of all spheres of life, both public and private,
within an all-inclusive culture, was predicated on the system of
fear bred by the SS state. The two apparently distinct aspects
of the revolution, the cultural and the administrative, were
thus inextricably bound together. It was the function of terror
to atomize German society by dissolving all existing social
relations and the function of culture to weld the masses back
into a collective form, that of the pseudo-egalitarian
Volksgemeinschaft. Goebbels hirnself provided one of the clearest
Statements on this relationship between culture and J:>Olitics
under fascism when he boasted:
Politics too is an art, perhaps the highest and
most far reaching one of all, and we who shape
modern German politics feel ourselves to be artistic
people, entrusted with the great responsibility of
forming out of the raw material of the masses the
solid, well-lvrought structure of the Volk. 46
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Music on the Eve
of the Third Reich
MICHAEL MEYER

Das Husikleben ist kein Leben flir die Husik.
Theodor \l, Adornol
Ohne eine traßende Gemeinschaft, die dahintersteht, ist
das musikalische Kunstwerk--im eigentlichen Sinne ein
Gemeinschaftswerk--nicht lebensfähig.
llilhelm Furt\vlinßler2
In view of its probler.1s, tenuousness, and brevity, and its
proximity and special relationship to the Third Reich, the
Heimar Republic has commonly been called a crisis state.
Humerous contemr>orary commentators and later historians have
examined ti1e economics, politics, and culture of Germany between
1919 and 1933 in terms of liberal, democratic, socialist, and
conservative principles that were instituted to varying degrees
in the period, only to then be abolished or channeled into the
totalitarian dictatorship of Hational Socialism in 1933. The
ideals reemerged and were reinstituted in the nost-Horld lvar II
era, aßain in various combinations in both German successor
states, and became the ideological framework for the historical
analyses of conditions in the 1/eimar Republic.
In sympathy wi th
select lveimar ideals and horrified over the Third Reich, postwar
and Holocaust historiaas have not been able to deal with the
lleimar Republic discretely. Cultural achievement, tiwugh
acbwwledged, consistently has been seen through the shadow
of Auschwitz. Yet, the sense of dool'l, crisis, and failure is
not the exclusive product of retrospection; it is contained in
self-conscious lleinar commentary and introspection.
A creature of nomentous historical forces and circumstance, the
lleimar Republic :1ad i ts Vernunftrepublikaner who entertairred
reservations ab out the new order but accepted it. Proßressive
intellectuals shared with them a historical perspective, one of
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comparison and contradiction; a v ie~• of existence that stressed
change, to some, even considered to be its essential feature.
Same progressives responded affirmatively to the new order,
others focused an its promise of a ßenuine republic. The '.o7ellknown opposition from the Right, :mown to students of German
history as the formulators of "the !'Olitics of cultural despair,"
the representatives of "the roots of the Hazi mind," or the
vBlkisch-fascist or conservative revolution, :rejected the new
order of outsiders altogether and entertained visions of permanence
and a hidden true order, which i t was their duty to bring out
into the OIJen and thus to realize. 3
Those who cried "crisis" the loudest actually also rejected the
historical view of the world; they joined those who studied change
and felt it was for the worse. Against modern developments they
undialectically upheld eternal values and prima! states: a
world of unehauging phenomena and characteristics. t1usicians and
nusic commentators shared in the response to an assumed cultural
crisis at large and in music specifically; they supported
ideological rhetoric through their expert analysis of an alleged
nusical crisis, the result of the latter's alientltion from both
the community and itself. \lhat follows will not be a survey of
music an t:lC eve of the Third Reich but rather a focus an the
perception of crisis in music, which reflected and reinforced
the ideological formulation of crisis in Germany.
Stripped of ideological jargon, the crisis in music is an
expression of the inevitable tension between institutional and
dynamic art and between differel1t generations of artists. Ilaving
matured to Germany 1 s outstanding and internationally reoognized
cultural institution, music suffered from its mvn success. From
its lofty and seeMingly autonomaus position, official music
reacted pompously to threats from within and naively to external
threats. Ta l~nowledgeable composers, the happy reconciliation
of music's objective materials and the musician's subjective
imagination, as manifested in the celebrated musical creations
of the tradition, as well as the fortunate harmony between the
institutions and their sustaining creative activities, appeared
to be fundamentally disturbed by profound changes in society and
music's attendant social function and in response to radical
developments in the art itself. Even the harmonious relationshi!l
between the different musical elements, a precondition for the
reconciliation of objective materials and subjective impulses,
and between inherited structural forms and their transformation
seemed to lead toward imminent destruction of the tradition.
Although previous revolutions in music were knmm to have been
assimilated into the mainstream and thus to have enriched the
musical heritage, at t!üs moment of acute social crisis the
apparently disrespectful and disintegrating imnulses of the
avant-garde pointed in a little understood direction, and against
established patterns of expression and Standards o:i' taste.
Traditionalists feared for the existence of music and civilization.
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At issue was the fundamental attitude toward reality alluded
to above: Is c!1ange, indeed, the dialectic understanding of
contradiction and development, the characteristic and necessary
trait of \lestern music, or had music evolved toward im ideal
state of aesthetic experience, as manifested in the reconciliation
of the demands of the material and subjective imagination and
between the elements themselves, and in the ultimate creative
achievement of ti1e tonal order and rules of harmony which offer
the comforts of structure as well as the flexibility to constantly
challenge and satisfy innovative spirits? In numerous essays
and letters to younger composers, Germany's celebrated conductor
Hilhelm Furtwl!ngler urged them to write the music they felt
they must, always stressing the human factor in relationship
to the musical material.4 Husical progressives responded with
reference to a develoment in style and technique, as well as an
inner dynamic of music that compels generational adjustment.
}iusicologists today still argue the same issue of free will and
determinism. Peter Yates speaks of music as an unbroken series
of events that determine another: during the seventeenth century,
all roads led to Bach; during the nineteenth to Schßnberg.
\lilliam Austin, on the other hand, challenges notions of a
com~elling dialectic of the material by noting that major Composers
like Strauss, Ravel, and Ralph Vaughn ;alliams do not fit into
the stylistic and technical evolution from \lagner to Sch8nberg.
Reminiscent of FurtwHngler, he suggests that composers choose
to write the kind of music they wish to write, regardless of a
place assigned them by determinists. Acknowledging major and
representative milestones in the evolution of modern music, he
nonetheless recognieeS. wide divergence from predetermined
patterns.s
The response to an alleged crisis of modern music in the Weimar
period involved progressive and conservative formulations that
overlapped and became confused with ideological categories and
positions. llusicians themselves have contributed to this
confusion. At least by the time of Carl }1aria von Heber they
had become accustomed to explaining their artistic and technical
principles in music criticism, music theory, and teaching, which
readily ex~anded into general cultural criticism with ideological
overtones. It has been argued that the need for explanation, as
opposed to simply composing and musicmakine, might itself be
regarded as a symptom of crisis. This is in large part due
to the fact that
in a oeriod of artistic upheaval, creative artists
find themselves first of all sharply aware of their own
relationship to their traditional inheritance and to
the directions in which they feel impelled to axtend or
even to reject it. Secondly, they find themselves in
a period in lvhich the formulated notions regarding
musical aesthetics, musical theory, and musical
syntax have long lost the vitality they once possessed,
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impelled or even obliged to arrive at what are at last
working formulations of their own. If they are not to
remain in relative solitude, they are also likely to
communicate these formulations.G
The assessment of music in the Weimar period was tied to general
\leltanschauung and politics, as both the Republic and the autonomy
of music were at stake. A book published by Erich Valentin in
1939 on Hans Pfitzner, llerk und Gestalt eines Deutschen expressly
tied music to politics and traced the origin of the cultural.:..
political parties of the Weimar period to \lagner' s time, when
music began to disintegrate into its components and lost its
communal links, and the individual was deprived of the security
of community and tradition. 7 \lagner' s vl:llkisch notions of a
revitalized national community, the communal function of art, and
the reintegration of the discrete arts into the ritualistic
Gesamtkunstwerk provided the inspiration for the Nazi author who
th us introduced the tradi tionalis t-vl:llkisch _Pfi tzner as ~lagner' s
heir in the 1920s. Yet, spokesmen of modern music also acclaimed
the \lagnerian tradition for its contributions to the expansion
of traditional harmony and other modernist innovations.
The Weimar parties agreed on the significance of Wagner,
particularly hisTristan-Vorspiel (1359), as the first clear
expression of an alleged disintegration of harmony--of our
\-lestern system of tonality.
\:hat to musical }Jrogressives
initiated progress, liberation, and the expansion of new tonal
possibilities, to alarmed pessimists constituted the beginriing
of a process of increasing decay at the end of lvhich appeared
the formalized twelve-tone music to which man no langer related.
A Schl:lnberg's student, llinfried Zillig, has analyzed this evolution
of music in sympathetic terms in a 1966 publication, as an
organic process of the dialectically evolving and constantly
reintegrating musical materials. A system-immanent theory
informs this his tory, which traces musical progress through
focus on major composers since Wagner. Zillig identifies with
those progressives who have interpreted ~olagner as a revolutionary
and antibourgeois, who was kidnapped by reaction, the bourgeois,
soldier organizations, and finally National Socialism. To
him, \lagner's "honor your great German masters" has been
distorted into serving the purpose of denouncing good German
musicians and condemning the development ~Vhich had become possible
and necessary through the revolutionary innovations in music
since the disintegration of tonality. Like nuclear physics,
which since Einstein's theories has upset a traditional and
honored view of science, Wagner's musical development has
fundamentally questioned the sanctified order of tonality to
such an excent that Tristan can be called an atonal work.3
Through the analysis of radical works of llagner, Debussy, Reger,
Strauss, and others, Zillig is able to present German nationalists
and racialists with a dilemma: Their national heroes, predominantly
acceptable on national and racial grounds, have contributed to

Music on the Eve of the Third Reich

319

the modern tradition, which for aesthetic-political reasons had
become unacceptable in the Third :teich.
RADICALIS!1
Our understanding of the progressive interpretation of music in
system-immanent,philosophical, and social terms is much enriched
by the radical music sociology of Theodor \1. Adorno, formulated
in large part in post-~veimar times. ') It is he who has examined
the paradox of \lagner' s reactionary, anti-Semi tic, authoritarian
personal behavior, writing, and political agitation relative
to his revolutionary musical oeuvre, noting, with res!Ject to his
strictly musical achievement, contradictory ideological impulses
of ambiguous consequence.lü Sharing Nietzsche's and Themas
!1ann's ambivalent attitude towards \lagner, he has clearly identified
the musical wizzard as a Nazi forebear, who at the same time
neßated faseist cultural policies through aspects of his lifestyle and the revolutionary consequences of his work. Adorno's
extended examination of \lagner is crucial for the study of preThird Reich fascism and anti-Semitism, in view of the methodology
and insights of the author and the significance of :lagner as
perhaps the outstanding cultural hero of the Nazis, certainly of
Ilitler. Yet, in some earlier \leimar-period essays, "On the
Social Significance of Husic" 11 and "Reaction and Progress," 12
Adorno already had captured the spirit of our topic and emerged
a most perceptive apologist of the avant-garde, especially of
the Schllnberg variety, and a critic of \leimar' s music culture
at large in both system-immanent, that is strictly musical, as
well as social terms. His critical analysis of music serves
both as object and conceptual frame1vork of this study. Even
though suffused with classical reductionist analysis of art
as a reflection of social trends and anathema to traditional
Ideengeschichte, that is, the study of ideas in a social vacuum,
his thought rejects the "fetishization" of either material or
cultural structure. The essence of his dialectically conceived
reality rather lies in "force fields" bet1veen objective conditions
and subjective imaßination. In order to free the arts, especially
music, for a liberating and critical role--central to his concern-he insisted on the integrity of music, its necessary autonomy,
and the need for the composer to grasp its substance at the most
recent and progressive level of historical development; thus he
was able to illustrate through music the meaning of "Critical
Theory," that negative and critical system of analysis that would
be impossible without the positing of genuine di.alectic tension.
!1usic had to transform itself, as well as "portray through its
own structure the social antinomies responsible for its
isolation."lJ Stressing autonomy with reference to the objective
condi tion of the art, "negative dialectics, "11! and the application
of this anti-affirmative philosophical premise to music, Adorno
differed from both "vulgar" Marxian reductionists, the promoters
of socialist realism, as well as traditionalists and reactionaries,
who variously stressed the affirmative function, rationalization,
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and administration of music, and thus ill-advisedly treated what
to him was an abstract and critical expression as "reified"-alienated, an object for consumption and manipulation.
Central to Adorno's exposition of traditional bourgeois understanding of music and the symbolic wort;l of muaic to the bourgeois
ideology of individualism--regressive and status-quo-oriented in
current social context as revealed by him and other critical
theorists elsewhere--was the questioning of inherited notions
of individual creativity . For one, he found the artistic subject
to be not only individual but social as well, thus unintentionally
expressing objective social tendencies. 11oreover, he insisted
that not single works, but ·the develo~ment on the level of music's
materials constitutes the level of progress in art as developed
by generations of composers. Even though he warned composers
against simply wishing "to meet the demands of the time," he
insisted that the freedom of the composer is curtailed by
historically evolved elements and that the meeting place of a
material dialectic and freedom of tlte composer is the concrete
work itself, the result of a Qrocess that sets each artistic
creation a!Jart from another • 15 It 1vas this focus on the historically evolved material, the insistence on autonomy, and the
disregard for the affirmative function of music within a
concurrently formulated notion of a Volksgemeinschaft, that, for
a variety of reasons, offended large segments of the bourgeois
concert-going public, traditionalist nationalists, as well as
"vulgar" !1arxists.l6 Adorno had moved from reductionist Marxian
aesthetics, which characterized the earlier work of the Institute
of Social Research, to the defense of music's autonomy, its
utopian and even transeendental powers, because of his conception
of music's crisis in this overly rationalized and administered
world, no less represented in Zhdanov's socialist realism of the
1930s than in the market-oriented music of the lleimar Republic
or the artificial and manipulated folk music of the Third Reich's
Blut und Boden cult.
Adorno's relentless dialectic raised questions about all expressions
of lleiiaar' s celebrated rausie culture, · including the modernist
section, thus contributing to the sense of crisis that would
otherwise perhaps be hidden by the richness of its achievement,
its affirmative function, and the l_)ositive commentary that it
attracted. Furtwlfngler, for one, called German music "the
clearest, most joyful and profoundly characteristic manifestation
of the German spirit, the most original and artistic accomplishment
of allmodern peoples."l7 And Artur Sehnahle noted in an
American lecture that "the German audiences in the medium-size
towns • . • knew most of the music they went to hear at concerts
• (and) there was probably not one in these audiences who
was not involved, actively or passively, in home-made music."l3
llaving inherited from nineteenth-ceatury political entities a
cultural networl~ of excellent stages, orchestras, operas, and
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choruses, the lleimar state fulfilled its responsibility to music,
which was sheltered, organized, and well attended. Although
underneath this prosperity existed the conflict between music's
institutional and practical needs and the claims of the
autonomaus artist, the resulting tension did not have only
negative consequences, since it contributed to the radical music
of the period which, in part, reacted against the cornmercial
exploitation of the traditional idiom. Central to all musical
controversy was Berlin, which had originally strengtherred its
position with the abolution of the courts, while l1unich,
Stuttgart, Dresden, and other cities had declined. noasting
three opera houses which affered new works of Strauss, Korngold,
D'Albert, Berg, and others, Berlin attracted great singers,
chamber groups, performers, and conductors. llere the public
witnessed experimentation in literature, art, film, theater,
and music. An international elite flourished araund musical
institutions and in the salons, especially the salons of Peter
Landeaker, owner of ßerlin's Philharmonie Hall, and that of
Louise llolff of the :lolff & Sachs concerll agency, attended
by businessmen, politicians, and artists. The various musical
factions were represented by great numbers of critics and
journals, all contributing to the general excitement of the age. 1 9
The general trends of twentieth-century music concentrated in
Weimar Germany. Its many concert halls presented the afferings
from the past--itself reassuring to traditionalist concert-goers
but alarming to others, who deplored the increasing ~erformance
of compositions of dead composers over those of live ones.
tloreover, traditionalist impulses governed much of the contemporary
afferings from neoromantic to neoclassic and new versions of
nationalism--in toto, the kind of composition which, when
integrated with the v!Hkisch cult of the German folk song, was
to find favor in the Third Reich under direct sponsorship of
the Reichsmusiklillmmer.20 In addition to this openly regressive
music culture, Adorno added that of an avowedly progressive
nature to his critical analysis, a more demanding task, which
required more careful decoding. Expressionism, for instance,
the avant-garde rage in all the arts already in Imperial days,
aroused the dialectician for its elevation of subjectivity to
authoritative ideology--a reference to system-immanent
contradiction which, one might add, is an inevitable development
of art. Yet, institutionally, too, the radical and oppositional
impulse had been tamed. By Adorno's time expressionism could
look back on a venerable tradition and had become celebrated
and institutionalized; its leading spirits had entered the
academy and assumed positions of pmver. Strauss, the future
president of the Reichsmusikkammer, had introduced expressionism
to opera with his shocking Salome a;<d Elektra, thus initiating
a musical trend of subjectivism, which culminated in the dramatic
works of Sch!:lnbeq~ and Berg, Throughout his life, even when
as an artist he was hardly composing in the expressionist mode
any langer, Sch!:lnberg continued to articulate the credo of the
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movement: "To express hirnself," l1e declared to be the artist' s
greatest goal. 21 Rooted in the c:uomaticism of Tristan,
expressionist musicians utilized ultra-expressive harmonic
language, wide leaps in melody, and the lügher registers of
instruments. Distortion of language as of abstract musical forms
of communication characterized an idiom that represented the
critical features that Adorno demanded of art. The neurotic
a tmosphere of Sci1Bnberg' s Pierrot Lunaire, for ins tance, was
evoked through· the eerie vocal line and lack of formal bearing
of ti1e entire work. Its medium and message were critical, yet
Adorno, after expressions of appreciation, concluded that "absolute
subjectivity is also subjectless • • • ; the more of the I of
expressionism is thrown upon itself, the more like the excluded
world of things it becomes."22 Recalling his views about
attistic freedom and the general error of subjectivism, he found
the aesthetic rationale of expressionism to be contradictory;
the subjective impulse had become contained in SchBnberr,' s
neoclassical, abstract twelve-tonal scheme, which the well-tempered
and triad-conditioned public would continue to reject as
"atonal." Yet, when tne objectified system beca!'le a rigid
imperative of composition, devoid of its negative function, Adorno,
in the 195Js, warned against the "hypostization" of the twelvetone row and the establishment of twelve-tone schools.23 In the
1930s, however, Adorno identified Seiltinberg with all that was
progressive in modern music.24 Other radical impulses that drew
their shock effect from nonmusical or musical elements of traditions
outside the concrete dialec.t ic of llestern art mtisic were rejected
more readily. The uses of folk or popular traditions, for instance,
and especially jazz, which were external to the llestern musical
experience, were simply dismissed for reasons of inauthenticity.
Commercially exploited "exotic" music offers potential
entertainment, relief, or introductions to other cultures, but
not genuine criticism. The radical dialectician knows that
"contradictions refer to those oppositions that are both necessary
for, and yet destructive of, particular processes or entities."25
l!owever, when he identified Stravinsky's primitivism and
neoclassical objectivism witi1 the vBlkisch-fascist ideology of
the times, knowledgeable musicologists have felt and continue
to maintain that Adorno' s c .r itical analysis had also assumed a
life of its own and had grmvn distant and too abstract. Adorno
seriously and consistently had correlated the habit of adapting
old forms and primitive rhythms that are external to the current
level of tne musical material to new realities with fascism,
thereby associating celebrated subjects of faseist defamation-Stravinsky, Hindemith, and llanns Eisler-- with their later
persecutors. 26
During the lleimar Republic, the progressive music establis:1ment
boasted of its avant-garde music festivals, of its celebrated
composers of diverse persuasions who held positions at prestigious
academies and other institutions, of its connections and
interactions with radicals in the other arts, supportive critics,
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musicologists, and a paying public--all in a culture that was
accustomed to musical controversy. Reaction concentrated its
attention on these "outsiders" as momentary "insiders," the
symptom of cultural crisis. The radicals, on the other hand,
realized that the avant-garde constituted but a small section of
musical life and that its existence was ~recarious. Aware of
economic, political, and social problems that foreshadowed the
repression of the Third Reich, music 1 s avant-gardewas caught
in the classical dileiDllla of radicalism--of either becoming further
estranged from the unsympathetic public and institutional powers
and crea ting and performing for o:J.ly their own shrinking circle,
or of striking compromises in various guises, which would gain
greater audiences and lead to assimilation and the tarning of
the critical impulse.
Adorno found musical radicalism sharing in all art's tendency
to reification, compromise, and idolization, but expressionism
represented negativity in as pure a form as possible; it lived
up to Sclil:lnberg's strict coiDllland that "music shall not adorn,
but speak truth,"27 lest it atrophy. Schl:lnberg's expressionism
fulfilled the tenets of Adorno's negative dialectics in that it
was firmly and consciously rooted in the historically evolved
musical material, while refusing to compromise with the unresolved
dissonances of contemporary society. Atonality challenged
tradition, social order, and popular taste, while it opened up
the infinite world of compositional possibilities, which was
perpetuated in the objectified new musical order of the twelvetone row. A product of the radical dissonances of expressionism,
Schl:lnberg's twelve-tone row consistently expressed musical
development and autonomy and thus was worth protecting. The
threat to music from tendencies within as from faseist
dictatorship without, so understood, constituted the core of
the radical's concern on the eve of the Third Reich.
CONSZRVATISI1
The historian studies phenomena, but we know, from the German
idealist philosophers and critical tlieorists, of an active
element in cognition. The objects of historical analysis are
shaped by the historian, hirnself both a critical and historical
subject. i1oreover, just as the object of this analysis, music,
is af fec ted by ti1e cri tical an<.! his torical mind and is at the
same time assumed to exist and develop through system-iiDlllanent
processes, so critical theory as applied to the analysis of modern
music is known to follm~ the norms intrinsic to itself. Indeed,
it is one of the most refined objects of conservative concern over
the state of modern music. In order to properly assess the
thought of musical conservatives and nationalists about their
art and its alle~ed crisis, we can therefore not rely exclusively
on Theodor Adorno. \le must instead turn to the sources, that
is, the conservative and nationalist thought as articulated
during the \leimar Republic.
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The great conductor, music director, and pre-eminent interpreter
of German music, llilhelm FurtwHngler, ex;>ressed the tradi tional
humanist concern for tne integrity of music both as an art form
and institution~ for its autonom~, as well as its relationship
to the public.2u Like the avant-garde, his reoresentative
conservative res:,Jonse to modern developments of music also focused
on the "eXhaustion of the inherited material" but then entertained
px;os:,Jects of revitalization through the hUI!Ian spirit (Adorno' s
subject). His focus recalls Thomas Uann's Dol•tor Faustus, a beok
written in consultation with Adorno. The writer and the conductor
agreed that music was linked to culture and politics, that it
symbolized this particular historical situation of Germany,
which was believed to be heading toward disintegration and chaos.
Germany' s and music' s untimely materialism in the lleimar period
was understood to be at the core of the problem; it had to be
reversed, since it was leading society and art towards selfdestruction. Yet in the eyes of the traditional humanist,
the human spirit will not concede an end to music. 'lhile the
material may be exhausted, there is no end to the spirit.29
This "faith in ti1e spirit" recalls Adorno's ironic "nature will
take care of itself."3J
FurtwHngler was director and conductor of !'lajor orchestras,
was recognized already in the early lleimar period as one of
two or three outstanding interpreters of German music, and was
to emerge as the major authority of music on the eve of the Nazi
assumption of power. rle was wooed by the Nazis, was vicepresident of the Reichsmusikkammer held other offices in 1933,
and gradually identified his calling during the Third Reich as
that of a ]>riest who stayed bellind to care for the needy with
his music and to assert his representative authority in defense
of music against totalitarian control.31 Unlike the critic
Adorno, a radical outsider, FurtwHngler spoke and wrote with
the authority of power and institutional representation. He
was widely regarded as music's official custodian and
representative, and as such, reflected generally held views
on music, its tradition, and the problems of contemporary music.
Already in 1915 he had written of crisis. His "Contemporary
Observations of a l1usician" registered a plea for the human factor
in composition, the active, integrated, and rooted musical
experience against what he called a contemporary one-sided
intellectualism and a frantic commitment to change at any price.
These latter aberrations he identified with articulate spokesmen
who, in his eyes, unfortunately controlled contemporary music.32
Yet, this great interpreter of romantic music also rejected
romantic programs as well as political slogans of nationalism and
later Hazism in mtisic as inappropriate in the current context.
Recognizing the impossibility of a return to romantic conditions
due to an enormaus development of music and social consciousness
since then, he found contemporary reactionary efforts in this
direction tobe another symptom of music's crisis. Using dated
materials and lacking musical compulsion, the contemporary
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programmatic composer shares an estrangement from the recent
level of music with naturalism, another expression of crisis.
FurtwMngler believed the principles of naturalism to be realistic
only in the case of rhythm because that element can copy a
natural process, although both romanticism and naturalism may be
realized when music is expressed in union with other arts (as
in songs, opera, and so on) that aarry extramusical ~rogram. In
the case of absolute music, however, it speaks its own, exclusive
language. llarmony, for one, defies naturalistic principles.
"One chord alone transfers us into a world of art" to which the
other senses have no access.33 The precious art can exist only
on its own terms, the conserMative agreed with the critical
theorist, but he held the avant-garde responsible for modern
music's alienation from the public due to its disregard for
human needs, the denial of "natural materials" \vithin the
tradition--ridiculed by Adorno as mere convention--and its
exclusive concentration on the most recent level of the musical
material, which in the consciousness of itself tends to become
objectified and thus alienated from the col!linunity. Though a
prerequisite for the creative process, alienated and exaggerated
consciousness proJuces denatured and visionless music; the
balance between the objective material and subjective imagination
is destroyed.
In his attempts to assume a posture of moderation and compromise
between the extreme forms of the regressive program of romanticism
and progressive materialism, he leaned to the former by
demonstrating an affinity with \lagner which was not shown, for
instance, in his relationship with SchHnberg. Although he
acknowledged the revolutionary role of \Vagner in the development
of music, he rejected the material consequences of that revolution
while acce~ting its underlying ideological assumptions. Wagner
was acceptable for his revolutionary role in his historical
setting, not for the role he might play as inspiration for future
revolutionaries. The conservative thus treats his heroes in
historical isolation. Recalling llagner's intentions, FurtwMngler
wrote:
The step from \lagner to SchHnberg, which is
traditionally explained and justified exclusively
on the grounJs of historical development, is the
first real nonhistoric step, the first real break
with history.34
In 1915, FurtwMngler the musician had commented on the breakup
of the traditional relationship between vision, the concept of
the whole, and the material, in conjunction with an emphasis
upon the materialistic threat to music and the creative process
in the arts. He had expanded his conception of crisis throughout
the 1920s to include the grave danger inherent in the progressive
isolation of modern music from · the community. He charged that
serious rnusic in its contemporary form had become the domain of
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an elite, not of the community. He deplored the wide gulf
between traditional music, which continued to plav a socially
functional role, anJ music as IIodern creative art f'on'l. In
view of this social crisis of music, Wagner was attractive as
one who bad appeared not as a destructive innovator, but as a
constructive revolutionary, eager to involve the community in
his new art form, the music drama, by means of lvhich he had tried
to recapture those archaic communal impulses that had given
rise to music originally and which bind rather than separate.35
Although his innovations have contributed to the isolation and
autonomy of the elements, \Jagner seduced conservatives with his
intention to create an ar:t that was to recall primeval unity to
a community frightfully conscious of disintegration, uprootedness,
and alienation. The material was to serve music, and music
was to further the poetic and political vision. The lJagnerian
Volksgemeinschaft was projected in response to the selfisolating ~endencies in music. Moreover, conservative acceptance
of the \lagnerian regression in the twentieth century demonstrates
the !_)ervasiveness and depth of llagner's impact on music because
Wagner personified another conservative ideal in that he combined
in his person both theory and practice. He lent hirnself to
conservative reaction to the alleged preponderance of intellectualism and materialism in lleimar Germany. Championing traditional
music for its social utility, conservatives denounced complicated
theory and abstraction, which could no langer be grasped by the
community. The preeminence of theory in addition to the practice
of an uprooted and abstract, intellectualized, and esoteric
music was no langer justified socially.
The dichotomy between music at its most recent level of material
development and the community's understanding of its needs
epitomized the crisis as observed by traditionalists. Indeed,
art is destined to die if no langer relevant to the community.
The central concern of v!:llkisch romantics ancl Richard \lagner
especially was therewith restated by twentieth-century
conservatives: It involved the existence of specialists who had
become estranged from the community. Conservative criticism
reflected the pervasive cultural criticism of other alienated
intellectuals after llorld Har I who held onto visions of cultural
unity and themes of continuity, in spite of the changes affected
by the world war. Alarmed over the gulf that separated the
musician from the audience, the mus1c1an ignored the social and
political realities of his time. FurtwMngler, for one, was
ignorant of the i~azis until they had the authority to command
him.36 Critical of the esoteric nature of modernistic music,
the conservative lvas unaware of his own profound isolation and
ahistorical existence.
\·l agner figures so prominently in these pages because he had
helped establish a German pattern of cultural criticism, and
his articulation of cultural crisis was original. Twentiethcentury conservatism in music in its specific German setting
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was derivative, although it merits representation in its own
right, being coeval with developments that reflected and
reinforced the ideological forrnulation of National Socialism .
Conservative musicians represented an esteemed music tradition,
powerful institutions and competency in the eyes of a grateful
public, yet, their much-praised activist music principles were
frozen by respect for the past. Dead composers' works were
perforrned in the formal ritual of official music life--nowhere
illustrated as clearly and cornmented on as frequently as at
Bayreuth37--where the conservative custodian of the tradition
clung to traditional values, which could be upheld only in the
exclusive realm of the arts while society was in turmoil.
The alienated. artist nostalgically recalled the traditional
relationship bet1veen hirnself and his patrons, mistaken now by
him for the people. The theme of alleged security was thus
distorted ideologically by means of a ruggedpose of individualism
and expertise; in FurtwHngler's case, rooted in the study of
Beethoven with whose struggle and sense of independence he
identified. Beethoven had been able to simplify complexities
while the modernists appeared to be uncomfortable wi th simple
expression and consciously strove for complexity.3ß \lithin the
framework of Beethovian individualism, the musician was said to
have composed for his public, foug;<t against its resistance,
but then helped shape its taste; while in the current context the
emancipated, autonomous, and intellectually arrogant avant-garde
imposed impossible dernands on the public, isolated itself, and
thus underrnined public appreciation and support for all.39
The progressive's atonality had begun as exciting experiment and
stood for freedom from tonality. FurtwHngler recalled the
rich afferings of Strauss, Pfitzner, Reger, Mahler, Sch8nberg,
Debussy, Ravel, Honegger, Stravinsky, Bartok, the young
I!indemith, and others at the beginning of the century. He
praised the liberating impulses of the generation of SchBnberg's
theory, the creativity of Bartok, the progressive works of
Stravinsky, llindemith, and so on. Spellbound by the great
tradition and accustomed to its revitalization through new
directions, he looked for a new synthesis of the creative
principle and the material dialectic. Yet, he found that
experimentation and liberation had culminated in SchBnberg's
twelve-tone music: systematized, stylized, theorized, and
increasingly ideologized. The addiction to composing within
the parameters of the new wave had resulted in the alienation of
music from its tradition and especially its public, since the
composers no langer had to face the public for confirrnation,
but simply like-minded peers who, as a group, concentrated on
the development of the material: harrnony, rhythl'l, and the methods
and constructs of the musical elements.
The conservative musician's indictment of the modern situation
of .music moved him close to the official position of Third Reich
cultural policy, 11hich was derived from vBlkisch forrnulation. The
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proximity of an independent and sincere conservatism to the
Uusikpolitik of National Socialism caused much soul-searching on
the part of conservatives and allowed skillful manipulation by
the ;<azi regime in the Third Reic:1. The ironic feature of Nazi
control of culture in Germany · is demonstrated in this confusion,
since this essentially anticonservative movement could pose as
savior of traditional culture from the deplorable situation of
which it was born.
Already before 1933 the public had taken sides in matters of art
by not supporting pro gressive music. Then and later the public
favored the conservative and much more prestigious position that,
in aesthetic formulation, sought to vindicate its inability to
grasp modern developments. In the same way that it could not make
sense of Einstein's insights, it failed to understand SchHnberg.
llhile the progressive insists on the same exclusive rights for
music that are granted nuclear physics, the conservative rejects
this comparison as self-defeating. In 1949 FurtwMngler deplored
tl1e liberation of the elements in all human endeavors.
As the Germans have given rise to concentration camps,
and the atom bomb was developed, both, to be sure,
not in the interest of the human spirit, atonality,
too, followed dictates of the material, without
consideration of man • • • if this condition might
possibly be excused in matters of material objects
its consequences in the realm of man, i.e., in the arts
and in ethics are terrible. This condition amounts to the
surrender of oan • • • to the anonymous powers of a
merciless world spirit.40
These words of conservative humanism were composed after
FurtwMngler had a chance to assess his relationship to vHlkisch
Sentiments in the reality of the Third Reich, when the Nazis
had rendered all purely musical debate meaningless. His legacy
documents the plight of humanism and its political naivete' in
our time.4 1
VBlkisch and Racialist Thought
Ilefore Furt~~Hngler was forced to compromise hirnself in the reality
of the Third Reich, he already sympathized with various features
of the vBlkisch tradition during the \Jeimar period. Hot yet
subjected to political pressures and manipulation, he praised no
other contemporary composer more highly than Hans Pfitzner,
whose polemical conservatism differed from. his own in its
radicalism, fervent advocacy of German cultural values, and
national resentment.4 2 To the artistic avant-garde and the
political left as well as the center, Pfitzner could not be
accepted on those terms. His distinguished compositional
record aside, his cultural-political poleMies brought him very
close to the political and cultural fascisn of the l'leimar period,
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which posed the severest threat to the autonomy of music on the
eve of the Third Reich. If the intellectual finesse of an
Adorno was required to decode the traditional. musical idiom
and musical cornrnentary and even outstanding components of the
avant-garde and exponents of socialist realism for faseist features
and potential, no such dialectic prohing was necessary for an
analysis of the vl:llkisch or faseist literature of the ~leimar
period. The vl:llkisch-fascist approach to defining and resolving
the crisis of modern music epitomized the threat to music's
autonomy as understood by Adorno. Pfitzner and the musicalogist
and SS UntersturmfUhrer Richard Eichenauer forrnulated the
vl::llkisch and racist responses res;:>ectively to an assurned pre-1933
crisis in music an~ German society in the terminology of later
l~azi Husikryolitik. •3
The vl:llkisch-racist ideology was to become official policy in
Germany as a result of the Nazi assumption of power in January
1933, and the subsequent Gleichschaltung of all culture. In
the Third Reich, categories of race were applied to the understanding and classification of music and musicians. Husicological
writing, guidelines for musical composition and performance, and
personnel decisions at musical institutions were governed by
principles associated with a German romantic-vl:llkisch tradition,
which had secured scientific status in the eyes of its believers
and practitioners through identification with the alleged
determinism of irnrnutable racial laws. Husic and musleians
were known and classified as arteigen (native) or artfremd
(alien), and these categories were no longer exclusively
understood in the rornantic-vl:llkisch sense of the arts and artists
being rooted in a distinct Volksgemeinschaft of cornrnon culture
but in terrns of a racial cornrnunity of cornrnon blood. Third
Reich forrnulators and executors of 11usikoolitik looked to racial
theory to identify and promote the German and purge the alien-above all the Jewish component of music.44
This situation of music in the Third Reich accords with a
farniliar picture of Nazi totalitarianism and that of culture in
general as well as other realms of the arts and the mind in the
Third Reicll.45 Moreover, the intellectual frarnework and
assurnptions of ;•ational Socialism are well lmown. 46 If hindsight
seemed to guide rnany engaged analysts of the background to
Auschwi tz, there is no doubt that ;,ational Socialism had roots
and synthesized much in German history: It was not an inevitable
product of German history, but the fulfillment of a set among
countless other sets of potentiality.47 \lhat the empirieist
thus is forced to docurnent and has indeed traced through careful
recording of thought and action in time--always being vulnerable
to the charge of drawing on selective data in support of
retrospective knmvledge--theorists have explained, ordered in
intelligible structures, and rendered as a negative program .in
Opposition to and thus in confirmation of their own positive
view of the world, A most compelling review and at the same
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time encom~assing explanation of the evolving ideology is
affered in George Lukacs's Die ZerstHrunP, ~er Ve~nunft, a
work of theoretical constructs and certainties and, at the same
time, of familiarity with all the nuances and detail of empirical
research. This enormaus volume traces the evolution of the
faseist doctrine, with its reactionary racialist potential,
from an ideational and ideal conception of race--as in Gobineau's
pessimistic assessment of history--to one of post-Darwinian
scientific certainty, until its ultimate faseist synthesis in
Foundations of ti1e Nineteenth Century of II. S. Chamberlain-the blueprint of Rosenberg' s l1yth of the Twentieth Century.
This learned Marxist synthesis and explanation, too, is familiar.
\ihat has been relatively little ex?lored by historians is the
relationship between the antitranscendental vHlkisch-fascist
ideology43 and music, even though musicians have significantly
contributed to its pre-Third Reich formulation, while holding
a decidedly honored place in the writings of nonmusicians.49
Wagner, as stated above, was central in every respect, but so
were lesser known musicians. Ilaving begun to analyze their
music and its place in society, the romantics introduced music
to social and political issues. 50 Schumann in 1334 had founded
the ;<eue Zeitschrift fUr Musik for musical, social, and poli tical
cornmentary. The journal had developed a "national" perspective
on art, so that by the time of Alfred Heuss's editorship from
1921 to 1934, the official Gleichschaltung with National
Socialism in 1933 required no particular coercion. Known then
as the Zeitschrift fllr Uusik, this journal propagated Nazi
Uusikpolitik and is an outstanding source for the students of
the poli tics of music in the Third Reich. 51
Continuity between the romantic nationalism of lieber and Schumann,
the vHlkisch anti-Semitism and racism of liagner, and the official
racism and totalitarianism of the Third Reich thus had an
institutional foundation, which underscored the sense of crisis
in the eyes of lleimar progressives. Nationalist and racist
musicians joined the Lagardes, Langbehns, and Moellers in their
quest for the regeneration of culture by political means and for
a restoration of healthy politics through the spiritual
regeneration of culture.
Hans Pfitzner's musical-political writings reflect this two-fold
dynamic of pre-Hazi musical-political polemies and confirm the
continuity thesis of historians who have analyzed "the roots of
the llazi mind" or the progressive "destruction of reason." In
order to test Lukacs's sweeping synthesis in music, the musical
counterpart to the post-Darwinian racial anthropology of a
Gumplowicz, \loltmann, or Sc:mltze-~<aumburg has to be examined,
and to that end the representative racial schalarship of Richard
Eicherrauer appears most suggestive. A teacher, composer,
musicologist, SS Untersturmfllhrer, and author of the 1932
publication Husik und Rasse, Eicherrauer articulated the final
response to crisis, while like all other participants in this
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debate on the state of music on t:1e eve of the Third Reich,
giving expression it it in the eyes of his opponents.
Hans Pfitzner composed much music, affered rnaster classes of
composition at prestigious music aaademies, was recognized by
fellow musicians as a major composer of his day and like his
idol \lagner, wrote political polemies on the situation of German
music and culture in general, which he held to be in a critical
state. Similar to FurtwMngler, he addressed an alleged crisis
in music whose order of tonality, room for the "human spirit,"
and general sense of proportion and purpose were threatened. The
alleged chaos in music mirrored condi tions in Germany, the \ves t
and the world, and music symbolized that condition. Salvation
would thus be possible through a rep,enerated rnnsic, while
music, it appeared, could only be restored to its ennobling
mission by a revitalized society--the classicr.~redicament of
the vBlkisch politicians of cultural despair.J
In differing with
FurtwMngler's stand, Pfitzner asked for the intervention of
politics in the aßfairs of the arts.
Pfitzner addressed music and the world in his extensive writings.
As a composer and writer about music, he was a traditionalist
conservative who believed in a musical tradition worth preserving
against "subversive" expressions in composition--materialistic
atonality in the sophisticated and alien jazz in the porular
realms--as well as the complementary music commentary.S3 He
felt our Uestern art music to be unique in that it had evolved
a perfect system of tonality, a balanced relationship between
the musical material and the human spirit, and--totally from
within itself--the miracle of harmony, a new and essential
element not to be found in nature.54 Like all self-chosen
defenders of civilization, he feared for its fraßile, artifiC:ially
human, and thus ~recious nature, which is nonnature--an expression
of his fundanental pessimism--and he wondered whether it would
survive. Can this creature of the human spirit be preserved
against the modernist (the machine) in music whose objectivism
and materialism is striving toward the elimination of civilization,
the disintegration of all national culture, and a return to
chaotic nature?55 __ he asked as he turned from crisis in music
to stating his alarm over the deficiencies of German culture.56
His polemies strayed from musical discourse to politics and to
"warfare of cosmic dimensions."57 The progressives in music
and music criticism, anathema already for their understanding and
randering of music~ were accused of participation in the antiGerman conspiracy.J3 Pfitzner's essays and musical works were
placed in the context of national and universal conflict and
crisis, ~•hich reached such an acute state in his mind that
radical political solution had become necessary. His outburst
in conversation with the writer Franz Werfe! that "Hitler will
show you--Germany will yet win,"59 demonstrates his commitment
at a time when Hitler's success was by no means a certainty.
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The issues on all levels, personalities and subjects as well as
national categories, were clearly established and the racial
orthodoxy of the Third Reich was anticipated with the Jew
ernerging as the embodiment of an opposite principle.
Pfitzner also dealt with Jewry in relation to "The fate of our
national art, specifically music." Since to him the national
element constituted the basis of his discussion on music, he
regarded internationalism as a "poison of the people" and the
Jew as uprooted and international. He actually denied being
anti-Semitic, stating that those Jews who agreed with him were
acceptable, and that he, indeed, had "Jewish friends." Ilowever
the Alljuden were active in international Bolshevik subversion,~J
and he took exception to the existence of a "Je\Yish critic in
a German national newspaper" who had accused him of being against
Beethoven--such is the state of music and decency in Germany,
he wrote. Although he allowed for good Jews, he clearly insisted
on racial characteristics of all peoples, which were expressed
in their art, the state of war, and "the weapons to be used in
battle." The language of his defense against the enemy who
ranges from "atonal chaos" to "primitive jazz," "international
bolshevism" to "American materialism," and "political pacifism"
to "international slush" in the arts,Cil moved him close to
National Socialism, although his recognition of the adversary's
strong points, for instance, the virtuosity, perfection, and
creative originality manifest in j azz; 62 and his idealism, \vhich
permitted Jewish contributions to German art, bring into question
total identi ty of the "prophet" wi.t h the reali ty of the Third
Reich.
In short, a reading of Pfitzner's extensive writings offers
examples of continuity as well as discontinuity with the
Husikpolitik of the Third Reich. His grouchiness and ill temper
kept him from easy integration into Third-Reich musical
organizations. ·:ne did not join the party, nor did he readily
sign solidarity proclamations with the Third Reich.63 Even in
strictly ideological terms, his racism was not clearly defined.
For such a definition, Richard Eichenauer's Husik und Rasse was
to play a central role.
The study of racial determinants in cultural achievement had
infiltrated German institutions of learninp, before the Third
Reich. l1usic too had been studied relative to the racialist
literature of Lud\Vig Ferdinand Clauss, Paul Schultze-Naumburg,
Alfred Rosenberg, and Hans F. K. GUnther. Yet, when Richard
Eichenauer published his Musik und Rasse in 1932, he acknowledged
race to be a young science. Honetheless, he pointed out that
explicit race theory had roots in the comparative study of
music of different nations. \Thereas earlier superficial studies
had simply referred to the distinct music of Europe as that of
the wllite race, he now recommended the refinement of the
scientific study of racial determinants of music, an endeavor
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he felt to be consistent with the program of National Socialism.
Committed to that ideology and equally rooted in a conservativeromantic musical tradition, he had no problern rejecting modern
trends as deviations from racial norms on the basis of
scientific evidence. He assumed the "new racial science" to be
generally known--especially that of GUnther--and proceeded to
present a methodology,64 which served as a general reference for
racialist musicology throughout the Third Reich.
It is this positive formulation of racism that also served as
reference tO critical theorists in their discovery of racism in
the structures of art and letters even when not explicitly stated
or admitted. Similarly, the reality of faseist totalitarianism
positively instituted and formulated, served as a model for the
various studies of authoritarianism and fascism by critical
theorists. In retrospect, some of the pre-1933 analyses were
indeed understood to be validated by post-1933 events.
Steeped in Hational Socialism and the romantic-vlllkisch tradition,
Eicherrauer wrote no less than a primer for .Third Reich racialist
musicology. Music was to be studied as a product of the whole
person, whose racial identity, in turn, was revealed by the music
so understood. The biological basis of music and musicians thus
established, Eicherrauer compiled a list of physical traits of
musicians that served as clues for the racial identification of
music. However, he held the features of what he called the
"racial soul" as more important because it was not subject to
the deviation encountered in physical traits, yet he held this
soul to be as pronounced and distinct aS physical characteristics.65
As an antidote to cultural relativism, abstractionism, and the

internationalism of music, the German racist sought recourse in
absolute racial characteristics of human beings and their musical
products, in timelese and characteristic values, in set
definitions of good and evil as of friend and foe, and in the
struggle between racially determined antagonists. Moreover,
only members of a race can truly appreciate the musical products
of their race and, as a German, he acknowledged his preference
for German music in the full confidence of that being a superior
music . Yet, even though his purpose and the end result were
clearly stated and the history of music was understood in the
same terms--by Eicherrauer as by maRy others, including
internationally known musicologists66 __ the new race science
admittedly had to be refined as racial norms had to be constantly
verified by the classified material. Data and theory reinforced
each other. The scholar simply had to acquaint hirnself with this
racial law, the racial traits of the objects of his study,
biographical detail for confirrnation of basic racial characteristics as well as deviations, and the musical works themselves.
Music thus contributed to the establishment of racial norms
which, in turn, facilitated the classification of music.67
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This musical-racial soul theory accorded with the classics of
Nazi art theory, Schultze-Naumburg's much-cited Kunst und Rasse,
for instance, in which the physical traits of artists, especially
their faces, were classified relative to cultural and environmental
factors.6G Similarly H.F.R. GUnther compiled comparative lists
of literary and p.lastic art objects on the basis of racial traits
of ti1e artists in his important book on Rasse und Stil. A ra<iial
musical typology was thus rooted in the general Nazi approach to
the study and classification of the arts and other products of
the mind. Race defined prevailing styles--introduced as objective
conditions--whereas differences within a style were attributed
to the individuality of the artist (composer). Citing Karl Ludwig
Schemann, Rasse in den Geisteswissenschaften, 1930, and
Richard Ullller-Freienfels, Psychologie des deutschen Henschen und
seiner Kultur, 1930, Eichenauer thus permitted musical
individualism not in reference to the evolution of music
understood to be the product of an object--(the musical materials
and inherited structures)--subject dialectic in time, but as
idiosyncratic deviation. Timeless racial Standards prevailed,
even in the case of known musical masters whose stature was
celebrated in their ability to reveal the racial soul of their
people and whose racial identity was therefore of utmost concern
to the Nazi musicologist.69 The rapid succession of modern styles
was dismissed as irrelevant and inconsequential--a result of
racial mixing--but not indicative of basic racial changes.70
In the atmosphere of what Rosenberg had described as VBlkerchaos,
the decadent phase of modern music had found its time and place to
develop. To root out the latter and guide music back into its
healthy path, the Third Reich would have to secure the regeneration
of the race, a project of ruthless biological warfare, which
would take centuries.71
In the laboratory of music-biologism--to which thousands of books
and articles bear witness72 __ Adorno found explicitly stated what
he had discerned in the musical structures and librettos of
bourgeois music culture and read in some romantic-vBlkisch
music commentary--a racial community in Parsifal, the first storm
trooper in the person of Siegfried, and the virulent anti-Semitism
in lvagner' s essays, which was mirrored in some of the characters
of his music dramas.73 A relationship is suggested between Nazi
reality and the anathemas of the terrninology of Adorno's analysis
of modern music. Time was to stand still in the thousand-year
Third Reich, durins whose twelve-year span Adorno examined the
spell-binding effects of Wagner's music: in the dream realities
affected by the high-pitched violin tremalos of the Venusberg
music or the reference to bourgeois values placed in a medieval
setting in the Meistersinger--the suggestion that if those values
existed then and now they will always exist. Love at first
sight, primeval drives, basic natures, categorical enemies,
pseudo-rebelliousness and pseudo~naturalness, raaring laughter
of those in power (llotan) at the exnense of those who suffer
(Alberich), good and evil embodied in racial opposites, a stage

Music on the Eve of the Third Reich

335

on which the gods and men converse, class conscious, and
representative individualism contrasted with idiosyncratic and
counterrevolutionary rebels, and many other of Adorno's suggestive
terms and interpretations of llagnerian characters and settings
testify to familiarity with the realities of the Third Reich and
its official music commentary.
The fellow emigre.Thomas Mann discovered his own affinity to
Adorno's ambivalence toward the genius Wagner in the 1940s,
and Wilhelm FurtwMngler, whose own denazification took several
years, praised the "heroic" Pfitzner shortly after the war,
when such protestation did not help his own cause but no one
spoke in behalf of Eichenauer. In normal times the Eichenauers
have to be sought in the unspoken referential world of analysts
who remernher the unmediated world of domination only too well.
It is perhaps for this reason that a few old critical theorists
became liberals. Though skeptical of liberalism as well, Adorno
increasingly became estranged from the traditional Marxist
concentration on the economy and focused instead on aesthetics
and mass culture. If in the 1930s he offended nonfascists with
references to fascistoid features of their work and lives, he
revealed his sensitivity to the overwhelming threat of barbarism.
The Gl:ltterdMmmerung had preceeded the Holocaust. His famous
question whether after Auschwitz a lyric poem is still possible
was formulated by him, in other words, already before Auschwitz.
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Jewish Treason against
the Laws of Life:
Nazi Religiosity and
Bourgeois Fantasy
ROBERT A. POlS

llver the years, puychohistorians have made increasing use of the
concept of 11 grou;> fantasy. 11 Even if the term is not utilized
explicitly, reference has been made to a putative state in which
a given group of people, due to events of a physically singular
or traumatic nature, cor.1es to share or participate in a fantasy,
a recrudescence of accur.mlated myth-grounded responses to
historical eilallenges .1 Haturally, psycholtistorians generally
must believe that r,roup fantasies are the products of phylogenetic
forces. Their various contents certainly are time-baund and, in
some cases, quite singular. Even the most nonreductionist
psychohistorian, however, must percieve general, underlying forms,
which are representative of phylogenesis. In this chapter, the
writer, while not concerned with ascertaininp, phylogenetic origins,
has no intention of calling this assumption into question. Rather,
assuming that the existence of group fantasies has been
determined, we will be focusing upon one that he perceives as
being of immense importance for lleimar Germany' s bourgeoisie~the fantasy of return to a natural order ir.nnune from the
challenges presented by military defeat and by the social,
economic, and political uncertainties posed by life in Weimar
Germany. This orderwas one in which elements perceived as
inimical, or at least alien, to Ger1Mn national life would
either have no role to play or would exist as entities to be
overcome. llational Socialism was ia large measure both a product
of and response to this group fantasy.
As indica ted above, especially for one sy1apathetic to psychohistory, there exists the temptation to ground a given fantasy
in more general ohylogenetic concerns. That kairotic 11 return of
the repressed, 11 which has played so important a role in Freudian
historical speculations, must come to mind whenever one focuses
upon any variety of group fantasy.2 Ultimately, such an
explanation might well be valid. llere, however, we will be
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focusing upon the nature and contents of a particular fantasy,
leaving phylogenetic concerns for others professionally better
able to deal with them.
For some time, it has been an article of faith that there were,
from the point of view of politics and ideology, two bourgeois
camps in \Jeimar Germany. One variety, at least at first, was
willing to accept the Republic, was generally opposed to those
various irrationalities that constituted the substratum of
National Socialist beliefs, and, on the whole, displayed tolerance
with regard to the Jewish question. The other group, however,
conservative, racist, or bot!J, came more and more to srevail, its
ranks being swollen by deserters from the first camp .
In some
respects, this interpretation is a valid one. Bourgeois
organizations such as the Center party and the German Democratic
party--an increasingly forlorn group--and, to an extent, the Left
wing of the German People 1 s party, ~•ere generally more willing
to taU: the language of political pluralism and were certainly
more "tolerant" than right- wing members of the German People's
party and the reactionary German National People's party, to
say nothing of the National Socialists.4 Further, it is true
that the decline of the Republic can be measured in direct
proportion to the decline of, say, the German :Jemocratic party.
Thus, the two-camps approach cannot be dismissed out of hand.
At the same time, though, investigation into what must be seen
as fundamental conscious emotional concerns of representatives
of the bourgeois class as a whole reveals that there was a
general, shared fautasy that cut across political lines; a
fantasy which, to no small degree, became actualized in the most
basic doctrines of National Socialism.
One could make the argument, of course, that German liberals or,
if one wis:1es, bourgeois moderates, even if they shared certain
concerns with conservatives or representatives of the radical
right, differed quantitatively to such a degree on such issues
as the role of parliamentary government, racism, anti-Semitism,
and so on, that to lump them together with their far more
stridently intolerant and antipluralistic fellow burghers is
unfair. Furthermore, another argument, most particularly with
regard to the so-called liberals under consideration, could be
made; namely, that, most particularly in a political situation
characterized by a more-or-less steady bourgeois drift to the
right, campaign rhetoric ought to be distinguished from genuine
beliefs. In response to the first potential objection, the
author is certainly willing to admit that there were meaningful
differences between the radical right-wing and moderate sections
of the German bourgeoisie. At the same time, though, the
acceptance by both groups of certain fundamental attitudes, at
times virtual superstitions, is of immense significance and
points to the persistence and power of those elements, which
were constitutive of the German bourgeois fantasy. The first
objection raises few problems and can be answered with little
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expenditure of time or energy. Consideration of so-called
private remarks of various liberal bourgeois figures of importance
in ~eimar Germany will reveal that ~ublic statements made in
the supposed heat of political campaigns either were actually
representative of these private remarks or soon came to be.
Even if one does not totally accept the so-called Fischer Thesis
in its entirety, there can be little doubt that Germany's
bourgeoisie had an immense stake in victory in h'orld llar r.5
Domestic tensions and sacrifices during the war, the anguish
of defeat, and governmental chaos following this defeat took an
immense psychic toll. To be sure, the German working class also
suffered greatly physically and psychologically. It, however,
had several advantages over the bourgeoisie. First of all,
there was the comforting balm of a progressive ideology; the
hope that, with the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment
of a republic, the first steps in the direction of a more equitable
society had been taken. For Social Democrats, this was of some
comfort. Coimnunists, while eschewing republican forms, could
derive satisfaction from more strident teleological expectations.
Paradoxically, it was the ruling class that, from the point of
view of hope in the future, was left high and dry. The so-called
revolution of 1913 had turned out to be historical froth, which,
nonetheless, had sufficed to drown the Spartacists. Economic
power remained in bourgeois hands. llilitary shame and republican
uncertainties, however, could not be fully assimilated . In
mitigation, there was unbridled fantasy, and, both for those who
as "republicans of reason" (Vernunftsrepublikaner) evidenced a
grudging willingness to work within the framework of parliamentary
republicanism and for those who rejected republican solutions
outright, this was of ilmnense importance throughout the tenure
of the ~eimar Republic.
In 1::117, the then liberal Ernst Krieck, a leading voice in
educational reform, published Die deutsche Staatsidee. This
work, completed under the grinding pressures of total war and
attendant horne-front scarcities, was written in tl1e idiom of
German romantic speculation. Thus, when the author spoke of the
state in organic terms, as being representative of a whole
Volkstum, he was not exactly breaking new ground. Neither was
he when he declared that the state had to be grounded in life,
which, he suggested "embraced nature and spirit as it did two
poles. "6 :n1at l~rieck--who joined the National Socialist party
in 1928--expressed, however, was a concern for holistic immersion
in life which, in one way or another, would characterize bourgeois
fantasizing during the Heimar period. The results of llorld ~ar I
were llideous and, even for liberals, hard to swallow. A heroic
Germany had gone under and, to the liberal Friedrich !1einecke,
it was obvious that "Ho state could rule for long on the basis
provided by the protagonists of the Left, with their Jewish,
sentimental-soft ideas."7 In this regard, it is of interest
to note the solution to pos t-llorld ~ lar I problems proffered
by the realist, iieinec!<e--a sort of internal emmigration into
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the infinite. This proposal appeared in liach der Revolution,
and in this conte;ct Heinecke affered the pre-l~orld War I
~andervogel youth movement as an example of how it could be done.
In the hearts of happy, wandering youth, the feeling
for tl1e horneland began to grow again. And the most
German in our art and poetry was truly none other than
the recapitulation of our landscape in the eyes of the
artist--that • • • synthesis of idyllic Herzlichkeit
.with ascending, overpowering feeling for the
infinite • • • • So, many of us today retain, even
in our narrowness, a longing for the innermost
recesses of our feeling, after the most German Germany
in nature and spirit.3
Heinecke had accepted the formation of a republic on realpolitical
grouuds. In his eyes, in the realm of politics, Vernunft-reason--had replaced Herz--heart. Yet, the dean of German liberal
historiography always retained a certain antiurban and antiSemitic bias, at least in the social sense. Both conditioning
and accompanying this was a tendency which we have seen in the
case of Er.1st Krieck--an attempt to draw strength from or seek
solace in an immersion of life forces, the infinite, or nature.
Cancern for putative forces of this ilk was not new and was
hardly confined to Germany, although it perhaps achieved its
greatest resonance in so-called Lebensphilosophie. In l~eimar
Germany, though, we can see this attaining unparalleled prominence
as a fantasy dimension to political and spiritual considerations.
As suggested in l1einecke' s statement in :;rach der Revolution,
discouraged bourgeois intellectuals often sought out salvation
in a sort of "reborn" German youth, one open to life forces of a
profound cl1aracter. Krieck, who, by the early ileimar period was
beginning his trek towards the radical right, declared that the
most valid philosophy of education always had to bear in mind
that "all knowledge, all experience is, first of all, a means in
the service of life formation" and that the educational experience
was of singular importance because, on the basis of individual
experience, one could not arrive at a comprehensive "world picture"
(Weltbild).9 The eventual goal of a "life forming" education
would be to create the total man, a sort of updated version of
Goethe' s lülhelm l!eister and concurrently, there would be an
emphasis upon the strengthening of character rather than upon
a perceived narrow intellectualism. llhile Krieck, at this
point, did not subscribe to the notion, so dear to many on the
German right, that immersion in life forces necessitated submission
to nature, he exhibited an almost sentimental attitude towards
those who, for one reason or another, remained outside the realm
of education. "The human in the state of nature is amidst us
and within us; in its purity, he is the new-born child in all
its i1elplessness. nlO This empathy for t:1e children of nature,
evidenced in l~eimar Germany, contributed to political decisions.

Nazi Religiosity and Bourgeois Fantasy

347

Ernst Krieck becarne a :~ational Socialist in 1923. In his
romanticizing of youth, however, he was at one with many liberals
of ti~e period. :le have considered Friedrich l1einecke. It is
importtant to point out that many of lleinecke's fellow liberals,
members of the ill-fated German Democratic party, regarded
German youth as somehow embodying rationally inexpressible
verities. To be sure, much of this stemmed from efforts to
compete with the radical right in drawing young people to their
particular political cause. Nevertheless, it is striking that
the editors of Der Demokrat thought it perfectly in order that
the January 5, 1923,issue of their journal be introduced by
quotations from the anti-Semitic obscurantists Heinrich von
Treitschke and Paul de Lagarde, quotations in which the writers
extolled !fOuth's readiness to fight for concrete ideals.ll \lhen
the German Democratic party essentially sacrificed its
republicanism in the name of ill-defined vBlkisch concerns, this
was accompanied by a plethora of articles defending that decision
and calling upon all of democratic persuasion to recognize that
the fusion with an anti-Semitic Jungdeutsche Orden to form the
politically absurd Staatspartei was necessary in order to provide
a nonauthoritarian outlet for youthful idealism. "The idea of
German youth," I~urt Goepel proclaimed, "is simply Germany,
Fatherland, homeland." Urban Germany had proved tobe too
impersonal and mechanistic for Germany's young people. The
state had a duty to provide "the expres~ion-form of the vBlkisch
will to national community," this was necessazy to satisfy
the spiritual needs of German youth.12 This iascination with
youth went beyond melioristic political considerations and indeed
was the expression of a fantasy that was of immense importance
in the psychic makeup of bourgeois lleimar Germany. Somehow,
youth embodied both historical and timeless virtues, elements
that had been lost in an increasingly urbanized and industrialized
Germany. Youth, in its ingenuous commitment tö ideals, was
Germany and, most assuredly, not the Germany born of military
disaster in 1913. It was in this fascination with youth and youth
movements that the \leimar liberals were very closely tied to
exponents of neo-conservatism and the radical right.
The interest displayed by German youth for the radical right and
vice-versa has been the subject of numerous studies.l3 For
our purposes, it is of immense impo•tance that representatives
of right-wing thinking perceived youth in somewhat the sarne
fashion as did many German liberals.
The German right, opposed to liberalism from the beginning, could
be somewhat more consistent in its extolling of German youth,
a youth which, in wmy ways, had been and would continue to be
antiliberal. In a virulent attack on liberalism, Moeller van den
Bruck, who already had established a name for hirnself as translator
of Dostoevski and as an ardent foe of post-\lorld War I Germany,
declared that, with regard to the newly-founded Relublic, "the
youth in Germany feels the basis of the betrayal." 4 German
youth, in its honesty and in its ingenuous commitment to principle,
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was willing to declare its opposition to a spiritually dishonest
republic and to "recognize the enemy as being liberals."l5
Accoruing to Moeller van den Bruck, German youth, in many ways
apolitical and naively idealistic, represented Germany. Both
liberals and conservatives were thus united in their view of
youth as representing a forthright, honest, and, almost because
of its apolitical character, significant commentary upon Germany 's
historical situation. For the right, however, this adulation
of youth had a religious dimension. As Karl Bernhard Ritter saw
it, youth, as the future of a Volk community (Volksgemeinschaft),
was constrained to see that "religion is a matter of the comrnunity,
and thus, in the first instance, a rnatter of concrete historical
community, a matter of the Volk. Each truly living religion is
a Volk religion."l6 Thus, youth was called upon to grasp the
fundamental role that was being assigned to it--to be the bearers
of a Christian religiosity that was, in essence, Germany itself.
Frank Glatze!, editor of the mont:üy journal Jungdeutsche Stimmen,
declared ti1at the society of 1922 lacked "the heart which beats
for the whole body." For the youth movement of pre-';<;orld ~Jar
Germany, the llandervogel, "the point of departure was • • • the
degeneration and decomposition of society, as well as the natural
Volk feelinp,."17 The llandervogel group, which could well serve
as examples to a deracinated society, "had no program written
on its banners," nothing but "life • • . and experience, u13
In an interesting sequence of ideas, Glatze! first declared that
the summer solstice ceremonial fire, which had been of great
traditional importance in the llandervogel movement and which
continued to be prominent in the activities of right-wing youth
movements after the war, was part of a new, ')IOuthful religious
experience, which had to be appreciated as such. The author
then went on to concern hirnself with the antiparliamentary,
antimonarchical, and antiparty nature of German youth. To be
sure, he concluded, "we know that the social question is the
core question of the Volksgemeinschaft; that socialism as idea
is the necessary antidote to liberalism."19 This was not only,
however, "a question of correct distribution of goods • •
but
just as mueh a question of condition of soul. u20 In one
paragraph full of bromide-laced bourgeois fantasy, Glatze!
captured the attitude of the radical right, as well as many
liberals, towards German youth. Somehow, in its very lack of
concreteness, in its longing for a new reli;iosity and a
nonsocialistic socialism, and in its condemnation of day-to-day
party politics, it was the real Germany. Naturally, for some
liberals, ti1e antiliberal nature of right-wing German youth,
was rather too much to endure. Like many of their ideological
counterparts all over the world, however, many 11 eimar-period
liberals felt distinctly uneasy about their social and ideational
position--perhaps e:ven a bit guilty. Same of this can be
observed in an article written by Gertrud Bäumer and published
in the liberal journal Die Hilfe after the disastraus (for the
Democrats) lfay 1923 elections.
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BMumer, noted bourgeois fernirrist a~d literary critic, seemed
to dcin right-wing sarments as she expressed interest in the
Jungdeutsche Orden, plaaing particular emphasis upon its
opposition to the "party essence." Besides paying greater
attention to this "Order," BMumer maintained that the German
Democratic party sltould recognize that lveiuar Democracy was
rooted "not in the pompaus relativism of liberal big-city
dwellers, but in many v!:llkisch and soil-bound strengths, • • •
and is conservative-bourgeois in all questions of conscience."21
The reaction of Germany's bourgeoisie to the introduction of
parliamentary government is well ~nown and need not be further
documented here. They were opposed to it, by and large, and even
the German Democratic party, which out of a sense of Realpolitik
declared itself in favor of parliamentary government, evidenced
a certain degree of suspicion towards the new institution from
the bep,inning, a suspicion which, over the years became traüslated
into a rejection on the part of many of its members. 22 Grm,ring
distrust of parliamentary government was a general phenomenon
in bourgeois circles during the 1leimar period. Behind the
objections to an h1posed parliamehtary system was something else-the fantasy of return.
If one examines the statements of Heinecke and BMumer, one is
struck by tlte thought that, for these liberals, there was a real,
somehow more valid, order beyond that of lleimar Germany. Fo_r__
lleinecke, there was the "most German Germany in nature and spirit."
For BMumer, there were "v!:llkische and soil-bound strengths."
Uhat these representatives of republican pluralism were stating
was that postwar Germany, a foreign-imposed, big-city entity,
was not real; that, somehow, behind all of the problems manifest
in military defeat and parliamentary bickering, there was another
Germany, the real Germany. This point of view was held by
other German liberals. For Willy Hellpach, psychelogist and
the Democratic party's presidential candidate in the first
presidential election of 1925, the ultimate source for German
democracy had to be Germany's farmers, a class indifferent to
big-city cries for tolerance in political and religious
matters.23 In a word, the most stolid, conservative--timeless,
really--element of German social and political life was the source
of all thinp,s positive, including that democracy to which, at
least in its \leimar form, many liberals were only formally
committed. Positive national strengths were rooted in a class
that fantasy had endowed with well-nigh mystical powers. The
real Germany was one that eluded rational political analysis.
Nevertheless, there was a natural order, which not only provided
foundations for whatever positive elements there were in
German pu!Hic life, but served as a source of comfort for those
increasingly alienated from Ueimar republicanism. This order,
antirepublican to be sure, was nonetheless the basis for democratic
republicanism. The implicit contradiction in all of this might
well have . been obvious to German liberals on a certain level of
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consciousness. As we have seen with regard to B!lumer's attitude
towards German youth, however, there was a stubborn unwillingness
to dispense with fantasizing about a real, more natural Germany.
Interestingly enough, one of the most fantasy-obsessed of Weimar
Germany' s beleagured democrats was :lalther Rathenau, at first
minister of reconstruction and then foreign mirtister under Josef
Wirth, chancellor between 1921 and 1923. Rathenau, the most
prominent Jew in German political life, was assassinated on
June 24, 1922, by right-wing terrorists wh6 might well have
adhered to some of the same mystical ideals to which this
spiritually crost confused individual clung throughout his life.24
llalter Rathenau's father, Emil, faunder of the AEG electrical
firm, had clone as much as anybody to bring "modemity" to
Germany. ~lalther Rathenau hirnself, of course, was a businessmau
of no mean acumen. Furthermore, as head of the Raw Materials
Board during the First \lorld \lar, he had established a reputation
for economic realism. The Treaty of Rapalle existed as proof
of his ability to engage in level-headed, well-nigh cold,
international diplomatic horse-trading. Yet, throughout his life,
Rathenau had exhibited a romantic alter-ego. For this most
rational of industrialists, the pursui t of transcendence was of
immense importance. Individualistic spirituality was the means
by which this spiritually perplexed capitalist sought to bind
hirnself to timeless forces, acceptance of which, in his eyes,
represented a rejection of his own Judaism . 25
Rathenau served the lleimar Republic valiantly and well and, in
large part, perished because of this service. In many ways,
though, Rathenau, like so many. of lüs liberal colleagues,
never completely adjusted to republican life and to a new state
form born of defeat. Throughout his life, he had combated what
he perceived to be grossly materialistic influences. As an
example of this, we can consider a 1917 speech. In it he
declared that he felt constrained to attempt to fulfill a
mission that he thought nature had given him: to combat the
"material, which had been tossed into this world like weeds
from a strange continent."26 He had to "infuse this unspiritual
with spirit."27 Part of this spiritwas a spiritual Germany from
which he drew strength. "This spiritual Germany lives, it lives
in you and it lives in several others and it appears completely
different than the Germany of which one hears and of which one
speaks."23 The Germany of warriors was certainly "strong and
great" but, in the final analysis (a comforting thought in 1917
and even more so in 1922 when the speech was reproduced in
the Deutsche Rundschau), it was spiritual, Germany which mattered.
Peace treaties mattered little, and Germany's future would not
be decided on the "battlefield of Flanders" but would be upon
"the battlefield of our hearts."29
Rathenau's messagewas a gentle one and, unlike many of his
countrymen, even some of his fellow liberals, he evidenced little
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bitterness over the stalemated course of tlte war, .and cries for
revanche were muted, to say the least. In this essay, however,
the reader can observe that fantasy of another, more spiritual
Germany, one implicitly "natural" in its spirituality. Material
Germany might well have been stalemated on the battlefield, and
starvation might well be prevailing on the home front; but,
there was an ultimate reality behind all of this, the reality
of the German spirit. This message was carried into the postllorld Uar I period.
In 1920, Rathenau published a wor~ entitled Die neue Gesellschaft,
a piece which offered a guarded prognosis for Germany 1 s future.
In this rambling essay, he revealed a lack of enthusiasm for
parliamentary republicanism that was characteristic of many
German liberals.30 The solutions offered by Rathenau to the
problems posed by defeat and disillusionment boiled down to
one overriding one: fulfillment of a uniquely German "mission."
"The way to the German mission, to German development /iiildung7,
which shall no longer be the Jevelop!.lent of classes, but thedevelopment of the Voli~, stands open through equalization of
labor. The whole land is the same as a team; each stands before
the same passage. Physical labor is no longer retarded by
the pressure of overexhaustion, spiritual labor no longer
divorced from the Volk."31 Rathenau, in brief, was calling for
that traditional V~gemeinschaft, which always had waxed large
in the fantasy world of the German bourgeoisie. "He don 1 t need
more rulers," he declared in a 1920 address before the Berlin
Democratic club. "Uhat we need are stewardships, responsibilitie~,
communities, self-governing, responsible communities."32 He saw
an important role for his party in this process, particularly
inasmuch as the German Democratic party was "no longer a party
of big interests."33 A communal Germany .in which, without
real societal.change, of course, each person had a role in the
fulfillment of a spiritual mission--this was Rathenau 1 s fantastic
(in the literal sense of the word) conception of how to deal
with the seemingly numberless problems that tormented the Weimar
Republic.
For Rathenau, as for other liberals, there was a mysterious "other
Germany"--one which existed above and beyond day-to-day political
life. Inspite of, or perhaps because of, his alienationfrom much
of German life due to his Jewishness, he seemed to have loved
this Germany with an intensity that defies conventional historical
analysis. In his diary, Harry Graf Kessler described an interview
with Rathenau 1 s sister. "The war crushed him," she said,
"because his 1 beloved 1 /Germany 7 had been overthrown." He had
wanted to defend his "beloved,TI but, being a Jew, he had never
been able to obtain an army commission, thus "his Jewishness
hung like a millstone around his neck."34
Right-wing writers and critics tended to be both more strident
and more consistent in their various expressions of the great
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bourgeois fantasy of lleirnar Gerrnany. For one thing, they obviously
could attack liberalisrn with greater consistency than the liberals
thernselves even though, as we have seen, liberals often seerned
to be quite eager to shed their rnelioristic principles in favor
of supposedly rnore heroic ones. In his previously-cited essay,
"An Liberalismus gehen die V!llker zugrunde," Moeller van den
Bruck declared that "liberalisrn is the freedorn to have no
convictions, and at the sarne time rnaintain that this · precisely
is conscience. n35 Liberalisrn appeared w:1en a comrnuni ty lost its
cohesiveness, it was t:1e expression of a society which is no
langer a cornrnunity.36 People who rernained part of nature, the
"Naturv!llker," "do not know liberalisrn. For theml. the world is
a unified experience which man shares wi th rnen. "3/ People who
had been able to form thernselves into cohesive states also had
the ability to keep liberalisrn under control. Deracinated
"society peoples" ("Gessellschaftsv!llker"), however, had ceased
to be a comrnunity, and it was here that liberalisrn was able to
take hold. 33 Liberalisrn, in the eyes of probably one of the rnos t
prominent right-wing spokesrnen in post-l~orld llar I Gerrnany, was
a syrnptorn of cornrnunal disintegration.
Right-wing thinkers often rnaintained that liberal or left-wing
ideologies were unnatural and hence not worthy of serious
consideration. In his 1920 article, "Biologie und Kommunismus,"
Hermann von TI.osen spoke of the necessity of understanding so-called
laws of life through studying biology.39 Thus, "any revolution
which is possible only throu.gh deviation frorn natural,
evolutionary laws appears as an anornoly to us." Nature was "not
cornrnunistic, above all, not dernocratic."40 Nature was
individualistic and aristocratic, and comrnunisrn, in its appeal
to human rights was incredibly naive. There were no rights in
nature, only laws.41 Nations had to live according to the laws
of life. All who defied these laws, and hence revealed thernselves
as unnatural, were doorned. Von Rosen sounded alrnost positivistic
in his rather cool appeal · to biological laws. Yet, throug:1out,
there was also an irnplicit utopianisrn: if a people adheres to
those natural laws that express thernselves politically in a
"natural" aristocracy, this people 'dll have tapped into eternal
forces. For von TI.osen, as for other representatives of bourgeois
right-wing thought, his was an age in which outrnoded, transient
values were being replaced by new beliefs grounded in tirneless
values. During this time, Ernst Krieck declared that hurnankind
had "to seek out a new attitude to the powers of life and of
occurrences; a new Mythu4, as exponent of a new belief and lifef eeling, is being born." 2
ICrieck looked forward to a time in which the individual would
attain fulfillrnent as a "valid rnernber of the cornrnunity of life
with all its forrns, values, goals, knowledge, and skills."43
llilhelrn Stapel, editor of the racist journal Deutsches Volksturn
and later a strong supporter of llazisrn, pressed this point in
an openly rnore v!llkisch direction, in his essay "Volk und
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Volkstum," when he declared that "Volk is an irrepressible,
natural community, differentiated from other forms."44
Representatives of the German right, like n~ny liberals, were
seeking out their nation's salvation in an immersion in nature,
or in recourse to certain fundamental "laws of life," as Krieck
was fond of putting it. Unlike the liberals, with the possible
exception of full-blown romantics such as nHumer, they could be
more consistent in their efforts since they felt no need to
somehow reconcile their beliefs with republican principles
and liberal meliorism. All of them were concerned with some sort
of national rebirth or, in Krieck's case, with the birth of a new
Mythus. A very specific means of helping to bring this about
was provided by Heinz Brauweiler who, in a widely-publicized
essay, suggested that Roman law be replaced in its entirety
by traditional German law, which he thought was more socially
conscious and hence sensitive to the needs of the whole
community.45 "In place of the contemporary artificial and
arbitrary division of the Volk, of the state body, through
parties and economic organizations, which all are more or less
filled with thoughts of class and class struggle, there will be
a natural division, grown out of nature."46 German law, the
product of a German spirit apparently rooted in nature, would
assist in restoration of this natural order.
Walther Rathenau, in his concern to infuse a materialistic
world with spiritual values, came close to offering a religious
solution to Germany's problems. In this, he differed somewhat
from his liberal colleagues. Right-wing spokesmen, however,
exhibited more of a willingness, indeed eagerness, to proffer
what one would have to call religious answers to the problems
of a deracinated Volk. Some of those who concerned themselves
with this issue spoke the jargon of traditional romanticism.
Will-Erich Peuckert, in his article "Gott-Natur," blamed the
Enlightenment for separating God from Nature. Fortunately, the
romantics of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century served
to restore the God/Nature synthesis.47 Peuckert saw the
restoration of "Naturphilosphie" as being of fundamental concern.
A new "unity of God/Nature" was needed in order to restore
spiritual balance for the German people. This could best be
accomplished if more attention were paid to "our farmers and
the 'primitives' on the land."4ß These were the humble possessors
of timeless, soil-bound truths.49 For individuals such as
Peuckert, the search for some far-off fusion between God and
nature was indicative of a more general concern, which we have
seen expressed by both liberals and rightists; his was a concern
for totalism, a complete immersion into nature or life forces.
Such was ti1e goal of one of the most distinguished existentialist
philosophers, l1artin Heidegger, who spent a lifetime attempting
to pass beyond what he percieved to be linguistic errors and
philosophical obscurantism and to embrace the ver~ ground of all
speculation, nothingness, as it turned out to be. 0 The great
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philosopher's genuine concern to penetrate into the very core
of natural being, something which was first evident in his Sein und
Zeit of 192 7, led him to er.1brace, i f only for a brief period";"t:he
I:e'bensphilosophie of National Socialism an<l to reject "academic
freedom" as signifying "unconcern." Academic freedom had been
"a capricious e~ercise of intentions and inclinations and was
noncommitment."51 In these reruarks, the reader can sense an
attitude to\<ards liberalism l!ather similar to that expressed
by Uoeller van den Bruck--it was symptomatic of a lack of
commitment to the natural, organic community. Some representatives
of the right, despairing at what they perceived to be the gap
between idealism and day-to-day political chicanery, saw the
infusion of religiosity into politics--or, perhaps more
accurately, the transformation of politics into a religion of
the Volk--as being the only way out of national degradation.
Rudolf Pechel, editor of the Deutsche Rundschau, in an essay
which appeared in a 1920 edition of the journal, declared that
many Germans were now willing to follow a dictator. All that
was needed was the appearance of a "great idea imbued with
transeendental strength, deep human love, and great righteousness
and purity." Such an i<lea, or more precisely, one who embodied
it, "will immediately find millians of supporters."52 In this
hour of parliamentary degradation (coincidentally, bhe essay
appeared around the time of the Kapp Putsch, but had been
written sametime before this occurred), strong personalities
were needed, personali ties that went beyond ma tters of s tate
and, in fact, embodied the German spirit.53 Pechel, whose
editorial independence would later get him in a great deal of
trouble during the National Socialist regime's rule in Germany,
appeared to be actually looking forward to a dictatorship-one rooted, of course, in transeendental national truths. He
was calling r.1ore for a religious transformation of values than
for dictatorship in the traditional sense of the word. This
became crystal clear in his 1922 essay, "Das Uort geht um,"
in which Pechel declared that "we Germans are now entering the
timespan of our fulfillment."54 In words both hoary and eerily
prophetic, Pechel went on: "The duty to Volkstum became a
religious challenge. The path to this reli,gion, which is
already itself a religion, can be traversed only by individuals."55
What was needed here, Pechel declared--bringing up an issue
considered in his 1920 essay--was a leader. Such a leader would
correspond to the figure presented by Paul de Lagarde. This
person was one "in which lives the most distinguished quintessence
of the German spirit." The leader had tobe an individual
characterized by "hate against the unnatural Unnatur." In the
final analysis, Germany was being confronted by a choice between
"God or Satan."56 Drastic measures were being suggested, but,
"the voice of our blood releases us from time-bound laws."57
This approach was perhaps apotheosized by Paul l(rannhals who,
in his 1923 work, Das organische Heltbild, boldly declared that
"for the future leaders of the German soul, politics will be,
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simultaneously, religion, and they will have to cleanse the
German house of those for whom religion has become politics."58
For some on the German right, the fantasy of return had to be
crowned by a spiritual revolution that was necessarily religious
in character. Politics were conceived of as being corrupt, as
degrading the existence of the German people. There was, as
Pechel stated, aa "unnatural" aspect that had to be purged from
Germau life. The future leaders of Germany would be men of deep
and abiding faith, ones who could say, as l!artin Luther did,
"Hier steche ich, ich kann nicht anders" (llere I stand, I can
do no other). 5 9
For bourgeois Germans, the Jews, at the very least, represented
a troublesome element, a group whose role in German life was
problematical. Even liberals, who could hardly be accused of
racism or of harboring mindless prejudices, spoke of a "Jewish
problem," some of them even after the massacres of World 1-lar
II. 60 Meinecl;e declared that anti-Semitism was the first step
to National Socialism and that things would have gone better
if the "Jewish proLlem" had been confrontJed earlier. lleuss,
during the course of an address, "Mut zur Liebe," given on
December 7, 1949, before the Gesellschaft fUr christlich-jlldische
Zusammenarbeit, spoke of a "Jewish-German and Jewish-Christian
problem." lfuile lleuss was hardly anti-Semitic in any systematic
sense and, after liorld liar II, went out of his way to lend
support to those Jews who remained in Germany and to the state
of Israel, his use of the above term points to the power of an
idea; namely, that there was--or had been--a "Jewish Problem" of
sorts. Friedrich lleinecke, as we shall see, tended to play down
German responsibility for how this so-called "problem" was
resolved. lleuss never rejected the idea that German responsibility
had to be assumed. Both Meinecke and Heuss, however, seemed to
be unable to see Jews as being an organic part of the German
national community. .Few German liberals could be accused of
systematic racism. Yet, a strong dose of at least social antiSemitism was part of the spiritual baggage which they carried
into the chaotic 1/eimar period. In the post-\vorld 1-lar I
fantasizing in which so many of them engaged, t:!e Jewish role,
or better, purpose in German life, became problematic.
On the surface, there was reason enough for liberals, not fully
committed to republicanism, tobe suspicious of the Jews. Jews,
by and large, supported the Republic and one of their number,
Hugo Preuss, had played an important role in writing the \Jeimar
constitution.61 The German Democratic party, which Heuss,
l1einecke, and virtually all bourgeois supporters of republicanism
either joiaed or voted for, derived a good deal of its support
from the German Jewish community. The Je1vs appeared to have
benefitted from republicanism and, as post-World \iar I Germany
went from crisis to crisis, those who seemed to have advanced
their posi tions through an apparently ineffectual form of
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government had to have stood out in the minds of individuals
who, liberal or not, always had retained a residue of suspicion
with regard to parliamentary government. llowever, for many
of the liberals, as for their rigi1t-winr, countrymen, the Jews
becarne suspect primarily because they seemed to have no natural
role in German life. Certainly, for both liberals and, for
that matter, for many on the right, this did not necessitate
that violent measures be undertaken to correct the situation.
Nevertheless, such an attitudewas hardly conducive to
sustaining meaniagful resistance against those willing to indulge
in such unpalatable measures.
As we have seen, Friedrich Heinecke and Gertrud Bliumer fantasized
about a deep-rooted, more real Germany--something which lived in
a timeless realm, far~removed from military disaster and
cosmopolitan, big-city cynicism. For both of these individuals,
German Jewry during the ileimar period proved to be troublinr,.
Meinecke, originally contemptuous of the German left, with its
"Jewis!t, sentimental, soft ideas," :i'ound it particularly
difficult to deal with the Jewish, liberal press. Usually, he
maintained in an essay of 1926, this press had served the national
interests. It could not be denied though, that, from time to
time, it bad manifested "a somewhat Jewish resentment."62 Of
immense importance for !1einecke was that certain impiety towards
the past which had been shown by the left-wing and liberal
press. From the time in which it first emerged onto the national
scene, Heinecke had attacked t;he National Socialist party as
representing a demagogic and divisive danr,er to Germany. Indeed,
it was in large measure because of these attacks that he was
removed from the editorship of the Historische Zeitschrift in
1935. llevertheless, while criticizing the Nazis for their
demagogic style, he was willing to admit, in an essay of
December 21, 193J, that he saw certain valuable elements in
the National Socialist movement. Besides its concern for a
"strong national will, the passionate feeling in regards to our
poli tical dependency," there was its "etl1ical revolt against
big-city dirt." 0 3 For !1einecke, hardly a systematic racist in
any sense of the term, the liberal press, "big-city dirt," and
that "somewhat Jewish resentment" were a sort of hardened
underside of "Jewish, sentimental softness." As we have seen,
in his post-ilorld \lar II work, The German Catastrophe, Meinecke
did suggest that, as he saw it, there was a definite "Jewish
Problem." In his eyes, the Jews themselves bore a large share
of the responsibility .for it. As he stated:
The Jews, who were inclined to enjoy indiscretely
the favorable economic situation now smiling upon
them, had since their full emancipation aroused
resentment of various sorts. They contributed much
to that gradual depreciation and discrediting of the
liberal world of ideas that set in after the end
of the nineteenth century. The fact that besides
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their negative and disintegrating influence they
also achieved a great deal that was positive in the
cultural and economic life of Germany was forgotten
by the mass of those who now attacked the darnage done
by the Jewish character.64
In t:lis statement we can see him drawing a sharp line between
Germans and a "Jewish character" that often was destructive,
frequently expressing itself in a "negative and disintegrating
manner." (l1illions of those who presumably bare this odious
character within them :1ad, of course, been just recently
exterminated, something upon which 11einecke placed little real
emphasis . ) One is compelled to ask just what it was that this
Jewish character was "disintegrating." Heinecke was never too
clear about this, but we can get a good idea, perhaps, if we
pander a statement he made concerning those positive elements
he saw in Hational Socialism. The emergence of liberalism,
he said, besides providing for individual liberation "had
left society too Nuch to itself and allowed the old ethical
ties such as family, custom, and social stratification to relax
while no energetic consideration was given to the creation of
new ties. Society was in danger of becoming amorphous."65
Hitler appeared to have been sensitive to this and particularly
so with regards to the needs of German youth.
For 11einecke, the yearning for that eternal Germany had
caused him to fall back upon the Wandervogel experience after
llorld llar I. After \lorld \iar II, there were the "Goethe Circles. "66
Part and parcel of this fantasy was the notion that Jews were
not really part of this Germany. They were different somehow
and, in their "disintegrating" form, dangeraus to a sort of
natural order that, for l!einecke, represented Germany in its
most authentic form.
Otto Gessler, a German democrat who was defense minister between
1920 and 192ß, was not one of those relatively rare liberals
who greeted the new-born Republic with enthusiasm. Indeed,
throughout, he maintained a considerable degree of loyalty
for not only the Hohenzollern but the llittelsbach dynasty of
Bavaria, Gessler's harne Land.67 Hohenzollerns, the ~ittelsbachs,
the pre-llorld llar I orderly society bequeathed Germany by
Bismarckian genius--these became increasingly important to
Gessler as his bitterness towards lleimar increased. It was
partially because of his love of this Germany that he became
associated with elements of the anti-Hitler underground in
World \lar II and, after the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt,
was arrested and tortured by the Gestapo.
For Gessler, lveimar-period Jewry came to embody everything that
was wrang with Germany. The big city was the source of that
cynicism, cosmopolitanism, and pacifism that so annoyed him;
"I considered it and still consider it today to be one of the
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most serious weaknesses of the Weimar system that it, out of its
liberal ideology, did not tear out this big-city degeneracy, root
and branch."68 He furiously attacked the left-wing Jewish press
and literary circles. "llith cold cynicism they tore down
everything upon which i1ealthy German national feeling depended
and treasured each phenomenon of decadence as a sign of the
progress of civilization."69 For Gessler, that "upon which
healthy German national feeling depended" was respect for timehallowed institutions such as the army, various forms of
monarchism, and .the ingenuous wholesomeness of a presumed past
age. Far more than Ueinecke, and possibly even ßäumer, Otto
Gessler, for eight years holder of one of the most important
of ministerial posts, perceived a singularly negative Jewish
spirit, expressing itself in urban degeneracy and unnatural
cynicism.
Harry Graf l~essler, a man of extraordinary decency and intelligence,
was a strong defender of the ll'eimar Republic--this, despite his
noble background (he was known as "the Red Count")-~one of the
most devoted of pacifists, and an admirer of Rathenau. He was
an enemy of National Socialism from the beginning and, throughout
his life, was totally opposed to political romanticism in any
form. Nevertheless, on Tuesday, il'ovember 30, 1920, he recorded
the following in his diary:
Danzig is a little Babylon. Unbelievably international
and cosmopolitan in the rnidst of its Gothic German
gables. Profiteers, whores, and sailors. Americans,
Poles, and Jews shading off into Germans. llany of the
Poles with a veneer of Americanism. At night, drunk
as swine, they demonstrate in the dance-halls a
charrning combination of American and Polish facets of
intoxication. Eastern Europe under the influence
of llilson. 11oney flies; gold delirium. Such a
circus hasn't been seen for years,7D
Kessler, bitterly opposed to racism and anti-Semitism,
cosmopolitan to his very roots, had his own memory of better
times. A man of unusual self-knO\vledge, he had his defenses
against such intrusions of fantasy-conditioned hatred (for such
it was and, no doubt understandably so) into his cognitive
processes. Others, however, had no such defenses and, indeed,
might have condemned them as cowardly if they did.
For many of the German right, the fantasy of a unified,
Volk-cornrnunity, grounded in the past and embodying the noble
principles of the real Germany, led them to view Judaism as a
disruptive, alien, unuatural force. Liberals, as we have seen,
displayed the same tendency from time to time; but; for the most
part, cor.Jrnitments to republicanism and "tolerance," no matter
how tenuous these might have . been, served an inhibiting function.
No such inhibitions exited on the right. llere, one often heard
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the call for a true, natural "German socialism." This variety of
secialism, cerparate in nature, had been betrayed, Max Hildebert
Boehm declared, by a new form of socialism--non-German Marxist
socialism. The bearers of this form were not hard to find. "The
Jew," Boehm maintained, "has German social history beginning
anew in Paris in 1739."71 German socialism rooted in the German
community, was natural; "Jewish socialism," for such it was in
Boehm's eyes, was not, but was, rather, grounded in events and
institutions foreign to Germany. For those concerned with a
streng, deep-rooted state, Asiatic examples of a lack of
state-consciousness served as warnings. "Politically, the Jews
are typically Asiatic," Helmut G!lring stated in a 1922 essay.
Their conception of state-life was limited in the extreme. Judah
and Israel seldom were able to get tagether on anything of
importance. "Beyond its law tablets, this indifferent people
feels itself uncertain when oppos~d to the imponderabilities of
state; it becomes · theoretical and fanciful!"72
The fear of some sort of Asian incursion into Germany in
particular and Europe in general was expressed by Charles E.
liaylan in his 1930 essay, "Die psychoanalytische Hethode." The
Hietzschean author was intensely disturbed by the threat posed
to Europea~ cultural values by a form of psychology that appeared
to appeal to the values of the "herd." While not opposed to
some aspects of psychoanalysis, its general tone suggested nonEuropean, Aryan roots. Indeed, Freudian psychoanalysis was
rep.resentative of a "growing Asiaticism" within Europe, the most
prominent representatives of which were Lenin and Freud . 73 The
bearers of the Asiatic influence utilized Christian terms such
as "equality, freedom, and justice" in a totally disingenuous
manner and \vere prima.rily concerned wi th tearing down others in
order to elevate themselves, such efforts stemrning from a
"deeply rooted inferiority complex."74 There were positive
aspects to psychoanalysis, Haylan declared; a new means of
"spiritual, creative love" (words which would have turned
lüetzsche's stomach) had been made available. 75 However, Asiatic,
foreign influences, so visible in Freud, had to be dispensed
with before those liberating elements could be efficacious. In
his article, Maylan did not use the ward "Jew"; but, to people
whose intellectual perceptions had been honed on the whetstone
of archetyping, the implication had to have been obvious.
Contempt for and fear of "alien" influences was generally
centered on the Jews. As might be expected, however, the French
came in for their share of criticism. An article written by
Y~rl Toth in 1921 was devoted to just such a critique.
In large
measure this piece placed emphasis upon the womanish nature of
French culture as contrasted with the masculine German culture.76
The weibliche character of the French culture was expressed in
its shameful and shameless pursuit of luxury and the entirely
artificial and theoretical nature of French freedom. German
freedom, on the other hand, was concrete and manly, and this
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could be seen in l~nt's categorical imperative.77 The French,
Toth declared, were completely unnatural. In fact, they feared
nature, and this could be seen in the unnatural aspect of their
chateaux and in the shameful way in which defenseless animals
were abused on the streets of Paris.73 Thus, on the one hand
there was German culture--masculine, natural, dedicated to
good, hard work. On the other one could ponder its French
counterpart--feminine, unnatural, dedicated to the pursuit of
luxury. In nmny ways, the accusations hurled at the Jews by
Otto \leininger around the beginning of the twentieth century
were now being expressed by Karl Toth with regard to the French. 79
In any case, we can see that Toth's 1921 article fit the
general fantasy pattern we have considered.
Criticism of the Jewish religion as embodying the character of a
soulless, mundane people was not new. In this regard, the
writings of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Richard \lagner come to
mind. Weimar Germany saw no lack of such criticism. One critic,
T. R. von Hoesslin, went so far as to declare that the Jews
had had nothing to do with the emergence of monotheism; that
this could not have originated out of "the psychic developmental
materials of the Jewish people. "30 The distinctly inferior
character of Judaism and the Jewish people was revealed in l1oses'
obtaining the ten commandments; The Jews had to be told to
obey. The ethical, good life could not come naturally out of
this people.ül Furthermore, "the transeendental feeling which
seeks out the divine in the innermost recesses of the world is
foreign to Judaism."::12 Emphasis upon the transeendental
experience came to the West only through Jesus Christ, who
von lloesslin compared to Lao Tze. In view of the author's
attitudes towards Judaism, it is legitimate to ask whether he
was concerned with separating Christianity from previously
assumed Old Testament roots, something that was hardly unprecedented
in German cultural history. In any case, the Jews had been
represented as being a mundane, unnatural people who, as to be
expected, produced a religion congruent with its character.33
\lhen the Nazis came to power, several of. the right-wing figures
we have considered became ardent s.upporters of the new regime.
Indeed, as we have seen, Ernst Krieck joined the party as early
as 1920. Most, however, did not, and Rudolf Pechel, the outspoken
editor of the Deutsche Rundschau, affered editorial and personal
opposition to such an extent that he eventually was thrown into
a concentration camp. There could be no questioning of his
courage or commitment to what he perceived to be conservative
principles. Pechel survived his experience and, after the war,
was one of the first to come out with a history of the German
resistance movements against llitler and to offer, along with
Friedrich l1einec!ce, something of an explanation for the "German
catastrophe." If one examines these writings, however, a
strange, rather disturbing phenomenon becomes apparent: Hardly
any time at all was expended on considering the Hazi solution
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to the "Jewish problem."ß4 In this regard, Deutschenspiegel is
particularly intriguing. On page 7 of the work, Feehel calls
upon Germans to undergo a moral revolution in order to lift
themselves out of the swamp of the Hazi period, a swamp which
has become known through "names such as Auschwitz, Maidanek,
Belsen and other concentration and extermination camps."ßS
From this point on, however, the author makes no mention of the
final solution and, instead, devotes hirnself to a crude sort
of psychohistorical--at times, racist--explanation of why German
history took the fated course it did. With great passion, Pechel
attacked those elements of the German national character that
he saw as being dangerous. Most prominent among them were
"disunity, lack of external and inner discipline • • • constriction
of feeling • • • lack of healthy human understanding as /ä7
regulative of action." These unhealthy characteristics were
responsible for the German people remaining spiritually rent
asunder, characterized by wide swings between sentimentality
and brutality. 86
Throughout Deutschenspiegel, Peche! gives no indication that
he was aware that he hirnself was utilizing a thorougiüy racist
approach to attack a racist regime. Perhaps, though, this was
due to the fact that, inspite of his supposed concern over the
existence of concentration and extermination camps, Nazi racism
was not really a pressing issue for him. llhat seemed to disturb
him the most was the shame that had somehow been brought upon
Germany. The role of the Jews in all of this did not seem to
matter very much. For Pechel, as for the liberal Meinecke,
World llar II, after all, had been a German catastrophe. If one
examines the post-llorld llar II wri tings of some of those who both
sustained and derived comfort from the great bourgeois fantasy
of Weimar Germany--the pursuit of that timeless, nonpolitical,
unified natural Germany that stood above and beyond military
disaster and political confusion--one must be impressed by just
how little the fate of Jews really mattered to these people.
Certainly, what happened to them was unfortunate, and they never
denied that the Holocaust had taken place. At the same time,
however, their rather obvious lack of interest in the fate of
European Jewry can only assist in illuminating further the
prominence of an almost automatic, indeed "natural," antiSemitism during the lleimar period. Somehow, in the natural
ordering of things, the Jews had no real positive role to play.
Until now, we have been concerned with a general bourgeois
fantasy, not, in a specific sense, with something that can be
viewed as a religion. \le have noted, however, that several
right-wing thinkers were interested in the restoration of a
sort of religion of nature or thought, that politics itself had
to be infused with a religious spirit. The National Socialists
have been described as maintaining allegiance to no ideals, as
being purely pragmatic in character. In one area, though,
their allegiance to principle was obvious, and this was both due
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to and rationalized by a religion of nature in large measure
grounded in bourgeois fantasizing but, assuredly, much more
consistent.
Many commentators have emphasized the reli~ious or pseudoreligious character of National Socialism.u7 Few, however, have
described it for what it really was--a religion of nature. Why
this has been the case is not easy to fathom. Perhaps, in
their emphases upon the necessity of living in harmony with
nature and in their extolling of the "natural man," the national
Socialists appear to be too close for comfort to present-day,
liberal environmentalism. In any case, those National Socialists
who mattered--the ones in the upper and middle echelons--adhered
to a weltanschauung that can only be described as being religious
in character.
For Hitler, the National Socialist movement drew its strength
"from a complete and comprehensive recognition of the essential
nature of life."ill3 National 3ocialist adherence to natural laws,
the "laws of life," as many :~azis chose to put it, allowed for
the emergence of a new human being. "The new man is among us!"
Hitler declared. "He is here! I will tell you a secret. I
have seen the vision of the new man--fearless and formidable.
I shrank from him."39 For llitler, his role and that of the
National Socialist movement was somewhat uncertain. At times,
he seemed to think that he was the new man, at others he more
modestly viewed hirnself and the movement, or only hims.El.lf, as
representing an incubation stage in the emergence of the new man.
One thing can be said for certain: llitler saw the movement as
embodying laws of life. Thus, it took precedence over any given
political or institutional forms, inchiding the state. If,
he declared in a Statement of 1933, "the formal bureaucracy of
the state should prove itself to be unsuitable to solve a
problem, the German nationwill set in action its living
organizations in order to assist in the breakthrough of its
life's necessities."90 The state, that unit hallowed by German
political and philosophical speculation, would take second place
to the demands of a people's "life necessities," demands that
could only be met by those acting in conscious fulfillment of
the laws of life.
The authentic grounding in life, which many National Socialists
saw as the primary strength of their movement, allowed them
to justify the intervention of ideology into all areas of
public affairs. The notion of value-free objectivity in science,
for example, was absurd. After all, according to Bernhard Rust,
minister of education, The National Socialist weltanschauung
emerged from life, and any true science was possible only on
"the basis of a living weltanschauung."91 These views were
echoed by the Nazi youth leader Heinz \lolff, who declared that
the so-called objectivity characteristic of sicentific liberalism
served to mal~e people forget that science was the creation of
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living men, of men of flesh and blood.9 2 Throughout the Nazi
writings that we have thus far considered, we can observe a
fundamental assumption; namely, that there existed a permanent
natural order of things upon which the National Socialists were
able to draw. This, in reality, elevated them above politiaal
parties and the state and, as Hitler hirnself often maintained,
gave them a religious caste. "Man," Ilitler once proclaimed,
"is God in the maldng. "93 This Statement has a curiously Hegelian
quality about it. For Ilitler, however, this new man was not
that being which emerged out of reflection upon the l.Jorld Spirit' s
peregrinations through history but, rather, that authentic
being who was grounded in nature, in laws of life.
It was this emphasis upon immersion in life--a notion which, in
many ways, had a pragmatic dimension that made everything done
in the name of National Socialism ultimately self-justifying-which had proved so attractive to Martin Ileidegger. Such was
also the case with Ernst Krieck who, having joined the National
Socialist party in 1923, really came into his own as one of the
official pedagogues after Hitler came to power. "The age <if
'pure reason,' of 'absolutes' and 'value-free' sciences has
ended," he declared in a 1933 work.94 Science now had tobe seen
as taking part "in the general shaping of life, the technical
shaping of the external ordering of life as well as in the internal
forming of human beings. "95 A new German humani ty had to be
created, one in which all elements of life, including science,
had to have roles to play.96 German efforts to carry out those
tasks necessary in this process had been continuously threatened.
"Rome, the French, Jews, Americans, to the point of niggerification,
/Niggertum? have attempted again and again to overthrow German
fulfillment."97 The answer to these threats was, of course,
Hitler, a man who "has succeeded in tapping a subterranean
vein of v1llkisch life and channeling the spring-source."9ß
The new German human being who Krieck saw as ernerging in his
time was what he called the gebundene Uensch--literally, the
"linked man"--a person tied to the Volk-cc\mmunity through the
National Socialist party. Total, natural harmony was his happy
lot. The "gebundene Uensch sees hirnself suspended between
mother earth and father heaven, between darkness and light • • •
and is a living whole in which life and becoming, task and toil
fulfill themselves . • . . The gebundene Mensch is the aristocratic
man, the man of race, breeding, and honor."99 Tobe sure, the
problems confronting such a person were immense--degeneration of
family ties, decline in the number of children, and the unnatl.ural
situation that had been created by the enfranchisement of
women.lOO Yet, by 1936, it would appear that Krieck had become
positively ecstatic over the role that National Socialism was
playing in bringing tagether all aspects of life.101
Immersion in life, in some sort of natural order that was timeless
and yet German--a concern that had been so prominent in bourgeois
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circles during the \veimar period--was enticing to all manner of
folk. The cleric, Fricdrich Gogarten, who even in his efforts
to reconcile religion with the new order did take pains to
differentiate between Christianity and National Socialism, had
to declare that the movement came "out of the core of human life"
and thus embraced the totality of existence.l02 The person
unwilling to accept the fact that true freedom came only with the
rule of a state governed by the National Socialist movement was
only an "abstract individual. nl03 Despite Go garten' s unwillingness
to see Christianity and Volkstum as being exactly one and the
same thing, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he
perceived National Socialism as somehow sanctifying national life.
For the l<ational Socialist minister of agriculture, \Jalther
Darre', there was no need to qualify an enthusiastic approval
of blood-and-soil efforts to bind all Germans together in
embracing Voll~stum. Past and present would become as one "when
the farmer's plow again breaks soil over the graves of his
ancestors."l04 A sense of community had been tarnished by
liberals. In this . regard, Darre' attacked the liberal conception
of marriage. Such a conception encouraged naked egotism, and
racial needs often had been forgotten. The sole purpose of
marriage, Darr~ declared, was the child. In fact, the child
was sacred, and its nurturing was the "ethical demand of our
time."l05 In this context, Darre', in his enthusiasm, went beyond
German bourgeois taste in declaring that children were so
important that circumstances of birth, that is, legitimacy or
illegi timacy, were really of .no consequence .106 The role of
the woman--presumably either within or out of wedlock--was
crucial. Like a farmer, she had to bring things to frui tion. If
her blood was not of the highest quality, the son would be sickly
and not be able to attain the level of his father.l07 Darre',
of course, represented an element of bucolic romanticism in the
National Socialism movement which, in many respects, had to be
dispensed with over time.l08 Nevertheless, in his concern for
the maintenance and advancement of an assumed natural order, or a
time-hallowed Volkstum rather beyond rational analysis, he
shared several of the more prominent concerns of Germany's
bourgeoisie. As a Nazi, he adhered to a religion of nature,
rejecting Christianity which, he declared, had introduced an
unnatural sense of shame with regard to the human body.l09
It was, perhaps, in the realm of anti-Semitism that the National
Socialists went well beyond the expectations of liberal and
conservative \veimar-period bourgeois wri ters and p4blicists.
Certainly, few of them could have anticipated anything quite
like the final solution. In one crucial way, however, the Hazis
shared--and admittedly elaborated upon--an attitude that was
rather general among bourgeois circles in \leimar Germany--this
was their view of the Jews as "unnatural," as somehow not belonging
to an authentic order of being.
"The Jew," Ilitler proclaimed, "is the antiman, the creature of
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another god. He must have come from another root of the human
race." Aryan and Jew were totally different beings. "The two
are as widely separated as man and beast. Not that I would call
the Jew a beast. He is much further from the beast than we
Aryans. He is a creature outside nature and alien to nature."llO
According to Hitler, the Jew was far ~emoved from that natural
world of soil-bound men and ingenuous animal life, which was
the life-sustaining habitate of the Aryan. The only conceivable
way, as Hitler saw it, in which the Jews could influence the
natural world was as a disease; the Jew was a virus, and "the
discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions
that have taken place in the world • • • • llow many diseases
have their origin in the Jewish virus!"lll For Heinrich Himmler,
"the Jew is a parasite which, like the parasites of the animal
and plant world, lives from the strengths and productive labor
of host peoples. The Jew is the blood-sucker of the world."112
As Darre', the ingenuous agriculturalist·, saw it, even the best
soil could s~stain weeds (Unkraut), and the hard-working farmer
had to be on guard against them. The various decrees against
the Jews served a valuable function because, "in the peasant
sense," they served to "free us from the weeds of Jewish
blood. ull3 These weeds--the Unkraut, which was perhaps
materialism to Rathenau?--had been responsible for the unnatural
shame that people had come to associate with their bodies,
something that had come out of a decomposing Jewish influence.
"Jewish desecration of German women corresponded to the witchpersecution of the church; both have a common spiritual
father--Jahwe!"ll4
An interasting link between the National Socialist religion of
nature and general bourgeois fantasizing about the natural
community was provided by Wilhelm Stapel, the conservative
thinker. Stapel had emphasized the natural character of the Volkcommunity. As in the case of Krieck, his star rose when the
Nazis came to power, and he produced a number of works on the
"Jewish Question" and related topics. On November 21, 1936, he
delivered an address entitled "Literarische Vorherrschaft der
Juden in Deutschland 19lß bis 1933." In this speech, which was
presented at the University of Munich, Stapel declared that the
Jews, particularly during the Weimar period, did not want to
become "artificial Germans," but rather "attemoted to make the
Germans into artificial Jews. nll5 In this context, it did not
matter whether a Jew was an assimilationist or a Zionist.
"Assimilation and Zionism were two methods of constructing a
domination. They were two ways of a secularized messianism."116
Jews, he went on to say, produced only mediocre original work
and functioned mainly in a negative sense, as critics. Stapel
gave several reasons for this, the most important of which was
that the German language could never be their language, even
if they were raised to speak it from childhood. It was not
something which "had come out of the Jewish substance, the Jewish
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soul, and the Jewish bodily structure /T7." 117 Furthermore,
Jews, living as they have been in the ncaluth," have had "a
streng need for discussion and polemic. Through polemic, one
attempts to make the other inwardly uncertain in order that he
accepts whatever one brings him. ull3 Through polemic and through
their hold on the publishing houses, the Jews had attempted to
interfere with, if not stunt, the natural development of German
literature. It was the Jews who were responsible for bringing
in the degenerating influence of -psychology into the literary
world, as well as "denatured" liberalism.ll9 In a most revealing
~ttack on Jewish emancipation, Stapel declared that the greatest
mistake had been to consider the Jews as a man when, in reality,
he remairred the same Jew "which he was from the beginning."120
There can be little doubt that, in its claim upon "laws of life,"
in its nature worship, and in its concern to bring about the age
of the new man, National Socialism viewed itself in well-nigh
religious terms, even though the movement often spoke in a
positivistic idiom. Host assuredly, its primary mission--the
destruction of a foe that was "an enemy to life"--was a sacred one.
In these aspects, of course, national Socialism certainly went
beyend the fantasizing of most Weimar-period bourgeois, whose
dreams of a timeless, yet naturally German community did not
involve the physical destruction of those who were not perceived
as having a role in it. At the same time, though, one must
appreciate the fact that for many liberals as well as conservative
and radical right-wing thinkers of lleimar Germany, Jews were
unnatural, deracinated beings who really did not have a positive
role to play in German life. For liberals at least, toleration
was the rule. This concept, however, had a rather vapid ring
to it under the circumstances.
To be sure, the notion of the Jews as being the unnatural bearer
of a mechanistic, soulless civilization had a long pedigree in
German cultural history. In the lleimar Republic, however,
itself born of military disaster and international humiliation
and beset by problems of pluralism to which most Germans were
unaccustomed, fantasizing about a presumed natural order of
things--and about those who were in one way or the other
unnatural--did have more sharply defined political consequences
than previously. llany of those who fantasized, of course, did
not support Hitler, and a few even struggled agairrst him. For
most bourgeois Germans, however, the fate of the Jews did not
provide much of a rallying point. Indeed, as we have seen, even
after the conscientiously carried out slaughters of World ~~ar II,
it was not an issue which one pondered, except to the extent
that the role of the Jews in bringing this disaster upon themselves
had to be considered. Hazism attained victory in its most
meaningful campaign not entirely because millians of people lent
it unqualified support at all times. Of equal importance was
the cold fact that in its putatively "life-grounded" religiosity,
it represented a concretization of bourgeois fantasizing about
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a natural, soil-bound order and a rejection of those who, at the
very least, did not belang to.this order or at most threatened
its emergence. Of course, most bourgeois Germans were incapab1e
of performing those monstrous acts carried out by Einsatzgruppen
(mobile killing units) and concentration camp functionaries. The
removal of a people, however, which seemed to exist as an
unassimilable entity within the body of the German Volk, was
not a painfuL.thing to bear. In the end, the establishment of a
natural order would assure that all would be set aright.
In 1920, there appeared a booklet entitled Die Unbesiegten. The
work was a collection of sayings and aphorisms gleaned from
leading figures in German cultural and political history. It
was meant to offer encouragement to a defeated and disheartened
German public. As far as the great bourgeois fantasy of return
was concerned, an anonymaus saying can perhaps be perceived as
being of some significance: "Der konnnt am weitesten, der nicht
weiss wohin er geht." "He goes furthest who knows not where
he is going. "121
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Failures of Thought in
Holocaust Interpretation
GEORGE KREN AND LEON RAPPOPORT

11
•••
and now the only visions of the world that can be taken
seriously are those that come through the irrevocably ash-darkened
prisms of post-Holocaustsense and sensibility. 11 Mistakenly
seen as mere rhetoric by some readers, this closing statement
of our bookl was in fact meant to be understood quite literally
as the thematic conclusion following from analyses of the
failures of law, religion, and science--the three pillars of
Western civilization--to prevent the Holocaust. This chapter
is an elaboratio!l and extension of the theme in question, with
the primary focus of inquiry being the impact of the Holocaust on
meaning as such, especially in connection with the general failure
of Holocaust schalarship to recognize this problern as the source
of a painfully clearcut inability to offer meaningful interpretation. Despite its importance, and perhaps .because of it, we use
the phrase 11 meaningful interpretation 11 here, in a very general
fashion,as being composed of two elements: explanation and
exegesis; the former involving the familiar what-leads-to-what
type of causal analysis, and the latter involving less familiar
questions of 11 what has changed, 11 and 11 how come? 11 It is especially
on this point that Holocaust schalarship has been most inadequate.

This is not to say that all scholars are totally blind to the
problem. Friedlamler, for example, reviewing efforts to make
teaching of the Holocaust an academic subject, suggested that any
serious consideration of the Hazi mass murder, as well as other
aspects of warfare and genocide in the twentieth century, forces
re-examination of the J!:nlightment idea of progress, and he argues
further that historians and social scientists have only 11 made
adjustments 11 while maintaining the ideal. 2 In another context,
Feingold, after examining the question of responsibility of guilt
for the Holocaust in admirable detail, concluded that the ultimate
mistake of the Jews was their naive belief in the reality of 11 a
spirit of civilization, a sense of humanitarian concern in the
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world, which could have been rnobilized to save Jewish lives. " 3
These rernarl~s, like our own quoted above, point to a problern that
has generally been ignored, avoided, or not perceived at all,
narnely that the Holocaust contradicts or calls into question all
forrns of knowledge suggesting that it could not occur. This we
call "the problern of rneaning"; its unacknowledged presence so
distorts and contarninates prevailing interpretations of the
Holocaust as to warrant the critical indictrnent "failure of
thought."
THE !1EANING PROBLml
If t:1e analysis to follow is approxirnately correct, then future
scholars will probably say of the tlventieth-century intellect
that its continuing failure in the face of the Holocaust was
the first unrnistakable sign of its collapse. And they rnight
further observe of that intellect or "rnentali ty" (wi th appropriate
footnoting of i ts early cri tics: 3ietzche, !Zafka, Kierkegaard,
Heidegger, Burckhardt, IJittgenstein, and others), that having
ernerged during t:1e preceding two-hundred-year rise of the rnass
industrial era, only to see that era ending in unprecedented rnass
destruction, the cornplex of rnoral and material values and logic
systerns defining the modern universe of rational thought, whereby
intellect could interpret the human condition, was now either
speechless or reduced to ernp ty .arp,umen ts over its own irnpotence.
The problern of meaning to be exarnined here constitues an irnportant
basis for the foregoing judgment and rnay be perceived in t:1e
Holocaust literature in various forrns, ranging frorn concrete
symptoms of scholarly frustration and distress, to confusions
rooted in uncritical acceptance of established epistemology.
The concrete symptoms are quite blatant, but they have for the
most part been carefully ignored, perhaps because they lead too
quickly to a threatening recognition of what rnight be terrned the
paradox of Holocaust knowledge; narnely, that the more one comes
to know ab out "the fac ts," the less one seerns able to conclude
about their rneaning. Virtually no irnportant question that has
been studied in factual detail had yielded answers on which
there is a satisfactory consensus. Instead, just the opposite
appears to be the case: After detailed study has been
accomplished, the disagreernents over interpretation becorne rnore,
rather than less severe. This condition is ubiquitous in the
literature, as a few salient exarnples should dernonstrate.
Increasing knowledge about. the Judenrat authorities and the Jewish
police organizations associated with them has reduced rather than
enhanced the possibility of reachin~ any general conclusion as to
whether those involved should be condemned as collaborators or
respected for their intention öf trying to "save what could be
saved." The recently published lla:rsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow,
for example, nal~es a strong case supporting many of his actions
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as head of the ghetto conununity. From his standpoint, some of the
most contemptible Jews were those leaders who used their Connections
to desert the conununity and escape to America. 4
The role of anti-Semitism in the :Iolocaust grows ever-more debatable
as knowledge accUI,mlates. Helen Fein' s recent quantitative
analysis argues that the best predictor of Jewish destruction
in the various Hazi-controlled territories was the degree of
prewar anti-Semitism in those territories.~ But Poliakov suggests
that such anti-Semitism is better understood to be merely
symptomatic, not causal, 0 and our own review of this matter,
including Fein's data and methods, led us to maintain that
indigenous government autonomy under the Hazis was the best
predictor of Jewish survival.
The problem of Je1vish resistance also remains ambivalent. 11aterial
ernerging over the past decade has shown that violent resistance
was far more prevalent than previously had been known. But all
the new information about extraordinary efforts toward armed
resistance has only succeeded in undercutting the prior concensus
tha t violent resis tance 1vas vi rtually impossible. No amoun t
of new infor~ation, however, can alter the still-unresolved moral
dilenunas posed by violent resistance.
Another exemplary case involves the debates over presumed SS
psychopathology. Our own interpretation, based partly on the
excellent documentary studies of Boehnert and Segev7 as well as
other sources, argues that t:1e vas t majority of SS, even those
in the murder camps, were essentially normal and nuot be understood as such. This raises serious questions about the prevailing
psychiatric conception of normalcy per se, however. Insofar
as psychiatric inferences of psychopatholo gy depend less upon
actions than circumstances, even extreme violence may 'not be
judged "abnormal."
There is aa almost endless supply of examples like these showing
that as further knowledge accumulates, the important substantive
and moral issues not only slip further away from direct analysis
and interpretation, but often become transformed in the process,
sometimes to emerge, like born-again Christians, as neat, lawabiding vehicles for the display of methodological cliches. But
concrete manifestations of the problern of meaning are not limited
to instances in which additional evidence tends to obscure and
deform the very questions it was supposed to resolve. In other
cases, where the points in question are not open to empirical
investigation, meaning can become lost in the labyrinths of
scholarly discourse.
A relatively pure example of the latter may be seen in the
controversy over whether or not the Holocaust should properly
be defined as a genocide of the Jews, in which they became
his torical victims "like all the ot:1ers": the Albigensians, the
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Armenians, the Japanese at Hiroshirna and Hagasaki, the Arnerican
Indians, the Carnbodians, and so on. The advantages of doing this
always seern quite obvious in the context of positivist social
science, since it opens the way for cornparative studies which
rnay then yield a general rnodel of genocide that can be applied to
all cases. Indeed, there is already at least one such study
that has received high praise for introducing an ahistorical
descriptive theory of genocide developed for the case of the
Armenians.3
The disadvantage >Df portraying the Ilolocaust as genocide is
that this conception robs the event of its uniqueness. As ßauer
and others have argued, the policies leading to the destruction
of the European Jews and the circurnstances under which it was
carried out are profoundly different frorn all other cases of
genocide, and even in terrns of nurnbers killed, the Holocaust is
unique. 9
The ques tion, therefore, rerna.ins: \las the Holocaust unique, or
rather (rnerely?), a genocide like all bhe others? It is a very
significant question because depending upon how it is answered,
the general orientation of interpretative analysis will obviously
vary a great deal.
In a comprehensive review of relevant scholarly perspectives on
this "enigrna of uniqueness," the Eckardts can reach no irnportan t
conclusions.lO Leaving no apparent intellectual stone unturned,
however, they proceed to discuss the philosophical, theological,
and political ramifications of the enigrna in accord with eight
different conceptual irnplications for its rneaning, and they end
by rnoving alvay frorn the original question, suggesting that what
it really signifies is a problernatic relationship between social
ethics and sociology of knowledge. llhatever else is accornplished
here, it seems clear that the rneaning of the original, difficult
question under consideration eventually gets lost in the abstract
discourse it has provoked. Moreover, it is exernplary for our
present purposes to emphasize that the Eckard't s never consider
that if the Holocaust is in fact a uniquely new developrnent in
the history of llestern-civilization, then its occurrence rnay
(1) disconfirrn the idea of social ethics as a useful category
of thought, and (2) demonstrate t:1e obsolescence of sociology of
knowledge as a useful rnode of social inquiry.
Up to now we have been concerned to point out sorne relatively
conc.r ete symptorns of the problern of rneaning and have noted a
few salient exarnples. These ~xarnples and others like thern
eventually create the necessity to look deeper. Given the
manifest difficulties of interpretation cited, the focus of
attention shifts quite naturally away frorn substantive questions
and toward underlying conceptual structures by which they are
formulated. The problern of rneaning then irnposes itself in terrns
of abstract theory and/or episternology. Ilence there ernerges a

Failures of Thought in Holocaust Interpretation

381

more basic, global question of meaning: Can it be that satisfactory interpretation of the lloloaaust has been prevented not
by confusion over subject matter (uncertain evidence, biased or
ambivalent forms for its articulation) but by confusion about
the conceptual tools applied to the subject matter? It is our
contention that this is, in fact, the case, and that it
ultimately arises from the inevitable failures of a post-Holocaust
schalarship that has largely been conducted on the basis of a
pre-Holocaust epistemology.
The limitations of this epistemology generate problems of meaning
at all levels of Holocaust scholarship. For the moment, however,
it is sufficient to identify the rudimentary source of the problern
as lying in the prevalent tendency to treat normative assumptions
of historical explanation as if they were absolute. The specific
aspects of epistemology in question here are commonly accepted
psychosocial-historical logic systems that are based upon
es.tablished definitions of, and distinctions between, facts,
theories, and value Statements. Like all abstractions, these
conceptual structures are essentially reifications, but as
successful reifications supported by wide consensus, they remain
above suspicion when phenomenal contradictions occur. Thus, to
consider a simple illustration, it is possible to analyze the
Holocaust by placing the facts of repression and then destruction
of the Jews in a plausible historical sequence or chronology
based on a theory of anti-Semitism. (That is, cause: Jews are
conceived by their persecutors as evil deniers of Christ;
effect: they deserve punishment.) normative explanation of
the Holocaust as the consequence of anti-Semitism is thereby
attained, and interpretation--the meaning of the Hoiocaust-follows directly in terms of the issues associated with antiSernitism; most generally, how to prevent it. Ilence the
explanation appears to be virtually equivalent to the meaning.
llhat is rnissed here, and alrnost entirely ignored in the
literature as well, is the question of how the world, including
anti-Semitism, rnust be seen differently after the Holocaust.
In cases where this question of meaning is acknowledged, it is
frequently by-passed via appeals to the lirnits of historiographic
competency; as if by referring to imponderable issues of
episternology posed by encounters with mind boggling horrors,
one might properly be excused for terminating the work of
analysis where it ought to begin. This position has the apparent
virtue of maintaining the appearances of scholarly rnodesty,
yet insofar as it denies the imperative to seek expansion of
existing boundaries of scholarly effort cornmensurate with the
magnitude of the problematic subject matter, it rnust be rejected
as a retrograde, defensive orientation. In our view, it is
precisely when the existing historical and psychosocial
imagination becomes most profoundly stymied that the demand for
creative analysis and interpretation should be most keenly felt
and acted upon.
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It also bears emphasis that the ~eaning problern we are concerned
with is not just a matter of philosophical speculation. Existing
interpretations of the Ilolocaust--or explanations masquerading
as interpretations--da not provide an adequate social, emotional,
or historical ground on which ordinary people may come to grips
with it as a human event defining our culture in the same way
as nuclear energy plants and Beethoven symphonies define our
culture. ilineteenth-century slavery, for example, was understood
to be a part of the culture that supported it, and was
conceptualized with enough clarity for ordinary persans to see
its moral, political, and socioeconomic - dimensions without much
difficulty. It was not an intimidating ho;uror to be avoided,
but a concrcte reality to be interrogated and resolved either
in terr~s of the prevailing world vicw or via the construction
of an alternative world view.
The foregoing viewpoints are articulated in the remaining
sections of this chapter, which is devoted to: (1) Contemporary
approaches to Holocaust interpretation, (2) liarxian and Freudian
morality, (3) failures before the Holocaust, and (4) a summary
and prospectus.
CONTE!1PORARY APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION
\lha t looks . . • like an interest in the nature of the
object being studicd or the area being explored, may
be primarily an effort by the organism to calm itself
down and to lower the level of tension, vigilance, and
apprehension. The unknown object is now primarily an
anxiety producer, and the behavior of examination and
prohing is first and foremost a detoxification of the
object, making it into something that need not be
feared (Abraham liaslow) .11
The literature of Holocaust interpretation may be ordered into
four readily identifiable and clearly different (if occasionally
overlapping) catep,ories. Briefly, and by reference to the primary
value orientations and assumptions each brings to the subject
matter, these categories or approaches are: (1) the established
liberal-eclectic, (2) the Freudian and neo-Freudian, (3) the
tiarxian and neo-I1arxian, and (4) the metaphysical-religious.
Although these approac~es obviously reflect opposing world views
based upon very different theoretical-philosophical convictions,
it is noteworthy that insofar as substantive Holocaust schalarship
is concerned, there is no major disagreement between them over
the large-scale historical evidence; they generally accept the
same thematic formulation of the problem-to-be-solved (How could
it happen? \fuat does it mean that it did?); and they similarly
tend to submerge the problern of meaning in ·the problern of
explanation. But the latter point will become clearer as we
examine each approach in turn.
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The Establis!1ed Libe:.:al-Eclectic Apnroach

It is difficult to specify the established orientation to Holocaust
schalarship and interpretation wit:10ut falling into tautological
semantics. That 'mich is the established, dominant way of doing
things is, mand.festly, "establishment" or "mainstream." And
the character of such scholarly work in Western European and
American society is typically liberal and eclectic. Ainong
historians and philosophers of science, T. S. :zuhn' s description
of "normal science" has become the accepted technical labe! for
the liberal-eclectic and usually positivist-empiricist theories
and methods of contemporary science. In Holocaust scholarship,
the equivalent of the normal science paradigm is made up of
narrative histories and empirical analyses grounded on the same
underlying liberal eclectic and positivist rationality underpinning the hard sciences.12
These works generally interpret the Holocaust as an aberration,
a terribly dark, bizarre event growing out of the irrational Nazi
racial ideology. In order to establish meaning, therefore, the
task of analysis then becomes one of reconstruction: deterraining
the sociohistorical sequence of what led to what and explaining
the peculiar circumstances of Hitler's rise to power as well as
the more specific details of the persecution of the Jews,
beginning with conventional anti-Semitism and ending in their
physical destruction.
This general approach presents the Holocaust as a kind of
historical morality play justifying the ideals of \Jestern liberal
democracy by showing what can happen when madmen gain power and
racism is allowed to prevail. Finer grain historical work is
devoted to explaining specific aspects of how the madmen came
to power and how they were able to impose their will (via the SS,
for example) once they had it. This explanatory effort has been
supported and enhanced by the qualitative case-history and
theoretical studies of psychiatrists and psychologists concerned
wi th the special psychodynamics of the Nazi leaders, their
appeal to the masses, and the ~:~akeup of their more devoted
followers. At a more general group level, quantitative empirical
research by sociologists and social psychologists has provided
abstract principles for the explanation of aberrant, destructive
behavior. Some of the better known examples here include studies
of authoritarianisra that have been applied to German national
character; studies of conformity and obedience to authority
indicating mechanisms whereby ordinary people might behave
atrociously; and more recently, Helen Fein's multiple regression
model of the l!olocaust, wherein the numbers of Jews killed in
various parts of Europe serve as the statistical criterion for
evaluating the weights assigned to such predictor variables as
levels of prewar anti-Semi tism and degrees of ~-lazi control.l3
All of the foregoing historical and psychological categories of
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work demonstrate the established, conventional orientation towards
the problern of interpretation, namely, that the meaning of the
Holocaust must be sought via explanations of hmv it came to pass.
And this tendency to equate meaning with explanation is frequently
confirmed by statements to the effect that by developing detailed
explanations, we will have the means of avoiding such terrible
horrors in the future. Implied, if not stated, is the idea of
the !Iolocaust as an aberration that can be prevented from ever
happening again if enough knowledge can be gained to explain how
it happened in the first place. The major thrust of this
interpretation is to minimize the significance of the Holocaust.
In contemporary textbooks, for example, it does not receive
close attention but is subsumed under the rubric of German
mistreatment of conquered populations. There is little room
here, ~uite obviously, for considering what it may mean to us
now as a factual event in the history of our civilization.
Above all, there is no hint of any reason why we should now feel
secure with explanatory interpretations of the Holocaust provided
in accord with the same intellectual parauigms which, earlier
on, failed to perceive its onset.
2.

The Freudian and neo-Freuuian Anuroach

The essential basis for Freudian and other psychiatric interpretations of the Holocaust is its blatant irrationality and
unspeakable cruelty. It is virtually c truism that wherever
gratuitously intense, "irrational" human· destructiveness has
appeared in the modern 1vorld since Freud, his theory has
invariable served as the main point of departure, if not the
entire structure, for rational psychosocial interpretation.
Freud hirnself set the pattern for this in his famous essays
"Why \lar?" and "Reflections on \lar and Death."
The Freudian formula, which .may be applied to irrational violence
across the board from individuals to groups, masses and nations,
holds that the more senseless the violence, the more obvious l y
it must be rooted in some form of instinct repression of which
the person, mass, or state is not consciously aware. Such
repression creates a burden of tension (anxiety, hostility),
which eventually Jaust be released (catharsis) either by turning
it inward (self-destruction, psychoses and neuroses) or outward
via creative redirection (sublimiation), or uestructive attack
upon a convenient target (scapegoat).
At both the individual and sociocultural levels, the specific
dynamics of experience (personal, historical) leading to the
conditions for violence will vary a great deal and be concealed
by all sortG of socially approved and/or institutionalized defense
mechanisms. Interpretation of violence, therefore, requires the
informed, discerning eye of a theorist who can penetrate to its
hidden sources.
Where sociocultural and historical trends unuerlying the Hc:!>.locaust
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are concerned, such writers as Erich Fromm and \lilhe1m Reich have
maintained that its sources lie, respectively, in the disruptions
of communal life produced by the industrial revolution and the
suppression of sexuality. Other aaalysts, such as Bruno Bettelheim
and Elie Cohen, who observed extraordinary behaviors among
prisoners and guards in the concentration and death camps, have
suggested that patterns of apparent violence and passivity may be
traced to the breakdown of inhibiting superego- and ego-protective
psychosocial mechanisms. And the !'lazi leadership, mainly Hitler,
but a nurober of high and medi1JIII rank leaders as well, has been
studied intensively via the method of psychobiography. Here too,
one may choose from among different interpretations, but the
general trend fits the basic model noted earlier, insofar as
personal repression and politicized forms of catharsis emerge
as prir.~ary sources of seemingly inexp licable moti ves.
The many significant insights provided by Freudian and neoFreudian works on Holocaust problems are well known enough to
be stipulated witlwut elalloration. It is not so obvious,
however, timt this approach is perfectly complementary to the
established historical and social science aberration interpretation.
In this connection, it is clear that an implicit, mutually
supportive division of labor prevails among conventional,
established forms of Holocaust scholarship. Historians and others
explain the aberrant circumstances opening the way for Nazi
power, while psychiatrists and psychoanalysts explain the
aberrant motives among the Nazis.
Taken together, and vie\~ed in a larger perspective, these two
approaches have obviously dominated Holocaust research, and their
explanatory theories have generally been accepted as the only
sensible interpretation.
3.

The Marxian Approach

There are so many different forms and facets to l!arx's own
writings, let alone those of his followers, imitators, and
interpreters, that no brief summary can claim to present a
comprehensive review of how Marxists (what kind? where? when?)
approach aay important event.
Concerning the Holocaust, however, the main :themes of virtually
all seriously committed 11arxian discussions are not so difficult
to identify because: (1) The destruction of the Jews per se has
not been seen as a very important topic for analysis; it is
usually subsumed and treated as .part of all the other ruthless
destruction caused by the Nazis. (2) The Holocaust is typically
portrayed as the final outcome of European anti-Semitism for
which a sound, well-established, socioeconomic explanation was
produced by llarx himself. And (3) HarKist scholars have avoided
direct engagement with the Holocaust not only because antiSemitism can be a "sensitive" political issue in the Soviet Union
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and many Third \/orld na tions, but also because it is difficul t
to find explanations for extraordinary irrational violence in a
very rational, economically-based social philosophy. Consequently,
although the following discussion is relatively brief, it
includes most if not all of the main themes of !1arxian Holocaust
interpretation.
In Harx's own theory of anti-Semitism, tile Jews were seen as
being both the historical progenitors of capitalism and also
among the chief victims of the industrial class society it
produced. Hore specifically and apart from its origins in the
early history of Christianity, Marx saw anti-Semitism nurtured
and encouraged by the ruling class, especially during times of
crises, because it served as a means of divertinp, the attention
of the masses away from recognition of tileir true condition,
and/or, away from awareness of the fact that the policies of the
ruling class were responsible for the crisis. In this sense,
anti-Semitism is a preeminent form of false consciousness. In
the modern era, moreover, anti-Semitism has a clear economic
function: ßy providing the Jews as a ready-made target for
popular discontent, it enhances the ability of the ruling class
(monopoly capitalism) to exploit its workers. The theory of
anti-Semitism, therefore, is directly linl;ed to the general
economic tbeory of capitalism.
Applied to the Holocaust, such Marxian t:1eory offers useful
guidelines for analysis of how the Hazis were able to exploit
anti-Semitism during their drive for power in the IJeimar Republic.
Once their control was established, however, and the Jews were
reduced to second class legal status via the Nurernburg laws (1935)
and the confiscatory forced emigration program, it would appear
that llarx's theory of anti-Semitism was more or less fulfilled,
although it is arguable that subsequent utilization of Jews
for slave labor is also relevant.
Uhy then kill Jews in wholesale lots when they could otherwise
have been exploited economically, if only by working them to
deat:1? llarxian theory has no real answer to t:üs question because
it does not conceptualize situations in which a genetically based
ideology of human destruction can take prolonged, systematic
priority over the achievement of economic benefits.
Some lfarxian theorists maintain that economic motives may be
found for the mass killings insofar as they involved not only
slave labor but also the collection from dead victims of their
hair, clot11ing, gold tooth fillings, and other valuables. Yet
such views do not stand up to close scrutiny; even the SS
econonics bureau objected to the mass killings as being inefficient
and uisruntive of important "'ar :>roduction activities.
Other llarxian writers have argued t:1at tl1e socioeconomic benefits
of Nazi anti-Semitism initially set the star.e for the Holocaust,
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but then become secondary to the !JOlitical significance of I!itler's
obsessive desire to eliminate the Jews. Thus, apart from his
personal hatreds, another reason for the Holocaust was his
realization that by killing so many people "for nothing," the
remairring subject peoples including the Germans, would be so
intimidated as to become willing servants to his policies. This
ignores the fact that the subject peoples were already intimidated
by methods other than the "final solution." Horeover, like so
many other 11arxian arguments--that the German capitalist ruling
class wanted the Jews got out of the way, or that this s!llme class
had to allow Hitler to kill the Jews as a reward for his anticommunist services in their behalf--this is quite strained and
lacks even surface plausibility as well as any Substantive
Support.
It is noteworthy, finally, that an ir.1portant critique of Marxian
efforts to apply the economic theory of anti-Semitism to the
Holocaust has been developed by Konrad Kwiet.l4 After reviewing
the work of East German (DDR) scholars, he observed that of
all the Nazi leadership, it was Hjalmar Schacht who best
represented the interests of German capitalism, yet it was Schacht
who resigned as finance minister in 1937 in protest agairrst the
excesses of ~-Holocaust Nazi anti-Semitism.
4.

The Hetaphysical-Religious Approach

The ranee of perspectives here is represented in exemplary fashion
by t:1e salient works of Emil Fackenheim, Elie iliesel, and Richard
Rubenstein. These authors have all engaged the problems of
explanation and meaning in explicit metaphysical terms, inclusive
of, but extending well beyond the relatively commonplace issues
of politico-religious theology. The latter have received attention
from ecumenical Christian philosophers such as Franklin Littel
but since their discussions have generally involved Christian
responsibility for anti-Semitism, and whether or not Jews should
still be held responsible for the death of Jesus and so forth,
we will not be concerned with them here.
The basic premise of Facl;:enheim' s extensive work is his assertion
that the Holocaust is a form of Jewish "sacred history"; an
epoch-making event comparable with the destruction of the Temple
by the Romans or the emancipation of Europe's Jews in the
eighteenth century. He explains the Holocaust as a culmination
of centuries of anti-Semitism, a more or less inevitable
catastrophe of Christian, not Jewish, civilization. In this
connection, he differs sharply from some traditional Jewish
theologians who see the mass destruction plainly as a punishment
from God visited on the Jews for their disobedience; their
assimilationist tendencies under the Enlightenment, and/or
their subsequent ~ionist politics. Fackenheim argues that the
destruction was too indiscriminate and cataclysmic to fit the
theology of punitive judgment.
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By the same token, he also rejects secularist views of the
Holocaust as an aherration or accident of history, since the
God of history would not permit such errors. Virtually hy a
process of elimination, then,Fackenheim comes to interpret
Ausc;lwitz as a manifestation of the will of God, a cornrnandment,
in fact, for Jews to hold fast to Judaism even in the face of
the most terrihle forces seeking to crush it.
Contradietory as it may seem to secular reason, and here
Fackenheim appeals to Hegelian dialectics for help against
lesser logic sys ter.JS, the Holocaust comrnandment is put forward
as a revelation insisting upon Jewish survival and rehirth, not
death. The birth and persistence of the State of Israel is at
least in part taken to he a realization of this cornrnandment.
But he further insists that all Jews who retain their Jewish
identity after t;l.e Holocaust when every claim to tationality
would see~demand its denial, whether or not they live in
Israel or practice their religion, are in this way hearing witness
against Hitler and thus against the corruption of \lestern
civilization that allowed him to flourish.
The general explanation and meaning of the Holocaust, therefore,
comes down to a form of dialogue hetween the disaster wrought
hy secular Christianity and the manifest mission of the Jews
to testify against it hy virtue of their continued existence.
For Fackenheim, Auschwitz represents an epochal hreakpoint in
Jewish history yet rernains metaphysically coterrninous with the
core theological history of the Jews.
Richard Ruhenstein takes a completely opposite position. Far
from heing conceivahle as a new, tragically heroic episode in the
on-going covenant hetween God and his chosen people, Ruhenstein
sees the Holocaust as the end of the covenant. The historical
Jewish God finis:1ed as another victim of Auschwitz. Having been
nearly ohliterated hy unrestrained secular power operating in the
service of traditional anti-Semitism allied with scientifically
rationalized raciscr, Jews now have no other choice except to
ahandon their God-Ideal and to seek to realize their values as
unaided hurnans t;1rough construction of their own cornrnuni ty. And
this cannot be accomplished if they continue in their traditional
diasporic indifferences to secular power.
Theologically and symholically, therefore, the meaning of the
Holocaust is the death of God. It is especially noteworthy,
however, that Ruhenstein argues this position not from the
outside, as a rationalist skeptic, hut from the inside, working
within the fundamental assurnptions of traditional Jewish faith.
Thus, if the historical Jewish God is so cruel as to ordain a
Holocaust or so impotent as to he unable to prevent it, that
God must in either case he rejected; the contract must he
ahrogated.

Failures of Thought in Holocaust Interpretation

389

neing neither a philosopher nor a theologian per se, the authority
of Elie lliesel 1 s writings on the rnetaphysical significance of the
Holocaust derives frorn the dedic.a tion of his art to his life
experience, first as prisoner and later as survivor of Auschwitz.
Unlike rnost survivors who have understandably rnade strenuous
efforts to distance thernselves frorn the Holocaust, lliesel had
devoted hirnself to staying in close tauch with it and has made
it the central focus of a rernarkable body of literature.
Apart frorn its literary value, however, this work demands
consideration in the present context because it epitornizes the
endless dialogue over rneaning between the living and dead victirns,
as well as their living or dead ideas of God. In many respects
that can hardly be enurnerated, 1Jiesel 1 s work has been to drarnatize
the experiential irnplications of the conflict between those who,
in one way or another, either take the position of Fackenheirn
or of Ruhenstein or else waver between thern. The extraördinary
tension of his work, therefore, follows frorn lliesel 1 s struggle
with the unresolvable paradox: One cannot, after Auschwitz,
accept that there is any immanent basis for rnorality either in
God or humanity; yet there is no way to bear life without the
presence of sornethinß in which to believe.
Caught in this paradox, the protagonists of \liesel 1 s fiction
rnay be seen as enacting a pilgrirn 1 s progress through all the
farniliar seenarios of desperat~on--withdrawn apathy, warfare,
rnurder, suicide, madness--only to find tllern ultirnately false
and usele$S.
In the end, the prototypical survivor rnakes a conditional peace
with hirnself through realization that the paradox of rnorality
is not a problern to be solved but to be lived with as a
condition of human life. Confronted with this condition, it is
the task of each individual to work out a pathway frorn despair
to affirrnation. IJiesel thus rnoves toward an existential posture
wherein doubts and dialogues concerning the Holocaust rernain
painfully vivid, yet becorne livable when both the severe lirnits
and redeerning possibilities of human thought and action are
finally grasped.
The similarities and conflicts between the three positions
outlined above should be readily apparent. In all of thern, of
course, arguments with and about God outweigh every other
consideration. This hermeneutical orientation is very
significant frorn our point of view, because unlike the other
approaches described, here one may see an immediate, alrnost
axiomatic rejection of pre-Holocaust civilization so far as
irnportant values and beliefs are concerned. Consequently,
distinctions between explanation and rneaning are all but wiped
out, and the salient issue becornes salvation; either for Jews-ingeneral or for their archetype in the person of the survivor.
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The four general approaches to Holocaust interpretation provide
in many ways a brief tour of the salient forms of culture
analysis presently practiced in Hestern civilization. That is,
regardless of whether the subject matter were somet(dng other
than the Holocaust, such as art, science, or male-female
relationships, one would still find that the gencral routes
toward interpretation, the approaches or forms of social
thought we have called liberal-eclectic, Freudian, Marxian,
and metaphysical, remain quite the same because they are really
all there is. l1oreover, although the dif ficul ties and limi ta tions
noted within each of these approac:1es when they are applied to
the :Iolocaust might easily show up in connection with other
subject matter, the unequivocal intensity of what is at stake
here cuts to the bone of every form of intcrpretation.
llhen the majority of established scholars, for example, speak of
the Holocaust as an extraordinary aberration, anu provide detaileu
accounts of how this aberration occurred, to the astonishment
of all concerned except for the handful of its central planners,
does this not mean, in effect, that even "advanced" human
societies can be so wildly unreliable that none of their pretentions
to "civilized" values can be taken for granted? And since the
very forms of throught and analysis employed to construct the
aberration interpretation are themselves intimately rooted in
and reflective of the civilized values and beliefs of the
Enlightenment now revealed to be untrustworthy (actually falsified
by evidence that they fail to prevent unspeakable destruction),
does this not discredit the basis for the interpretation? In
other worus, if one takes the aberration theme seriously enoup,h
to pursue its implications, it ultimately turns back upon itself,
calling into question the rationality it is based upon.
At the metaphysical-religious end of the interpretation spectrum,
a similar type of paradox also exists and causes very serious
problems, but of a different sort from those we have identified
for conventional scholars. Those who believe in a divine power
called "god" face a dilemma. If an event of such terrible
magnitude as the Holocaust could oecur by chance, as an
aberration, then can there be any divine power worthy of the name?
And if it was not a ra~dom event but actually ordained by a divine
will or power, then how can one accept such a power to be an
object of belief or worship?
Unresolvable, this dilemma imposes itself as a huge, intimidating
burden upon all Jewish theology and rnetaphysics. Like Sisy.phus
with his heavy stone, Jewish moral philosophers seem condemned
to be forever pushing this intolerable weight up the infinite
mountainside of existential meaning. l~or:se yet, those few who
honorably and knowingly acknowledge this burden (there are many
who do not) anu struggle to grapple it forward, are further
condemned to struggle with each other as well. Does the Holocaust
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affirm the presence and will of God for Jews to reestablish their
religion in its traditional horneland (Fackenheim)? Or does it
terminate the historical Jewish God ideal (Rubenstein), leaving
Jews only with the desperate necessity to maintain themselves in
a garrison state? Or does it, finally, only convey massively
irrefutable evidence of the existential emptiness within which
Jews either may or may not choose, by their own act of will, to
affirm a God ideal (\liesel)?
Goropared with the consensus prevailing among most established
secular scholars, who seem confortably at easc:. with the aberration
interpretation, the disputes and cont:radictions among the
metaphysical writers appear passionately arbitrary and perhaps
childishly irrational. But if our analysis to this point is
correct, t:1en the bitter epistemological struggles characteristic
of the metaphysical approach may ultimately be _iudged as the
r.wre appropriate line of interpretation because it at least
keeps alive the fires of critical controversy and painful
confrontation. The liberal secul3r approach, by contrast, goes
on with explanatory business-as-usual, almost as if nothing had
happened.
The two remaining approaches to Holocaust interpretation, via
Freudian and !1arxian .theory, have each, to a certain extent, been
assimilated to ti1e es tablished aberration theme of secular
scholarshi?. As we have seen, Freudian works explain the unusual
motives of the Nazi leadership in terms of psychopathology
(individual aberration), whereas !1arxian analyses of Hazi policies
offer explanations in terms of the economic benefits of antiSemitism (a collective false consciousness). Liberal eclectic
schalarship has no special difficulty joining these ideas
tagether and adding various empirical findings to demonstrate how
they combined in Germany to yield the preconditions for an
aberration as large as the Holocaust.
Freudian and liarxian thought can only be pasted tagether in this
fashion, however, so lang as the profound antagonisms between
them are put asiJe in favor of their technical explanatory points
of convergence. Thus, for example, l!arx's structural-economic
theory of anti-Seiui tism appears to blend easily into Freud' s
relevant psychodynamic formulations of projection and scapegoating.
Yet the two systems are not simply theories of social behavior
susceptible to reconciliation at the hands of clever scholars;
they are moral world views based on radically opposed fundamental
assumptions. The antithesis here is so intense that each
conceives the ot:1er to be symptomatic of the illnesses it aims to
correct! (To the l1arxist, Freudian theory and nractice is a
bourgeois self-indulgence diverting attention away from the real
material sources of human suffering; to the Freudian, !1arxist
theory and practice is a complex defensive rationalization and
compensation for failures of psychosexual development.)
Furthermore, it remains an unresolved :tarxian mystery how the
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conventional historical-economic forces behind anti-Semitism
could have gone amok to produce the Holocaust; and it remains
similarly a Freudian mystery how ~ersons so dominated by
pathological symptoms as Hitler and the other leading Nazis
could have come to control and preside over the reorganization of
a complex nation state. But there are problems with both systems
of thought that must be addressed in depth because they suggest
that the 11arxian and Freudian failures vis-a-vis the Holocaust
are rooted in their conceptualizations of morality.
UARXIAll AHD FREUDIAl< 110RALITY
In both 11arxian and Freudian thought, morality as such is generally
treated as an epiphenomenon; an artifact of the sociocultural
framewerk rather than a defining quality of the human condition.
There is no golden rule nor any other absolute standard
prohibiting any of the various forms of human destructiveness
to be found in either the Marxian or Freudian canons. Instead,
both relegate traJitional ideas of right and wrong to the status
of either primitive, religious Superstition,. and/or evolving
social norms serving to maintain existing power structures: of
the ruling class (for l:1arx), or t:1e patriarchal father (for Freud).
The general thrust of both systems, therefore, is to eliminate
or trivialize all conventional notions of ~oral responsibility by
revealing their sources in the oppressive economic and psychosocial
structures of society.
This is not to say that the Marxian and Freudian systems have no
moral dimension. llut their moral dimension is indirect; derivative
from their fundamental commitments to human liberation from
economic and psychosocial forms of oppression. The basic analysis
of morality presented in both systems emphasized that unless
special circumstances intervene, the ideas of rip,ht and wrong
prevailing in society and within individuals will remain beyond
the reach of deliberate, self-conscious control. Groups and
individuals will rcmain dominated by the morality associated with
their economic and psychosocial situation, unless they can reach
a new level of self-awareness via revolutionary activity or
psychoanalysis. Yet even in these exceptional Situations, the
liberty that may be experienced contains no special ethic except
group- and self-realization. To be liberated in these (Marxian
or Freudian) terms, therefore, is to be freed from any absolute
Standards of rigltt and wrong.
Such freedom can also carry with it an imperative to violate the
prior socially inculcated moral restraints against destructive
aggression, especially insofar as t:10se restraints may now be
perceived as instrumental to the prior state of oppression.
According to the liarxian system, destructive violence may in
fact be required in aid of the revolution; and according to some
branchcs of Freudian tlteory, personal violence (acting out) may
be construeJ as therapeutic catharsis in aid of ego development.
In both systems, it appears that normative morality is a
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disguised instrument of oppression that may be transcended;
but once a liberating transcendence is attained, morality becomes
quite problematic, something to be decided upon depending on
circumstances. It is precisely at this point, however, that the
locus of moral t :wught becomes external to the group or the
individual, since determinations of right or wrong can only be
made according to objective interpretations of circumstances.
These interpretations, of course, are attained by following the
guidelines of theory; either Harxian or Freudian as the case
may be. This is a major epistemological move away from the
traditions of religious metaphysics and liberal pragmatics. The
end result, manifestly, is that right and wrong are no langer
matters of internal conviction or reflexivity, but are, instead,
remote constructions of circumstaaces mediated by theory. Once
this epistemological quality of Marxian and Freudian thought is
understood, it becomes painfully apparent that, at the level of
daily moral praxis, they cannot provide any formal stipulations
defining right aad wrong behavior.
The many forr.~al similarities between Marxian a::1d Freudian
conceptions of morality may seem to contradict the prior critique
of eclectic schalarship by ignoring the antithesis between them.
Yet this antithesis can only be fully appreciated once the points
of formal similarity have been acknowledged, for it is in their
mechanisms and procedures of moral interpretation--their "rules
of the game"--that Marxian and Freudian thought stand in total
opposition to one another. In abrief, necessarily oversimplified
way, it may be said that the moral touchstone of Marxism is
economics; other things being equal, any activity enhancing the
extent to which workers can own and control their own productive
labor, thereby avoiding alienation, will be liberating and thus
morally goo•l. T;le touchstarre of Freudian morality is · effective
psychosexual development; other things being equal, activities
enhancing the individual's achievement of the psychosexual stage
of genitality will be liberating and thus morally good.
The antithesis here hardly requires elaboration, except to
specify that when they are applied at the level of common praxis,
the chief point of conflict between the two systems lies in their
radically different assumptions about the sources of human
motivation. Is it reducible to a matter of economics or
psychosexual needs and instincts? Should external material
circumstances be seen as the generative source of inner psychosexual development or vice versa? There is no adequate answer
to such questions, although compromise solutions have been
attempted by stepping outside of both systems. This was ti:ied
by critical theorists Adorno, Harcu3e, and others, but it leads
inevitably to another dilemma: If liberal thoup,ht is rejected
as being false in accord with llarxian and Freudian analyses,
and if the global exclusivity claimed by the Marxian and Freudian
systeras are both rejected in order to argue that both may be
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correct when they are considered within some hip,her level system
that neither one will accept, then what sort of thought system
has one arrived at? lfuat are the "rules of the game" in this
supra-llarxist-Freudian system that purports to embrace both of
them? The critical theorists could not answer this question,
except by attempting to convert the general strategy of
relentless llarxian-Freudian criticism into a philosophical system.
This was Adorno's aim in his final and most obscure work,
Negative Dialectics. By all accounts, including those of the most
devoted admirers of critical theory, it does not succeed in
constituting a new system.
FAlLURES BEFORE THE HOLOCAUST
It is not clear whether the palpable failures of Harxian and
Freudian t:1ought in tlle face of t:1e Holocaust should be conceived
as demonstrating that the two systems are altogether false in
their claims toward general interpretations of society or that they
are simply much more limited in their applicability to htnnan
affairs than their progenitors could possibly imagine. After
all, neither Harx nor Freud nor any of t:1eir c:üef exponents
could think that anything like the Holocaust might ever occur
at the center of European civilization. It is clear, however,
that neither l1arxian nor Freudian views of human motivation
are adequate to interpret the behavior of the victims and
perpetrators of thc Holocaust.
11ore specifically, when examining such "perpetrator" issues as
the evolution of the final-solution policy, the functioning of
the SS organization which carried it out, or the behavior of
individual SS commanders of death camps, there do not appear to
be any important problems that can be resolved in accord with
economic motives. If anything, the theory of motivation based
on dialectical materialism suggests that a policy of the magnitude,
ferocity, and counterproductivity of the final solution would
never be adopted by rational men and could never be implemented
effectively by irrational men.
On the other hand, alt:10ugh Freudian psychosexual theory suggests
that atrocious horrors may be committed by certain individuals
(working out bizarre psychodynamics via ego defensive acts of
aggression) and sometimes groups; namely, the Jim Jones cult
murders and mass suicides, it also suggests that such horrors
will be limited and relatively rare insofar as they depart from
normative social values. If anything, psychosexual analyses
of individual and group behavior processes implies that the
conduct of mass killing, torture, and brutalization of defenseless
men, women, and children as a matter oi' daily routine should be
a social-emotional impossibility. There were in fact some cases
of SS men, and many more among their victims, who did commit
suicide or allow themselves to die 'juickly rat;1er than go on
with life under such circumstances; had more of them done so,
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Freudian theory would have a stronger claim to fit the ev.ents.
In general, it may be acknowledged that such concepts as Marx's
notion of alienation and Freud's notion of compartmenta~ization,
projection, and other defense mechanisms can be usefully employed
to help explain how ordinary men ~ay adapt themselves to
extraordinary atrocities, but even in the hands of ti1e most adept
scholars, these concepts merely offer tentative grounds for
speculative discussions beyond the scope of their parent theories.
It is noteworthy, in this context, that Freudian theorists,
some of whom were themselves prisoners in death camps and
concentration camps, have done much more work on Holocaust problems
than lfarxian theorists. Almost without exception, these writers
(for example, Bettelheim, Cohen, Fromm, Frankel, Lifton, E. A.
Rappaport) try to show how the Holocaust experience requires basic
modifications of important Freudian assumptions, as well as
different forms of process interpretation. So far as SS behavior
is concerned, one of the major points of contention has been
the question or moral values: \lere the SS men with criminal
superegos as some theorists claimed? lvere they banal, self-seeking
mediocrities? Or were they instead, so very high in the qualities
called authoritarianism that their morality was superceded and
subordinated to their need for obedience to a charismatic leader?
Other questions concerning the behavior of both victims and
survivors of the camps have generated still more controversy,
particularly when they involve matters of apparent victim
passivity and reasons why some prisoners seemed better able to
survive than others. The fact that vast uncertainty and conflict
remains about such matters, even among the most credible and
articulate of Freudians who have bad nearly forty years to sort
out the evidence, is in itself very clear evidence that the
theory is inadequate to interpret the events.
This conclusion is also supported by A. E. Rappaport's little
knowa but very significant professional analysis of how Freudian
theory fails before the traumatic experiences of Holocaust
survivors.l5 As both a survivor and a psychoanalyst consulted
by other survivors, Rappapart brought unique credentials to bis
scrutiny of theory. His conclusions that (a) it was wrong to
apply the concept "traumatic neurosis" to the behavior problems
of survivors, and (b) that a traumatized ego--contrary to the
teaching of Freudian theory--could result from atrocious experiences
in the absence of any predisposing childhood conflict or trauma,
are developed in a way that gives a very practical and moving
sense of the difficulties created by the fact that Freudian theory
does not fit liolocaust trauma and, consequently, cannot offer
much help to its survivor clients.
SUMMARY A!ID PROSPECTUS
Our main arguments have been that: (1) The various modes of
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thought applied to the task of Holocaust interpretation have all
been inadequate because they do not acknowledge the extent to
which their epistemological assumptions, theoretical structures,
and methodologies have been conpromised or falsified by the fact
that the Holocaust happened. (2) The internal contradictions and
confusion between explanation and meaning characterizing the
eclectic empirieist and metaphysical approaches are evident.
(3) The Harxian and Freudian approaches to the Holocaust fail
for two reasons that have not been appreciated. As moral world
views, the two systems share with liberal empiricism the idea that
morality ~ay be conceptualized objectively and thus enable rational
evaluations to be nade of right and wrong. ßy shifting the
locus of morality to material and psychosexual circumstances,
however, the end result is only a new form of complex subjectivity
affering no assurances agairrst tendencies toward mass destruction.
Furthermore, insofar as the two s~rstems provide theories of
motivation, they both turn out to be largely irrelevant to the
problematic behaviors of Holocaust victims, perpetrators, and
survivors. In none of these groups, does one find significant
evidence suggesting that either material gain/loss or psyc:1osexual
gratification/frustration was anything more than a fringe motive
for the majority.
Based on the foregoing considerations, our general thesis is
that all or uost of the important failures of thought before the
Holocaust follow from a more basic and pervasive failure to
recognize that the Holocaust has altered the boundaries of human
possibilities: 3ecause of the Holocaust, we must recognize that
reality has been changed. It now includes as actual happenings
and plausible likelihoods, events that were heretofore simply
not thought of, or else thought of but dismissed as bizarre
fantasy. 3y relying upon philosophical assumptions, values,
theories, and methods rooted in pre-llolocaust visions of reality
and possibility, scholars have consistently and systematically
either missed or misconstrued important problematic aspects of the
Holocaust.
Hhat occurs at the level of psychosocial theory seems directly
expressive of Feyerabend's formal critique of science in general,
namely, that insofar as new evidence is obtained, it will be
assimilated into the preexisting expert consensus even if this
requires a radical deformation of the evidence in order to
maintain the credibility of the consensus. Feyerabend argues
further that whatever evidence cannot be fit into the preexisting
consensus will be ignored or devalued as subjectively biased,
mystical, or otherwise flawed.l6
It is noteworthy, moreover, that within their own specific
histories both !1arxian and Freudian thought contain very dramatic
instances of alternative viewpoints and critiques that were
directed at the same general points of theoretical significance
that we have identified in connection with the Holocaust. lhthin
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the 11arxian tradition, the views of theorists such as Sore!, who
emphasized the influence of myth over human behavior, and of
Bakunin, who argued for the reflexive independence of small
groups as against the intrinsically oppressive hierarchical
organization of masses, both exemplify a concern with themes that
were anathema to l~rx but now appear very cogent in relation
to the Holocaust and subsequent events of this century. (Revival
of interest in anarchist theory among contemporary intellectuals
is no accident.)
In the Freudian tradition, the major internal critiques came from
Jung and Reich. Jung's ideas about racial archetypes, especially
his Nietzchean ambivalence about the Germanie "blonde beast"
were dismissed by Freud as evidence of his latent anti-Semitism;
and Reich's work on the psychosexual basis of Nazism as a mass
movement was also rejected. ßoth of these renegade Freudians
were able to perceive some of .t he darker aspects of European
culture in ways that Freud's commitment to an outmoded scientific
rationality apparently prevented.
Mainly judged to be failures in their own time, these revision1st
currents within the Marxian and Freudian traditions have in . one
form or another made steady gains ever since the Holocaust.
~fuen taken tagether with other dissident currents of modern
thought, such as the critical theory of Adorno, llorkheimer,
and Marcuse, and the existentialism of Sartre and Heidegger,
there begins to be visible among the many overlaps and common
predispositions between them a loosely linked body of thought-full of contradictions, obscurities, and apparent dead ends, to
be sure, that is strikingly relevant to the Holocaust experience.
It is in these philosophical, psychosocial, and historical domains
of the cranky, quirky critics of all that is held dear by the
modern democratic or authoritarian industrial state, that the
latent forms for an adequate post-Holocaust social epistemology
may be perceived.
Without claiming any special priority or making any pretense
toward a fulfilled, programmatic vision, it is possible to
suggest at least three key premises for such an epistemology. If,
as we have tried to show, the facticity of the Holocaust defies
interpretation via the main streams of pre-Holocaust social thought,
it is because the events of the Holocaust reveal their central
conceptual structures to be either false or inadequate. First
among these conceptual structures is the Enlightenment ideal of
material and moral progress via science and technology. It is
now clear, however, that these enterprises are ruthlessly amoral
and that their potential for human progress, (liberation from
fear, want, and so forth) is matched or exceeded by their
potential for human destruction--w~ether in the form of weapons,
death camps, or disease~causing chemieals in the natural
environment. Consequently, science and technology are not to
be trusted; not to be taken at their face value, for they lead as
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easily to Auschwitz as to Disney Horld.
Furthermore, science and technology are not neutral
instrumentalities of human will, as is so often claimed by those
with the highest stakes in maintaining their present-day hegemony.
On the contrary, the record of the twentieth century in general
and the Holocaust in particular shmvs that the Promethean qualities
of instrumental power conferred by science/technology have
functioned in fact as irresistible seducers toward fundamentally
antihuman thought and antihuman social policies. It is a
familiar and credible argument, in this connection, that every
advance of science/technology has been accompanied by a further
decline in the ontological status of human beings from subjects
to objects.
A second and closely related conceptual structure supporting
pre-Holocaust epistemology is the Cartesian splitting of the
psyche leading to the normative view of rationality. The
Cartesian split is more and more generally recognized to be the
origin of the modern domination of abstract, analytical thought
over reflexive human feelings.
A post-Holocaust epistemology
cannot accept such a split. In fact, from the Standpoint of
the ilolocaust, it seems obvious that we must stand ·oescartes
on his head and declare: -I am, t:1.erefore I think, feel, and
so on.
The thrust of this proposition is not to eliminate any or all
forms of rationality, but to restore the balance between
abstraction and reflexivity. This requires alteration of the
subject-object relationship, both in terms of the presumed
differences between subjectivity and objectivity, on the one
hand, and on the other, of the now-conventional thought models
allowing subjects to be converted into objects.
Finally, a third and crucially important general premise of
post-Holocaust epistemology must be recognition that the chief
social instrument of human suffering in the twentieth century-epitomized in the !Iolocaust--has been the modern state. Whatever
else it may be or might have been, the bureaucratic, hierarchical,
rationalized structure of the modern industrial state is a social
invention that has evolved in this century into an historically
unparalleled engine of efficient human destruction. It is the
primary empirical means and co,nstitutes the technical-methodological
framework whereby the sundry forces within society can be coordinated to function against the immanent interests of sensate
humanity. As Jules !Ienry suggested in the title of his psychosocial analysis of American society, we may see "Culture Against
!!an" revealed not only in warfare, but also in the daily, prosiac
activities of the state. Furthermore, as we have argued elsewhere
in detail, the failures of law, religion, and science revealed
in the Holocaust are intimately associated with the fact that
these three pillars of llestern civilizatibn have all come under
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control of the modern state, beyi~d which there is no higher
authority today anymore than in Europe circa 1939-45.
It should be emphasized again, by way of conclusion, that once
interpretations of the Holocaust as a species of insane antiSemitism and/or historical aberration are rejected for the reasons
we have discussed, then it can only be perceived as on acute
manifestation of the modern transformation of European civilization.
Embodying many of the antihuman trends already glimpsed and
occasionally prophesized by some pre-llolocaust thinkers who
tried to warn against the terrible ontological consequences they
saw latent in the growing dominance, above all, of science/
technology, rationality, and the structure of the modern state,
the Holocaust forces deep critical reconsideration of the
epistemological underpinnings of the European Enlightenment.
In our view, the Holocaust is nothing less than a horrible
monument to the confusion and failure of the modes of thought
that have dominated twentiety-century \lestern civilization.
Hazism jioned tagether the mythic, aggressively destructive
elements of human culture with those of nationality, technology,
and bureaucratic social control. We see this symbolized today
when terrible new weapons systems are named after Greek or
Hindu Gods. Unself-conscious efforts to interpret the Holocaust
in accord with such modes of thought cannot succeed; if postIlolocaust epistemoloßy does not yet exist, then it is necessary
for us to begin to invent it. From this standpoint, Holocaust
interpretation can ortly be accepted as valid insofar as it
becomes the means of revealing the deep structural thought systems
that made it possible and then exploring routes toward their
alteration, guideu by ernerging new visions of the ideal of a
unitary and indivisible humanity.
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Epilogue
HARVEY C. GREISMAN

Because scientists look for continuities to explain things, and
because it is widely assumed that as time passes it is easier
to make dispassionate judgments about historical events, the job
of explaining the Holocaust becomes barder with each passing
year. Instead of clearing up, the contradictions just multiply
as the scholar must reconcile one of the most brutal mass
exterminations in human history with the artistic and scientific
achievements of the \lest's most literate nation. It is to the
credit of the editors of this volume and to its contributors,
that they do not attempt grandiose metahistorical theories.
The essays in this book treat discrete sections of the topic in
modest portians and are informative without being overly technical.
In the best spirit of social science research, these essays will
help to pull tagether the many pieces of the puzzle so that
someday one can come to understand why the years 1933-1945
happened the way they did.
Although explanation of the Holocaust: by some grand sweep of
llegelian logic would be Quixotic to say the least, the data-rich
articles in this book should be seen against a backdrop of
human behavior, needs, and drives. One of the salient background
elements of the Holocaust is tied to the question of its
uniqueness. \Jas this the first such event of its kind, and i f
it was not, what is it about the Holocaust that makes us cringe
forty years after the event?
Long before the Roman senate passed its farnaus resolution,
"Delende Est Carthago!" the desire of one people to totally
obliterate another was an estab1ished part of human behavior.
Subjugation and wholesale enslavement are closely related to
warfare throughout ancient history, and fossil evidence indicates
that the cruder ancestors of modern human beings behaved
similarly. Complete annihilation of a tribe or the inhabitants
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of a city or region also occupied many places in written history,
myth, and the grey world that lies between them. Motivated by
revenge or the more complex desire to ensure sameness and
uniformity, attempts to eradicate whole peoples crop up from
time to time. The Basques may represent the final remnant of
the most enormous holocaust of prehistory, while, on somewhat
less speculative ground, the Louisiana Acadians are all that
remain of a community transported two thousand miles southward
to remove the danger they posed as an eighteenth-century
"security risk."
The British engineered the diaspora of the Acadians, we well as
a slaughter of Scottish clans which, after the disaster at
Culloden, assumed genocidal proportions. Hhile considering the
long list of England's assaults on ethnic minorities, the potato
famines of the 1340s probably come as close to a holocaust as
the nineteenth-century imagination would permit. As history
moves away from the vendetta mentality of the localized
traditional world and into the cost-benefit sentiment of raison
d'etat, it takes on the characteristics of the industrial system.
The question as to whether papal authorities would have used
gas chambers and cremation mills to obliterate the Hussites,
Albigensians, and Taborites if they had them handy may be
intriguing, but it gets us nowhere. The point is that the
machinery and organization required for the kind of h0.locaust that
was leveled against the Jews in this century was simply unavailable
in the past. It is only with the European imperium over Africa
that one sees the first glinnner of the holocaust mentality
wedded to the industrial model. Joseph Conrad's stygian imagery
in Heart of Darkness really predicted more of the future than
Jules Verne or H. G. llells: The IIestern imagination grasped the
fact that the assembly line could be made to produce automobiles,
to dismember cattle, and to eliminate great numbers of human
beings.
ßecause of twentieth-century events, the term "holocaust" has
come to be applied strictly to the extermination of European Jews
during the Third Reich. In effect, the twentieth century has
witnessed any nurober of holocausts in which ethnic, religious,
or racial groups have been systematically annihilated by legitimate
government authorities. 11 \Jho remembers the Armenians?" was
Hitler's laconic answer when some moderate Nazis questioned the
wisdom of the final solution. Few then recalled the massacre
of three million Armenians by the Turks during llorld \lar I. Only
professional historians and others '"'ho keep track of such things
remernher them a t all.
r•ew research into German policy in occupied nations had yielded
some provocative material regarding the Nazi philosophy of human
extermination. It is now acknowledged that several million
ethnic Poles were killed by the Germans under the explicit command
from Berlin to depopulate Poland for German settlement. The mass
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murder of Ukranians has also been discovered. Although Poles
and Ukranians may have cooperated with the German occupiers in
seeking out and exterminating the Jews, it was in the end to no
avail since they, too, were considered racial inferiors and
allotted their own spot on the Nazi timetable of annihilation
or enslavement. Xenophobie hysteria was not uncommon during the
1940s, and the Allied nations were hardly immune to it.
The technological advances of the twentieth century, especially
in the areas of communication, inforn~tion retrieval, transport,
and management have provided an impressive list of holocausts.
What, then, makes the ordeal of the Jews in Europe so special?
The answer lies partially in the style with which the Germans,
"the most educated people in Europe," dispatched so many of their
own citizens. Stauding small children against a walland
shooting them forr no reason other than a flimsy accusation of
racial inferiority evokes a certain repulsion. But disposing
of them in !arge factories specifically designed for the purpese
is really a quantum leap in the science of death. The Holocaust
involved the active participation of the industrial, scientific,
and business communities. The efficiency of the whole undertaking
was calculated down to the last detail. Extracting gold fillings
from teeth, employing body fat for soap manufacture, and using
skin for lampshades are characteristic of the expertise associated
with cost-effective business enterprise. The rationalized
procedures and assembly-line methods that produced goods could
also be utilized to destroy human beings for the manufacture
of consumer goods.
Modern industry proved itself extraordinarily versatile during
the Third Reich, and one can only wonder to what lengths these
techniques would have been improved had the war not turned against
the Germans. Social research into bureaucracy and complex
organizations can give us some clues: It is entirely possible
that long after every Jew in Europe had been killed, the Holocaust
machinery would have continued to function. Pressure to keep it
going would have come from the industries that supplied the
equipment, from the railroads that shipped the "raw material" to
the camps, and from the functionaries who managed the administrative
apparatus. As for victims, there is every indication that the Slav
"race" would have been next and after them other candidates
could be nominated for subhuman status as the need presented
itself.
There are several ideological villains in the Holocaust drama,
but the essays in this volume amply demonstrate the prominent
role played by biological nationalism. From the curious melange
of opinion, fact, theory, and myth that constituted Victorian
science, the idea of a master race emerged as one of the most
powerful and compelling. Once the scientific community obliged
by "proving" that some races were inferior to others and that it
was perfectly reasonable to judge someone by his ancestors'
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"blood," the door was open to the most fantastic abuses
imaginable. Far from having been burnt up in the GBtterdHmmerung
of 1945, biological nationalism and the doctrine of a master
race are today enjoying something of a comeback.
Dobkowski and llallimann have done us a genuine service in
assembling this excellent collection. It is, sadly enough,
most timely, because t~e intellectual forces that justified the
Holocaust of the 1940s are as active today as they were then.
Indians in ßrazil, Paraguay, and Argentina may not be openly
brandedas "mongrel races," but t~ey are likely to be
exterminated just the same, and with an ideological justification
that bears a striking resemblance to that used Juring the Third
Reich . Although objecti ve conditions in today' s world seem to
cry out for a dissolution of national boundaries, pleas for
reason are drowned out by the celebration of tribal fantasies.
Threats of nuclear war, global famine, and energy scarcity seem
unimportant to petty dictators and world leaders alike, who
childishly beat the drum of nationalist ideology.
After the Hazi takeover in Germany, all art and literature
considered non-Aryan was destroyed. In Vienna, Freud learned
that his books had been burned. r:1e faunder of psychoanalysis
believed that this showed progress. He reasoned that in the Dark
Ages he, as well as his books, would have been burned. Freud
died in England before he could find out that his opinion was not
justified. !lad he remained, he, too, would have been consumed
by the Holocaust. Freud was not alone in his failure to imagine
just how far llestern "civilization" could regress. The tribal
fantasies of biological nationalism can create a world more akin
to that of the prima! horde than the Dark Ages. Group fantasies
about master races can only help to bring about the final
holocaust which, if nothing else, will be considerably less
sectarian than its predecessors.
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